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Abstract
In Kenya, like in many other countries around the world, private equity’s
emergence as a creative method for financing companies, is attracting
attention as the government seeks new ways of financing its private sector –
which it now recognises as the engine for Kenya’s economic development.
This policy outlook is undermined by the reality of a yet extensively under-
capitalised private sector, and the lack of a coherent body of knowledge and
experience on Kenyan private equity. This study, for the first time, brings
together that dispersed body of knowledge to facilitate coherent analysis of
the emerging legal and institutional issues that private equity introduces.
Using case law and statutory analysis, documentary reviews, interviews and
surveys to construct the complete picture of Kenyan private equity, this
empirical legal inquiry finds that the law on private equity in Kenya is
incomplete: it is patchy and dispersed, and is not uniformly applied among
and across all private equity market intermediaries. Secondly, the institutions
charged with supervising the implementation of the law are under-
capacitated, with the result that regulatory supervision within the private
equity industry remains weak and largely unfelt. Thirdly, the legal
institutions supporting private equity practice in Kenya (security of property
rights, security of financial contracts and integrity in financial reporting) are
in a nascent state of development. Fourthly, there is no clear policy on
alternative investments generally, and private equity particularly, in Kenya,
undermining precision in regulatory objectives. These realities combine to
blunt the impact of private equity in driving creative entrepreneurship. These
realities support the need for structured national capacity enhancement
across all spheres of private equity practice, such as would strengthen
regulatory supervision, the emergence of a ‘home brand’ to private equity,
the increased visibility of structured government engagement in channelling
private equity into economically productive sectors linked to the nation’s
development strategy. These findings mirror earlier research investigating
the under-performance of private equity in emerging markets, with the
upshot that a Law and Institutional Growth Model for Private Equity in
Kenya is the necessary catalyst that will trigger the rapid expansion of the
Kenyan private equity industry in aid of national development.
xviii
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SETTING OUT THE PROBLEM AND SCOPE OF STUDY
1.1 Introduction
Private equity - a financial and investment intermediary between holders and
providers of capital on the one hand, and specific types of private companies, on the other1 -
can be catalytic in transforming the way in which a country’s most productive economic
sectors develop.2 This is particularly true in a developing country context like Kenya, a sub-
Saharan African country whose private sector is still under-capitalised and under-developed.3
Development research indicates that the private sector is the main driver of economic
growth, 4 a position adopted in development literature 5 as well as in Kenya’s ambitious
economic development plans which seek to transform Kenya into a middle-income economy
by the year 2030.6 Yet to be an effective partner in development, the private sector needs to
be adequately and appropriately capitalised.
1 Douglas J. Cumming and Sofia A. Johan, Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International
Perspective (Elsevier, USA, 2009) 3, 4
2 Richard Kitchen, ‘Venture Capital: Is It Appropriate for Developing Countries?’ In Business Finance in Less
Developed Capital Markets (1992) Klaus Fischer and George Papaioannou (eds), Hofstra University– private
equity is (a) a type of investor, (b) a financial contracting strategy through which equity capital is made
available to private companies, and (c) an investment management service.
3 Mukhisa Kituyi, Improving the Investment Climate and Participation of the Private Sector in the Economy
(Ministry of Trade and Industry, Policy Briefing Paper, Nairobi, 11-12 April 2005) 2,3
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKENYA/Resources/improveing_ic_Kituyi.pdf> accessed 29 December
2011; also: IMF Financial Access Survey (2009) <http://fas.imf.org/> - accessed 5 February 2012 – key
indicators are that out of 1000 adults, less than 74 have access to a bank loan, and less than 370 own a savings
account. There are 2 bank branches in every 1000 square kilometres (or 7 ATMs to every 100,000 adults), and
lending to private sector stood at 32.6% of GDP, while deposits were 46% of GDP.
4 Yochanan Shachmurove, ‘An Introduction to the Special Issues on Financial Markets of the Middle East’
(2004) 9(3) International Journal of Business 213
5 DfID, ‘The Engine of Development: The Private Sector and Prosperity for Poor People’ (DfID, 2011)
<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/Private-sector-approach-paper-May2011.pdf> accessed 5
October 2011. Also: Asian Development Bank, ‘Overview’ (ADB, 2011) <http://beta.adb.org/themes/private-
sector-development> accessed 20 October 2011 – ‘private sector has been, remains and will be the engine of
growth’.
6 Government of Kenya, ‘Vision 2030’ <http://www.vision2030.go.ke/index.php/front/vision> accessed August
2007.
2There is extensive evidence from multilateral development institutions that financial
infrastructure in emerging markets remain under-developed. 7 ‘Financial infrastructure’
includes all the institutions, technologies, standards and rules that support financial mediation
in a country.8 Bossone, Mahajan and Zahir find that weak financial infrastructure tends to
drive selection bias, that is, providers of enterprise capital tending to withhold financing from
borrowers deemed to carry too much risk.9 Rajan and Zingales had earlier lead evidence
suggesting that efficient financial infrastructure improved quality and quantity of business
finance.10 A World Bank and IFC study in 2010 suggested that laws and regulations support
the efficient operation of a country’s financial infrastructure and financial system, thereby
indirectly the direction in which a country’s private sector develops. 11
This study argues that private equity can be a useful partner in expanding sources and
types of business finance, enabling private companies to more efficiently access the types of
enterprise capital in the right amounts.
Why is private equity uniquely well-suited to resolve these challenges?
7 Margaret Miller, Nataliya Mylenko and Shalini Sankaranayanan, ‘Financial Infrastructure – Building Access
Through Transparent and Stable Financial Systems’ (2009) International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and International Finance Corporation,
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/0,,contentMDK:22298
550~menuPK:6434193~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:282885,00.html> accessed 23 January
2012 – “access to finance is the result of a complex interplay of different financial intermediaries, the right kind
of financial infrastructure, and a sound legal and regulatory framework”, 1
8 Penelope J Brook, ‘Foreword’ in Margaret Miller, Nataliya Mylenko and Shalini Sankaranayanan, ‘Financial
Infrastructure – Building Access Through Transparent and Stable Financial Systems’ (2009) International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development and International Finance Corporation,
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/0,,contentMDK:22298
550~menuPK:6434193~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:282885,00.html> accessed 23 January 2012
-‘Institutions’ in this context include payment remittance and securities settlement systems, collateral registries
and credit reference bureaux.
9 Biagio Bossone, Sandeep Mahajan and Farah Zahir, ‘Financial Infrastructure, Group Interests and Capital
Accumulation: Theory Evidence and Policy’ (2003) IMF Working Paper 03/24
10 Rajan Raghuram and Luigi Zingales, ‘Financial Dependence and Economic Growth’ (1998) 88 (3) American
Economic Review 559-86
11 Miller, et al., ‘Financial Infrastructure’ (2009) (n 7), 1 “access to finance is the result of a complex interplay
of different financial intermediaries, the right kind of financial infrastructure, and a sound legal and regulatory
framework”
3Industry studies12 on the one hand, and development literature,13 on the other, have
urged the argument firstly that private equity drives economic development because it
promotes innovation. European studies, however, suggest a less optimistic impact, finding
mixed results in Italy14 and UK.15 The general weight of opinion nonetheless suggests a
positive relationship between the introduction of private equity into a company and its rapid
growth.16 The argument is that this type of finance improves corporate performance by
increasing productivity17 and disciplining management efficiency.18 These studies ascribe
these outcomes to the private equity contracting model, which introduces close monitoring of
management action – and the overall impact, it is argued, is stronger business entities in the
economy.
Private equity, unlike collateral-based business credit, does not operate on a lending
basis – it becomes a shareholder in a business, strengthening balance sheets, providing
financing for a company’s most risky ventures, and enabling a company to unlock matching
traditional credit where needed, aiding promising new businesses to blossom. Research
12 Samuel Kortum and Josh Lerner, ‘Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation’ (2002) 31(4)
RAND Journal of Economics 674-692
13 Josh Lerner, Morten Sorensen and Per Stromberg, ‘Private Equity and Long-Run Investment: The Case for
Innovation’, The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report (2008) World Economic Forum, January
2008.
14 Stefano Caselli, Francesco Corielli, Stefano Gatti and Francesca Querci, ‘Corporate Governance and
Independent Directors, Much Ado About Nothing? The Evidence Behind Private Equity Investment
Performance’ (2008) CAREFIN-Universita Bocconi (unpublished); cf: Francesco Perrini, Ginevra Rossi, and
Barbara Rovetta, ‘Does Ownership Structure Affect Performance? Evidence from the Italian Market’ (2008) 16
(4) Corporate Governance: An Intenational Review 312-325 - explores the cause-effect relationship between
private equity and innovation; inconclusive whether innovation follows private equity, or vice versa.
15 Robert Cressy, Federico Munari, Alessandro Malipiero, ‘Creative Destruction? Evidence that Buyouts Shed
Jobs to Raise Returns’ (2011) 13(1) Venture Capital: Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 1-22
16 Johan Per Stromberg, ‘Private Equity, Industry Performance and Cyclicality’ (2010) The Global Economic
Impact of Private Equity Report, World Economic Forum, 19 part 2
17 Kevin Ames, ‘Management Buyouts and Firm-Level Productivity: evidence from a panel of UK
manufacturing firms’ (2002) 49(3) Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 304-317 – studies 78 UK buyouts
between 1986-1997; Richard Harris, Donald Siegel and Mike Wright, ‘Assessing the Impact of Management
Buyouts on Economic Efficiency: Plant-Level Evidence from the UK’ (2005) unpublished working paper –
studying 979 UK buyouts between 1994-1998.
18 Oliver Hart and John Moore, ‘Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining
Management’ (1995) (85) 3The American Economic Review 567-585; Cf: Matthias Dewatripont and Jean
Tirole, ‘A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence’ (1994) 19
(4) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1027-1054
4suggests that private equity is effective in introducing new technologies and new ideas into
the marketplace and dispersing them across an economy.19 Such investments, it is said,
encourage and spur innovation,20 generate good returns to investors thereby aiding in the
mobilisation of capital, 21 encourage robust corporate growth and expansion. 22 It is also
argued that it improves corporate governance23 and promotes research and development as
lucrative commercial undertakings.24
With all this promise, private equity does warrant serious academic investigation, a
pursuit that would model options for its growth within a developing country context. This is
all the more pertinent given its origins in North America and Western Europe, countries with
highly developed legal systems and institutions, compared to the relative under-development
of legal systems in developing countries. 25
This chapter does five things. Firstly, it sets out, in section 1.2, the main research
question underpinning this thesis and motivates it through a reflection on how various
governments around the world have employed legal instruments in public policy targeted at
private equity, and an exploration of private equity as a problem in law. Section 1.2 ends with
a statement of supporting questions that help in focusing the scope of the study. Secondly, In
19 Richard Kitchen, Venture Capital in Developing Countries (n 2) 1
20 Marcos A. Mollica and Luigi Zingales, ‘The Impact of Venture Capital on Innovation and the Creation of
New Business’ (2007) Working Paper Chicago University; cf: Josh Lerner, Morten Sorensen and Johan Per
Stromberg, ‘Private Equity and Long-Run Investment: The Case for Innovation’ (2008) The Global Economic
Impact of Private Equity, World Economic Forum Alternative Investment Working Paper Series
<http://www.weforum.org/> accessed January 2011.
21 European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, ‘Survey of the Economic and Social Impact of
Venture Capital in Europe’ (2002) <http://www.evca.eu/UploadedFiles/surv_econ_soc_impact_vc.pdf>
accessed 20 October 2011
22 Shai Bernstein, Josh Lerner, Morten Sorensen and Johan per Stromberg, ‘Private Equity, Industry
Performance and Cyclicality’ (2010) The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report, World Economic
Forum, 19 <http://www.weforum.org/> accessed January 2011
23 George P Baker and Karen H Wruck, ‘Organisational Changes and Value Creation in Leveraged Buyouts:
The Case of OM Scott & Sons Company’ (1989) 25 Journal of Financial Economics 163, 190
24 European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, Special Paper on Technology Success Stories
(2002) <http://www.evca.eu/uploadedFiles/eur_tech_success_stories.pdf> accessed 4 June 2011 - research and
development is especially important to growing economies that need innovative solutions to long-standing
economic challenges.
25 ch 3, 65, for a succinct history of private equity.
5section 1.3, a number of justifications are offered why a study of private equity is important
to a developing economy like Kenya. Thirdly, in section 1.4, the study is delimited through
ascribing meaning and context to the two central themes of the inquiry, that is to say, ‘laws’
and ‘institutions’. This section also sets out the claims to originality, and justifies the choice
of Kenya as a case study in this investigation. Fourthly, in section 1.5, some of the key
concepts underpinning the study are defined, notably the richly nuanced and contextual
meaning of the term private equity, and the meaning of emerging markets. Lastly, in section
1.6, the chapter concludes with an outline of the way in which the remainder of the thesis has
been organised.
1.2 The Questions
1.2.1 Main Question
The general reflections in the preceding section suggest the existence of a dependency
between the state of a country’s economic , financial and private sector development. If
private equity offers a viable part solution to the unlocking of a nation’s private sector
potential in driving economic growth, a fundamental policy question becomes how can a
country grow private equity? In other words, what factors must a country secure for a robust
and economically significant private equity industry to grow – that is deepen its financial
infrastructure and its financial system?26 What would those factors mean for a country’s law
and institutional development process?
26 Miller et al., ‘Financial Infrastructure’ (2009) ( n 7) 1
6Opinion is generally united among private equity practitioners, 27 investors 28 and
academics29 that the following four broad country characteristics influence the emergence of
private equity markets:
(i) economic growth rate and size of the economy;
(ii) size of stock markets and or depth of debt markets;
(iii) levels of entrepreneurship; and
(iv) quality of the legal system and regulatory practices.
The first three determinants are macro-economic in character, while the fourth is
socio-legal in nature. There is much less agreement, unfortunately, on which, if any, of the
four factors wields the greater influence – the deterministic effect, so to say – in catalysing a
sure start to the industry’s emergence and robust growth. This mix of factors, it is clear,
transcend any single academic discipline, but the fourth set of factors (legal system and
regulatory practices) to varying degrees appear to influence the manner in which the first
three conditions develop. In light of the foregoing, this study asks the following main
question -
Are laws and legal institutions really relevant to the growth of private equity
in an emerging market like Kenya? If so, what are the key emerging legal
and institutional issues?
This thesis argues that in an emerging market context, the law, and its legal
institutions, are likely to be more influential than macro-economic factors in nurturing
fortuitous environments for a robust private equity industry to emerge and expand. In
27Heino Meerkatt and Heinrich Liechtenstein, ‘New Markets, New Rules: will emerging markets reshape
private equity?’ (IFC, November 2010)
<www.ifc.org/...Markets.../BCG+New+Markets+New+Rules+Nov+10.pdf> accessed 11 October 2011.
28 International Finance Corporation, ‘The Case for Emerging Markets Private Equity’ (IFC, February 2011)
<www.ifc.org/.../EM_PE_Sharing_IFCs_Experience_v9_February2011.pdf> accessed 16 October 2011
29 Marina Balboa and Jose Marti, ‘Conceptual Model for Private Equity Markets: Proposal and Empirical Test
on Fundraising’ (EFMA London Meetings 2002) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=313934>
accessed 16 November 2011.
7adopting this proposition, this study views the first three elements as the ‘external factors’
that create the economic opportunity, while the fourth element is viewed as the ‘internal
factor’ that qualitatively unlocks both demand and supply of private equity through creating
crucial platforms for efficient financial contracting. In effect, the law is viewed as an
‘enabler’, hence the question what can a country do to enable the emergence of conditions
that support the growth of private equity.30
As chapter 5 discusses in detail, 31 Kenya has a nascent private equity industry,
suggesting it is still a new form of financial contracting and intermediation in Kenya. The
second part of the main question, hence, seeks to explore the legal and institutional issues that
private equity raises and how the practice of private equity is anchored in the law. To what
extent are the issues raised by private equity efficiently resolved within the Kenyan legal and
institutional system? These are the central themes holding this investigation together.
This study thus unpicks the fourth element from among the four broad country
characteristics for private equity set out above – from the perspective of its likely
disproportionate influence on how the other three factors develop.32 A discernible theme
arising from the literature, as far as emerging markets private equity is concerned, is the
notion that socio-economic environments, with particular emphasis on legal and regulatory
conditions, are especially crucial to private investment. This line of thinking argues that “the
most attractive markets for investors are determined (…) by the relative sophistication of (…)
their regulatory and legal systems.”33
Without prejudice to the thesis statement set out above, the macro-economic factors
(economic growth rate, size of the stock market, depth of local debt markets, levels of
entrepreneurship and infrastructure), which are styled ‘the external factors’ in this chapter,
30 Miller et al., ‘Financial Infrastructure’ (2009) (n 7) 1 – laws and regulations support financial infrastructure
components to perform optimally
31 ch5, 158
32 Miller et al., ‘Financial Infrastructure,’ (2009) (n 7), 1-2
33 Meerkatt and Liechtenstein 2010 ( n 27) 1
8are not unimportant in the wider scheme of private equity growth.34 The argument in this
thesis, however, is that for these external factors to be highly effective, a supporting legal and
regulatory framework is necessary.35
Evidence by Armour and Cumming36 that stock markets do play a role in the growth
of private equity, also places heavier weight on the impact of laws that support
entrepreneurship, tolerates business failure, and protects shareholders, in addition to
supporting a low-tax environment. These, they find, play a potentially larger role in
determining whether private equity markets deepen in an economy. Their finding on taxation
resonates with earlier work by Porteba,37 while their findings on the legal determinants
(including pension fund regulations and tax policy) extend similar findings by Jeng and
Wells.38
These notions have certainly found currency in public policy, as the next section
illustrates. Studies by the private equity industry itself lend support to the core argument in
this study: the Latin America Venture Capital Association,39 the British Venture Capital
Association (BVCA),40 as well as the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA)41 all
agree on the importance of law and legal institutions in culturing conducive environments for
private equity to emerge and grow.
34 Maria Ahmed, ‘Strong Prospects for African Private Equity’ (Emerging Markets, 24 April 2006)
<http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/1039301/Strong-prospects-for-Africa-private-equity.html> accessed
16 October 2011
35 Wei Xiao, ‘The New Economy and Venture Capital in China’ OYCF (2002) 3 (6) Perspectives
36 John Armour and Douglas Cumming, ‘The Legislative Road to Silicon Valley’ (2006) 58 Oxford Economic
596-635
37 James M. Porteba, ‘Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxation’ in LH Summers (ed), Tax Policy and the
Economy, (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1989) ch 347-67
38 L.A. Jeng and P.C. Wells,’ Determinants of Venture Capital Fundraising: Evidence Across Countries’ (2002)
6 Journal of Corporate Finance 241-89
39 Jenna Gottlieb, ‘Evolving Regulation’ (LAVCA, 8 March 2011) <http://lavca.org/2011/03/08/evolving-
regulation/> accessed 23 January 2012
40 British Venture Capital Association, ‘A Guide to Private Equity’ (2010)
<http://admin.bvca.co.uk//library/documents/Guide_to_PE_2010.pdf> accessed 23 January 2012
41 EVCA Benchmarking Tax and Legal Environments (2008)
<http://www.evca.eu/publicandregulatoryaffairs/default.aspx?id=2414#2008> accessed 23 January 2012
91.2.2 Legal Instruments in Public Policy for Private Equity
Governments across North America and Western Europe, as well as others around the
world (see table 1, below), have adopted varied public policy measures targeted at crafting
more conducive national environments for private equity. A strong tenet of these public
policy responses has been the employment of legal instruments.
The first column in the table shows the year when governmental responses to private
equity was undertaken. The second column shows the country implementing the measure,
and in the third column, the policy measure is depicted. Column four summarises the impact
each policy measure helped deliver.
Table 1 Cross-Country Evidence of Policy Interventions in Private Equity/Venture Capital
Year Country Policy Intervention Impact
1958 USA Small Business Investment Companies Act42 Larger fund pools, PE/VC
Professionalization
1974 USA Employee Retirement Investment Scheme Act43 Chocked off pension
Investments in PE/VC
1978 USA “Prudent Man” ERISA clarification44 Triggered rapid investments in
PE/VC
1980 USA Small Business Innovation Research Programme45 Channelled billions into
PE/VC
1992 Israel Yozma Programme – USD100m Govt VCF46 Rapid co-investing by private
Sector
2000 UK Numerous specialist government funds47 Targeted small firms
42 U.S. Small Business Administration, ‘Small Business Investment Act of 1958’ <http://www.sba.gov/about-
sba-info/13754> accessed 24 October 2011
43 ERISA, Pub. L. 93-406 - USCS s1002 of 2 September 1974
44 Title 29-18 1B-4 USCS s1104 – ‘Fiduciary Duties’, s1104(a)(1) ‘The Prudent Man Standard of Care’.
45 Joshua Gans, and Stern Scott, ‘When does funding Research from Smaller Firms Bring Fruit? Evidence from
the SBIR Programme’ (2003) 12 (4) Economics of Innovation and New Technology 361-384
46 Gil Avimelech and Morris Teubal, ‘Israel’s Venture Capital Industry: Emergence, Operation and Impact’ in
David Citendamar (ed.), The Growth of Venture Capital: A Cross-Cultural Analysis (Westport Praeger 2002)
47 British Venture Capital Association, ‘A Guide to Private Equity’ (2010)
<http://admin.bvca.co.uk//library/documents/Guide_to_PE_2010.pdf> 8-13
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2001 Denmark Danish Growth venture Fund48 Market Stimulated
2001 EC European Investment Fund49 Euros 2 billion fresh capital
2003 France Plan Innovation50 Targeted at innovative firms;
2006 Netherlands Regulatory Harmonisation51 More investments into PE/VC
2002 Singapore52 Tax Incentives (Silicon Valley Model) Rapid growth of local PE
2002 Taiwan53 Tax Incentives/Business Regulation Explosive growth in VC
2003 India54 Venture Capital Regulations / Capital Markets Rise of Technology Valley
2003 China55 Changes to PE Laws – 2003; 2006; 2007 Increased fundraising for China
2003 Japan56
1998 Brazil Various regulatory improvements since 200357 Brazil more attractive to global
Private equity firms
The role and influence of public policy in the emergence and growth of markets for
risk finance is thus well documented. It is telling that a substantial number of the foregoing
public policy responses employed legal instruments, and were targeted at shoring up the
supply, or quantity, of private equity/venture capital in an economy.
48 Vækstfonden’s (Danish Growth Fund), ‘The Best Market for Innovation Finance in Europe’ (2001)
<http://www.vf.dk/OmVaekstfonden/Vision.aspx> accessed 25 October 2011
49 Europa, ‘European Investment Fund’ (1994) < http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-
bodies/eif/index_en.htm> accessed 8 December 2007
50 Marco Da Rin, Giovanna Nicodano and Alessandro Sembenelli, ‘Public policy and the creation of active
venture capital markets’ (2006) 90 (8-9) Journal of Public Economics 1699-1723
51 Douglas Cumming and Sofia Johan, ‘Regulatory Harmonization and the Development of Private Equity
Markets’ (2007) 31 Journal of Banking and Finance 3218-3250 – see chapter 3, section 3.2.2c for detailed
discussion.
52 Winston T.H. Koh and Francis Koh, ‘Venture Capital and Economic Growth: An Industry Overview and
Singapore’s Experience’ (2002) Singapore Management University, school of Economics and Social Sciences
Workong Paper 21 /2002
53 L Songtao, ‘The Stage and the Character of Venture Capital Development in Taiwan, Asia and Pacific
Economies’ (2000)
54 Mike Wright, Andy Lockett and Serika Pruthi, ‘Internationalization of Western Venture Capitalists into
Emerging Markets: Risk Assessment and Information in India’ (2002) 19 (1) Journal of Small Business
Economics 1 – 62 Springer Netherlands
55 Lutz-Christian Wolff, Mergers and Acquisitions in China: Law and Practice 2008 (2nd edn, CCH Hong Kong
Limited 2008), ch 5, 6, 7, 8 and 15 - These include the Regulations on the Administration of Foreign-Invested
Venture Capital Enterprises, 2003 (which sets out express prohibitions on the types of investment activities
foreign-invested enterprises cannot undertake), the Interim Measures for the Administration of Venture Capital
Funds, 2006, which apply to non-foreign invested venture capital undertakings, and revisions to the Chinese
partnership law in 2007, which had revisions impacting foreign-invested partnerships. Chinese law distinguishes
between onshore and offshore funds, and subjects offshore funds and special purpose investment vehicles to
specific restrictions.
56 Masaki Kuroki, Mark P. Rice and Pier A Abetti, ‘Emerging Trends in the Japanese venture Capital Industry’
(2000) Journal of Private Equity 39 -49
57 Generally,[Editor], Latin America Venture Capital Association, ‘Evolving Regulation’ (8 March 2011),
<http://lavca.org/2011/03/08/evolving-regulation/> accessed 23 January 2012
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Korosteleva et al58 suggest that regulation is an important catalyst of start-up capital
into the economy, but find that ‘over-regulation’ has a stifling effect. However, ‘over-
regulation’ within that study is not precisely defined, and it is doubtful whether the term
means the same thing in different economic contexts, casting some doubt over the ‘stifling
effect’ argument. From a public policy perspective, nonetheless, the effectiveness of a
country’s financial system’s regulatory model would seem to have a strong impact on how
financial markets develop.
Bose, Panini and Chitralekha find that while there is broad consensus that enforcing
property rights accounts for the emergence of financial markets, causation could run in the
opposite direction as well: so that financial development can trigger or catalyse property
rights reforms.59 Other factors include, on the one hand, taxation policies and how the capital
gains system is organised,60 and, on the other, the assurance of an exit framework from
investments. 61 These issues have been categorised by other commentators among the
qualitative elements of public policy.62
The main line of inquiry in this work is motivated by the notion that at the heart of the
private equity investment decision in emerging markets lie perhaps two fundamental worries:
firstly, the extent to which property rights in financial investments are secure, and secondly,
58 Julia Korosteleva, and Tomasz Mickiewicz, ‘Property Rights, Supply of Formal Informed Finance and
Business Start-up Financing’ (2008)
<http://www.hse.ru/data/445/633/1233/Mickiewicz%20&%20Korosteleva_Start-up%20Finance_EACES.pdf>
accessed 25 October 2011
59 Niloy Bose, Antu Panini Murshid, Chitralekha Rath, ‘Finance and Property Rights: Exploring Other
Directions’ <www.isid.ac.in/~pu/conference/dec_10_conf/.../NiloyBose.pdf> accessed 25 October 2011
60 James Porteba, ‘Capital Gains Tax Policy Toward Entrepreneurship’ (1989) 42 (3) National Tax Journal 375,
90; Christian Keuschnigg and Soren Bo Nielsen, ‘Public Policy for Venture Capital’ (2001) 8 (4) International
Tax and Public Finance 557, 72; Christian Keuschnigg and Soren Bo Nielsen, ‘Start Ups, Venture Capitalists
and Capital Gains Tax’ (2004) 88 (5) Journal of Public Economics 1011,1042
61 Claudio Michelacci and Javier Suarez, ‘Business Creation and the Stock Market’ (2004) 71(2) Review of
Economic Studies 459, 81
62 Colin Mason, ‘Public Policy Support for the Informal Venture Capital Market in Europe: a critical review’
Working Paper 08-07/2008
<http://www.strath.ac.uk/media/departments/huntercentre/research/workingpapers/Public_Policy_Support_For_
Informal_Venture_Capital_Market_in_Europe_A_Critical_Review.pdf> Accessed 25 October 2011
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the extent to which acceptable investment returns can be earned, from such markets. Both
worries have been mainstreamed by a literature strand backing a role for law and legal
institutions in financial market development,63 and secondly, links contract and divestment
efficiency to earnings or realized returns.64
The main question is also motivated by the experience of private equity in emerging
markets. 65 Once an exotic and limited investment and financial contracting activity, it has
rapidly globalised,66 having first appeared in North America and Western Europe, where it is
also highly sophisticated and well developed.67 According to Preqin,68 the industry raised
over USD1.8 trillion69 globally between 2006 and 2008 – the highest in history, and a period
that came to be known as the ‘golden age of private equity’.70 During the same period, the
number of private equity fund managers doubled – from 918 fund managers in January 2007
to 1,673 in March 2009.71
Statistics collated by the Emerging Markets Private Equity Association (‘EMPEA’)
on fundraising, the number of active funds and fund managers, and the geographic spread of
63 For example, Hernando De Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails
Everywhere Else (Black Swan, Bantam Press, Great Britain, 2000).
64 Douglas Cumming and Grant Flemming, ‘A Law and Finance Analysis of Venture Capital Exits in Emerging
Markets’ (2003) Australian National University Working Paper Series in Finance.
65 Emerging Markets Private Equity Association < http://www.empea.net/.> Accessed 16 September, 2010 –
these markets, for private equity, are Latin America, India, China & Asia, Eastern Europe, Middle East and
North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa - South, East, Central and West Africa
66Mike Wright, Sarika Pruthi and Andy Lockett, International Venture Capital Research: From Cross-Country
Comparisons to Crossing Borders (2005), Nottingham University Business School Centre for Management Buy-
Out. See also: W. Megginson, Toward A Global Model of Venture Capital? The University of Oklahoma
( 2002) 2, 5, 23-28 < http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/M/William.L.Megginson-1> accessed 2 April 2008.
67 Steven M Davidoff, ‘The Failure of Private Equity’ (2009) 82(3) Southern California Law Review 481-546 -
for history of private equity, go to chapter 3, 65.
68 Preqin, ‘Global Quarterly Private Equity Fundraising 2004-2009’ (USA, 1 July 2009) 1
<www.preqin.com/.../Q2%202009%20Private%20Equity%20Fundraising%20Up%2.>accessed 15
September 2010
69 ibid
70 Richman Lou and Elaine Cummings, ‘Global Private Equity Report’ (Bain & Company Inc. , 2010) 2
< http://www.tricappartners.com/images/Bain_-_Global_PE_Report_2011.pdf.> accessed 30 September, 2010
71 ibid.
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private equity, indicate phenomenal growth in emerging market private equity activity.72
Indeed, by 2008, the OECD observed that ‘private equity is the African investment story to
watch’.73 Private equity has thus become a global phenomenon.
It is unsurprising, hence, that Kenya has in the last decade witnessed an increasing
number of private equity companies setting up office in the country.74 The quality of financial
transparency – ultimately a question of business and securities regulation – is already
recognised as one of the areas relevant to private equity that calls for development to promote
access to enterprise finance.75 Other barriers stem from firm characteristics such as family
ownership of business, especially the impact of relinquishing control of family businesses.76
Amidst this fast-changing space, Kenyan investment managers are setting up funds of their
own, riding on their stellar investment records.77
Private equity’s arrival on the world stage has not induced similar economic impact
across countries, however, with industry statistics demonstrating its early underperformance
in emerging markets. 78 Research continues to vex the question why it has not always
‘transplanted’ successfully in emerging markets.79 The general question that arises is whether
72 EMPEA, ‘Emerging Market Private Equity Industry Statistics: Fundraising and Investment’ (Q4 2009) <
http://www.empea.net/> accessed 6 April 2010
73 Thomas Dickson, OECD, Policy Insight No.60, Private Equity: An Eye for Investment under African Skies?
(OECD African Economic Outlook, 2008) < http://www.oecd.org/dev/insights > accessed 6 April 2009
74 Wanjiru Waithaka, ‘Kenya Becomes a Magnet for Private Equity’ (BiD Network, 7 March 2008)
<http://www.bidnetwork.org/page/84199/en> accessed 5 April 2008. See chapter 5 for a full discussion of the
Kenyan private equity industry.
75 George Omondi, ‘Lack of Disclosure Blocking SMEs from Funds’ (All Africa, 22 April 2010)
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201004210993.html> accessed 22 April 2010.
76 George Omondi, ‘Small Firms Shy Away from Private Equity Lenders’ (All Africa, 4 May 2010)
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201005040973.html> accessed 4 May 2010.
77 Emanuel Were, ‘Kenya’s New Capitalists Go Big on Private Equity’ (Business Daily, 5 June 2009)
<http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/-/539552/606824/-/item/0/-/cs7v4d/-/index.html> accessed 5 June 2009.
78 Emerging Markets Private Equity Association, ‘Emerging Markets Private Equity Fundraising and Investment
Review 2008’ (2009) 22
<http://www.empea.net/EMPEA_Fundraising_Investment_Report_2008_nonmember[1].pdf.> Accessed 27 July
2010
79 Josh Lerner and Antoinette Schoar, ‘Private equity in the developing world: the determinants of transaction
structures’ (2003) Harvard Business School/Massachusetts Institute of Technology Working paper, cf: Douglas
Cumming and Grant Fleming, ‘The impact of legality on private equity markets: evidence from the Asia-Pacific
(2004), EFMA Conference, Glasgow, unpublished)
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the experience of emerging markets private equity is a case of an investment model that has
proven unsuitable to emerging market conditions, or of incomplete market institutions in such
markets that cannot effectively support the asset class, or primarily a problem in law – legal
frameworks with structures that cannot support the needs of the specialised financial
contracts that underwrite private equity?80 These issues underpin the main themes of this
study.
1.2.3 Private Equity: A Problem in Law
To amplify the preceding issues, it is observed that in practice, private equity occurs as a
set or series of financial contracts that define ‘the private equity cycle’.81 The ‘cycle’ has
three main phases of occurrence –
(i) the fundraising phase when investors make funds available for private equity
ventures;
(ii) the investment stage when specialist fund managers identify, select and invest in
private companies;82 and
(iii) the divestment stage when fund managers unlock the value in their investments
through a range of liquidation strategies.83
Each stage is underwritten by a specific type of financial contract, hence there are three
main sets of contracts: contracts governing the relationship between capital holders and fund
managers, contracts between fund managers and investee (venture) companies, and contracts
80 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, ‘Economic Development, Legality and the
Transplant Effect’ (2003) 47 European Economic Review 165-95
81 Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2004) ch
2 (An Overview of Venture Capital Fundraising) 23; ch 3 (What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?) 33
82 ibid 157
83 ibid 345 ch 3 s 3.3 for an exposition of the nature of private equity.
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between fund managers and third-party acquirers of fund manager-held securities at the time
of divestment. At the level of the venture company (stage II of the cycle, above), three
specific sale and purchase agreements underpin the private equity ‘event’.84 They are –
(i) a share acquisition transaction;
(ii) an equity finance transaction; and
(iii) a debt finance transaction.
The research question asks in effect: at each of the key stages of the private equity
cycle, what role do (or can) laws and legal institutions play in expanding fundraising, or
driving demand for private equity, or creating efficient conditions for the conclusion and
execution of financial contracts?85
At first glance – and as economists readily argue - the very design and nature of
private equity as a monitoring-based financial contracting strategy would seem to discount a
central role for the law and by extension its legal institutions in the emergence and expansion
of the industry.86 This argument rides on the much-flaunted ability of private equity to
effectively assess investment risks through thorough pre-investment screening processes,
overcome informational asymmetries, and align ownership and management interests thereby
ruling out or sufficiently internalising agency risks through negotiated compensation
structures embedded in the investment agreement.87 It is upon this basis that arguments have
been advanced that macroeconomic factors that drive the external environment for private
84 Jack S Levin, Structuring Private Equity, Venture Capital and Entrepreneurial Transactions (Aspen, 2011),
5-12, and for background: 1-3, 1-8, 1-10, 2-10, 4-4 and 4-68
85 Ronald J Gilson, ‘Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience’ (2003) 55
Stanford Law Review 1067-1103
86 Michael Gorman and William Sahlman, ‘What Do Venture Capitalists Do?’ (1989) 4 Journal of Business
Venturing 231-248
87 From the framework of an economic conception of property rights – for instance: starting with Coase 1937
(contract theory of the firm); Alchian and Demsetz 1972 & Jensen and Meckling 1976 (incentives theory and
residual claims); Klein, Crawford & Alchian 1978; Williamson 1979 (limitation of post-contract alienations);
Grossman and Hart 1986, and Hart and Moore 1990 (detangling of hold-ups); Aghion and Bolton 1992
(incomplete contracts).
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equity (availability of investment opportunities and exit avenues), rather than internal factors
(legal factors such as systems for contractual integrity) play a deterministic role in the
occurrence and growth of private equity markets.
This thesis takes the view that an exclusivist approach to the subject’s study, either
economic and fiscal, or legal, would yield misguided results in an emerging market context
for at least five primary reasons.
Firstly, private equity is structured as a set of financial contracts, and as such, raises
issues in contract law.88 The mere fact that lots of resources are devoted to a pre-investment
discovery process that leads to the adoption of financing agreements that in some cases run
into hundreds of pages suggests not only the critical importance of pre-investment covenants,
but also the importance of clarifying a logical basis for the allocation of rights and obligations.
It would be folly otherwise.89 As much, therefore, as other environmental factors such as
macro-economic determinants may be important variables in a country’s attractiveness to
investment, the foregoing argument asserts that legal determinants could be the decisive
variable, in the investment decision.
Secondly, as a monitoring-based contracting and investment strategy, the private
equity financial contract is a relational contractual coalition that relies on external agencies
for the resolution of contract-based disagreements – which introduces a role for dispute-
88 To illustrate the intensely law-based private equity process, model private equity contract templates can be
found at the American National Venture Capital Association website at
<http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=108&Itemid=136> (current as of
February 2011) accessed 17 February 2012 – These include a term sheet, a stock purchase agreement, a
certificate of incorporation, investor rights agreement, voting agreement, rights of first refusal and co-sale
agreement, management rights letter, indemnification agreement and legal opinions.
89 id – the USA private equity industry is estimated to spend over USD200 million annually in pre-investment
contract negotiations.
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resolving institutions. These institutions include courts, but also norms of behaviour
supporting positive reputations.90
Thirdly, by virtue of its methodology - share capital and acquisition-type
investments – private equity raises issues under both corporate and securities laws.91
Fourthly, in an emerging context where legal and market institutions are still nascent
or absent, and macroeconomic instability common, an important role arises for the law in
organising market structure and behaviour.92
Fifthly, macroeconomic factors depend on legal instruments. Thus to achieve deep
debt markets in a country, that country will rely on bank sector regulation and capital markets
regulations in organising market activity, establishing trading and other rules of exchange,
punishing errant behaviour – in effect, employing the law to deliver the macroeconomic
effect of ‘confidence’ in a financial system.93
It can be observed that in an inter-disciplinary industry such as private equity, no one
academic discipline in isolation is able to deliver a definitive model for growth. Nonetheless,
this thesis argues that legal and institutional factors are likely to wield a stronger influence
than the other competing explanations to the emergence and growth of private equity in
developing countries like Kenya.
90 Eric A. Posner, ‘A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error’ (August 1999)
University of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper 80
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=173788> accessed 23 October 2007.
91 Luc Renneboog, and Tomas Simons (2005), ‘Public-to-private transactions: LBOs, MBOs, MBIs, and IBOs,’
Finance Working Paper 94/2005 European Corporate Governance Institute.
92 Douglass C North, ‘Institutions’ (1991) 5(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 97-112
93 Joseph J Norton, Taking Stock of the First Generation of Financial Sector Legal Reform, (2007) SMU
Dedman School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 9, 32 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=981226> accessed 28
October 2011; cf: JJ Norton, ‘Financial Sector Reform and International Financial Crises: The Legal Challenges’
(1998) 16 Essays in International Financial Economic Law; Davide Lombardo and Marco Pagano, Law and
Equity Markets: A Simple Convergence and Diversity of Corporate Governance Regimes and Capital Markets, J.
McCahery, P. Moerland, T. Raaijmakers, L. Renneboog (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2002)
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The foregoing themes are central to this inquiry for two reasons. Firstly, economic,94
financial economists 95 and legal 96 scholars have and continue to clash over attempts to
answer the main question in this study, with the former two pointing to macroeconomic
factors as the deterministic elements, while the latter holds up the defining role of the law and
legal institutions in facilitating private transactions. All disciplines lend forceful and
persuasive arguments in support of the divergent views. Secondly, for Kenya, which is
seeking to unlock channels for financing its private sector in an effort to catalyse economic
development, and given private equity’s promising emergence in Kenya, modelling
approaches could not be more confusing and uncertain.97 This is thus an important question
from both academic and practical perspectives.
1.2.4 The Secondary Questions
To fully explore the variables to the research themes outlined above, the following
secondary questions appear pertinent to the totality of this inquiry:
 Firstly, if the law is relevant, whether it plays a deterministic or supporting
role.
 Secondly, if relevant, in what ways it is so.
94 Alexander I. J. Dyck and Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison (2002)
CEPR Discussion Paper 3177 <SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=301200> accessed 28 October 2011 – the
argument is that legal institutions do not exert a first-order impact in financial development: key questions in
this thinking include whether investor protection is relevant to financial development in the first place, and
whether the law is relevant to private contracting, economic development, corporate finance or even the growth
and expansion of the private sector.
95 Raghuram G Rajan and Luigi Zingales, ‘Financial Dependence and Growth’ (1998) 88 American Economic
Review 559 - 586, and Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic, ‘Law, Finance and Firm Growth’ (1998)
53 Journal of Finance 2107 - 2137 – financial institutions crucial for company and industrialisation.
96 Rafael La Porta, Lopez des Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (LLSV) ‘Determinants of External
Finance’ (1997) 52 Journal of finance 1131 - 50; LLSV, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political
Economy 1113 - 55; LLSV, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (2000a) 58 Journal of Financial
Economy 3 - 27.
97 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, ‘Economic Development, Legality and the
Transplant Effect’ (2003) 47 European Economic Review 165-95.
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 Thirdly, which strands of the law are particularly important in delivering the
desired public policy objective of developing an efficient market for enterprise
finance generally, and private equity in particular?
 More generally, does the state of economic development influence the extent
to which the law becomes an effective tool in designing and growing markets
for enterprise capital? To varying degrees, a sub-issue is whether it is
defensible to argue that the state of the law and legal institutions can and does
constitute a sufficient and necessary condition for the emergence of strong
markets for private equity in an emerging market.98
In exploring the role of the law in financial market development, particularly where
alternative investment segments like private equity are concerned, the notion of ‘investment
risk’ serves a useful purpose. Emerging markets are developing country markets, and these
markets carry investment risk, driven by a combination of contracting and regulatory risks.
‘Risk’ is a term employed in this work to refer to uncertainties associated with the making of
private equity investments – and they occur at each cycle of private equity: fundraising,
investment and divestment. Each cycle, it has been shown, is rooted in a financial contract,
which occurs amidst a charged space of varying risks. These types of risks could include but
are not limited to the following examples:
(i) at the fundraising phase, risks whether fund managers are adequately skilled to
select good corporate candidates to invest in; whether the investments will
succeed in the long term; whether government policy with respect to specific
98 But see: Benjamin Powell, Making Poor Nations Rich, Entrepreneurship and the Process of Economic
Development (Stanford University Press, 2007) Foreword and ch.1: there are unsettled questions whether
institutions per se cause growth, or whether the human capital within institutions, operating within boundaries of
appropriate conduct clearly defined by laws and market practice, bring about economic growth. More
confusingly, it is unsettled whether causation is uni-directional, bi-directional or iterative: that is, from
institutions to economic growth, or economic growth to stronger institutions, or in an iterative, continuous,
mutually-reinforcing basis.
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investment sectors hold constant for the duration of the investment; whether the
state of money markets in a jurisdiction allow the necessary bank facilities to be
put in place to complete private equity investments;99
(ii) at the investment stage, whether target investment companies tell the whole truth
with respect to the financial and legal condition of the company’s business,
whether owners and managers of the business will operate in a manner that
promotes the interests of the private equity investors, whether and how tax law
treats specialised compensation structures such as stock options, whether courts
will enforce financial contracts should the need arise, whether regulatory
requirements relating to the practice of private equity changes during the course of
the investment;100
(iii) at the divestment stage, whether a profitable exit opportunity and route is
available, whether capital gains are subject to tax and how tax law treats capital
gains, whether taxation laws allow for the avoidance of double taxation, whether
mergers and acquisition regulations as well as securities regulations as they relate
to share transfers will permit desired exit strategies, whether certain types of exit
strategies embody undesirable features such as possible investor lock-ins in stock
market exits, as well as whether the law generally changes during the course of
the investment in a manner that negatively impacts an investment’s planned exit
strategy.101
‘Risk’ is thus a dynamic concept in financial investing embodying –
99 Gompers and Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (2004) (n 81)
100 Rafael Repullo and Javier Suarez, ‘Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach’ (2004) 8 Review
of Finance 75-108.
101 Stephen Kaplan, Johan Per Stromberg, ‘Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An empirical
analysis of venture capital contracts’ (2002) 18 Review of Economic Studies38-67.
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 Contracting Risk – a risk that the disclosures and representations that inform the
contracting decision are untruthful;
 Commercial Risk – a risk that the company invested in fails to perform because of a
product that fails to succeed in the market or because some exigent market
development introduces product failure;
 Regulatory Risk – a risk that the law changes in a manner not anticipated under
contract, rendering the purpose of the contract unattainable or increasing the business
costs associated with its attainment beyond the economic value of the venture;
 Foreign Exchange Risk – a risk that economic fundamentals in an investment host
country fail, triggering capital flight, or a financial crash in the markets, introducing
foreign exchange volatilities, leading to radical changes in investment valuations;
 Political Risk – a risk that in-country governance upheavals lead to social and
economic instability, the introduction of radical shifts in policy especially where
foreign-held investments are concerned (including the risk of expropriation).
Private equity, as an economic activity, is not immune to these permutations to investment
‘risk’, and risk management forms a critical part of the private equity investment design. It is
interesting to explore how the various laws and the legal institutions compound or ameliorate
these myriad risks within an emerging market context.
These secondary themes are probed to varying degrees to aid in the clearer
understanding of the themes flowing from the main research question.
1.3 Why is a study of private equity important to Kenya?
Private equity, as a source of business finance and investment know-how, supports
creative entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship is the process by which firms are born and others
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phased out - new ideas emerge as old ones die off: a process termed ‘creative destruction’.102
Entrepreneurs are business people that seek to generate value through the creation or
expansion of some economic activity, by identifying and exploiting new products, processes
and markets.103 Schumpeter (1934)104 and Baumol (2008)105 define entrepreneurial activity in
terms that closely match the impact of private equity: the introduction of new goods;
introduction of new production methods; opening of new markets; establishing new supply
sources; or carrying out the new organisation of an industry. In this sense, entrepreneurship
is a fundamental catalyst to economic growth.106
Kenya’s public policy has not always matched the policy-recognition of the
importance of entrepreneurship to economic growth with commensurate public policy
measures that translate such recognition into market practice. Development research
illustrates that the historical mismatch between academic and policy recognition of that role
is increasingly being bridged, as governments across the world give closer attention to the
determinants of entrepreneurship.107 Three main elements are said to drive entrepreneurship:
determining factors (regulation, culture, market conditions, skills, research and development
and access to finance); performance measures (firm-based and employment-based indicators);
and impact (job creation, economic growth and poverty reduction).108 It is interesting to
102 Powell, Making Nations Rich (2007) (n 98) 1, 79, 112.
103 ibid
104 Joseph A Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: an inquiry into profits, capital, credit, interest
and business cycle (Transaction Publishers, 1982 reprint), ch 1
105 William J Baumol and Robert Strom, ‘Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth’ (2007) 1(3-4) Strategic
Entrepreneurship Journal 233-237
106 Powell, Making Nations Rich (2008) (n 98) 112
107 OECD, ‘Measuring Entrepreneurship – A Digest of Indicators’ (2008) OECD – Eurostat Entrepreneurship
Indicators Programme, 5, 6 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/23/41664409.pdf> accessed 15 December 2008
- These indicators canvass a wide range of sub-themes: levels of expenditure on research and development as a
proxy for the creation and diffusion of knowledge; collaboration on innovation – for the joint development of
products, processes and networks, as well as linkages between large and small companies within an economy;
ease of access to loans – especially against the strength of a business plan without collateral (debt; equity);
population size, and education levels; ease of doing business (including clear and enforceable regulatory
framework, supported by property rights, dispute resolution institutions and protection of contractual partners;
and efficiency of the tax system as an important regulatory tool.
108 ibid
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observe that the determinants of entrepreneurship are closely associated thematically to the
four factors said to drive the emergence and growth of private equity – discussed earlier in
this chapter.
Kenyan public policy since 2003 is increasingly emphasising the instrumental role of
Kenya’s private sector in driving sustainable economic development, job and wealth
creation.109 The leading policy statements on point are: the Economic Recovery Strategy
(henceforth ERS) of 2003-2007, Vision 2030 of 2007(henceforth Vision 2030),110 the Private
Sector Development Strategy (henceforth PSDS) 2006-2012,111 and the Master Plan Study for
Kenya’s Industrial Development (henceforth MAPSKID) 2007.112 This recognition mirrors
global practice, reinforced by recent and ongoing governmental reactions to the ‘Great
Recession’ – the banking crisis of 2007-2008 – which saw governments around the world
directly channelling huge amounts of public funds into private businesses to stem a drawn-
out recession.113
The government is matching these policy pronouncements with specific programmes
such as allocating funds to a Youth Development Fund, Kazi kwa Vijana, Small and Micro-
Enterprise Fund, Women Enterprise Fund, Kenya Youth Empowerment Project and the wider
economic stimulus programme under implementation since 2008.114 It is also continuously
109 Government of Kenya, Budget Statement for Fiscal Year 2011 2012, (Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Minister for
Finance & Deputy Prime Minister, 8 June 2011), paras 10, 19, 22, 35 – focusing on tax and business regulatory
reforms <http://www.treasury.go.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=110&Itemid=86>
accessed 23 January 2012
110 Government of Kenya, ‘Vision 2030’ <http://www.vision2030.go.ke/index.php/front/vision> accessed
August 2007.
111 Republic of Kenya, Private Sector Development Website
<http://www.psds.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=32> accessed 8 January
2008
112 Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Industrialisation (2011)
<http://www.industrialization.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=164:mapskid&catid=59:
downloads&Itemid=131> accessed 21 October 2011
113 Masaaki Shirakawa, ‘The International Policy Response to Financial Crises’ (2009)
<http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2009/papers/Shirakawa.08.24.09.pdf> accessed 18 October
2011
114 Government of Kenya, Budget Statement, 2011/2012 ( n 109) paras.10, 19, 22.
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reforming the business environment including through introducing the Single Business
Permit (SBP) initiative (funded by DfID in 2000) that collapsed 16 business licenses into a
SBP.115 While laudable, the persisting fragmentation of the business licensing regime, driven
by statutory requirements under the Local Government Act of 1963, mean that if a business
operator wishes to establish business operations in more than one local authority, they would
be required to seek and obtain separate SBPs for each locality.116 The government has since
2003 phased out over 1,300 business licenses that added immense cost and opacity to
business set-up in Kenya, and since 2006, has adopted a ‘guillotine’ strategy by which
inefficient and unnecessary business regulations and permits are phased out through the
annual budget process – arguably a more efficient strategy for dealing with an overly-
bureaucratic regulatory system.117
It is also widely recognised that Kenya’s private sector, like others around the world,
has experienced a long-standing funding gap.118 The PSDS recounts the numerous structural
inefficiencies private businesses face in Kenya including a narrow formal economy, a large
informal economy, a lack of access to credit and related financial services, a festering system
of regulatory arbitrage, and disconnects between small and large entities within the
economy.119 On the difficulties surrounding access to finance, the constraints include limited
access to bank credit, prohibitive collateral requirements, a narrow range of financial
products, and limited financial services for small and medium enterprises.120 Private equity is
not a panacea to these myriad development issues: it is merely a part solution to a much
larger problem, and other programmes are necessary to bring about sustainable development.
115 Kituyi, ‘Improving the Investment Climate’ (2005) (n 3) 2,3
116 Cap 265, ss163, 163A, 164, 165 and 166
117 Kituyi, Improving Investment Climate (2005) (n 3) 4-6
118 World Bank, IFC, Financial Investment and Advisory Service, ‘Review of Administrative Barriers to
Investment in Kenya’ (2004) <http://www.ifc.org/IFCext/fias.nsf/..../> - the study found that among others,
access to finance remained a challenge.
119 Government of Kenya, ‘PSDS 2006-2010’ (Ministry of Trade and Industry) 16-18
http://www.psds.go.ke/images/stories/psds.pdf accessed 12 January 2012
120 Investment Climate Action Plan (2005)
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The question of increasing the supply of creative capital remains a long-standing
agenda, however. For instance, in 2005, the Ministry of Trade, with World Bank support,
launched the Micro Small and Medium Enterprise (MSMEs) Competitiveness Project to
promote the flow of capital to MSMEs, as well as the provision of institutional and capacity
building programmes for these businesses.121 Improvements to the business environment,
training of businesses in enterprise skills, and building market linkages were additional
objectives. 122 Financial deepening involved the establishment of a Financial Sector
Deepening Trust to pilot a range of financial services and products tailored to the needs of
MSMEs. The programme additionally involved a MSME Risk Capital component – which
was aimed at pioneering a new range of risk capital instruments including mixed debt and
equity finance, and related variants.123
The cited studies and policy pronouncements underscore government’s growing
recognition of the sense of urgency surrounding the need to create structures that enable the
private sector to flourish – and one such response is expanding access to finance and related
services. These studies also show that a recurrent theme is not just a lack of access to
adequate amounts of business finance, but specifically access to appropriate types of business
finance. The needs of Kenya’s small and microenterprise entities (SMEs)124 are particularly
acute, as chapter four elaborates. 125 Some of the policy responses since 2005 propose
solutions that strikingly mirror the private equity contracting strategy, as the preceding
paragraph clearly outlines.
121 Kituyi, Improving Investment Climate (2005) ( n 3) 3
122 This theme was recognised in the form of ‘Measure 6’, in the ‘Blue Book on Investment Best Practice in
Investment Promotion and Facilitation – for Kenya’ (2005), developed under UNCTAD’s technical assistance:
<http://www.unctad.org >
123 ibid 3
124 The Capital Markets (Registered Venture Capital Companies) Regulations 2007, section 2, defines a small
and micro-enterprise (SME) to mean ‘any business whose annual turnover does not exceed Kenya shillings five
hundred million’ - the vast majority of the Kenyan private corporate sector falls within this financial bracket.
125 Ch 4, 129-131
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If Kenya is to achieve economic prosperity through its private sector, access to
innovative business finance must be expanded, not incrementally, but exponentially. This
work argues that private equity offers a potential part-solution to this need, justifying an
exploration of legal and institutional factors that can support its emergence as a significant
segment of a country’s financial system.
1.4 Scope of Study
1.4.1 Legal and Institutional Elements
In this study, ‘laws’ mean actual statutory instruments and legislative
provisions in Kenya addressed to the subject under investigation – ‘private equity’. To
answer the question whether law is relevant, either as a determining or partly influential
factor, in the emergence of private equity markets in developing countries, this study explores
five key themes with respect to Kenyan private equity:
(i) laws and institutions for private contracting;
(ii) laws and institutions for financial transparency;
(iii) laws and institutions for securities dealings;
(iv) laws and institutions for corporate activity; and
(v) laws and institutions for the taxation of investment activity.
By ‘institutions’ are meant not just the Kenyan regulators (or implementing agencies
tasked with the administration of the law), but also legal institutions in the sense in which
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North126 employs the term, that is to say, entrenched standards of conduct across disparate
economic spheres, and in this study, they include –
(i) the institution of property rights security;
(ii) the institution of contract integrity;
(iii) the institution of financial reporting.
The study’s empirical chapters (introduced below) are devoted to an investigation of the
issues set out above. To effectively achieve the study objectives, it was deemed necessary to
adopt a methodology that brought the researcher into direct contact with the key subjects of
study. The actual empirical approach undertaken is fully reported in chapter two of this work.
Financial contracting is adopted as a linking theme throughout the thesis on the basis that,
as already alluded earlier in this chapter, private equity occurs a set of financial contracts. As
Cumming and Johan put it, “financial contracting is not just what private equity and venture
capitalists do; it is in essence what they are.”127 In addition, all the themes investigated in this
work are analysed from an empirical law and finance perspective, with financial contracting
as a key prism through which findings are ascribed meaning.
This work adopts a law and policy orientation, which choice was consciously made given
the fact that it is in many respects the pioneering academic work in this area for the study
economy. This choice is furthermore driven by the intrinsic nature of the primary research
question.
126 North, ‘Institutions’ (1991) (n 92)
127 Cumming and Johan, Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting (2009) (n 1) ix
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1.4.2 Originality and Contribution to Knowledge
Originality in this work is firmly embedded in the empirical chapters – chapters four
through eight. The general law in Kenya is evaluated in light of both the traditional methods
of legal inquiry (statutory and case law analysis) and the voices of a broad range of research
participants engaged in the primary data collection stages of this study. Chapter two reports
fully on the empirical method and process.
This work is also original in the sense that it is the first comprehensive study of
Kenyan private equity. As a contribution to knowledge, therefore, this study extends the
frontiers of what we know about African private equity in particular, and more broadly, what
we know about emerging market private equity. It brings together the regulatory and statutory
experience of private equity in Kenya, permitting the comparison of how the various pieces
of legislations and regulations fit together, where inconsistencies in the law exist, where
practice is incongruent with the law, where the law is vague or silent, and how private equity
intermediaries have related with the laws and institutions supporting their business. As such,
this study serves as a baseline for future academic endeavour – and future extensions will
find a coherent basis upon which to extrapolate.
1.4.3 Why Kenya is Selected as a Case Study
To answer the research themes set out in the preceding sections, it is necessary to
interrogate the relationship between the law and the strength and structure of the private
equity industry within a defined legal system. Such a legal system, for purposes of this
inquiry, needs to have an existing and active private equity industry, and varying levels of
market imperfections (institutional, regulatory and macroeconomic). Under these conditions,
it is easier to isolate elements in public policy that can have an immediate impact in the
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observed behaviour of private equity industry – hence the choice of Kenya as an ‘emerging
market’ means Kenya is an appropriate jurisdiction as a case study for private equity research
in emerging market contexts (‘emerging markets’ defined under section 1.5).
Kenya, an African developing country, answers neatly to Pereiro’s typology of an
emerging market. It had a per capita income of $780 in 2010 – falling within the World Bank
definition of a ‘low income economy’.128 IMF’s financial access survey for Kenya confirms
the under-developed financial infrastructure in the country,129 illustrating the widespread
institutional and regulatory challenges facing Kenya – answering to an ‘emerging market’
typology.
Kenya, as it was shown in the opening pages of this chapter, is also one of the
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa where private equity has taken root. African trends in private
equity investing show that there are primarily four regions of concentrated private equity
activity: Southern Africa (with South Africa as the leading destination of all private equity
investments in Africa), West Africa (with Nigeria being the lead destination), East Africa
(with Kenya being the lead destination), and North Africa (which is lumped with the Middle
East in industry surveys).130 This means that in Kenya, there is a reasonable number of
private equity intermediaries (fund managers and advisors, as well as investors) that can
support an empirical enquiry on all research questions raised earlier.
Furthermore, the basic elements constituting the necessary financial infrastructure
onto which private equity could anchor also exist in Kenya. Kenya has a well-developed
banking sector, a wide mix of financial service providers, as well as a functional public
equities market that has three investment segments: the main investments segment, the
128 World Bank Group, Kenya Country Data (2011)
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/KENYAEXTN/.../> - mirror’s
IMF Country Classifications for Kenya. A deeper discussion on these features is provided in chapter 4.
129 IMF Financial Access Survey (2009) ( n 3) 2-3
130 EMPEA (n 65)
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alternative investment segment, and the securities investments segment.131 Kenyan law and
financial management policies have given rise to other specialised financial regulators
including independent pensions and insurance regulators, both creatures of statute. With these
antecedents, Kenya provides sufficient depth of experience to support an inquiry of the scale
herein.
From a juridical perspective, Kenya has a defined regulatory framework for private
investment, a judicial structure, and a well-developed contract law system. Jurisprudential
peculiarities lend an opportunity for insights into how adaptive private equity finance is to
national legal and institutional environments.
These conditions render Kenya a good choice for an in-depth case study on the
interactions between law and financial development, employing private equity as a case study.
Besides contributing fundamentally to deepening existing work on Kenya from a financial
reform perspective, this study directly expands the depth of law and finance literature
available on the state of private equity in Kenya, and, indirectly, in Africa.
With the foregoing broad issues in mind, the next section explores the key
terminology used recurrently across this work. Owing to private equity’s different
manifestation in different jurisdictions, the term can mean different things, and not defining it
introduces an element of uncertainty over what specific classes of private equity this work
dwells on. ‘Emerging markets’ for private equity purposes also raise specific issues that a
definition would serve well to clarify. Similarly, the notion of ‘risk’ deserves clarification and
delimitation for purposes of the inquiry. All of these issues are explored in the next section.
131 Ch 4 explores the structure of Kenya’s financial system, ch 110
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1.5 Key Terms
‘Private equity’ comes in many flavours, types and styles, and it can mean different
things in different jurisdictions.132 Generally, there are two principal ways of looking at
private equity – either as the type of finance (transaction type) or the type of company it is
invested in (stage of investment).133 Below, a ‘jargon buster’ is provided to demystify the
different types of private equity transactions as they have occurred around the world, and as
they have been used in Africa’s emerging markets. A specific introduction to the terminology
used under Kenyan law is provided as well.
1.5.1 Venture Capital
Webster’s dictionary defines ‘venture capital’ as “money invested in stocks,
especially in new or expanding enterprises, with the expectation of repayment in profits and
dividends but subject to the hazards of ownership – as distinguished from capital loaned by
banks.” It is also called ‘equity capital.’ ‘Venture’ is defined in the Random House
Dictionary of English Language (1966 ed.) as ‘a business enterprise or speculation in which
loss is risked in the hope of profits; a commercial or other speculation.’
The terms ‘private equity’ and ‘venture capital’ have been used almost
interchangeably across legal jurisdictions, giving rise to some measure of confusion over the
distinctions between the two. In the USA, the term ‘venture capital’ has historically had a
distinct meaning, and has been used to refer to private equity investments in younger growing
companies, and especially companies that are technology-led.134 The term ‘private equity’ in
the USA has, in contrast, been reserved for private equity investments in mature businesses,
132 Geoff Yates, and Mike Hinchliffe, A Practical Guide to Private Equity Transactions (Cambridge University
Press, 2010) 2
133 Levin, Structuring Entrepreneurial Transactions (2011) (n 84) ch 2.
134 Levin, Structuring Entrepreneurial Transactions (2011) (n 84) 2-7, 1-8
32
and notably to define transactions that employ substantial debt in completing the
acquisition.135
In the UK, the two terms ‘venture capital’ and ‘private equity’ were used loosely and
virtually interchangeably until as recently as 2006, when the leveraged buyout boom
skyrocketed in the UK, and industry practitioners started distinguishing between the two
terms, reserving ‘venture capital’ as reference to investments in less mature businesses in the
technology, biotechnology and life science fields (healthcare and pharmaceuticals).136 The
British national association for private equity is until now referred to as the ‘BVCA’ – the
‘British Venture Capital Association’.137
Under Kenyan law, there is no distinction between private equity and venture
capital.138 Industry practitioners, on the other hand, like to refer to their business as ‘private
equity’, perhaps taking a cue from the position of the African Venture Capital Association,
which refers to all forms of private equity occurring in Africa as ‘private equity’.139 All fund
managers interviewed in the course of this study referred to their businesses as ‘private
equity’, in spite of terminology under the law.
Under Section 2 of the Capital Markets (Registered Venture Capital Companies)
Regulations of 2007, Laws of Kenya, 140 the following types of venture capital are
contemplated.
135 Levin 2011 (n 84) 1-3, 1-9
136 Yates and Hinchliffe 2010 (n 132) 4
137 British Venture Capital Association < http://www.bvca.co.uk.> accessed 23 July 2010
138 R 2, The Capital Markets (Registered Venture Capital Companies) Regulations, 2007, Legal Notice No.183
of 2007
139 Africa Venture Capital Association 2005 Yearbook < http://www.avcanet.com > accessed 23 July 2010
140 Capital Markets Act, s 12, Cap 485A, of 1990, Laws of Kenya.
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(i) Seed capital – defined as financing targeted at research, assessment and
development of initial concepts, prototypes for product development and initial
marketing;141
(ii) Start-up financing – defined as financing to aid in commencing operations,
production or concept/prototype implementation;142
(iii) Mid-stage financing – defined as investment to provide working capital or capital
expenditure in the commercialisation process, or additional capital injections to
increase production capacity, marketing or product development, and funding in
aid of the listing (or going-public) process;143
(iv) Subsidiary financing – defined to mean financing for trade sale transactions that
provide investment exits to venture capital funds.144
It is significant that Kenyan law does not make reference to buyout transactions directly –
and in practice, the regulatory recognition of ‘subsidiary financing’ has been adopted as a
veiled reference to the buyout segment of local private equity transactions. As Part III of the
thesis discusses, various regulatory factors constrain the emergence of a full-blown buyout
segment to local private equity deals in Kenya.
1.5.2 Growth Capital
Growth capital is a term used to refer to investments in relatively mature companies
that are looking to grow or expand their businesses.145 Under Kenyan definition, this would
141 Capital Markets (Registered Venture Capital Companies) Regulations 2007, R 2
142 ibid
143 ibid
144 ibid
145 Yates & Hinchliffe 2010 (n 132) 4
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equate well with what the law terms ‘mid-stage financing’.146 In the global scene, another
term that refers to roughly the same type of private equity funding is ‘development capital’, a
term not frequently met in Kenyan usage.
Growth capital is also frequently applied to the restructuring of capital structures
especially where earlier transactions saddled the company with too much debt. Business
growth or expansion can frequently offer existing shareholders an avenue for unlocking a
cash value in their stockholding – so growth capital can frequently be employed to achieve
investment exits to varying levels – either fully or partially by way of share liquidation for a
cash benefit.147 Finally, this type of private equity can also be used in an investment strategy
known as “buy and build” – a process whereby private equity investors support management
teams in companies they target to carry out buy-in or buyouts - also known as Management
Buy-Ins (MBI) and Management Buyouts (MBO). This can be understood as a series of
corporate acquisitions aimed at consolidating a specific market segment.148 MBOs and MBIs
are not common in Kenya yet, as chapter 5 (pp.190) demonstrates.
1.5.3 Management Buyouts (MBOs) and Management Buy-ins (MBIs)
An MBO occurs when a company’s incumbent management acquires the company
with the support of private equity financing. Prior to the buyout transaction, the management
may either hold a minority ownership in the company, or it may have no shareholding at
all.149 Buyout transactions are driven by corporate restructuring needs – either because large
146 Capital Markets ( Registered Venture Capital Companies) Regulations 2007, R 2.
147 Yates and Hinchliffe 2010 (n 132) 5
148 Yates and Hinchliffe 2010 (n 132) 5
149 Yates and Hinchliffe 2010 (n 132) 2
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corporations seek asset disposal to unlock some value, or when they want to specialise
through the sale of non-core subsidiaries and corporate divisions.150
An MBI is identical in transactional process to an MBO, save for the fact that in the
former, the management team has not previously been involved in the management of the
target company.151 In other words, an MBI enables a team of outsiders to take over the
management of a target company.
1.5.4 Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs)
LBOs are buyout transactions that employ a large proportion of debt in the structure
of the acquisition finance.152 This transactional structure was popularised in the 1980s LBO
decade, and in the period between 2005 and 2007, when some of the largest private equity
transactions occurred in Europe.153 The LBO transaction is the most popular and well-known
face of the buyout market, and the one that has also attracted significant public opposition
around the world.154
1.5.5 Institutional Buyout (IBOs)
This buyout market is identical in virtually all respects with the LBO transaction,
except that unlike in the LBO process where management takes the lead in structuring the
150 Levin, 2011(n 84) 1-9; ch 5
151 Yates and Hinchliffe 2010 (n 132) 3
152 US Government Accountability Office, Private Equity: Recent Growth in Leveraged Buyouts Exposed Risks
That Warrant Continued Attention (GAO-08-885, 2008) <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08885.pdf >
accessed 21 October 2011.
153 Patrick A Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructurings (John Wiley & Sons, 5th edn, 2011)
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154 GAO, 2008 (n 152) 16-19
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investment opportunity, it is the institutional private equity investor that takes the lead in
structuring the IBO deal.
1.5.6 Secondary Buyouts (SBOs)
This term is used to refer to buyout transactions that involve the sale of a company’s
shares from one private equity investor to new private equity investors without winding down
the investment in the company. The same term is used when a ‘special purpose vehicle’
employed in the completion of an investment (as the investment holding entity) is transferred
through share dispositions.155
Secondary buyouts are not very common in Kenyan private equity practice. The
private equity secondary market is expanding, and is increasingly attracting investors from
outside its traditional investor base.156
1.5.7 PE for Infrastructure
Infrastructure assets relate to essential community services, represent natural
monopolies and strategic competitive advantage, and have reasonably predictable and long-
term cash flows. They also have a high fixed capital base with comparatively low operating
costs - on average of between 10% and 30% of revenue. Along with the long-term operating
155 British Venture Capital Association, ‘A Guide to Private Equity’ 17 <
http://admin.bvca.co.uk//library/documents/Guide_to_PE_2010.pdf> accessed 23 January 2012
156 Preqin, ‘Secondary Market Activity in 2011 (Preqin, 17 February 2011)
<http://www.preqin.com/blog/101/3459/secondary-market-activity-2011> accessed 26 October 2011 -
Secondary buyouts are facilitated by secondary funds. These funds specialize in buying out primary private
equity funds, affording investors early exits from funds. All shares in a fund can be bought out where both
managers and investors agree to the transaction. They can also buy portfolios of primary funds. These
transactions offer primary investors an arbitrage between quicker cash flows and a discount to immediate
portfolio value.
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licence and predictable demand, often in a regulated environment, this allows the manager to
forecast cash flows with accuracy.
Private equity funds for infrastructure157 have increasingly gained currency in recent
years. 158 These funds are specialized investment vehicles through which institutional
investors achieve exposure to infrastructure assets. . Infrastructure funds finance projects
such as airports, sea ports, toll-roads, railroads, and utilities such as water, electricity and gas.
Infrastructure assets are not elastic to equity markets, and can represent valuable
diversification in an investment portfolio for pension funds and other institutional investors
with long-dated liabilities because of its comparatively stable, long-term and inflation
protected returns.
1.5.8 Real Estate Private Equity
Private equity has forayed into real estate investing through a specialised investment
vehicle called the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT). REITs enable the pooling of
investment capital targeted at estate and other housing development projects, and can be
particularly instrumental in the provision of housing needs, urban development and related
programmes. 159 REITs, with cash-flows structured around either leases or recurrent
investment receivables, promise liquidity with growth protection, which real estate property
offers. The uniqueness of medium-term predictability in property income streams reduces
157Preqin, ‘2011 Preqin Global Infrastructure Report’ (Preqin, 2011) <http://www.preqin.com/item/2011-preqin-
global-infrastructure-report/4/3364#DescriptionLong> accessed 25 October 2011.
158 Jason Kelly and Jonathan Keehner, ‘KKR Fund Tripped Up as Infrastructure Challenges Private Equity’
(Bloomberg, 4 March 2010)
< http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=azDCuFomQ47A> accessed 25 October 2011
159 Government of Kenya, Budget Statement 2011/2012 (n 109) para.135
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volatility in earnings, making REITs a predictable type of investment. Predictability of
earnings protects against inflationary pressures.160
1.5.9 Distressed, Turnaround and Special Situations PE
Distressed private equity refers to private equity investments dedicated to investments
in companies that are experiencing financial distress.161 For instance, a common feature is the
acquisition of distressed debt securities in the hope they appreciate in economic value over
time, or as a strategy to acquire control of the entity. Turnaround investments refer to private
equity financing made into businesses experiencing commercial difficulties. This investment
is intended to ‘turn around’ the company into profitability, and can be employed as an avenue
to gain access to corporate ownership.162
Special situations private equity is event-driven and exploits complex opportunities
that for instance enable a fund manager to exploit pricing inefficiencies following a
‘significant event’ or in anticipation of one. This investment category specializes in
financially distressed entities, buying out the debt portfolios in troubled investments where it
believes there is a reasonable chance for a positive turnaround. At the height of the ’Great
160 REITA, ‘About REITS’ (Reita, UK) < http://www.bpf.org.uk/en/reita/reits/about_reits.php> accessed 26
October 2011 - pension funds wanting stable balance sheets at maturity will find REITs an attractive asset class.
161 Preqin, ‘Special Report: Distressed Private Equity’ (2011) 3 <http://www.preqin.com/listResearch.aspx>
accessed 23 January 2012
162 Kelly DePonte, ‘Guide to Distressed Debt and Turnaround Investing: making, managing and exiting
investments in distressed companies and their securities’ (Private Equity International, 2007)
< http://www.peimedia.com/productimages/Media/000/165/467/Sample-16.pdf> accessed 15 October 2011.
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Recession’, private equity made massive investments in the distressed debt market.163 It is a
substantially lucrative, but highly specialised market place.164
1.5.10 Mezzanine Funds
Mezzanine funds are specialized private equity funds that provide the middle finance
essential in the completion of the financial engineering process of a private equity deal.165
Mezzanine funding is structured as high-yield debt, often with warrants which allow for
convertibility at exit. These types of finance are subordinated to other acquisition debt, and
structurally carry a medium investment risk, reflected in the higher current return it carries. It
could also comprise of bridge financing, which financing is made available on short-term
bases, to be bridged out once the deal’s main financing is in place. This term is also used to
refer to the short-term financing provided to a company undergoing a listing process (to
facilitate the listing).166 The ‘bridge-out’ deal often entails substantial profits to the fund
provider.
In Summary…
Confronted with the dizzying number of monikers associated with the term ‘private
equity’, it is easy to see why Yates and Hinchliffe have described the terminology
163 Helia Ebrahimi, ‘Private Equity Firms Rush to Distressed Debt Assets’ (The Telegraph 2 December 2008) <
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/privateequity/3543216/Private-equity-firms-
rush-to-distressed-debt-assets.html> accessed 26 October 2011.
164 Ann Cullen, ‘Distressed Private Equity: Spinning Hay into Gold’ (2004) Harvard Business School <
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/3914.html> accessed 26 October 2011.
165 Preqin, Research, ‘Mezzanine Fundraising’ (June 2011) <http://www.preqin.com/listResearch.aspx>
accessed 23 January 2012
166 BVCA, ‘Guide to Private Equity’ (February 2010) 17
<http://admin.bvca.co.uk//library/documents/Guide_to_PE_2010.pdf> accessed 23 January 2012
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surrounding the practice of private equity as creating “shin and shimmer.”167 In this study, all
forms of private equity are referred to generically as private equity.
1.5.11 ‘Emerging Markets’
In this inquiry, ‘emerging markets’ is a term used to describe countries and regions of
the world where the practice of private equity (in its three phases) is still nascent and growing.
According to EMPEA, there are seven geographical regions classified as emerging markets
for private equity: Latin America; Central, Eastern Europe and Russia; China; Asia; India;
Africa; and Middle East and North Africa.168
What are the defining features of an ‘emerging market’?
An emerging market, according to Louis Pereiro 169 is any economy that is still
developing. Key features of such an economy include emerging technologies, emerging
capital markets, and emerging firms. In terms of structure, such a market frequently suffers
various market imperfections including barriers to entry, intrusive and often volatile
regulations, political risk, uncertain legal doctrines or institutions, agency costs, informational
asymmetries occasioned from lack of transparency in financial reporting, and volatile
investment returns. 170 In other words, it is an uncertain market from an investment
perspective. Market uncertainty from an investor’s viewpoint could mean financial
uncertainty (risk the investment will fail), opaqueness (steep monitoring and due diligence
167 Yates and Hinchliffe (2010) (n 132) 2
168 EMPEA, ‘EMPE Fundraising and Investment Review’ (EMPEA 2010) < http://www.empea.net/Main-Menu-
Category/EMPEA-Research/Fundraising-Review.aspx> accessed 15 October 2011.
169 Louis E. Pereiro, Valuation of Companies in Emerging Markets: A Practical Approach (John Wiley & Sons,
New York, 2002) 3, 4
170 ibid
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costs, raising transaction costs), and insecurity (property and contractual rights will not be
secure). Arkelof defined such a country as “a market of lemons”.171
1.6 Structure of the Thesis
The question of private equity, this thesis introduction has shown, is an important one,
especially for a country like Kenya that stands in continued need for more creative methods
of financing its private sector. The tensions between economists and lawyers over the
determinants of private equity markets in the developing world were explored, yielding the
proposition underlying the main research question, summed up in the thesis statement. Being
a contested claim, this chapter has laid the framework for an evaluation of the reality of the
Kenyan private equity experience, enabling an eventual deduction of lessons that can inform
future efforts to strengthen the framework for private equity in Kenya.
Having clarified the research problem, and contextualised it within a specified
economic and legal context for investigation, and having explored various underlying
concepts and issues, including an exposition of the varied terminology employed in
describing the problem at hand, the rest of this thesis is organised as follows.
The thesis is organised into three main parts. Part one includes chapters one to three,
and these are background chapters to the study. Part two comprises chapters four through
eight, and these are the empirical chapters in the study. Part three presents the study’s
conclusions, implications and thoughts on further research, and includes a bibliography of
references consulted in completing this work. Each chapter is now briefly introduced in the
paragraphs that follow.
171 George A Akerlof, ‘The Market for ‘’Lemons’’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84
(3) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 488,500
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Chapter two presents the Study’s methodology. This includes a discussion of the
empirical design, data descriptions, the qualitative evaluation model and analytical strategy.
Chapter three is a primer on private equity, and tackles three issues: it discusses the
history, the nature and the characteristics of private equity in economic development.
Chapter 4 discusses three core issues: how enterprises are financed in Kenya, whether
there exist barriers to enterprise capital, and concludes with an assessment of the issues
private equity financing solutions give rise to. In essence, this chapter defines the character of
demand for private equity in Kenya.
Chapter 5 delves into the structure and organisation of the Kenyan private equity
industry. It looks at the players, fundraising trends, fund structures, deal structures, the
qualitative environment for deal making (including financial disclosure), avenues to contract
enforcement and investment exits. It concludes with an assessment of the medium-term
outlook for private equity in Kenya. In other words, this chapter defines the character of the
‘supply’ of private equity in Kenya. From that empirical review, key issues become evident
on the impact of private equity on the country’s legal and institutional development.
Chapter 6 analyses the legal framework for the practice of private equity in Kenya,
highlighting several issues on the relationship between private equity and the law of financial
markets, corporate and tax laws and policies, supporting deductions on a law reform agenda.
Chapter 7 moves the regulatory assessment into the tax law and policy framework,
offering an assessment of the extent to which Kenyan law supports efficient tax-planning for
private equity investments.
Chapter 8 evaluates the framework for the protection of property rights and the
enforcement of contracts. It explores the systems for dispute resolution in the practice of
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private equity, assessing the extent to which financial contracts are secure in Kenya.
Particular focus is given to the role of arbitration and litigation in financial contract
management. Like the preceding empirical chapters, it is grounded in survey findings,
statutory and case law analysis, and secondary documentary evidence.
Chapter 9 is a short, reflective and analytical chapter that draws learning and
implications from across the study, deducing specific practice and policy implications, as
well as setting out what this study means for future research.
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2
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN
2.1 Introduction
It was alluded in the preceding chapter that this study was orientated towards a law
and policy framework, with the central theme of financial contracting weaving through each
chapter.1 To explore these issues, this study was designed as an empirical legal research, as
opposed to doctrinal research. Doctrinal legal research is concerned with the letter of law, its
motivations, and its practice, that is to say, an analysis of statutes, case law and regulatory
practice.2 This orientation in practice adopts a dogmatic approach.3 The evidence in the
dogmatic approach is gathered from within the law, which is seen as self-sustaining and self-
consistent, as well as being accessible through legal interpretations in case law with little
need to look outside the four corners of the law for textual understanding.4
Empirical legal research enables an understanding of how law and legal institutions
operate in the wider social economic and political contexts. 5 Unlike doctrinal research,
therefore, empirical legal research permits an observation of the law in society. 6 This
approach employs two main methods of inquiry – quantitative and qualitative methods.
Quantitative research rides on the notion of ‘quantity’, that is to say, the statistical recurrence
of observable instances. It is the mathematical certainty – that is, the use of numbers,
1 ch 1, 3-19
2 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, ‘Introduction and Overview’ in McConville and Chui (eds),
Research Methods for Law ( Edinburgh University Press 2007) 1,15
3 Sharon Hanson, Legal Method, Skills and Reasoning (3rd edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2010) - involving an
identification of facts and issues to be investigated, the gathering of background information, an assignation of
key words underpinning the study, an identification of the legal sources, the organisation of material, citations
and completion of the analytical assessment.
4Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Doctrinal Legal Research and Non-Doctrinal Research’ in Mike McConville
and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (n 2) 22,45
5 J Paul Lomio, Henrik Spang-Hanssen, and George D Wilson, Legal Research Methods in a Modern-World: A
Course Book ( 3rd edn DJOF Publishing)
6 Nuffield Inquiry on Empirical Legal Research, Law in the Real World: Improving Our Understanding of How
Law Works (2006) <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/socio-legal/empirical/docs/inquiry_summary.pdf> accessed 10
October 2011.
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percentages and numerical values - that lends this method ‘objectivity’ or ‘hardness’. To
assure integrity of findings, quantitative methods employ statistical tools in data
interpretation. Qualitative research methods, in comparison, are distinct in their dependence
on ‘quality’, as opposed to ‘quantity’ – that is to say, data integrity does not depend on the
sheer strength of statistical recurrence of observable instances, but on how they are
interpreted using words or pictures. It is this data capture and analytics that makes the method
to be criticised as ‘subjective’ – that is, not free from researcher bias. These distinctions are
generally overstated, as the next paragraph illustrates.
In terms of tools, quantitative methods employ such instruments as surveys and
questionnaires, while qualitative methods use such tools as interviews and observations. Most
legal research today embeds both methodologies to varying degrees. In fact, the intrinsic
character of instruments like surveys and questionnaires allow for the capture of both types of
data, narrowing the distinctions between ‘doctrinal’ and ‘non-doctrinal’ legal research. These
two research orientations are thus complementary, not exclusive.7
This chapter is devoted to an exposition of how this study was conducted. It details
the methodology, and sets out the research model that guided the collection of primary data.
It then describes the conceptual framework for the data and categorises data by type of
impact (either institutional or legal), as well as discussing the analytical approaches applied to
the data. The various limitations applying to the chosen methodology and methods are
acknowledged, and distinctions made as to the rigour of the factual findings in the study.
2.2 Conceptual Reflections
In undertaking a legal inquiry, legal scholars ordinarily investigate statutes and their
legislative histories on the one hand, and case law on the other hand to induce specific
7 Dobinson and Johns 2010 (n 4)
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results.8 Comparative legal studies usually take into consideration language nuances, isolating
identified formal differences where such yield similar functional ends upon interpretation.9
Validity of results turns on the rigour of methods and tools employed, as well as on the
qualitative aspects of the analytical models employed. Generalisation is not always an
absolute end in qualitative work, but ‘relatability’ tests are central:10 that is to say, where the
principal variables and socio-legal conditions in a given study generally mirror those
obtaining in a similarly placed context, the results of a qualitative piece of research could,
subject to the scale of the completed work, be illuminating and influential in predicting the
likelihood of similar outcomes for the unstudied but similarly placed socio-legal context.
Each method has its strengths and weaknesses. Neither is adequate in the absolute in
testing competing theories.11 This thesis is not about discovering an ‘existential truth’ about
emerging market private equity behaviour generally, or in Kenya specifically. Rather, it seeks
to understand the relationships between the identified variables (laws and institutions), and to
deduce the meanings of those relationships from a policy and practice framework. Flexibility
was built in to enable the assimilation of unfolding reality, and methodical approaches were
adjusted as necessary.
Methodological studies have shown that designing approaches to inquiry constitutes a
critical process in the conduct of any investigation, one which if ignored or poorly managed,
will negatively impact successful project implementation or its value. This process is
8 Detlev Vagts, ‘The New Wave’ in Festschrift Fur Jean Nicolas Douey, Rainer Schweizer et al (eds),
Comparative Company Law (2002) 595-96, 605
9 Paul Davies, Gerard Hertiz and Klaus Hopt, ‘Beyond the Anatomy, in Rienier Kraakman et al (eds), The
Anatomy of Corporate Law (2004) 216-7
10 Michael Bassey, ‘Pedagogic Research: on the relative merits of search for generalization of single events’
(1981) 7(1) Oxford Review of Education 73,94
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0305498810070108> accessed 10 October 2011
11 Mark J. Roe, ‘Legal Origins and Modern Stock Markets’ (2006) 120 Harvard Law Review 460
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structured, and follows certain rules, especially when the research project has academic or
policy/practice goals.12
Methodology selection is guided by the nature of the problem to be investigated, the
study objectives, the theoretical frameworks and target data character. 13 The actual
tools/instruments of inquiry are dependent on the chosen methodologies, which on their part
are influenced by the researcher’s theoretical perspectives. Theoretical perspectives are
ultimately influenced by the researcher’s individual world view of “what it means to know”
(also termed ‘epistemology’).14 These concepts guide in the determination of what types of
knowledge are valid and adequate in any type of academic endeavour.
Epistemological stances and theoretical perspectives influence methodology design:
going beyond mere choice of research tools, to questions of the kind of evidence necessary to
build knowledge, where that evidence should be gathered from, and how it is to be
interpreted.15
Quantitative methods focus on the relationships between sets of facts, while qualitative
methods are more concerned with understanding human perceptions of phenomena.
Qualitative approaches seek to tell the “inside view” (ideographic), 16 as it were, while
12 For some excellent reference works on research design: Judith Bell, Doing Your Research Project: a guide
for first-time researchers in education and social science (Buckingham: 2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 1993);
Abbas Tashakkori and Charles Teddlie (eds.), Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioural Research
(Sage Publications, 2003); Zina O’Leary, Researching Real World Problems - A Guide to Methods of Inquiry
(Sage Publications, 2005); Carol M. Roberts, The Dissertation Journey – A Practical and Comprehensive Guide
to Planning, Writing and Defending Your Dissertation (California: Corwin Press, Sage Publications, 2004); Jan
Dul and Tony Hak, Case Study Methodology in Business Research (Oxford: 1st edn, Butterworth-Heinemann,
Elsevier, 2008).
13 Roberts 2004 (n 12) 109.
14 David E Gray, Doing Research in the Real World ( Sage Publications, 2004) 16 – epistemology is influenced
by whether the researcher sees the observed experience as a static reality (the Parmedian ‘unchanging reality’ –
c.445BC – or a dynamic world view where observed phenomena continuously changes, following Heraclitus
c.475BC: ‘a becoming ontology’.
15 Gray, 2004 (n 14) 17.
16 Roberts, 2004 (n 12) Ch 11.
48
quantitative methods tend to “describe” factual relationships (nomothetic).17 In other words,
its focus is not quantity, but the essential character of phenomena. Qualitative research is
contextual, capable of telling how and why things happen as they do. Through permitting a
‘human interface’, this methodology allows personal viewpoints to emerge. 18 The core
characteristics of qualitative research include:
 intense contact within a ‘field’ – or the research context;
 a desire/objective to attain an integrated understanding of the study, including the
attitudes of research subjects;
 iteration – with room for continuous feedback to research field for verification;
 a desire to understand motivation to human conduct within the research context.
Unlike for the quantitative methodology, qualitative data requires the intermediate steps
of data reduction and classification before analysis is undertaken. Analysis as a research
process is not necessarily sequential to data collection, as happens in statistical analysis, and
may happen in the process of data reduction and classification, when patterns are teased out,
themes emerge, and definitive blocks of group findings emerge. It is in the context of these
themes and patterns that generalizations are made possible from a qualitative perspective.19
As to design, qualitative research is generally constructed as a conceptual framework,
where a set of variables are identified, and these are then discussed often in detailed narrative
form, exposing their relationships. The study variables constitute ‘intellectual bins’, and
effectively operate as receptacles for research findings according to variable.20 Generating a
conceptual framework effectively imposes some level of structure to a study, defining what
17 Roberts, 2004 (n 12) 111.
18 Gray, 2004 (n 14) 320.
19 Generally: Roberts, 2004 (n 12) 142-146.
20 Matthew B. Miles and Michael A. Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: an expanded source book (London
& Thousand Oaks California: 2nd edn, Sage Publications 1994) 18
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falls within the study parameters and what doesn’t. With this sort of structure, it is possible to
hypothesize the relationships between variables.21
With a research conceptual framework in place, it is possible to delimit the amount of
data needed to be gathered to establish the aims of study. ‘Serendipity’ (completely
unexpected ‘realities’) is an important exception to a structured inquiry design. Such findings
may open up completely new frontiers of thought/knowledge. Allowing for serendipitous
findings is important in qualitative research, which often adopts a significant inductive
leverage in its processes (seen in the frequent use of semi-structured questionnaires and
interview schedules, or completely unstructured interviews/survey methodology).22
With the forgoing conceptual issues to hand, the next section sets out the menu of
tools employed to underpin the study’s empirical design.
2.3 Methods
This research explores the following variables, drawing from the legal issues
identified for resolution in the preceding chapter:23
(i) The sources of enterprise capital and constraints experienced by private
companies;
(ii) The structure of the private equity industry – by type of institution, investment
segment, funding structures and matters incidental and integral thereto;
(iii) The legal framework for private equity fund registration, management and
investment;
21 Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, ‘Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for
Novice Researchers’ (2008) 13(4) The Qualitative Report 544, 545-6 <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR13-
4/baxter.pdf> accessed 11 October 2011.
22 Gray, 2004 (n 14) 319.
23 Ch 1, 5, 17, 25
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(iv) The tax framework for private equity investment activity;
(v) The design of private equity financial contracts – in terms of rights distribution,
the types of rights and how they are clustered in the contracts; and
(vi) Avenues and strategies for contract enforcement.
To gather evidentiary material relating to each of the variables above, therefore, the following
inquiry tools were employed:
 Document analysis – including laws, policy papers, published research, newspaper
reports, texts, case law analysis;
 Questionnaire survey – fully structured; and
 Interviews.
These methods are consistent with inquiry tools within the qualitative research design
framework described above. Each instrument can be used either independently or in
combination with other instruments.24
2.4 Research Model
To guide in data collection and interpretation, a simple model was adopted for the
‘intellectual bins’ in this study – contained within the research questions stated in chapter
24 Interviews permit in-depth discussions around the key study variables. They also allow for the pursuit of
emerging thoughts and iteration – the flexibility to revisit discussions and positions in light of expanding
knowledge. Questionnaires allow wide reach, especially where the sampled populations are widely dispersed
geographically. Document analysis is a non-obtrusive tool that is especially valuable when some of the variables
include a study of public policy papers, legislations, published research and other information ‘in the public
domain’. Many qualitative studies often begin on the strength of document analysis.
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one.25 The model is informed by and closely mirrors the private equity cycle: fundraising,
investment and divestment.26 The key elements of this model are as follows.
The private equity investment cycle is depicted in three phases within the frame of a
contractual coalition. In the first phase, pre-investment hurdles are overcome and investors
are able to make investments into private equity (the investment contract at the fundraising
phase). In the second phase, pre-contract hurdles are overcome and financial investment
contracts are entered into with private companies (due diligence, related undertakings, and
the financing contracts). During this phase, fears about integrity are resolved and the
contractual coalition is facilitated to last the duration of the investment, usually anything up
to 10 years (cash flow and control rights – the investment contract). In the third phase,
benefits are paid (contractual value extracted) following successful divestment, and the
contractual coalition is brought to an end (the sale agreement).
Laws and legal institutions influence and impact the occurrence, the form and the
terms of the various contracts that define each phase of the private equity cycle. Laws and
legal institutions might also influence the behaviour of market intermediaries during each
phase of the private equity cycle. The central question is what should the foundations focus
on – capacity building of relevant institutions, or strengthening supervisory bodies or the
development of legislation. This model permits the acquisition of a granular understanding of
the law and practice of private equity in each of its phases of occurrence in Kenya. Such an
observation also permits deductions on the impact that elements found to be either present or
absent in a country’s legal and institutional structures have on how private equity markets
grow.
25 Ch 1, 4
26 Ch 1, 13
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Given the tenderness of the industry, a time-series analysis of trends was not possible,
not least because of data unavailability and the fact that most of the funds presently active are
less than six years old, and have yet to exit a single position. Any time series analysis would
be incomplete for a narrow data range. This presents an opportunity for future studies of all
types (qualitative/empirical) to extend this initial work.
The research model suggests firstly that removal of structural and regulatory barriers
such as improper business practices (bureaucracy, enforcement and corruption), and
improvements to the business environment (regulatory efficiency and favourable public
policy on taxation) can increase the quantity of private equity finance, perhaps as a proxy to
increased property rights. Secondly, that financial transparency of the firm lowers the
motivation for price protection, suggesting that under conditions of transparent financial
contracting, ‘trust’ increases the quantity of property rights, and tends to motivate an
expansion in the supply of private equity/venture capital. This is tested in the structured
survey and interview sessions, and triangulated through the experience of differently placed
subjects.
2.5 Applying Model to Data
The study’s empirical strategy attempts to evaluate, with the guidance of the
foregoing model, the impact of alternative policies on the quality and quantity of private
equity/venture capital. Three broad types of policies are considered for this purpose.
Firstly, policies that determine the entry of private equity/venture capital into a legal
jurisdiction. In this category are included fit and proper requirements for setting up a private
equity business, the quality of financial reporting (to understand reading costs and covenants
in private equity financial contracts).
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Secondly, policies that determine the strength of property rights (investment
protection; contract enforcement).
Thirdly, policies that affect returns either directly or indirectly. Policies with a direct
impact include taxation of capital gains, treatment of stock options, dividend regulations,
regulations relating to access to public equity markets for entrepreneurial firms, as well as
policies related to research and development. Policies with an indirect impact on returns
include policies that create/reduce barriers to entrepreneurship – both for the venture
capitalist and the entrepreneur (policies relating to barriers to enterprise; barriers to enterprise
capital; public equity markets; and formal credit).
Each of these themes are explored within self-contained but intrinsically inter-linked
chapters that make up the empirical content of the study.
2.6 Data Sources
The study is designed as a single-country study, rather than a cross-jurisdictional
comparative analysis. Evaluating the relationship between laws and legal institutions on the
one hand, and financial intermediaries on the other, and the impact of those relationships on
the structure of financial contracts , and the distribution as well as design of property rights
within a single legal and market jurisdiction, is ideal for exploring how similarly situated
investors respond to the common regulatory environment. All study subjects are linked by a
common market, operate under an identical legal policy framework, and compete for
financial contracts in a fairly homogenised playfield of capital consumers.
The data was collected from a range of sources including statutory instruments,
legislations, case law, policy documents, private equity fund managers, financial sector
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regulators, policy makers, accounting firms and legal professionals. To gain interview access,
however, fund managers required anonymity, and non-attribution of responses. For most
respondents, this was the first formal academic discourse in their Kenyan investment
experience, and given the industry’s penchant for confidentiality and ‘secrecy’, many did not
feel sufficiently disposed to unconditional participation. As the study was not geared to an
exposition of the investment strategies of any one firm, this condition was embedded into the
study’s empirical design.
As such, the results are reported at a generic and synthesised level. Where specific
individuals are identified, it is with the express consent of those respondents. Where fund-
specific information already existed in the public domain, however, direct attribution of
apocryphal origins is made. Some public sector agents requested anonymity too, while others
gave permission to be identified in the study as and where appropriate.
Identities of interviewees have consequently been coded as follows:
 Fund managers are identified by the prefix ‘FM’ followed by a 3-digit number
starting with 101.
 Regulators are identified by the prefix ‘RG’ followed by a three digit number
starting with 201.
 Policy makers are coded ‘PM’ with a suffix containing 2 digits.
 Tax firms and tax experts are coded ‘TX’ with a single digit.
 Lawyers, and judicial officials are coded ‘LX’ with a two-digit number.
Where direct quotes are made, the attribution will be to the general codes laid out above.
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Kenya did not at the time of the study have a national private equity association as is
the case in countries such as South Africa27 and Egypt.28 Both these countries have larger
private equity markets compared to Kenya. Consequently, there is very little data available on
the industry’s track record, growth trajectory, investment strategy, entry multiples, earnings
by exit volumes and multiples, or indeed the structure of compensation structures. A few
local funds are members of the continental industry body – Africa Venture Capital
Association (AVCA) – which started annual publication of industry statistics only in 2005.29
Even then, however, that data set is shallow, narrow and unreliable. Any empirically
orientated study of the Kenyan private equity/venture capital industry must therefore rely on
hand-collected data.
To achieve the foregoing objective, companies answering to the following carefully
crafted inclusion criteria were traced and added to the study sample:
(i) structured all or a substantial portion of their investments as equity or quasi-
equity;
(ii) engaged in active value-add services, e.g., active engagement with the investee
company beyond the simple provision of finance;
(iii) actively sought to impact the investee’s corporate strategy;
(iv) invested with a focus on a medium-term divestment;
(v) was controlled by an independent team of professional managers; and
(vi) had made at least one investment.
27 The South Africa Venture Capital Association < http://www.savca.co.za/.> accessed 21 January 2008
28 The Egyptian Venture Capital Association < http://www.avcaegypt2009.com/> accessed 21 January 2008
29 African Venture Capital Association (AVCA), (AVCA 2005 Directory, November 2005)
<www.avcanet.com.> accessed 21 January 2008
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Out of 43 companies whose business involved investments of a financial nature, only
27 answered all the inclusion criteria. Out of these, 10 were set up (registered) in Kenya
before 2005, while the vast majority 17 funds were set up and/or registered between 2006 and
2010. That is 10 funds in over 50 years, compared to 17 funds in just four years. This
represents a sharp spike in the number of private equity intermediaries interested in Kenya as
an investment location.
Data on the legal framework covered business regulations (registration, licensing,
mergers and acquisitions, pension and insurance fund regulations), tax regulation, investment
incentive policies, financial reporting, and contract enforcing institutions. Other data related
to private equity contract design, enforcement trends and practices, exit or divestment
avenues, and macroeconomic indicators central to the development of financial markets.
2.7 Instrumentation
To collect the foregoing data bands, the following instrumentation was designed:
(a) a series of prompts to aid in information capture in doctrinal research (document
analysis of policies, statutes and case law and academic literature);
(b) a structured comprehensive questionnaire to gather information from private equity
fund managers on the state of their world – fund formation, fund sources, fund
management, investment design, cash flow and control rights, sector focus,
enforcement choices and exit strategies – attached as Appendix ‘A’;
(c) an interview schedule titled “The Earnings Question”, having 8 questions, used to
gather data at a discursive level from fund managers – attached as Appendix ‘B’;
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(d) an interview schedule comprising ten questions surrounding the integrity of financial
statements in the study economy, and specifically the extent to which international
financial reporting and accounting standards have found local implementation, and
also data on the strength of auxiliary enforcement/compliance
mechanisms/institutions – attached as Appendix ‘C’;
(e) an interview schedule comprising 5 questions surrounding the question of the judicial
integrity and efficiency, attached as Appendix ‘D’.
Where an inquiry demands complex iterative processes, such as in this research where
several societal features affect each other, the approaches here employed offer real value. In
an inquiry that embodies an intense iterative approach, the methodology employed here
works well in shedding necessary light upon otherwise disconnected instances of
observations, which, upon iteration, expose intrinsic inter-connectedness, or reverse
causations. This mirrors approaches in studies of similar scale.30
The interview method permitted the triangulation of findings. For instance, the same
interview schedule administered to the Judiciary was administered to the Law Society of
Kenya and to a range of independent law firms; similarly, the interview schedule
administered to the Capital Markets Authority was administered to the Institute for Certified
Public Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK) and to three out of five largest multinational tax and
audit firms operating in Kenya. In like manner, the same set of questions were separately put
to all financial sector regulators engaged in the study: the State Law Office, the Capital
Markets Authority, the Ministry of Finance, the Retirement Benefits Authority and the
Insurance Regulatory Authority. As far as the fund managers were concerned, the central
themes in the interview schedule were designed to build upon and shed light on their
30 Stefano Caselli, Francesco Corielli, Stefano Gatti and Francesca Querci, ‘Corporate Governance and
Independent Directors, Much Ado About Nothing? The Evidence Behind Private Equity Investment
Performance’ (2008) CAREFIN-Universita Bocconi (unpublished) 11
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responses to the structured questionnaire. This approach permitted the drawing out of data
relationships a structured survey is not well suited to elicit.
2.8 Data Description
Data relating to the number of private equity firms operating in Kenya was hand-
collected through interviews with the Attorney General’s Office (Registrar General), the
Capital Markets Authority, interviews with private equity intermediaries and professionals,
document analysis, and web-trawling. Data on funds raised was similarly hand-collected and
counter-checked against data reported on each fund manager’s website (not all fund managers
operated out of a website, however, and the fundraising picture for Kenya is far from
complete: this is worthy of separate specific investigation).
Data relating to investment stages was collected through a questionnaire survey of all
known fund managers that met the selection criteria outlined earlier.
Data on environmental factors (i.e., business climate) including investment freedom
(the latitude that capital holders have in channelling their investments into various economic
sectors) was collected from secondary sources – published policies of the Government of
Kenya, and findings in development literature such as the World Bank (publishing the Doing
Business Index), United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (on statistics relating
to foreign direct investment), the International Monetary Fund (publishing varied country
statistics and prescribing country programmes), the World Economic Forum (publishing
global competitiveness reports), and the Fraser Institute (publishing the freedom of the world
index).
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The measures of barriers to entrepreneurship are adapted from the World Bank Doing
Business Indices, World Economic Competitiveness Reports by the World Economic Forum,
the World Competitiveness Yearbook by the IMD and the Freedom of the World Index, and
are (i) the quality of enforcement; (ii) financial reporting; (iii) bureaucracy; (iv) prevalence of
improper business practices (corruption) in legal institutions; (v) labour market rigidities; (vi)
investment restrictions (vii) starting and closing a business; (viii) getting commercial credit;
and (ix) investor protection.
The more open an economy, the wider the opportunity for selection. Such freedom
might have a strong impact on the contribution of private equity/venture capital to economic
development. It would also permit specialisation, helping to develop local talent and disperse
opportunities across economic sectors. To account for this element, data on investment
segments (sectors – which are defined as infrastructure, agribusiness, entertainment,
manufacturing, media, retail, telecoms, healthcare, information technology and financial
services) was collected through the structured questionnaire survey, followed by in-depth
personal interviews.
Data on fund structures, employment, fund sources and geographic spread, the length
of financial contracts, exit strategy, as well as the attitudes of local fund managers to the
regulatory and financial contracting realities in Kenya were collected through a structured
questionnaire survey. Interviews were subsequently held to more deeply explore dynamics
around investment hold periods and exit frameworks.
To measure the quality of the exit framework (hence the security of property rights
through value extraction), the study assesses the availability and accessibility of stock
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markets to investee companies, and the extent to which stock markets provide a dedicated
platform for entrepreneurial companies.31
Barriers to entry might turn capital holders away from investing by lowering returns -
through raising transaction costs - in the form of reading costs (due diligence) and monitoring.
Exponentially high reading costs can turn capital seekers away, further perpetuating the
funding gap. To measure barriers to entry on the supply side, data on taxation is introduced
including tax avoidance, capital gains tax rates, treatment of stock options, dividends and
compensating tax, tax incentives to private equity/venture capital, and compliance data for
financial reporting purposes.
Investment regulations are also collated including on fund structures, regulation of
capital structure, income tax rules on thin capitalisation, fund registration, approval and
licensing, reporting and investment restrictions. For these data, an analysis of the law was
conducted, together with individual meetings with three key regulators: the regulator for
business registration, the regulator for investments, and the regulator for financial reporting.
2.9 Analytical Strategy
The empirical findings are interpreted through a financial contracting framework,
underpinned by the notion of property rights security. Several reasons explain this framework.
Firstly, the study is designed as a diagnostic tool to help identify and locate historical
impediments to the growth of private equity with the view to equipping legal reformers with
specific response tools. This has significant ramifications for economic development.
31 Laura Bottazzi, and Marco Da Rin, ‘Europe’s New Stock Markets’ (2002) CEPR Discussion Paper 3521/
1990s, many European countries opened such platforms within their stock exchanges.
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Secondly, financial contracting as an analytical concept permits an evaluation of the
manner in which law and finance interface in Kenyan private equity practice. The unit of
analysis for this purpose – it was shown earlier – is the private equity cycle – impact on
fundraising, investment and divestment.
Thirdly, data availability, depth and reliability were a concern prior to the launch of
the inquiry. Several factors informed that premonition. Private equity is a relatively young
industry in Kenya – as chapter 5 documents. The general public, policy makers and the local
business community are still struggling to acquire a proper understanding of the industry’s
manifestations.
2.10 Limitations to Chosen Method and Impact on Results
This inquiry has adopted the classical tools of legal inquiry. However, even this approach
does not yield tight results when the law is linked to finance – results that clearly indicate in
which direction causation runs. Thus from a methodological framework, the central line of
inquiry would lend the following three alternative questions:
(i) do laws cause strong private equity markets to develop? or
(ii) does the development of private equity markets trigger the emergence of strong
law? Or
(iii) would a developing economy that does not boast either strong laws or strong
financial markets induce both?
A practical evaluation could be useful in the conduct of value judgements over this
methodology. A nascent financial market, it could be hypothesized, would demand
supporting legal structures, and as these structures are operationalised, the markets expand
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and mature. With maturing markets and an enlightened set of market participants, the demand
for even better law is made. This cyclical process between strengthened law and strengthened
financial markets appears to be a continuous process.32 This interpretation particularly sits
well with the theoretical posturing in the study: that the law and legal institutions are likely to
play stronger roles vis-à-vis macroeconomic (read financial) factors in the emergence of
efficient private equity financial markets in a developing or emerging market context.
Nonetheless, the strict empirical question – in which direction does causation run in this
context? - admits of no neat answer. The question, however, must be asked: would such an
answer present more functional practical policy outcomes? Alternatively, would the primary
fact of dependability between the state of the law and the state of the market suffice to inject
impetus to the notion that law is and does operate to engineer financial markets – whether
such engineering is uni-directional or bi-directional? Either way, it seems the debate would
be academic. The evidence suggests a dependability between the state of the law and
contracting choices within the private equity practice in Kenya, but does not establish the
direction of that dependability. This is work for future research, especially work favouring
quantitative empirical legal research.
The classical methodology of legal scholars that look to laws, legislative history and
judicial precedent would not be adequate to capture this iterative process on how law and
finance interact. Neither would those of legal comparativists nor financial economists: their
structural strictures do not permit the bi-directional nature of the causation under study.
Another possible weakness of this work’s methodology, however, can be found in the
chosen analytical frame: financial contracting and property rights. This approach is likely to
have omitted the evaluation of other equally critical variables. Furthermore, as a qualitative
32 Roe, Modern Stock Markets (2006) (n 11)
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study, the data was not well suited to an econometric analysis of study variables – a fact
likely to draw criticism from empiricists – on the question of results replicability. As Bassey
(1981) noted, however, in qualitative inquiries, it is the relatability, not replicability, of
findings, that counts, provided process rigour is evidenced.33
The acknowledged methodical weaknesses in this inquiry’s selected methodology are
compensated for by the intrinsic rigour of the methodical approaches. The data is triangulated
by use of different data collection tools, and the iteration of inquiry points across chosen tools.
Furthermore, differently placed subjects within the two key areas of inquiry – finance and
law – were engaged on similar inquiry points.
In this sense, this work follows the theory of ‘fuzzy logic’, led by Michael Bassey.34 The
theory offers a possible solution to the problem of generalisation in social research
(empiricism) by propounding the replacement of scientific certainty (encapsulated in the
normativeness of empirical approaches, hence observing ‘a’ so many times in ‘b’ always
leading to ‘f’) with the uncertainty (fuzziness) of qualified statements (encapsulated in the
non-empirical approach of qualitative research, hence observing ‘a’ in ‘b’ so many times
‘may’ lead to ‘f’). To the extent that these fuzzy predictions are supported by a logical
narrative, grounded in a research account that evinces process rigour and that makes clear the
context for the predictions in the fuzzy logic, those predictions offer forceful bases capable of
supporting targeted reforms. If this fuzzy logic and its predictions motivate replication of this
methodology, either to support, augment, or otherwise qualify it, then this work would have
contributed substantially to legal development, and to the law and finance theory as applied
to private equity.
33 Michael Bassey, ‘A Solution to the Problem of Generalisation in Educational Research: fuzzy prediction’
(2001) 27(1) Oxford Review of Education 18 <http://www.jstor.org/pss/1050990> accessed 10 October 2011.
34 ibid
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A final possible limitation of this work is the fact that it is primarily a study of a single
economy, raising the valid argument its findings may not necessarily be relevant to other
jurisdictions. The choice was consciously made with these facts in mind, motivated by the
acknowledged need for financial sector deepening in Kenya, and in light of the fact that the
private equity industry in Africa is still nascent. At the very least, this study offers a useful
law and policy model upon which to model larger, cross-country comparisons, perhaps after
the manner of the European Venture Capital’s popular ‘Benchmarking European Tax and
Legal Environments’ studies since 2004.35
2.11 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the central pillars underpinning this inquiry – and in many
ways, its effective implementation underlies the quality, content and structure of this work.
The tools encompass all inquiry points – both legal and institutional variables, and the
analytical frame provides the prism for drawing out implications of the study’s findings. Its
strong empirical ethic proved valuable in discovering primary knowledge on the research
questions.
35 European Venture Capital Association, ‘Benchmarking Tax and Legal Environments’ (2008)
<http://www.evca.eu/publicandregulatoryaffairs/default.aspx?id=2414#2008> accessed 23 January 2012
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3
HISTORY AND NATURE OF PRIVATE EQUITY
3.1 Introduction
Private equity, both as a contracting strategy and as an industry, is relatively
young, as this chapter shows. It first emerged in its organized form in the USA, which is also
the largest private equity market in the world.1 The chapter begins by tracing significant
instances of private investments in risky ventures, from its innocuous beginnings in the early
18th century,2 and traces its metamorphosis3 to its present-day highly visible,4 if sometimes
controversial,5 market standing. It answers the questions where private equity began, how it
emerged, and how it spread around the world. Furthermore, it explores the various structures
and institutions, and highlights the role of public policy in shaping the growth of private
equity in the last century. Through a review of its history, it is also possible to acquire an
appreciation of why public policy responses to its emergence have increasingly gained
currency around the world.
This approach provides a useful understanding on the type of investor, the investment
vehicle and investment sectors, as well as the dependencies between private equity and the
wider financial markets.
This review draws mainly from the experience of private equity in the United States
of America (USA) and Western Europe. Section 3.2 explores the evolution of private equity,
1 Douglas J. Cumming and Sofia A. Johan, Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: An International
Perspective (Elsevier, USA, 2009) 1
2 Charles P Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 1993) 110
3 Charles Morris, The Tycoons: How Andrew Carnegie, John D Rockefeller, Jay Gould and JP Morgan invented
the American Super-economy (Reprint edn, Owls Books, US, 2006).
4 World Economic Forum, The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2010 (2009), Anuradha
Gurung and Josh Lerner (eds.) Globalization of Alternative Investments, Working Papers 3
<http://www/weforum.org> accessed 21 October 2010
5 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, ‘Taming the Private Equity Fund “Locusts” ’ (Europe’s World, Spring 2008)
<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articlereview/ArticleID/20433
/Default.aspx> accessed 5 June 2011
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with section 3.2.1 starting by showing that in the very early days, private equity was
dominated by high-net-worth individuals – right up to the 1950s.6 Unlike merchant banking
that first appeared in Europe,7 modern-day private equity first appeared in the USA. It was
led by some of America’s richest entrepreneurs of the time, hence squarely located within the
private sector of the US economy even in its early manifestations.8
As the benefits of private equity-led investments became increasingly known,
government venture funds slowly flowed into private sector-led investments. The entry of
government into private equity heralded the beginnings of public policy interventions in
private equity activities,9 interventions which, as the discussion in section 3.2.2 amplifies,
would in the decades following the 1950s expand to include non-fiscal policy measures.
Different approaches to public policy design for private equity is reviewed through a
consideration of experiences drawn from the USA, the UK, the Netherlands, Israel, Chile,
Spain and Taiwan.
Section 3.2.3 through 3.2.5 review the progressive institutionalisation of private
equity transaction structures, the segmentation of the private equity industry and the
emergence of various sub-classes of private equity finance, the drivers of fundraising into
private equity, as well as some of the negative corporate practices associated with private
equity over time.
Section 3.2.6 explores the globalization of private equity – its spread beyond North
America and Western Europe after the 1990s decade. This section considers the factors that
acted as precursors to the emergence of a global era for private equity. These include the
relationship between private equity and public equity markets, the availability of credit (both
bank loans and “junk” bonds), regulatory reforms and public policy support measures. This
6 Morris, The Tycoons (2006) (n 3) 2-4
7 Charles P Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe (1993) (n 2) - for detailed background.
8 Morris, The Tycoons ( n 3)
9 Ch 1, 9
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review helps in demonstrating that over time, a relationship between legal development and
private equity growth is discernible.10
Section 3.3 turns from historical accounting to a focus on the character and nature of
private equity – both the finance and the practice. It is shown that it is an adaptive kind of
enterprise capital, versatile in overcoming business uncertainties, unlimited by the asset
characteristics of venture companies, and employs specialised financing techniques to
underpin its unique investing model. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The Evolution of Private Equity
3.2.1 Very Early Private Equity
As stated at the start of this chapter, private investment in business has been with man
as far back as human commercial history goes.11 In the medieval ages, the financing of sea
voyages – such as those by Christopher Columbus (by the Spanish monarchy and Italian
investors) and the ventures of the well-known British East India Company in the 18th Century
– was venture capital at work.12 Other structured investments can also be traced back to
Europe at the dawn of the industrial revolution, for instance when merchant bankers financed
industrial enterprises in the 1850s in London and Paris.13
In 1854, Credit Mobilier was founded by Jacob and Isaac Pereire, two Jewish
journalists, and it became an aggressive and future-looking investment bank across Europe
and North America.14 These two later teamed up with Jay Cooke, a New York tycoon, and
10 Ch 1, 6 - the leading proposition suggested an interdependency between private equity markets and legal
development.
11 Richard Brealey and Stewart Myers, ‘How Corporations Issue Securities’ ch 15 in Principles of Corporate
Finance (4th edn, McGraw Hill, USA, 1991) 339-346
12 Spencer E Ante, Creative Capital: Georges Doriot and the Birth of Venture Capital, (Harvard Business
School Press, 2008) Introduction, xiii.
13 Valentine V Craig, ‘Merchant Banking: Past and Present’ (2000) FDIC Banking Review <
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2001sep/article2.html> accessed 1 October 2011
14 Charles P Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe (1993) (n 2) 110
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they jointly provided part of the financing for the American Transcontinental Railroad, built
between 1863 and 1869.15
Later, in 1901, J. Pierpont Morgan, through his company J.P. Morgan & Co., acquired
Carnegie Steel Company from Andrew Carnegie and Henry Phips for USD480 million.16 The
moneys involved in the acquisition of Carnegie Steel Company was not public money; it was
entirely private finance.
By the 1930s, individual venture capitalists included the Rockefellers, 17 the
Vanderbilts18 and Jay H Whitney – all very wealthy American families.19 It is significant that
very little is recorded about venture investing by wealthy individuals before the 1930s in the
USA, just as is the case for Western Europe. Nonetheless, the few recorded cases illustrated
the power of risk capital in nurturing innovative entrepreneurship.
Developments in the 1950s, following the economic shocks of the Second World
War, heralded a new era for private equity, as the next section illustrates.
3.2.2 Government Venture Capital and Public Policy in Private Equity
The motivations for early government involvement in private equity can be traced to
studies just after the Great Depression on both sides of the Atlantic (USA and UK) that
documented what has come to be known as ‘the funding gap’, a phrase used to refer to the
difficulty faced by small enterprises in accessing appropriate forms of enterprise capital.20
One study was conducted by the USA government in 1935; the other by the UK government
15 Sven Beckert, The Monied Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie,
1850-1896 (New Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2003)
16 (….) ‘Henry Phipps – The Founder’ (The Phipps Houses Group) <
http://www.phippsny.org/about_h_phipps.html> accessed 1 September 2011
17 Ron Chernow, Titan: The Life of John D Rockefeller, Sr (2nd edn, Vintage Books 2004) - helped found
Eastern Airlines and Douglas Aircraft in 1938.
18 T.J. Stiles, The First Tycoon: The Epic Life of Cornelius Vanderbilt (Reprint edn, Vintage Books 2010) -
1938: founded E.M. Warburg & Co., which later became Warburg Pincus LLP.
19 Spencer E. Ante, Creative Capital: Georges Doriot and the Birth of Venture Capital (Harvard Business
School Press 2008)
20 Stratos Papadimitrou, Panos Mourkoudoutas, ‘Bridging the Start-up Equity Financing Gap: Three Policy
Models’ (2002) 4 (1) European Business Review 104-110
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in 1931. Both studies triggered public policy responses that were to mark the start of a long
string of public policy measures in support of private equity, models that have found favour
even outside the developed markets of North America and Western Europe, as this section
shows further below.21 In the following sub-sections, the experiences coming out of the USA,
the UK, Netherlands, Spain, Israel, Taiwan and Chile are briefly reviewed. The models that
emerge indicate the difficulty that countries seeking to model successful national private
equity industries are faced with.
3.2.2a - USA
In 1958, the USA government enacted the Small Business Investment Companies
(SBICs) Act of 1958.22 The Act achieved two main objectives: firstly, it facilitated the
pooling of federally chartered funds that venture investors could leverage; secondly, it
enabled the formation of special companies that could gain access to such federally chartered
fund pools (which they could leverage up to four times the capital they had in aid of their
investment funds – that is, for every private dollar raised towards investment in technology
start-up companies, an additional four public dollars could be leveraged in a form of
government match-funding). The companies that could access this facility were known as
small business investment companies (SBICs).
It can be deduced that the SBIC Act of 1958 supported capital formation in the USA
private sector, and promoted the emergence of investment specialisation through creating an
enabling environment for novel investment solutions.
In addition to the SBICs, the USA government implemented from 1958 the Small
Business Investment Research (SBIR) programme, which was designed to support innovative
21 Charles M. Noone, ‘The 1968 Model SBIC’ (1967-1968) 23 Bus.Law 1214, 8
22 Charles M Noone and Stanley M Rubel, SBICs: Pioneers in Organized Venture Capital (Chicago Capital
Publishing Company1970); Charles M. Noone, ‘The Various Sources of Venture Capital available to Small
Business Concerns,’ (1970-1971) 26 Bus. Law 721
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research by start-up companies, as well as create and advance industry linkages between
small and large technology-driven enterprises. This programme aided in stimulating rapid
technological advancements, and was instrumental in heralding the take-off of internet and
telecommunications technologies in the 1990s.23
Between the 1970s and the 2000s, the USA government undertook a series of
additional policy measures specifically aimed at unlocking fundraising for private equity
investments. These policy measures included changes to the tax codes to create investment
incentives targeted at institutional and individual investors, as well as regulatory changes that
empowered institutional investments into private equity.
In other indirect policy interventions, the USA government introduced legislation that
supported the emergence of professional services around private equity, starting with the role
of investment advisors which was subjected to legal treatment from 1940. Table one below
summarises the footprint of USA public policy for private equity over time. The first column
indicates the policy measure, while the second column summarises the impact of the measure
as observed over time.
23 Joshua Gans and Stern Scott, ‘When does funding Research from Smaller Firms Bring Fruit? Evidence from
the SBIR Programme’ (2003) 12 (4) Economics of Innovation and New Technology 361-384
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Table 3.1 – USA Legal Policy for Private Equity 1934 - 2010
Law/Development Impact
Securities Exchange Act of 193424 Established the American financial services regulator – the Securities
Exchange Commission, one of whose functions is the regulation of
alternative investments (including hedge funds, private equity).
Investment Company Act of
194025
Made provision for stringent disclosure standards for investment
companies and investment advisors. Exempted investment advisors
from extensive registration requirements.
Small Business Investment Act of
195826
Established federal fund pools that could be leveraged by venture
capitalists up to 4 times the amount of private funding. It expanded
sources of private equity capital, supported the emergence of a pool of
private equity professionals, and progressed technological development
in the USA.
Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) of 197427
Prohibited corporate pension funds from investing in risky investment
vehicles, including in unquoted/privately held companies. It further
demanded that investment risk was to be assessed at the individual
investment level, upping the barriers to investment.
The US Department of Labour
promulgated the “Prudent Man”
rule (Section 404(a)(1)(B), ERISA
1974)
Required fiduciaries to act with the care, skill, prudence and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a
like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of
an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.
Economic Recovery Tax Act of
198128
Lowered the capital gains tax rate to 20% from 28%, further sweetening
risky investments.
Tax law reforms – USA – 1986
through 199729
Tax Reform Act of 1986 – reversed the ERTA tax reductions, including
the capital gains tax rate (raised to 28%).
1993, Clinton tax reforms–14% capital gains tax incentive for
investments held for more than 5 years.
1997 – the Clinton administration lowered capital gains tax rate to
20%.30
DODD-FRANK Act, 2010
Part IV (Title IV, s 403-417
Extends exemptions applicable to investment advisors under the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 – by raising the minimum threshold
from USD25 million to USD100 million.
24 P.L. 111-257, approved October 5, 2010 <http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf> accessed 27 October
2010.
25 P.L. 111-257, approved October 5, 2010 <http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/ica40.pdf> accessed 27 October
2010.
26 Small Business Investment Companies Act 1958, 15 U.S.C. § 661 et seq; Regulations - Part 107 Title 13
Code of Federal Regulations, 13 C.F.R. § 107.20 et seq
27 P.L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, enacted September 2, 1974
28 P.L. 97-34, ERTA ("Kemp-Roth Tax Cut): large increase in revenue from capital gains tax after ERTA;
declined when taxes were subsequently raised to 28%
29Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (MIT Press, MA, 2nd edn, 2004) 36
30 PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘National Venture Capital Association "MoneyTree" Report’ <
www.pwcmoneytree.com/moneytree/nav.jsp?page=historical> accessed 10 September 2011 – strongly
influential on fundraising: in 1995, USD8 billion invested in USA venture capital; in 1998 investments rose to
USD28 billion, and to over USD50 billion in 1999.
72
Introduces a new range of exemptions: investment advisors with assets
less than USD150 million and advising private equity funds purely are
exempt from SEC registration requirements. Advisors to venture capital
funds are exempt as well. Foreign private equity advisors are also
exempt, provided they avoid permanent establishment in the USA, have
fewer than 15 clients and do not advise any registered investment
company. Family offices are exempt. Advisors solely advising SBICs
are also exempt.
The experience of the USA thus offers a useful point for reflection on how public
policy can indirectly be employed to support the development of specialised types of funding
sources to the private sector. From the perspective of this inquiry, it is notable that the USA
placed emphasis on legal instruments, but did not adopt a dedicated law on private equity.
The legacy of the USA SBIC programme is mixed, however.31 The SBIC programme
was layered with complex, expansive regulation. In spite of the extensive regulation of the
SBIC programme, screening procedures were inefficient, and allowed the entry into the field
of ill-qualified players. The result was that unqualified applicants ended up selecting portfolio
companies poorly, and realized negative returns, placing large investor capital at stake.32
Nonetheless, the SBIC programme was instrumental in incubating and maturing the first
batch of professional private equity investors, and, SBICs continue to invest in early stage
private equity to date.33
3.2.2b – UK
In the United Kingdom (UK), a 1931 study identified – like the USA study of 1935
considered in the preceding sub-section - ‘the Macmillan Gap’, a ‘chronic’ funding gap in the
31 Jeffrey Nuechterlein, ‘International Venture Capital – The Role of Start-up Financing in the USA, Europe
and Asia’ Patrick deSouza (eds), Economic Strategy and National Security: a next generation approach
(Westview, 2000) 6
32 Gompers and Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (2004) ( n 29) 147 - these developments were to foreshadow
the savings and loans crisis of the 1980s, when most SBICs collapsed
33 David H Hsu and Martin Kenney, ‘Organizing Venture Capital: the Rise and Demise of American Research
and Development Corporation’ (1946-1973) Working Paper 163/2004
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financing of small UK enterprises.34 Research indicates that Britain’s banking sector was
centralised (‘oligopolistic’ in Scott’s words), pursuing a strategy of liquidity maximisation
and risk minimisation over the provision of long-term capital that the majority of SMEs
required to grow.35 Banks during this period favoured the provision of short-term credit such
as working capital and cash flow management having such near term horizons as 13-19
months. While many of these loans could be rolled over repeatedly, the key feature was their
‘recallability’ at short notice, which precluded the deployment of leveraged finance in capital
expenditures.36 It recommended the establishment of an independent government-funded
company to focus on working with the marginalised small businesses. 37 This company was to
provide financing structured as preference shares, debentures and common equity, and it was
to act as a bridge between the smaller companies and the bigger companies (effectively a
market-maker). In 1945, the UK Labour government formed two companies – the Industrial
and Commercial Corporation and Finance Corporation for Industry – both of which were to
merge in 1975 when it was floated as “3i” as it is known today.38
The UK government in 1983 conducted a review of progress since the 1931 study,
and the findings confirmed the MacMillan Gap persisted. In response, it initiated the
Business Expansion Scheme (BES), by which it made available tax relief for investments in
unquoted securities.39 By 1988, however, the BES programme had not left a positive legacy
as investors in unquoted equity avoided early stage and start-up companies, which were
34 Harold MacMilan, Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Banking, Finance and Credit, Cmd. 3897
(London 1931) – phenomenon named after the Committee’s report.
35 Peter Scott and Lucy Newton, ‘Jealous Monopolists? British Banks and Responses to the MacMillan Gap
During the 1930s’ (2007) 8 (4) Enterprise and Society 881-919
36 Duncan M. Ross, “The MacMillan Gap” and the British Credit Market in the 1930s, in PL Cottrell, A
Teichova and T Yuzawa (eds), Finance in the Age of the Corporate Economy (Aldershot, UK, 1997) 209-226
37 Lord Piercy, ‘The MacMillan Gap and the Shortage of Risk Capital’ Series A (General) (1955) 118 (1) 1
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 1-7
38 3i’s full history < www.3i.com/about3i/history-of-3i.html> accessed 15 January 2012
39 Richard T Harrison, and Colin C Mason, ‘Risk Finance, the Equity Gap and New Venture Formation in the
United Kingdom: the Impact of the Business Expansion Scheme’ in B.A. Kirchhoff, W.A. Long, W.E.
McMullen, K.H. Vesper, and W.W. Wetzel (eds), Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research (Wellesley, MA:
Babson College, 1988) 595-609.
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viewed as unpredictable commercial ventures.40 Effectively, the gap persisted. Between then
and now, the UK government has implemented a long series of direct engagement in availing
funds in attempts to bridge this perceived funding gap – including the Small Firm Loan
Guarantee Scheme; Enterprise Finance Guarantee Scheme; Regional Venture Capital Funds;
Enterprise Capital Funds; Early Growth Funds; Grants for Business Investments; University
Challenge Seed Fund Scheme; Grants for Research and Development; UK Innovation
Investment Fund; Enterprise Investment Scheme; and Venture Capital Trusts.41
In terms of strategy, the foregoing UK public policy measures included the provision
of choice over organisation form (hence private equity companies could register as limited
liability partnerships, trusts, limited companies and even investment funds). The UK
government also employed tax tools in driving investments into private equity. The most
notable included the provision of tax reliefs for investments into private equity and small
enterprises. Share disposals meeting specified thresholds were variously exempt from capital
gains taxes, as well as the non-accrual of withholding tax on some dividends. Deductibility of
certain expenditures in private equity-related activities was allowed. Underlying all the
foregoing was a strong culture of efficient business regulation.42
3.2.2c – The Netherlands
According to the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (the
EVCA), the Netherlands follows France, Ireland, Belgium and the UK, as being among
Europe’s most efficient markets for private equity. There are no quantitative, qualitative or
geographic restrictions on pension and insurance funds investments into private equity. In
40 Richard T Harrison and Colin Mason, ‘The Role of the Business Expansion Scheme in the United Kingdom’
(1989) 17 Omega 147-57.
41 British Venture Capital Association, ‘A Guide to Private Equity’ (2010)
<http://admin.bvca.co.uk//library/documents/Guide_to_PE_2010.pdf> 8-13
42 The Takeover Panel, United Kingdom – established in 1968 to oversee the orderly conduct of all takeovers,
mergers and acquisitions, including private-equity led transactions.
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addition, Dutch law provides two domestic fund structures that are tax transparent. Fund
management is VAT-exempt, and investments into private equity attract fiscal incentives. In
fact, the Dutch have a law styled the R&D Promotion Act.43
In 2006, the Dutch Pension and Insurance Funds implemented regulatory changes
relating to risk management in institutional investments within the pension and insurance
fund industries, based on three tests: ‘continuity’; ‘solvency’; and ‘minimum’ tests, motivated
by Basel II principles on risk management, adequate capitalisation and greater transparency.44
During the same year, the Dutch Parliament approved a bill seeking to entice unlisted
companies to apply international financial reporting standards (which, among other things,
requires the proper recognition of losses) in their accounting. This latter move was aimed at
harmonising regulations on investments across institutional investors. The impact was
increased investments into private equity.45
On 4th October 2011, the Dutch Parliament approved a new business form for private
equity with limited liability, hailed by the industry as introducing greater flexibility in Dutch
private equity fund structures.46 This new vehicle does not require a minimum share capital,
nor separate authorized share capital. The reforms also introduced relaxation to previous
strict provisions relating to the prohibition of certain forms of financial assistance, and the
requirement of a two-month ‘no objection’ period to all proposals to reduce a company’s
issued share capital. Under the new framework, there is no longer an ‘objection’ period,
subject to required safeguards being met. 47
43 European Venture Capital Association, Benchmarking European Tax and Legal Environments 2008 (EVCA
Tax and Legal Committee), 10, 107 http://www.evca.eu/uploadedFiles/Benchmark.pdf, accessed 28 February
2012
44 Douglas Cumming and Sofia Johan, ‘Regulatory Harmonization and the Development of Private Equity
Markets’ (2007) 31 Journal of Banking and Finance 3218-3250
45 id
46 Marco de Lignie, ‘The Netherlands – Tax and Legal Update’ (EVCA Tax and Legal Committee), (January
2012), www.evca.eu/publicandregulatoryaffairs/ accessed 28 February 2012
47 id
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In 2012, the Dutch government proposed (under the tax bill) to tighten safeguards
against overleveraging private equity transactions through limiting eligibility for tax
deductibility where excessive debt is employed. The 2012 Dutch tax bill also tightened
safeguards around tax avoiding strategies aimed at avoiding withholding taxes when
distributing earnings to investors. 48
The impact of Dutch reforms in this area has been increased fundraising, and wider
availability of financing to innovative start-up technology firms in the Netherlands, an
experience that supports the observation that the law can be employed as a ‘dispersal’
instrument – aiding in the allocation of available capital to the most productive economic
sectors of a nation.49
3.2.2d – Israel
Israel, an economy outside of Europe, is known in the industry to have demonstrated a
successful face to government venture capital, under the ‘Yozma’ programme, launched in
1993.50 Under Yozma I, the Israeli government helped set up and capitalise 10 venture capital
companies, providing USD20 million in seed funding to each fund. These funds were
dedicated to investing in start-up companies specialising in areas where Israel has
demonstrated world leadership: communications, information technology, and life sciences. It
also invested directly in its own portfolio companies – and it became a startling success,
transforming Israeli venture capital into a world-class private equity industry in under ten
48 id
49 EVCA, ‘Venture Capital Incentives in Europe, Europe Private Equity Special Paper’ (1997) 1-30 – other
countries implementing active incentive schemes for private equity include Sweden, Germany, Spain, Italy,
France, Finland, and Denmark.
50 The Yozma Group, ‘Overview’< http://www.yozma.com/overview> accessed 23 January 2012.
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years.51 By 1998, Yozma II had been launched, with strong investor participation from USA
and Europe.52
The Israeli venture capital model is unique,53 and serves to illustrate the depth of
forethought any government would need to engage in when considering public policy support
measures aimed at growing a market for risk finance like private equity. An analysis of the
Israeli model reveals the following five well-defined pillars -
(i) it involved the creation of a substantial government fund pool that could operate
as a fund of funds;54
(ii) it required the establishment of a specialist public office to manage and oversee
the programme – the Office of Chief Scientist (OCS) – which was made a
department of state. The OCS oversaw Yozma investments in start-up companies,
supervised Yozma investments in the 10 drop-down funds it set up to kick-start
Israel’s venture capital industry, and to ensure that Yozma was invested in high-
growth technology companies;55
(iii) Yozma also involved the establishment, culturing and nurturing of links with
Israel’s scientific and academic institutions (as this facilitated the sustained
commercialisation of research, and ensured academic programmes met the real
needs of the Israeli economy);56
(iv) Yozma additionally forged and sustained good working relationships with
overseas top-tier private equity funds that allowed for the attraction into Israel of
51 Uzia Galil, ‘Before the Boom: The First Three Decades of Venture Capital in Israel’ (1997 Yearbook), Israel
Venture Capital Association 22
52 id
53 The Yozma Group, ‘Uniqueness’< http://www.yozma.com/uniqueness> accessed 23 January 2012.
54 id
55 id
56 id
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high quality talent, the sharing of good practice, and the opening up of Israeli
private-equity backed companies and their products to overseas markets;57
(v) Yozma furthermore developed a network of technology incubators all over Israel.
This network facilitated the rapid transformation of ideas into commercially viable
programmes.58
From a systems transplant perspective,59 the Israeli model is a very interesting case study
for Kenyan policy makers. The Israeli model offers the lesson that to successfully target
public policy in growing a robust and dynamic private equity market, prioritising economic
sectors to address is a good strategy. Every country has certain aspects of economic
competitiveness that can provide an entry point to public policy targeting. It is also
significant that the Israeli model, like the American model, does not involve changes to the
law. However, like it was in the USA, the Israeli regulatory framework was already
sophisticated by 1993 – hence the absence of regulatory reforms does not suggest the law is
irrelevant. Applying the logic from a model transplant framework, it appears that legal
development is a critical ingredient to the success of public policy for private equity.
3.2.2e – Chile
Approaches to the design of private equity markets have varied around the world. In
Chile, the government enacted the Chilean Venture Capital Law in 1989 to establish a legal
framework for the establishment of venture capital funds and to promote pension fund
investments into private equity. The law created a special fund structure, the FIDEs (under
Act 18,815). These fund structures were closely regulated and in time, remained attractive
57 id
58 id
59 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, ‘Economic Development, Legality and the
Transplant Effect’ (2003) 47 European Economic Review 165-95
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only to pension and insurance funds.60 In 2000, a new law, Act 19,769 was adopted to amend
Act 18,815, and a new Act 18,046 for other corporate activity. Act 19,705 was introduced in
2000 to govern stock listings. Act 18,815 created a new fund structure whose impact was tax
deferment, providing a new reinvestment option that promoted share exchangeability, hence
improved exit mechanisms. The Chilean initiative did not include tax incentives, and there is
a general perception that the 1989 law failed to achieve its intended objectives. In 2006, a
new bill was introduced to create a framework for the formation of limited liability
partnerships in Chile – to improve clarity in the governance of the investment process that
was missing under previous law.61 In 2010, wide-ranging reforms to Chile’s financial system
were promulgated under Law No. 20,448 of 3 August 2010.62
3.2.2f - Spain
Spain,63 like Chile, enacted a dedicated law on private equity in 1999, on the back of
European policy statements recognising the importance of private equity to European
economic development. Unlike the Chilean approach, however, Spain’s Venture Capital Law
of 1999 included a generous package of tax incentives relating to business expenditure,
capital expenditure, contracting researchers and technology transfers. There is no capital
gains tax on earnings from private equity investments, and the fund structures ensure that
international investors do not attract ‘permanent establishment’ for domestic tax treatment
under Spanish law.64
60 Rafael Hernandez Mayoral, Thomas L Eldert and Gustavo Struck, Comparative Review of Legal and
Regulatory Frameworks Supporting Venture Capital (Morrison & Foerster LLP, 2003)
61 Jason Mitchell, ‘Venture Capital: Chilean Reforms Fail the Entrepreneur Test’ (Euromoney, October 2006)
<http://www.euromoney.com/Article/1079933/Venture-capital-Chilean-reforms-fail-the-entrepreneur-test.html>
accessed 17 February 2012
62 Miguel Massone and Felipe Cousino, ‘Developments and Trends in Chiliean Capital Markets’ (Allesandri
Compania, Abogados, 16 August 2011) <http://www.alessandri.cl/press/2011/08/developments-and-trends-in-
the-chilean-capital-markets-felipe-cousino>
63 Spanish Law 1/1999
64 EVCA, Benchmarking Tax and Legal Environments 2008, (n 43) 142-43.
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Spanish law furthermore provides for two specialised organisational forms for private
equity: the ‘SCRs’ (Sociedad de Capital de Riesgo), and the ‘FCRs’ (Fondo de Capital
Riesgo).65 Both structures are non-tax transparent, however. For instance, it is noted that
while management fees are VAT exempt, advisory fees are not. Nonetheless, Spain is today
one of Europe’s most progressive, reformative, jurisdictions for private equity.66
3.2.2g - Taiwan
Taiwan’s experience is an easy case study in early successful transplantation of the
private equity model to a developing country. Taiwan employed a three-pronged strategy: the
adoption of a dedicated private equity law, the provision of government funding to kick-start
the industry, and the use of creative tax incentives. The Venture Capital Investment
Enterprises Regulations were adopted in 1983 – establishing the venture capital enterprise as
the dedicated venture capital organisational form. A government fund-of-fund was set up, and
the National Industrial Technology Research Institute was set-up to spearhead research and
development in high technology. A national Science and Technology Park was also set up to
nurture high-tech businesses.67
In 2005, legislative amendments introduced a number of improvements to the legal
framework for private equity, removing investment restrictions, improving exit regulations
via the stock market that previously had a mandatory lock-in of four years, and further
restrictions on non-transferable minimum shareholding in listed companies, as well as
removal of restrictions on investing in venture capital enterprises. 68
65 EVCA, ‘Private Equity Fund Structures in Europe (2010), An EVCA Tax and Legal Committee Special Paper
4 < http://www.evca.eu/uploadedfiles/home/public_and_regulatory_affairs/doc_sp_fundstructures.pdf>
accessed 24 February 2012
66 EVCA, Benchmarking Tax and Legal Environments 2008 (n 43) 10
67 Taiwan Venture Capital Association, ‘Venture Capital as Policy Tool’
<http://www.tvca.org.tw/en/policy.php> accessed 24 February 2012
68 Taiwan Venture Capital Association, ‘Laws and Regulations’ < http://www.tvca.org.tw/en/laws.php>
accessed 24 February 2012 - ‘Scope and Guidelines for Venture Capital Enterprises’ approved 31 March 2006
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3.2.2h – Lessons from Competing Models
The varying design of national approaches to private equity development from a public
policy perspective suggest that national peculiarities and policy emphases can result in
substantially different outcomes across jurisdictions. Both Chile and Spain attempted a
stimulation of an Over-the-Counter market to promote stock-market trading of invested
companies, for instance, but early experiences were dismal in outcome. Taiwan, on the other
hand, had enjoyed a strong public equity market since the early 1960s, and had in 1983 an
active OTC market. By the close of the 1980s decade, the Taiwan Stock Exchange allowed
for small and medium enterprises to list, leading to the emergence of the Taiwanese OTC as
the second largest in Asia.
These public policy responses suggest several potentially definitive lessons in the context
of this study. Firstly, both the USA and UK governments recognised the link between
technological advancement and the role of their respective private sectors. Secondly, they
recognised that an under-capitalised private sector would not deliver its full potential – and
hence employed targeted public policy instruments in triggering private sector capital
mobilisation. Thirdly, the policy ingredients included actual financing through the creation of
dedicated government funds, tax incentives and general business regulation. Fourthly, a
developed legal environment that provided alternatives to business forms available for private
equity investments facilitated specialisations within the industry. The combined experience
emerging from the foregoing reviews support the proposition that well-planned, public policy
measures for private equity could become phenomenally successful.
These are fundamental lessons for countries in the developing world seeking models to
adapt in the culturing of their own local private equity industries. For a developing country
that does not have an advanced legal system and a sophisticated financial sector, developing
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both would not be options, but mutually reinforcing objectives. It would also seem that to
develop strong financial infrastructures and systems, strong laws would be necessary to
regulate conduct and standardise rules of engagement.69 Public policy modelling thus would
do well to take into account domestic realities in seeking models to transplant.
It has also been shown that the legacies of both SBIC and BES programmes are mixed,
unlike the Yozma success story – suggesting there is no clear-cut formula against which to
judge the ingredients of a successful programme for government investing as a venture
capitalist. These would depend on peculiar country factors. The combined experiences of the
reviewed economies demonstrate the wide range of possible policy measures a government
can deploy in culturing and nurturing the emergence and growth of markets for innovative
enterprise capital. The challenge is to accurately assess national peculiarities and structure
country-specific public policy measures.70
3.2.3 Institutionalisation and Segmentation of Private Equity
Investment advisory services and capital mobilisation were the first triggers to the
institutionalisation of the private equity contracting strategy. In 1940, USA public policy
found investment advisors to be engaging in activities that warranted regulatory
intervention.71 In 1946, the American Research and Development Corporation (ARDC) and
JH Whitney were formed, 72 both organised as ‘closed-end funds’. 73 Other investment
69 Margaret Miller, Nataliya Mylenko and Shalini Sankaranayanan, ‘Financial Infrastructure – Building Access
Through Transparent and Stable Financial Systems’ (2009) International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and International Finance Corporation. 1
< http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/.../...0.html> accessed
23 January 2012 – access to finance is the result of a complex interplay of different financial intermediaries, the
right kind of financial infrastructure, and a sound legal and regulatory framework
70 Berkowitz et al, ‘Legality and the Transplant Effect’ (2003) (n 59) 165-95
71 Aug.22, 1940, ch. 686, title II, 54 Stat.847 amended through P.L. 112-90 3 January 2012 – the public policy
rationale for this law is set out SEC 201: (a) the totality of investment advisory services occurred by means and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce (b) their advisory services permeated every sphere of securities-related
dealings at an interstate level (c) the transactions over which they lent advice occurred in such volume as to
substantially affect interstate commerce, national equity markets, the banking system and the national economy.
72 Gompers and Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (n 29) 8, 146.
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advisory companies continued to emerge74 so that by the 1970s, investment advisory services
were a substantial part of the private equity industry. The number of these market
intermediaries was sufficiently high that in 1973, the National Venture Capital Association
(NAVCA) was formed.75
Fund management as a distinct service emerged in the 1970s, and was greatly
consolidated in the 1980s, making it one of private equity’s most visible institutions to date.
In the USA, this took the form of the limited liability partnership (LLPs), a form of business
organisation within which the roles of investors and that of fund management and investment
services are distinguished, allocated and managed. The fund management and investment
placement roles fell to the general partner (GP), responsible for the day to day administration
of private equity investments into companies. Investors into private equity (both institutional
and individual) became the limited partners (LPs), playing no direct management or
administrative role within the LLP framework. The relationship between GPs and LPs is
secured under contract, 76 and their respective roles are usually grounded on statutory
requirements relating to business partnerships.77
The partnership agreement stipulates how much the investor commits into the fund,
how commitments are drawn down, how long a fund manager has to make the draw downs,
73 Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, ‘The Venture Capital Revolution’ (2001) 15 (2) Journal of Economic
Perspectives 145, 146 - designed like mutual funds: shares that trade from investor to investor on an exchange
(like a stock), but not redeemable against the issuer firm, shielding issuers from redemption claims: this enabled
issuers to raise capital upfront through share sales to institutional investors, and to make medium to long-term
capital investments. Investment exit is via share transfers to other investors. See JB De Long and Andrew
Shleifer, ‘Closed-End Fund Discounts,’ (1992) 18 Journal of Portfolio Management 46-53: The publicly-traded
structure of closed-end funds came under abuse, with unethical brokers promising rewards that the markets
could not sustain, and failing to advise pensioners of risks associated with stock markets. Private equity
investment advisors practiced discounted trading of the publicly traded securities, a wrong market practice that
introduced substantial losses to investors in private equity in the 1980s.
74 Gompers and Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle ( n 29) 9-14 - notably on Sand Hill Road, California,
including Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers and Sequoia Capital in 1972
75 ibid, 8
76 Douglas J Cumming and Sofia A Johan, Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: an International
Perspective, ch.5, ‘Limited Partnership Agreement’, (USA, MA, Elsevier, 2009) 93-128
77 Generally, James M Schell, Private Equity Funds: Business Structure and Operations (Corporate Securities
Series), (Law Journal Press, New York, 1999) – by 1992, LLPs accounted for 81% of all private equity activity
in the USA.
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the investor’s claw-back powers, the fund manager’s compensation frameworks, the
mandatory minimum return expected, and other matters including tax issues. Inability to
complete draw downs within stipulated periods significantly lowers a fund manager’s
positive performance standing.78 The LP agreement employs three main covenant categories:
(i) covenants governing the management of the private equity fund,79 (ii) covenants covering
the activities of fund managers,80 and (iii) covenants restricting the types of investments fund
managers may undertake.81
The LLPs of the 1980s were exempt from the disclosure requirements under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, but were restricted as to the number of partners in the
partnership (both individual and institutional).82 They were also structured to have a finite
life-time, and unlike the closed-end funds of the 1950s, investors by the 1980s expected a
return on their capital within the fund’s ten-year lifespan.83 This organisational form also
permitted tax efficiency (as ‘pass through’ investment vehicles, with no entity-level tax).84
With sophistication in investment advisory and fund management services, and as
participants in the private equity industry increased, GPs and LPs increasingly sought to
differentiate their services, increasingly became specialised, pursuing higher returns and
unique market positioning. This specialisations gave rise to what is now known as ‘market
segmentation’ in private equity. Sections 3.1 and 3.2.1 of this chapter demonstrated how
78 Gompers and Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (2004) (n 29) 28
79 Gompers and Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (2004) (n 29) 73-75 - limits on maximum investment in any
one entity, restrictions on the leveraging of funds, limits to investment debt at the fund level, capital structuring
and caps on permissible deal debt levels, restrictions on co-investments with follow-on funds, and restrictions on
investment of profits (partnership capital gains).
80 ibid 75-77 – GPs restricted in permissible co-investments, sale of partnership interests, fund raising activities,
‘outside’ activities (non-partnership business), and addition of new GPs. Derogations sometimes allowed,
subject usually to majority or super-majority decision of LPs or the advisory board.
81 ibid 77 – restrictions: the type of assets in which the fund can invest in; investments in other venture funds,
public securities, LBOs, foreign securities or other asset classes.
82 Investment Advisors Act 1940 15 U.S.C s80b-1 et seq. S 203(2)(c)
83 William A. Sahlman, ‘The Structure and Governance of the Venture Capital Organizations’ (1990) 27 Journal
of Financial Economics 473-521.
84 Generally, Gompers and Lerner, Venture Capital Cycle, (2004) ( n 29) 65 ch 4– ‘How are Venture
Partnerships Structured?
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venture capital was the main form of private equity in the early days. By the 1970s, this had
changed substantially. 85
Exogenous factors contributed to the process of market segmentation in private
equity. These include both positive and negative market events. The positive events included
the three periods of credit ‘booms’ in the 1980s, 1990s and the 2000s. The negative events
include the failure of private equity in the 1980s (collapse of the leveraged buyout market),
happening on the back of a stock market crash86 and the savings and loans crisis in the
USA,87 failure of investment banks that underwrote junk bonds88 and the ‘blind pools’ of the
1980s,89 followed by the stock market crash in the year 2000 and the credit crunch in 2008.
During periods of cheap credit and robust capital markets activity, fundraising for
private equity can reach phenomenal levels – as fundraising statistics indicate. For instance,
industry commentators spoke of ‘too much money chasing too few deals’90 in private equity.
Investment bankers in the USA underwrote a huge market of high-yield bonds (‘junk
bonds’).91 In the 1980s, increased fundraising led to increasing transaction values92 (peaking
85 ibid 8, 146
86 Mark Carlson, ‘A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash’ – with a Discussion of the Federal Reserve
Response (2006) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve,
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200713/200713pap.pdf> – it happened on 19 October 1987:
the stock market and its associated futures and options markets failed, with the S&P 500 index plunging 20%.
Key drivers included over-pricing of equities markets, and risky behaviour among financial institutions.
87 For a comprehensive chronology of the events that built up to the crisis of the S&Ls industry in the USA by
1985, see USA Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, ‘The S&L Crisis: A Chrono-Bibliography’ (FDIC
website) < http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/s&l/ >accessed 23 January 2012 – the crisis merely peaked in
the late 1980s, but its roots trace back to 1966.
88 Mary Zey, Banking on Fraud: Drexel, Junk Bonds and Buyouts (Social Institutions and Social Change)
(Aldine Transaction 1993); cf: James B Stewart, Den of Thieves (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1992) 267 -
Burnham Lambert of the investment bank Drexel Lambert – USA’s largest junk bonds underwriter then, was
found guilty by the USA SEC in 1986 of market misconduct, fined USD650 million, and by 1990, was
bankrupt, taking with it a huge funding source for LBO transactions (it was the lead funder of ‘blind pools’ used
to finance LBOs in the 1980s).
89 Miles Livingston and Glen Williams, Drexel Burnham Lambert’s Bankruptcy and the Subsequent Decline in
Underwriter Fees (2007) 84 Journal of Financial Economics 472-501 – with a market dominance of over 50%,
underwriting fees for junk bonds were on average 3.5% in the 1980s, but with Drexel’s bankruptcy, market
competition opened up, and underwriting fees fell to below 2.5% yield levels, and have stayed there.
90 Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, ‘Money Chasing Deals? The Impact of Fund Inflows of Private Equity
Valuation’ (2000) 55 Journal of Financial Economics 281–325.
91 Robert A Taggart, ‘The Growth of the “Junk” Bond Market and its Role in Financing Takeovers’ in Alan J
Auerbach (ed) Mergers and Acquisitions, (University of Chicago Press, 1987) 5-24.
<http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5819.pdf>
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with the RJR Nabisco – or SunGuard Systems - LBO by KKR in 1989 valued at USD31.1
billion – the biggest LBO until then).93 The number of LBO transactions increased during this
period from a few hundred in the 1970s to over 2000 by 1989.94
Cheap credit supported the emergence of highly leveraged financial engineering
structures in private equity practice, designed to suit different kinds of buyout transactions.
They included the leveraged, management, institutional, secondary and other forms of
buyouts, most of which feature private equity’s unique monitoring-based contracting strategy.
Banks, riding on the private equity promise, have been party to the development and
mainstreaming of unique financial products closely associated with the private equity
financial engineering method, including ‘covenant lite loans,’ 95 Pay-in-Kind (PIK)96 and
Pay-in-Kind Toggle (PIK-T).97
When markets for complex financial engineering imploded, private equity investors
sought safer investment exits for their portfolios in private equity. During each period of
crisis, many highly leveraged investments (buyouts) experienced financial distress. The
practice of selling troubled investment portfolios at the secondary market grew into the now
well-defined and highly sophisticated private equity secondaries market.98 Other troubled
specialist investment funds and advisors emerged to take advantage of cheaply priced high-
value corporate portfolios. These included a private equity market segment styled ‘special
situations private equity’ and ‘distressed private equity’.99 This category of funders take up
92 Gompers and Lerner, Venture Capital Cycle (20040, What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising (n29) 36
93 Bryan Burrough and John Heylar, Barbarians at the Gate (Arrow Books, 2004)
94 Tim Opler and Sheridan Titman, ‘The Determinants of Leveraged Buyout Activity – Free Cash Flow vs.
Financial Distress’ (1993) 45 (5) Journal of Finance
95 Geoffrey Parnass, ‘High Yield Debt Issues Trigger “PIK” Options’ (EGS LLP, Private Equity Law Review, 19
April 2009) < http://www.privateequitylawreview.com/tags/pik/> accessed 29 April 2011.
96 id
97 id
98 Campbell Lutyens, The Private Equity Secondaries Market: a complete guide to its structure, operation and
performance (PEI Media Ltd, 2008) 11.
99 Stephen Kaplan and Per Stromberg, ‘Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity’ (2008) 22 Journal of Economic
Perspectives 4
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market positions grounded on either price mispricing or some analytical basis that indicates
the underlying asset value will turnaround, promising high returns.
For instance, responding to the turmoil in USA financial markets, the USA Congress
enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989,100 which
prohibited S&Ls companies from investing in junk bonds. S&Ls were to invest only in
investment-grade bonds. Instantly, a huge funding pool had been taken out of the LBO
financial market. That Act further required S&Ls companies holding junk bonds to sell their
holdings by the end of 1993, precipitating a situation whereby the market was awash with
low priced assets, while conversely, the market for new issuances was frozen (as lower rated
issuers could not afford to underwrite funding at the new costly rates) – creating a situation of
substantial financial strains among corporations that had become extensively exposed to the
private equity financing method. Special situations and distressed private equity thrive under
these circumstances. Fund managers that still had uncommitted capital found high-quality
assets to buy at distressed prices. Distressed private equity had emerged as a new high-
earning investment activity.
With experience of cyclicality in mainstream-market linked private equity, the
industry sub-specialised into asset bases that were more resilient to exogenous shocks like
real estate investment trust (REITs) and the infrastructure fund for private equity (IFPEs),
both of which were subsequently created as dedicated investment vehicles, both attractive
new asset classes for private equity.
In 2008, new segments to private equity investing emerged. These included PIPEs
(private investments in public equity) and debt purchases in existing LBO transactions.101
Furthermore, publicly traded private equity emerged, with private equity adopting publicly
100 Publ. L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, enacted 9 August 1989
101 For instance, in 2008, Apollo Management, TPG Capital and Blackstone Group bought $12.5B bank loans
from Citigroup, comprising senior secured leveraged loans made to finance buyout transactions. Similarly, in
2008, TPG Capital invested $7B in Washington Mutual, a struggling S&L company to stabilise the Company’s
balance sheet.
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traded vehicles. This market convergence between private equity and public equity markets is
still metamorphosing. In 2007, the Blackstone Group successfully went public. Trading was
robust at opening, with an opening price of USD35 a share, it closed with USD38 on day 1,
but subsequently lost nearly 90% of its value to trade at USD3.55, with minimal recovery
since.102 KKR’s public offering a year earlier of KKR Private Equity Investors or KPE, raised
USD5 billion through a listing on the Euro-next exchange in Amsterdam. Initially, the offer
was over-subscribed by more than 3 times what it had expected. Trading subsequently did not
fare too well, dampening investor appetite for publicly traded private equity.103
To summarise the preceding discussion, it can be seen that private equity’s
institutionalisation, segmentation and fundraising processes have all been impacted by
myriad external factors including the impact of laws and regulatory policies, developments in
the wider financial markets, as well as the impact of regulations on institutional investors. A
close appreciation of these issues is important to an understanding of the dynamics that define
a country’s stage of private equity development – and while it is automatic that historical
development models can be mimicked, general lessons can be drawn to inform current and
future efforts aimed at expanding national markets for private equity.
3.2.4 Drivers of Private Equity Fundraising Since the 1950s
Three key themes tend to stand out in private equity’s fundraising experience since
the 1950s: the first is the impact of government policy and regulation; the second is the role
of investment banks and the high-yield-bond market; the third is innovation within credit
102 Peter Lattman, ‘Suit Over Lack of Disclosure in Blackstone I.P.O. Sent Back to Trial Court,’ (The New York
Times, 11 February 2011),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE2DA1639F932A25751C0A9679D8B63&ref=blackstone
group, accessed 26 February 2012
103 Julie Creswell, ‘After Years of Anticipation, a Subdued Public Offering for Kohlberg Kravis,’ (The New
York Times, 15 July 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/business/16place.html accessed 26 February
2012
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markets. Underwriting all of these factors is the market segmentation process already
discussed.
To illustrate the first driver of private equity fundraising, the case of the USA stands
out. Fundraising drivers included the formation of SBICs in 1958 and the 1979 clarification
of the “prudent man rule” under ERISA, which saw pension fund investment into private
equity increasing.104 The language of the law was as follows:105
‘S.1104(a)(1)
(a) Prudent man standard of care
(1) Subject to sections 1103(c) and (d), 1342, and 1344 of this title, a fiduciary
shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and—
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character
and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D)in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions
of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter.’
The ERISA clarification applied a fiduciary standard to investment decision-making,
in place of applying a regulated threshold to exposure limits.
As already alluded above, the role of investment bankers and underwriters of sub-
investment grade corporate securities (‘junk bonds’) was a substantial driver of fundraising
for private equity LBOs in the 1980s. Investment bankers like Drexel Burnham and Michael
Milken (1980s) and Chemical Bank (1990s) supported ‘blind pools’. After the bankruptcy of
Drexel, 106 Chemical Bank quickly became the largest lender in LBO financings by 1993.
104 Gompers and Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (2004) (n 29) ‘What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?’
36
105 USC Title 29-18 1B(4) s1104(a)(1)
106 Mary Zey, Banking on Fraud: Drexel, Junk Bonds and Buyouts (Social Institutions and Social Change)
(Aldine Transaction 1993); cf: James B Stewart, Den of Thieves (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1992) 267
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Furthermore, Chemical bank established new off-shoots around the private equity market,
styled syndicated leveraged finance businesses and related advisory services. This signalled a
new dimension in the private equity industry – a deepening and sophistication of operations
and investors.
The 2000s period was marked by a significant level of risk-tolerance in primary
financial markets, made prominent by the PIK and PIK-T as well as ‘covenant lite’ methods
of refinancing non-performing loan portfolios. PIK-toggles are indentures issued by
companies facing cash flow problems to holders of high yield debt. Their issuance triggers
interest rate increases, at a compounded rate. With the PIK toggle flexibility, cash-strapped
debt issuers were able to avoid technical default. The problem was that the issuing companies
got deeper into debt. In 2005-2007 when private equity fundraising was particularly robust,
the ‘covenant lite’ financing feature was mainstreamed: private equity fund managers
negotiated very favourable terms with lenders on both senior and subordinated loans. Senior
debt would usually carry minimum capital ratio requirements on the borrower, but during this
period, these automatic conditions were suspended, hence the ‘covenant-lite’ funding
terms.107
Regulatory changes can also have negative impact on the private equity industry. For
instance, regulatory changes following corporate failures in the USA in 2000-2001 in the
form of the Sarbanes Oxley law, officially titled the Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act, 2002, had two unintended effects: firstly, it created a new regime of
rules to govern publicly traded corporations that sharply raised the bureaucratic costs of
compliance, prompting many public corporations to support going-private buyouts. Secondly,
107 David Stowell, Investment Banks, Hedge Funds and Private Equity: The New Paradigm (Elsevier, London,
2010) 361
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for venture capital, exit avenues narrowed: going public was no longer a very attractive
proposition, owing to the heightened scrutiny by the SEC.108
Following the ‘Great Recession’, the availability of issuers narrowed down and yield
spreads widened significantly from 2008, precipitating a pull-back by investment banks.
Deals could not price. The leveraged finance markets ground to a halt, forcing buyout firms
to withdraw from, renegotiate or re-price deals completed prior to the downturn.109
The foregoing review illustrates a close nexus between private equity fundraising and
robust primary markets. In virtually all of the three decades since the 1980s when private
equity has benefited more from institutional investors as opposed to government funding
sources, private equity has succeeded when primary credit markets do well. Whenever
investment banking or the traditional banking industry experienced shocks, private equity
fundraising and investments suffered. From a law and policy perspective, these experiences
suggest that in crafting a legal framework for private equity, its design ought to take into
account how private equity-specific law reform impacts or otherwise relates with the wider
regulation of a nation’s financial and capital markets.
3.2.5 Negative Corporate Practices
The practice of corporate raiding (also known as ‘hostile takeovers’) involves the
subjection of companies to forced acquisition, against management and shareholder
wishes.110 Private equity intermediaries perfected the corporate raiding art in the 1980s. Most
buyouts during that decade were public-to-private transactions, that is, public companies
108 Gary Fooks, ‘Auditors and the Permissive Society: Market Failure, Globalisation and Financial Regulation in
the USA’ (2003) 5(2) Risk Management 17
109 Steven M Davidoff, ‘The Failure of Private Equity’ (2009) 82 Southern California Law Review 481, 483-5
110 Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H Summers, ‘Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers’ in Alan J Auerbach (ed),
Corporate Takeovers Causes and Consequences (The University of Chicago Press, 1991) 33 – Illustration:
1985 hostile takeover of TWA by Carl Icahn. Subsequently, Icahn sells off TWA’s assets to repay buyout debt.
Other notorious corporate raiders : Victor Posner - hostile takeover of Sharon Steel Corporation in 1969, ended
in bankruptcy in 1987.
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getting delisted from regulated securities exchanges, reverting to private ownership.
Corporate raiders were motivated more by the promise of windfall earnings through over-
leveraging their targets’ balance sheets, undertaking subsequent asset stripping in some cases,
or structuring huge payouts to themselves post-acquisition, than in long-term value addition
to corporate assets.111
The most negative legacy of the corporate raids of the 1980s appear, however, to have
revolved primarily around two key issues: saddling acquired companies with too much debt,
and the entry into the industry of persons not well qualified to undertake complex financial
contracting and investment management. As a result of these twin issues, a number of
takeover transactions ended in bankruptcy.112
Managers, detesting hostile takeovers, adopted defensive measures in response. The
defence mechanisms included ‘poison pills’ (actions that accelerated a company’s internal
self-destruction, such as varying management contracts in a way that introduced substantial
new underlying corporate liabilities), ‘golden parachutes’ (employment contract clauses that
ensured that redundancies occasioned by a hostile takeover would require massive payments
to senior management members at the end of their service contracts), taking on new loans that
render a target company unprofitable, as well as the practice of ‘greenmail’ (where a
corporate raider would agree to abandon a hostile takeover provided the corporate raider
111 Burrough and Heylar, Barbarians at the Gate (2004) (n 93): On the first accusation, fingers point to the
personal earnings drawn by such investors as Simon Ray in the Gibson Greetings buyout - 1982 (USD66
million). Cf: the 1985 buyout by Thomas H. Lee of Sterling Jewellers for USD28 million. Lee put up USD3
million in equity, leveraged the rest. 1987, sold Sterling Jewellers for USD210 million, earned USD180 million
in profits. To many commentators, this translated to pure greed.
112 Michael C Jensen, Willy Burkhardt and Brian K Barry, “Wisconsin Central Ltd Railroad and Berkshire
Partners (A) and (B)” Harvard Business School Case Study, 9-19-062, 9-190-070 (1990) - business strategy fell
apart soon after the transaction was completed: investors failed to deploy management IT systems against which
financial modeling had depended; financial and cash flow projections were flawed.
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received a significant stake in the company and he received an incentive payment from the
company in lieu of the hostile takeover (essentially a bribe).113
The use of very high debt thresholds as part of the acquisition finance in 1980s LBOs
became the bane of the corporate raiding phenomenon of the decade, although this strategy
had earlier roots: the takeover of Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company on 21 January 1955 by
McClean Industries Inc illuminates this strategy. Borrowing USD42 million for the
transaction, McLean issued itself USD7 million preferred stock as part of the acquisition
settlement, and, upon completion of the acquisition, used USD20 million of the company’s
cash and assets to retire USD20 million of the borrowed acquisition capital. Shortly
thereafter, the board voted a dividend payout to McLean of USD25 million.114
Investment bankers in the 1980s also engaged in illegal investment activities, as the
case of Drexel Burnham amply illustrates. Drexel was fined USD650 million dollars, the
largest fine ever handed down by the SEC until then, for stock manipulation, stock parking,
insider trading and defrauding its clients. Furthermore, it agreed to implement stricter
safeguards on its oversight procedures. 115 In February 1990, however, Drexel Burnham
Lambert filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
Towards the end of the 1980s, the earlier supernormal returns that the private equity
contracting strategy had boasted could not be sustained. Several companies bought out by
private equity went into bankruptcy, while others such as RJR Nabisco were in financial
distress.116
113 US Government Accountability Office (GAO), ‘Private Equity: Recent Growth in Leveraged Buyouts
Exposed Risks that Warrant Continued Attention’ (GAO-08-885, 2008) 17
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08885.pdf> accessed 21 October 2011
114 Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy
Bigger (Princeton University Press, 2006)
115 Mary Zey, Banking on Fraud: Drexel, Junk Bonds and Buyouts (Social Institutions and Social Change)
(Aldine Transaction 1993); cf: James B Stewart, Den of Thieves (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1992) 267 –
“junk bonds” were crucial to the completion of financial structuring in LBO transactions in the 1980s.
116 Stephen J Davis, John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin, Josh Lerner and Javier Miranda, ‘Private Equity and
Employment’ (2011) NBER Working Paper 17399, 45 < http://www.nber.org/papers/w17399.pdf> accessed 28
October 2011
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Market intermediaries are adept at exploiting the limits of regulatory inefficiencies –
and it can be observed that the corporate raids of the 1980s, Drexel’s misconduct, and the
misrepresentation of returns expectations to institutional investors by investment advisors all
happened within the framework of USA regulations for investment activity. The USA
government response to the crises of the 1980s suggests that regulatory framework was
inadequate, inefficient or otherwise incomplete to have permitted the pursuit of the various
negative corporate activities. As the review under this section has demonstrated, the
consequences can be quite damaging. It can be deduced then, that the promise of private
equity needs strong laws and institutions in emerging markets: but then, where should that
law be sourced? This is an important question that underpins this work in many ways.
3.2.6 Globalisation of Private Equity
European private equity came of age in the 2000s decade, although private equity had
taken root in Europe in the 1980s, with the European Venture Capital Association being
formed in 1984.117 Prior to the 2000s decade, private equity investing was largely dominated
by USA private equity. The stock market crash of 2000 humbled American private equity
markets, but European private equity was resilient and for the first time in 2001, European
private equity overtook USA activity.118
Private equity outside the USA has picked up strongly in the 2000s, as chart 3.1
below shows. Emerging market-focused funds raised a total of USD32 billion in 2011,119 way
below the pre-crisis high of USD 67 billion raised in capital 2008, and USD59 billion in
117 European Venture Capital Association, ‘Introduction’
< http://www.evca.eu/knowledgecenter/default.aspx?id=544> accessed 29 October 2011
118 European Venture Capital Association, ‘Preliminary Annual Survey Figures Indicate Difficult Fundraising,
But Steady Investment in 2002’ (EVCA Press Release, Geneva, 12 March 2003) <
http://www.evca.eu/Toolbox/Search.aspx?s=fundraising+2000> accessed 29 October 2011
119 Emerging Markets Private Equity Association, ‘Industry Statistics, EMPEA Q3 2011EM PE Industry
Statistics’ <http://www.empea.net/Main-Menu-Category/EMPEA-Research/Industry-Statistics.aspx> accessed
18 July 2010.
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2007. Even then, however, emerging market fundraising has come a long way since 2003,
when USD3 billion was raised.120
Chart 3.1 Fundraising and Investment Trends, Emerging Markets
Source: EMPEA
In terms of the number of funds, as of December 31, 2008, there were a total of 352
funds active in Emerging Markets. As of March 2009, a total of 371 funds were targeting to
raise USD144 billion in capital.121 African fundraising experienced the strongest year-on-
year growth in the 2007/2008 period.122 In 2011, a total of 119 funds accounted for all the
fundraising up to October.
China continues to dominate all fundraising and investment activity in emerging
markets.123 In 2011, China attracted 73% of all the fundraising, while Brazil for the first time
120 Jennifer Choi, Emerging Markets Private Equity Funds Raise Record Amount of Capital Despite Global
Slowdown: US USD66.5 Billion Raised in 2008. Emerging Markets Private Equity Association, Press Release
(Washington D.C., February 2009) <http://www.empea.net / > accessed 18 July 2010.
121 Emerging Markets Private Equity Association, Emerging Markets Private Equity Fundraising and Investment
Review, 2008 (April, 2009) 14
<http://www.empea.net/EMPEA_Fundraising_Investment_Report_2008_nonmember[1].pdf> accessed 27 July
2010.
122 EMPEA, ‘Industry Statistics: Fundraising and Investment’ ( 2010)
<http://www.empea.net/EMPEA_IndustryStatisticsUpdate_PublicVersion[1].pdf>accessed 27 July 2010.
123 Emerging Markets Private Equity Association, ‘Fundraising for Emerging Markets Tripled in 2005’
(EMPEA, 2006) < http://www.empea.net/Main-Menu-Category/EMPEA-Research/Fundraising-
Review/Fundraising-Review-2003-2005.aspx?FT=.pdf> accessed 28 October 2011.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002
Funds Raised
Funds Invested
96
overtook India as the second largest emerging market. Eastern European private equity also
picked up strongly: Africa’s emerging markets continue to trail all emerging market
regions. 124 Within Africa, South Africa continues to dominate African private equity,
attracting over 70% of all Africa-focused fundraising and investment activity. Outside of
South Africa, private equity activity is increasing in West, East, North and Central Africa.
3.3. Transactional Features of Private Equity
3.3.1 Specialised, Adaptive Enterprise Capital
The foregoing discussion has shown that private is a type of corporate finance
potentially useful in the development of new products and technologies, 125 expanding
working capital, making acquisitions, strengthening a company’s balance sheet, resolving
ownership and management issues (such as succession in family-owned companies), or
undertaking buy-out and buy-in transactions.126 It emerged to fill gaps that conventional
financial intermediaries have historically not bridged. As a specialised type of corporate
finance, private equity employs a number of strategies to achieve this. Firstly, it exploits
market mispricing, a key element in the buyout market.127 Secondly, it fills the funding gap
through superior risk-mitigation and risk-pricing techniques – supplying Arkelof’s “lemons
gap”.128 Thirdly, it exploits operating inefficiencies in firms – be they at the individual firm
level where corporate restructuring would create value or where divisional spin-offs would
permit operational and synergistic focus.129
124 Ch 1, 13
125 SJ Davis, JC Haltiwanger, S Schuh, Job Creation and Destruction (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1996)
126 European Venture Capital Association < http://www.evca.eu/toolbox/glossary.aspx?id=982> accessed 12
August 2008
127 Preqin, ‘Special Situations Private Equity’ < http://www.preqin.com/listResearch.aspx > accessed 12 August
2010
128 George A Arkelof, ‘The Market for “lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84
Quarterly Journal of Economics 488-500. cf: Richard Kitchen, ‘Venture Capital: Is It Appropriate for
Developing Countries?’ In Business Finance in Less Developed Capital Markets (1992) Klaus Fischer and
George Papaioannou (eds), Hofstra University
129 Preqin, (n127)
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3.3.2 Overcoming Business Uncertainty
Although the transactional form of private equity involves dealing in corporate
securities primarily, it was shown in the preceding sections that it is unquoted. Its strategy is
focused on unlisted companies presenting prospects for strong growth, but facing different
types of barriers in accessing needed enterprise finance. These barriers exist either because
companies have no pre-existing cash flows and therefore not able to support collateralized
lending, or represent emerging sectors or untested technologies, typifying business and
market uncertainty. This is the reason private equity venture companies are said to be ‘high
risk’.130
Three factors generally influence a company’s financing choices. Firstly, there are
issues around business uncertainty. Secondly, there is the problem of asymmetric
information. Thirdly, there is the problem of the nature of company assets (also known as
‘asset quality’).131 These three problems can become complex depending on the state of
financial development, and the depth of market development, within a given jurisdiction. The
effect of these issues is the introduction of business uncertainty, rendering most traditional
financiers wary of assuming unascertainable risks bound up in such companies.
The problem of uncertainty stems from the business characteristics of the enterprise.
Questions here can include, for instance, whether the entity will succeed or fail post-
financing, whether the product will be a success or whether the research programme behind
the product will succeed. Market competition complicates these uncertainties even more.132
Holders of capital including traditional credit markets such as banking institutions,
and institutional investors such as pension funds and university endowment funds, are ill-
suited to assess business risk outside of an assessment of collateral sufficiency relating to a
130 Gompers and Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (2004) (n 29) 23-25
131 ibid 157-169
132 ibid 157
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loan application, rendering them incapable of undertaking monitoring-based financing.133
Some of these limitations stem from regulatory constraints and lending protocols defining
bank credit. Institutional investors frequently have neither the time nor the industry expertise
to mitigate the types of business uncertainty that private companies present. These realities
limit their ability to make informed investment decisions about the capital seeking company.
Regulations frequently limit the type of investments regulated institutional investors can
make.134
Private equity, unlike both bank and institutional investors, tends to manage
investment risk better, owing to its monitoring-based investment model, as the following
sentences attempt to show. It has the ability and resources to conduct comprehensive due
diligence which enables fund managers to assess investment risks more robustly, overcoming
the limitations that both banks and regulated institutional investors cannot surmount. It also
does not operate from a ‘lending’ framework: it is a business partner, tying its fortunes to
those of venture companies invested in. It stages its financing, ensuring progressive and
sustained attainment of mutual business objectives, and enabling for conflicts and non-
performance to be addressed as soon as they arise. It assumes executive powers that enable it
control management. Where the size of the financing is substantial, it can syndicate its
investments, more effectively managing risk. It can vary corporate reporting and
accountability requirements beyond the minimum required under statutory edicts, reducing
the scope for asymmetric information between investors and investees. 135
133 ibid 163
134 ibid 162
135 There is extensive research on the problem termed ‘agency’ in financial contracting, both theoretical and
empirical. They are grounded in the notion of incomplete contracts. A review of the theory of agency is not
directly central to this study, and is not done. However, some illustration of key thinking on agency can be
found in: Michael C Jensen and WH Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Finance 305-60; Michael C Jensen, ‘Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow,
Corporate Finance and Takeovers’ (1986) 76 American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 323-29; Paul
A Gompers, ‘Optimal Investment, Monitoring and the Staging of Venture Capital’ (1995) 50 Journal of Finance
281-325, In Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, (MIT Press 2004) ch 8: Why Are
Investments Staged? 171-200. Paul Gompers, ‘Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry’ (1996) 42 Journal
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Private equity furthermore has become well-known for its hands-on approach to
investing, colloquially referred to as ‘monitoring-based’ financing136 - the fund manager gets
directly involved in the operations and leadership of the companies brought under its
investment portfolio. 137The fund manager provides professional and technical investment
support services to the company. This business model extends the financier’s role into an
advisory and disciplining role, as well as a market support role.138 This strategy is heavily
linked to the twin institutions of cash flow139 and business control rights.140 In addition, it
affords a platform for the alignment of interests on both sides of the funding stream, but with
control flowing from the fund manager’s end of the contractual relationship.141 Private equity
intermediaries design the capital structures142 of their investments in a way that ensures
investor capital is not only preserved, but grown.143
3.3.3 Unlimited by the Asset Characteristics of Venture Companies
The asset character problem that limits the ability of firms to raise capital relates to
the frequent lack of tangible assets that can be collateralised. Research by Titman and
of Financial Economics 133-156; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-des-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert
Vishny, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (2000a) 58 Journal of Financial Economics 3-27;
Gavin Reid, Venture Capital Investment: An Agency Analysis of UK Practice - Routledge Studies in the Modern
World Economy (Routledge 1998).
136 ibid 25 – they advise on the development of new business plans, advise management on product or service
development, sit in the board, can hire and fire management.
137 EVCA, ‘ Key Facts and Figures’ < http://www.evca.eu/publicandregulatoryaffairs/default.aspx?id=86 >
accessed 1 September 2011>
138 Paul Gompers, ‘Optimal Investment, Monitoring and the Staging of Venture Capital’ (1995) 50 Journal of
Finance 1461-1489
139 Jonathan E Cole and Albert L Sokol, ‘Structuring Venture Capital Investments,’ in Bokster, D. (edn), Pratt’s
Guide to Venture Capital Sources (New York, Securities Data Publishing 1998) 31-39
140 Thomas F. Hellman, ‘The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts’ (1998) 29 Rand Journal
of Economics 57 – 76. Also: Eric Berglof, A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance (1994) 10 Journal of
Law, Economics and Organization 247-67
141 Stephen N Kaplan and Per Stromberg, ‘Financial Contract Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical
Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts’ (2003) 70 Review of Economic Studies 281-315
142 Edgar Norton and Bernard Tenenbaum., ‘Factors Affecting the Structure of Venture Capital Deals’ (1992) 30
(3) journal of Small Business Management 20-29 <http://www.epnet.com/ehost/login.html>
143 William A Sahlman, ‘Aspects of Financial Contracting in Venture Capital’ (1988) 1 Journal of Applied
Corporate Finance 23-26
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Wessels, 144 Friend and Lang, 145 and Rajan and Zingales 146 sought to show a positive
correlation between increased debt and expanded tangibility of assets, consistent with the
argument positively linking leverage to the liquidation value of assets as propounded by such
commentators as Williamson147 and Shleifer and Vishny.148 ‘Asset tangibility’ refers to the
ability of a capital-seeking company to evidence tangible assets owned by it (in practice,
found in its balance sheets). Since formal credit is generally collateralised, the deeper a
company’s tangible asset base is, the higher the leverage it can raise.
Other writers suggest that enterprises dependent on future growth for firm value (like
most venture companies in the early and growth phases) employ little or no debt supporting
the notion of ‘ideas-based financing’, such as private equity. Frequently, these choices are not
optional. The long-and-short of this problem is that the more easily company asset-type
allows entrepreneurs to abscond with investor capital, the more difficult it will be for that
company to raise external finance. Asset characteristics that discourage leveraging (bank
credit) make monitoring-based financing ideal.149
3.3.4 The Elements of a Private Equity Transaction
Private equity involves, at a very simplified level, a purchase and a sale agreement.
The process of acquiring shareholding in a company involves a share acquisition (or
subscription) transaction. Realising the value in the shares would require the shareholder to
sell its stake in the company – a sale transaction. These basic transactions underline any
144 Sheridan Titman and Roberto Wessels, ‘The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice’ (1988) 43 Journal of
Finance 1-19.
145 Irwin Friend and Larry HP Lang, ‘An Empirical Test of The Impact of Managerial Self-Interest on Corporate
Capital Structure’ (1988) 43 Journal of Finance 271-81.
146 Raghuram G Rajan and Luigi G Zingales, ‘What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence
From International Data’ (1995) 50 Journal of Finance 1421-60.
147 Oliver Eaton Williamson, ‘Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance’ (1988) 43 Journal of Finance 567-
91.
148 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, ‘Liquidation Value and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium
Approach’ (1992) 47 Journal of Finance 1343-66 - extending Williamson (1988), argue that asset specificity
lower leverage opportunities, because industry-specific assets are less liquid than non-industry specific assets.
149 Rajan and Zingales, Capital Structure 1995 (n 146)
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private equity transaction, regardless of investment segment. The core elements in a private
equity deal could thus be summarized as follows.
Table 3.2 Summary of Elements in a Private Equity Transaction
Primary Transactions150 Financing Mix151 Auxiliary Services Priority Order152
Acquisition
transaction
Debt finance
transaction
Equity finance
transaction
Debt (loans)
Mezzanine (loans)
Bridge (loans)
Equity
 Common
 Preferred
 Convertibles
 Options
 warrants
Merchant Bankers
Lawyers
Accountants
Tax Consultants
Investment Advisors
Analysts
Capital Markets153
Senior Debt (Banks)
Shareholder Loans
 merchant banks
 private equity
partners
 other lenders
Mezzanine Finance
 Sr. subordinated
debt
 Subordinated debt
 Bridge loans
 Partnership loans
 With/without
coupons
Equity layers
 Usually
involve a
‘cash sweep’
feature
 Usually build
in revolving
credit facility
 Financing mix conveys investment control rights – over the business cash-
flows and management decision making (board seats).154
 Share classes carry class rights, even within same share classes, based on
pre-negotiated contract-based rights and obligations155
 Transactions structured to guard against liabilities migrating upstream156
 Transactions structured to anticipate exit strategy
150 Jack S Levin, Structuring Private Equity, Venture Capital and Entrepreneurial Transactions (Aspen, 2011)
1, 1-8, 1-12
151 Titman and Wessels, ‘Capital Structure Choice’ (1988) (n 144), 3
152 Li Jin and Fiona Wang, ‘Leveraged Buyouts: Inception, Evolution and Future Trends’ (2002) 3(6)
Perspectives < http://www.oycf.org/Perspectives2/18_093002/contents.htm> accessed 15 October 2007
153 E.g. Laura C. Field and Gordon Hanka, ‘The Expiration of IPO Share Lockups’ (2001) 56 Journal of Finance
471, 2-3
154 Hellman, ‘Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts’ (1998) (n 140) 57-76; cf: Stephen Kaplan and Johan
Per Stromberg, ‘Financial Contract Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital
Contracts’ (2003) 70 Review of Economic Studies 281-315
155 Yosha S Chan, ‘On the Positive Role of Financial Intermediation in Allocation of Venture Capital in a
Market with Imperfect Information’ (1983) 38 Journal of Finance 1543
156 Levin, Structuring Entrepreneurial Transactions (2011) (n 150) 5-29 – 5-32; 5-56 – 5-63: including unpaid
tax liabilities, pension plan liabilities, withdrawal liabilities for underfunded union pension funds, medical and
life insurances of target’s retirees, environmental cleanup, impact of tax on capital structures, and similar issues.
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Private equity employs different strategies to effect the deal finance transactions it can
leverage the target’s balance sheet, issue subordinated or mezzanine debt which could be
structured as shareholder loans in a stock or share purchase transaction, amalgamate the
target with a new acquisition entity or special purpose vehicle, or use specialised cash
mergers (reverse subsidiary cash merger, reverse to party cash merger or part purchase plus
part redemption of target’s stock).157
Senior debt is secured against the venture companies asset base. Each debt class and
tranche carries varying maturities and repayment terms, however. Some require the
amortisation of principal and scheduled interest payments together. Others have warrants
attaching to the debt, allowing lenders to participate in the equity upside should the
investment be a “home-run” (highly successful).158 Employing PIK-toggles can marginally
raise interest rates.159 Preference share classes can also be designed to accept PIK dividends,
representing interest payments in the form of additional shares of preferred stock.160
The ‘cash sweep’ provision ensures that any cash surpluses (the free cash flow
remaining after priority and mandatory amortisation payments are made) are employed in
principal down payments for all debt classes in order of their seniority. It is not a floating-
charge type instrument; it is attached to specific debt classes during the deal structuring
phase.161
Revolving credit is a type of line of credit that allows the invested venture company
access to working capital should it experience difficulties post-investment and enables the
157 ibid
158 Jonathan Olsen, ‘Note on Leveraged Buyout,’ (2003) Tuck School of Business (Dartmouth, unpublished),
<http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu/search/> , 4
159 Geoffrey Parnass, ‘High Yield Debt Issues Trigger “PIK” Options,’ (EGS LLP, Private Equity Law Review,
19 April 2009) <http://www.privateequitylawreview.com/tags/pik/> accessed 29 April 2011
160 Olsen, ‘Leveraged Buyout,’ 2003 (n 158)
161 ibid
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acquired business to make certain capital investments, and to meet unforeseen costs,
including overruns in operating expenditures, without having to raise new debt.162
Taking the totality of the foregoing transactional features of private equity, it becomes
clear that a country’s legal and institutional environment can potentially exert a strong
influence over how the private equity industry evolves. For instance, questions on the extent
to which companies can self-finance in the buyout process become pertinent. Similarly, the
overall legal framework for mergers and acquisitions could determine the extent to which a
buyout market can grow in a given legal system.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that private equity in its modern form is a relatively
young phenomenon, but one that has undergone substantial changes in its methodology,
sophistication and role in the economic fabric of the countries it has grown in. Four key
observations arise from the discourse in this chapter.
The first is that private equity as an industry can respond to targeted public policy
interventions, yet the reviewed experiences of some less successful public policy projects
offer lessons on design elements: a country seeking to grow private equity through
employment of public policy tools ought to undertake careful evaluation over which aspects
to target.
The second is that private equity is sensitive to shocks in public equity markets, and to
volatility in the banking sector, suggesting the existence of an influential link between private
equity and traditional financial markets – with private equity’s resilience riding substantially
on stability in these primary financial markets. The implication of this deduction is that
162 Li Jin and Fiona Wang, 2002 (n 152)
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public policy for private equity needs to be holistic, taking into account the need for financial
sector deepening across all sectors of the economy.
The third relates to the nature of private equity – and the review in this chapter
indicates that private equity holds out the promise of surmounting barriers to innovation,
creativity and enterprise – by facilitating access to risk capital for firms that would otherwise
not access funding. It has over time developed and adapted specialised financing packages,
investment conditions and approaches, well-suited to differently placed companies. As a tool
in economic management therefore, private equity holds out the opportunity for private sector
growth and development.
Lastly, private equity, like all corporate activity, is prone to excesses. The extent to
which its negative manifestations find room to occur depends strongly on a country’s legal
standards and enforcement ethic. These latter elements frequently turn on the ‘culture’ and
‘ethics’ of the legal system.
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4
SOURCES OF ENTERPRISE FINANCE IN KENYA
4.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter, it was shown that private equity is a type of investor that is
focused on private sector businesses which require different forms of external capital to
finance their operations. The sources of finance available to them vary across jurisdictions,
but generally include bank credit (commercial banks, development banks), and nonbank
credit (investment banks and companies, savings and credit cooperatives, building societies,
and microfinance institutions), public equity markets (stock exchanges, over the counter
markets, bond markets and other regulated equity exchanges), and equity finance (private
equity in all its varieties). This chapter is devoted to an exploration of how private companies
raise their capital requirements. It speaks to four specific questions: what are the sources of
enterprise capital in Kenya? What types of enterprises seek and need financing in Kenya?
What barriers exist in their accessing desired types of financing? What is the private equity
opportunity in Kenya?
In reviewing the sources of enterprise capital in Kenya, this chapter draws partly from
the empirical findings of the surveys and interviews that underpin this study.
Research suggests that the quality of a country’s private sector can be influential in
determining the type of financing available to businesses.1 Development literature is bold in
modelling a similar pathway: that finance and private sector growth revolve around the
1 Thomas Hellman and Manju Puri, ‘The Interaction Between Product Market and Financing Strategy: The Role
of Venture Capital’ (2000) 13:4 Review of Financial Studies 959-984. Cf: Thomas Hellman and Manju Puri,
‘Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-Up Firms: Empirical Evidence’ (2002) 57:1 Journal of
Finance 169-197; Samuel Kortum and Josh Lerner, ‘Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to
Innovation’ (2000) 31:4 Rand Journal 674-692.
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behaviour and performance of firms.2 The ‘quality’ of the private sector is the sum of the type,
condition and structure of the entrepreneurial space in an economy.3 For instance, a country
with a highly formalised private sector is likely to witness a stronger demand for formal types
of business finance compared to a country with a business community that is preponderantly
informal.4 The level of formalisation could affect the quality and extent to which good
collateral can be mobilised by economic operators. Secondly, the financing options available
could turn on factors outside the private sector – such as prudential regulations, and the
ability or, more frequently, the willingness, of formal credit markets to lend against ideas as
opposed to collateral.
Private equity is a commercial undertaking, and a central argument in this
investigation is that the quality of business climate in a country is likely to influence how
private equity grows as an industry in that country. This chapter consequently includes a
short review of the business climate in Kenya, with the objective of illustrating aspects that
could benefit from direct public policy interventions to improve the quality of the business
climate such as would enable private equity to grow.
To set the stage for the discussion that follows, section 4.2 offers a number of
reflections on the supply and demand factors underpinning risk finance generally. Section 4.3
reviews the three main sources of enterprise capital in Kenya: microfinance, bank loans and
public equity sources. These review highlights the central features underpinning each type of
finance: in effect, the providers, and what type of commercial enterprise is most likely to be
well-suited to each.
2 The World Bank, ‘Finance and Private Sector Research’ (2010)
<http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=478071&pagePK=64168176&piPK=64168140&th
eSitePK=478060> accessed 20 October 2011.
3OECD, ‘Measuring Entrepreneurship – A Digest of Indicators’ (2008) OECD – Eurostat Entrepreneurship
Indicators Programme,<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/23/41664409.pdf>
4 By formal is meant the status of a business enterprise as an officially registered or otherwise legally constituted
venture. By informal is meant businesses that are unregistered, often led by sole entrepreneurs, frequently do not
have fixed and known business addresses, and mostly family-based.
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To resolve the second issue, section 4.4 offers an analysis of the investment climate,
as well as a descriptive analysis of the structure of the private sector in Kenya. This review
shows how a challenging business environment negatively impacts the emergence of strong
companies which would in turn drive a stronger demand for different types of enterprise
finance. In addition, the review offers a typology of an average capital-seeking enterprise in
Kenya: showing how a certain type of company would experience significant barriers in
raising different types of enterprise capital in Kenya.
To address the third issue (barriers to enterprise capital in Kenya), section 4.5 teases
out the most prevalent forms of barriers identified in the course of the study: including the
quality of collateral necessary to support bank loans, the cost of bank loans (interest rates),
the problem of business informality and how this relates to both bank and capital market
sources of finance, the impact of negative business practices as a barrier to finance. In
addition, the quality of the banking sector is reviewed, with special focus on the historical
fragility of the banking sector and how negative public policy contributed to weakening the
commercial banking sector, and how a weak banking sector in turn failed to serve the
country’s business community. Finally, the section also reviews the range of products
available in the formal credit markets.
Based on these reviews, section 4.6 reflects on the implications this chapter raises for
private equity development in Kenya. Particularly, it highlights the role that private equity
could play, better clarifying the extent to which law and legal institutions have a part to play.
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4.2 Supply and Demand Drivers to Risk Finance – Some Issues
Research has shown that public policy can impede or promote access to enterprise
capital.5 The condition of a country’s private sector, thus, could be said to mirror that
country’s legal and political outlook: if the legal system is effective – that is, stable and
predictable - and the political philosophy supports enterprise and protects private property,
productive entrepreneurship that supports economic growth is likely to expand. 6 Such
entrepreneurship requires fit-for-purpose financing for optimal expansion. These are the
demand drivers for business finance. The thesis in official studies and policies on private
sector development in Kenya suggest that difficulties in accessing finance, opaque tax
regimes, poor infrastructure, corruption, insecurity and burdensome business regulations
continue to frustrate entrepreneurship.7
Supply-side factors are just as important, however – and by this are meant the various
sources of and motivations for making financing available to business ventures. In this
respect, therefore, the depth of the money and capital markets in a country, can effectively
determine both type and quantity of enterprise finance available for business ventures. By
money markets are meant credit sources such as bank financing and other sources of debt
finance. By capital markets is meant the market for securities either through a regulated
exchange or bond markets. If a country’s money and capital markets are shallow from a
liquidity perspective, it is not likely that sources of business finance would be well-developed.
5 Deepak Lal, Foreword, in Benjamin Powell (ed), Making Poor Nations Rich: Entrepreneurship and the
Process of Economic Development, (Independent Institute, Stanford, California © 2008)
6ibid, Benjamin Powell, ch 1.
7 These policy studies include the FIAS Study on Administrative Barriers to Investment in Kenya, 2004; the
Sessional Papey 2/ 2005 on the Development of Micro- and Small Enterprises for Wealth and Employment
Creation; the Private Sector Development Strategy (PSDS) 2006-2010, the Economic Recovery Strategy for
Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS) 2003-2007; the Investment Climate Action Plan (ICAP) 2005; and
Vision 2030. Also, The Master Plan Study for Kenyan Industrial Development (MAPSKID ) 2007, Ministry of
Trade and Industry < http://www.ministryoftradeandindustry.go.ke/ > accessed 20 January 2011
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In situations where demand for enterprise finance outstrips supply, it is likely that
institutional sources of enterprise finance would be inefficient. 8 Procedural barriers that
complicate access to finance – for example, bureaucratising collateral requirements on both
quantity and quality, or the length of time the applicant enterprise should have been trading
successfully prior to applying - might be observed more frequently. The more onerous these
requirements are, and depending on the structural context of the private sector, the higher the
likelihood that businesses within such a jurisdiction would experience financial exclusion to
varying degrees.9
In contrast, where money and capital markets are well developed, and the number of
intermediating institutions is high, there is likely to be a healthy competition in financial
product innovation, meaning the financial markets are more likely to be responsive to the
needs of an economy, and likely to be more able to innovate financing solutions to meet the
needs of the business community. Conditions for access to financing would also most likely
be less onerous, and may not be motivated by an intrinsic desire to limit the number of
qualifying applicants.10
In reality, however, but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the
demand and supply factors do not operate in isolation. For the capital provider, the quality of
the ‘demand’ can effectively shape the quality and type of the supply. This is how: business
lenders and financiers are motivated by profit. How much profit a financing opportunity
promises depends on any number of factors including the volume or scale of financing (larger
8 Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole, ‘Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector’ (1997)
112:3 Quarterly Journal of Economics 663-91.
9 Simon Johnson, John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff, ‘Property Rights and Finance’ (2002) 92:5 The
American Economic Review 1335-1355.
10 Margaret Miller, Nataliya Mylenko and Shalini Sankaranayanan, ‘Financial Infrastructure – Building Access
Through Transparent and Stable Financial Systems’ (2009) International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and International Finance Corporation. 1
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/.../...0.html> accessed
23 January 2012 – “access to finance is the result of a complex interplay of different financial intermediaries,
the right kind of financial infrastructure, and a sound legal and regulatory framework”.
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credits yield higher profits, lowers monitoring costs), character of the opportunity (e.g., a
very high risk, high return venture), consumer profile (e.g. a captive market, a growing
market, a single consumer), regulatory costs (issues around compliance) and, frequently in a
developing economy context, the prevailing economic policies of the day. Any funding
application would invariably ride on the foregoing pillars, and this is what is characterised as
demand in this chapter.
From a financial contracting framework, private equity financial contracts - like all
commercial contracts - are designed to speak to (i) the dynamics of the business transaction,
(ii) the special circumstances of the contracting parties – especially those likely to introduce
risks to contract objectives, and (iii) the various options available within a legal jurisdiction
for the promotion and, where necessary, the enforcement of obligations. Understanding the
larger themes defining the occurrence – and terms - of financial contracts in Kenya, is a
useful step towards exposing elements open to policy reform with the view to improving the
business climate for private equity finance to occur.11
4.3 Kenya’s Financial and Money Market Institutions
4.3.1 The General Financial Infrastructure in Kenya
Kenya’s financial sector, generally considered to be one of the broadest and most
sophisticated in Sub-Saharan Africa, 12 is made up of two main types of institutional
intermediaries: money market institutions and financial market institutions. Money market
11 Marco da Rin, Giovanna Nicodano, and Alessandro Sembenelli, Public Policy and the Creation of Active
Venture Capital Markets, European Central Bank, Working Paper Series 430/2005 <http://www.ecb.int.>
accessed 20 October 2011.
12 Klaus Schwab, ‘Global Competitiveness Report 2011’ (World Economic Forum, 2011) 55
<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-11.pdf> accessed 20 October
2011.
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institutions refer to financial institutions affiliated to the banking sector, while capital markets
institutions are those financial institutions affiliated directly with the public equity markets in
the country.
As of 2011, money market institutions comprised 43 banks, 13 6 licensed deposit-
taking microfinance institutions(MFIs)14 and 52 unregistered micro finance institutions, 5,892
licensed banking agents, 6 nonbank financial institutions, 1 mortgage finance institution,15 4
building societies, 127 licensed foreign exchange bureaux, 17 pension funds supporting 1,216
pension schemes,16 and 6,473 Savings and Credit Cooperative Companies (SACCOs), as well
as a range of insurance schemes and mutual funds.
Within the capital market framework, there were, in 2011, 4 types of approved
institutions, 6 stock brokers, 19 investment banks, 20 investment advisers, 18 fund managers
(6 being high-risk debt and related investment services, 1 being a venture capital fund, and 11
being traditional asset management companies), 7 approved Employee Share Ownership
(ESOP) schemes, 11 approved collective investment (CIS) schemes, 15 authorized
depositories, and 20 investment advisors.17
13 Schedule 1, Central Bank of Kenya Act of 1966, Cap 491 Laws of Kenya; Central Bank of Kenya,
‘Introduction to Financial System’ <http://www.centralbank.go.ke/financial system/banks/Introduction.aspx >
accessed 15 August 2011: Out of the 44 banks, 31 are locally owned; 13 are foreign owned. Out of the 31 local
banks, 3 comprise banks with significant government state corporations shareholding (National Bank of Kenya
is 70.6% government owned; Consolidated Bank is 77% government owned; Development Bank of Kenya is
100% government owned); 27 are commercial banks.
14 Central Bank of Kenya, ‘Deposit Taking Microfinance Institutions’
<http://www.centralbank.go.ke/financialsystem/microfinance/deposittaking.aspx> accessed 15 August 2011:
these are Faulu Kenya DTM Ltd; Kenya Women Finance Trust DTM Ltd; Remu DTM Ltd; SMEP DTM Ltd;
UWEZO DTM Ltd; Rafiki DTM – with a total of 54 branches nationwide between them.
15 Central Bank of Kenya, Introduction to Financial System (n 12)
16 Retirement Benefits Authority, ‘Registered Schemes’,
<http://www.rba.go.ke/media/docs/schemes/Registered-Schemes.pdf > accessed 8 October 2011
17 Kenya Gazette Vol.CXII-No.45 of 30 April 2011, published by the CMA in compliance with sections 11(3)
and 27(1) of the Act.
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In the following sub-sections, each of the financing options outlined above is
considered in greater detail under four themes: micro-finance, credit and cooperative societies,
bank finance and capital market financing solutions.
4.3.2 Micro-Finance
The micro-finance sector in Kenya comprises a range of institutions including
microfinance banks, wholesale MFIs, retail MFIs, development institutions and insurance
companies.18 The MFI industry currently serves an estimated 6.5 million Kenyan families and
households through its 52 registered members, all of whom are currently overseeing an
outstanding loan portfolio of KES29 billion (roughly USD310 million).19
MFIs in Kenya can be either registered as deposit-taking MFIs or non-deposit taking
MFIs. MFIs subject to regulatory oversight are regulated by the Central Bank of Kenya,
under the Microfinance Act of 2006.20 As of at end 2011, there were 5 licensed deposit-
taking MFIs.21 A deposit-taking business is one that holds itself out as accepting deposits on
day to day basis, and conducts its business through lending or extending credit at its own
risk.22 The Central Bank has additionally approved 34 other microfinance business names –
the first step towards registration as a deposit-taking MFI in Kenya.23
18 Association of Microfinance Institutions of Kenya (AMFI), ‘Membership’
<http://www.amfikenya.com/pages.php?p=1> accessed 10 October 2011: serving 6.5 million clients, with
outstanding loan portfolio of over Ksh.29 billion (roughly over $310 million).
19 ibid
20 No.19, s 5, Laws of Kenya
21 Central Bank of Kenya, ‘Deposit Taking Microfinance Institutions’ <
http://www.centralbank.go.ke/financialsystem/microfinance/deposittaking.aspx> accessed 9 September
2011.These were: Faulu Kenya DTM Ltd; Kenya Women Finance Trust DTM Ltd; Remu DTM Ltd; SMEP
DTM Ltd; and Uwezo DTM Ltd – all licensed between May 2009 and December 2010.
22 Microfinance Act 2006, s 2
23 Central Bank of Kenya, ‘Annual Report’ (2010) 44 <
http://www.centralbank.go.ke/downloads/publications/annualreports/cbk/annual_2009-10.pdf> accessed 10
September 2011
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Micro-finance has been catalytic in the emergence of some of Kenya’s major
commercial banks. Equity Bank Ltd and Family Bank Ltd were initially building societies.24
K-REP Bank Ltd was a non-governmental organisation offering microfinance services.25
Cooperative Bank of Kenya Ltd was a cooperative society.26 All four banks grew out of the
historically narrow market penetration of traditional forms of banking in Kenya, and they
continue to define the country’s microfinance landscape. It was estimated that in 2010,
formal banking institutions held $17.8billion in assets, compared to $1.5billion held by
MFIs.27
There are in Kenya a number of other institutions whose financing solutions fit
properly within a ‘micro-finance’ definition – and these include unregistered micro-finance
lenders, mobile money payment systems, development finance institutions, non-
governmental organisations practising micro-finance, and informal self-help groups and
unlicensed money lenders. 28 In terms of relative market share, commercial banks are
estimated to serve a total of 22.6% of Kenya’s adult population, while microfinance
institutions serve an estimated 17.9%. Informal financial markets including non-
governmental organisations, self-help groups and money lenders serve an additional 22.8% of
Kenyans. The foregoing suggests that a total of 32.7% of Kenya’s adult population do not
have access to any form of financial services.29
Micro-finance in all its varieties is provided in the form of short-term loans, usually
secured against some form of collateral. Sector specialisation within the micro-finance
24 Mix Market,’ Micro Finance in Kenya: Country Briefing’ (2010) <
http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/country/Kenya/report#node-26111-link> accessed 6 September 2011
25 ibid
26 ibid
27 CIA Fact Book 2010 < https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html> accessed
18 August 2011
28 Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, Kenya (March 2011) <
http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.13733> accessed 20 October 2011
29 Mix Market, ‘Micro Finance in Kenya: Country Briefing’ (2010) <
http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/country/Kenya/report#node-26111-link> accessed 6 September 2011
114
industry also aids in relational contracting, reducing the perception of risk and driving
commercial trust. The simple fact of the sector’s substantial growth in Kenya is indicative
that the unique contracting strategies within the industry continue to be effective.
The Microfinance Act of 2006 imposes licensing and transparency requirements,30
deposit protection requirements (up to Ksh.100,000 per depositor)31 and also makes provision
for dissolution of institutions, 32 corporate governance, 33 performance and accounting
standards34 and supervision by the Central Bank of Kenya.35 The Act was revised in 2008 to
create two categories of deposit-taking MFIs, one styled ‘community-based MFIs’ and the
other ‘nationwide MFIs’. Capital requirements were relaxed for the former, and they can
convert to the nation-wide status. Nation-wide MFIs cannot convert to community-based
status because of the lighter operational conditions.36
Non-deposit taking (or ‘credit only’) MFIs are not regulated by the Central Bank of
Kenya. They can be regulated by the Savings and Credit Cooperatives Societies Regulatory
Authority (SASRA) where they qualify as SACCOs, or by the Non-Governmental
Organisations Council under the NGO Coordination Act No.19 of 1990 if they are NGOs.
All other MFIs that do not fit any of the foregoing descriptions are unregulated – and there is
an ongoing debate on how to bring this unregulated group of MFIs under the sector’s broad
regulatory framework.37
The AMFI has adopted a code of conduct and a generic constitution that it
recommends to all its members to abide by. These efforts augment the minimum statutory
30 Microfinance Act, ss 4,5,6,7,8,9,10
31 ibid, The Microfinance (Deposit Taking Microfinance Deposit Protection Fund) Regulations, 2009
32 Microfinance Act No.19 2006, s 38, Laws of Kenya
33 ibid ss 11-22, Part III (Governance)
34 ibid ss 23-34
35 ibid ss 8, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42
36 ibid s 7, 48(2) – implemented in: The Microfinance (Categorization of Deposit-Taking Microfinance
Institutions) Regulations, 2008, Legal Notice No.57 of 2008.
37 Mix Market, ‘Micro Finance in Kenya: Country Briefing’ (2010) <
http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/country/Kenya/report#node-26111-link> accessed 6 September 2011.
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standards, and importantly introduce development-orientated standards including social
responsibility, environmental management and financial sustainability.38
For purposes of this thesis, micro-finance, while serving an important economic role,
is not a solution well-suited to the kind of economic activity that private equity financing
would be financing – supporting the need for private equity’s specialised approaches and
solutions to enterprise growth.
4.3.3 Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies
Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOS) are regulated by the SASRA, in
accordance with the SACCO Societies Act No.14 of 2008.39 As stated earlier, there were
some 6,473 such schemes as at end 2010. This estimate is inconclusive, however, as there
does not yet exist a national unified register of such entities.
SACCOs fill a critical gap left open by stringent bank regulations on personal finance.
There are generally three core types of SACCOs in Kenya, clustered according to either type
or geographic location. Firstly, there are the urban SACCOs, headquartered in Nairobi, with
branches around the main cities and towns in the country, and managing substantial asset
bases (up to KES15 billion in some SACCOs by some estimates).40 Then there are rural
SACCOs, serving rural populations (most of whom are otherwise unbanked as section 4.4
establishes). Rural SACCOs are frequently the only form of financing available in some of
Kenya’s remotest communities. Thirdly, there are employer-based SACCOs, set up by
38 AMFI, ‘Kenyan MFI Practitioners Make Historic Decisions on 20th August 2010’
<http://www.amfikenya.com/pages.php?p=65&ID=26> ( n 17)
39 ss 4 (establishment), 5 (objects and functions), 23-28 (licensing regime), 48 (regulation of SACCO Societies)
40 FSD Kenya, ‘Automation of SACCOs: An Assessment of Potential Solutions’ (March 2010) 13
<http://www.fsdkenya.org/pdf_documents/10-09-22_SACCO_automation_report.pdf> accessed 19 February
2012
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employers across different economic sectors to expand financing solutions to their employees.
Fourthly, there are agricultural SACCOs, linked to the main agricultural sectors in Kenya
(such as tea, coffee, rice), and they serve agricultural communities (farmers) across the
country.
In terms of structure, SACCOs fall into two types: credit only and deposit-taking
SACCOs. The former simply make credit available to members through giving their
members a flexible savings facility implementing a check-off system managed by the various
payroll services. Entry is easy and exit is easy. Members are allowed to access their savings
at any time, and when they require a loan, the terms and conditions are easy to comply with.
They generally permit members to leverage their shares up to three times (‘shares’ being the
face-value of their cash savings in their SACCO account), repayable over a maximum period
of 48 months in most cases. SACCOS have also diversified their financing products
(‘development loans’, ‘emergency loans’, ‘school fees loans’, and ‘construction loans’) while
preserving the procedural simplicity of the funding framework.41
Deposit-taking SACCOs offer front office savings activities (FOSA), and are now
subject to stringent regulations under the SASRA. It was estimated that there were about 200
deposit-taking SACCOs in Kenya in 2010, and it is on record that at least 66 more were
licensed by SASRA by the end of 2011. 42
SACCOs enable the lower end of capital consumers to finance small-scale business
ventures, as well as various consumer needs. Importantly for this study, SACCOs are not
41 For an illustration: Kenya Union of Savings and Credit Organisations (KUSCO), ‘Loans’
<http://www.kuscco.com/index.php/publications/cat_view/50-loans> accessed 19 February 2012
accessed 19 February 2012
42KUSCO, ‘Deposit-Taking SACCOs Licensed by SASRA’ (2011)
<http://www.kuscco.com/dmdocuments/licensedsaccos.pdf> accessed 19 February 2012
117
sources of substantial enterprise capital, and while they serve a critical socio-economic need,
the critical problem of lack of effective enterprise capital for fast growing SMEs persists.
Contextualising the foregoing framework into this study, both MFIs and SACCOs
meet a critical societal need, but do not effectively address the funding gap in Kenya.
4.3.4 Bank Loans
Medium and large enterprises in Kenya can, generically speaking, raise their
financing requirements from (i) commercial banks, (ii) development finance institutions, and
(iii) investment companies.
When providing an overview of the financial system in Kenya earlier in this chapter,
it was shown that there are 43 banks in Kenya. 31 of these are commercial banks. A review of
the broad range of bank products available to the business community shows the following
products on offer by Kenya’s banks:43
 Short-term, syndicated and term loans and overdrafts – loans can be secured or
unsecured – conditions vary across banks
 Bonds and commercial paper
 Trade finance (letters of credit, pre/post import finance, invoice and bill
discounting, stock finance, guarantees and bonds, business advisory services)
 Asset finance (vehicle/assets, insurance premium finance, leasing)
43 Generally, Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd < http://www.barclays.com>; Kenya Commercial Bank <
http://www.kcbbankgroup.com>; Cooperative Bank of Kenya Ltd < http://www.co-opbank.co.ke>; Standard
Chartered Bank of Kenya Ltd < http://www.standardchartered.com/ke/en>; CFC Stanbic Bank <
http://www.stanbicbank.co.ke/portal/site/kenya> all accessed 8 October 2011
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 Custodial services
 Transactional banking
 SME loans (Cooperative Bank making available up to Ksh.50 million per
borrower, and Standard Chartered Bank offering a range of specialised
products for SMEs including working capital, business expansion, business
protection, yield enhancement and cross-border banking).
Commercial bank loans and advances attracted a lending rate of 14.29% in July 2010,
compared to 13.3% in 2007, and 13.1% in 2005, while savings yielded 1.55% and deposits
3.85% returns in July 2010, compared to 1.55% and 1.7% respectively in 2007, and 1.4% for
both in 2005. Overdrafts in July 2010 attracted an interest rate of 14.03%, compared to 13%
in 2007, and 13.7% in 2005.44
As of October 2011, lending rates had risen beyond 25% for commercial loans as a
result of a devalued shilling, which shed nearly 25% of its value over the preceding twelve
months (October 2010). The main factors driving the depreciation of the Kenya shilling
included the effects of the Great Recession (which slowed down Europe as an important
export market for Kenya),45 and capital flight46 (estimated at over USD201 million – or
KES17 billion).47 Governments around the world have responded differently to the Great
Recession. In the UK, quantitative easing measures formed a central part of the credit
44 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics ( 2008) < http://www.knbs.or.ke/> accessed 10 October 2011
45 BBC, ‘G20 Ministers Meeting to Discuss Eurozone Debt Crisis’ (BBC, 14 October 2011)
< http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15302908> accessed 20 October 2011.
46Andrew Burns and Theo Janse van Rensburg, ‘Global Economic Prospects: Vulnerabilities and Uncertainties’
(The World Bank, 2012) 8, 27-28.
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/GEPEXT/0,,contentMDK
:21021075~menuPK:51087945~pagePK:51087946~piPK:51087916~theSitePK:538110,00.html >
47 Geoffrey Irungu, ‘Flight of sh17bn in foreign currency sparked shilling’s rapid fall as banks moved to cash in’
(Business Daily, Nairobi, 16 February 2012)
<http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate+News/Flight+of+Sh17bn+in+forex+sparked++shilling+rapid+
fall/-/539550/1329102/-/9gxeegz/-/index.html> accessed 19 February 2012
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response mechanisms,48 in addition to other approaches adopted generally across Western
Europe.49
Commercial banks in Kenya lend against collateral for the most part. As the
discussion below suggests, for the SME sector, business informality militates against the
accumulation of good collateral, meaning that access to substantial amounts of bank finance
to meet business needs will be a significant barrier for a large proportion of the private sector.
The effect of the Great Recession in Kenya on enterprise finance has been on the cost of bank
credit.50 With strict collateral requirements, enterprises that do not have strong asset bases
find formal credit inaccessible.
4.3.5 Public Equity Markets
Public equity markets are another source of substantial enterprise finance in
Kenya, but only to specific types of businesses that can meet the stringent listing
requirements, detailed below. A company in Kenya can meet its financing requirements by
selling its shares to the public through the regulated capital markets operating under the
Nairobi Stock Exchange (the NSE). Where this avenue is adopted for the first time in a
company’s capital structuring, the process is termed an initial public offering (IPO), subject
to specified listing rules.51 The Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) was officially established in
48 David Miles, ‘Monetary Policy and Financial Dislocation’ (Bank of England, 10 October 2011)
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2011/093.htm> accessed 20 October 2011 – as of January
2012, a total of £325 in quantitative easing had been injected into the British economy.
49 The World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2012 ( n 45) 5 – including bank sector reforms, facilitated
access of banks to dollar markets and medium-term ECB funding, reinforcement of European financial stability,
passage of fiscal and structural reform packages in Greece, Italy and Spain, and agreement on a pan-European
fiscal compact.
50 The Central Bank of Kenya < http://www.centralbank.go.ke/> accessed 10 September 2011
51 The Capital Markets (Securities)(Public Offers Listing and Disclosure) Regulations 2002.
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1954 as a voluntary association of stock brokers registered under the Societies Act of the
Kenyan Colony.52
The NSE has three investment segments: the main investment segment or the MIMS,
the alternative investments segment or the AIMS, and the Fixed Income Security Market
Segment or the FISMS.53 As of August 2011, there were 58 listed companies on the MIMS (7
agribusiness firms, 8 companies in commercial services, 2 telecommunication and technology,
4 automobiles and accessories, 10 banking, 5 insurance, 4 investment businesses, 9
manufacturing and allied firms, 5 construction and allied, and 4 energy and petroleum). There
were 8 companies on the AIMS, and 13 fixed income securities on the FISMS (including
preference shares, floating rate notes, medium term floating rate notes, medium term
unsecured notes, subordinated bonds, public infrastructure bonds, government infrastructure
bonds and treasury bonds).54 In total, there are 79 listings as of 2011 - in 56 years since the
Exchange was first established.55
There is anecdotal evidence that an over-the-counter (OTC) market that expands
trading platforms within the capital markets framework is currently operational and quite
active in Kenya.56 It is unregulated, however, and register keepers for trading companies are
reluctant to divulge information about their clientele. Newspaper reports suggest that as many
as 200 companies are gearing for trade within the OTC market, which became fully active
52 Nairobi Stock Exchange, ‘History of the Organisation’ (Nairobi Stock Exchange, 10 October 2011) <
http://www.nse.co.ke/about-nse/history-of-the-organisation.html > accessed 10 October 2011 – for a detailed
history of the NSE
53 The Nairobi Stock Exchange, Listing Manual, para 7.2, 31 <http://www.nse.co.ke/listed-companies/listing-
rules.html> accessed 10 October 2011.
54 Nairobi Stock Exchange, < http://www.nse.co.ke/> accessed 22 September 2010
55 Nairobi Stock Exchange, ‘Equity Statistics’ (Nairobi Stock Exchange, 10 October 2011),
<http://www.nse.co.ke/market-statistics/equity-statistics.html> accessed 10 October 2011. As of 7 October
2011, market capitalisation stood at KES884.29 billion – down from KES1.136 trillion in August 2010, and
KES1.143 trillion in July, 2010. As a share of GDP, this represents a market capitalisation of 0.39486% in
August 2010, and 0.39729% in July 2010 – based on current GDP calculated at USD35.611 billion at market
prices.
56 John Gachiri, ‘Vibrant over the counter market lists 13 new firms’ (Nairobi, Business Daily, 26 October
2011) < http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Vibrant+over+the+counter+market+lists+13+new+firms/-
/539552/1262376/-/c8k7yo/-/index.html> accessed 28 October 2011
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from around the year 2006. The Capital Markets Authority is working on amendments to the
Capital Markets Act of 1989 to mainstream the OTC market – for businesses in the market to
fundraise through listings.57
It is thus defensible to observe that the stock exchange is yet to see robust activity in
terms of listings especially by SMEs, supporting the general trends in private equity exit
strategies that currently disfavour the stock markets.58
Listing regulations for the MIMs at the NSE require the following of every company
seeking to list for the first time on the bourse:59
(i) the issuance of an information memorandum meeting the requirements of the
CMA, and so approved by the CMA, and carrying a whole range of
disclosures for that purpose;
(ii) the issuer must be an incorporated company limited by shares under
national law;
(iii) the issuer’s authorised and issued share capital must be not less than fifty
million Kenya shillings of ordinary fully paid up shares;
(iv) the issuer’s net assets immediately prior to listing must be not less than
Kenya shillings one hundred million;
(v) additionally, the issuer is required to have current audited financial
statements, in the IFRS format, not older than four months prior to listing
application, prepared on going concern basis;
57 Capital Markets Authority, ‘Amendments to the Capital Markets Act to Remove Barriers to Trading of Listed
Securities 2011’
<http://www.cma.or.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=151&Itemid=32>
58 Ch 5, 188
59 Regulation 6, Capital Markets (Securities)(Public Offers Listing and Disclosure) Regulations 2002.
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(vi) the issuer is also required to procure that 25% of its issued shares are held
by no less than 1000 subscribers immediately following the offer;
(vii) and there are various stringent requirements on the integrity and
competence of the directors and senior management of the listing firm.
As section 4.4 demonstrates, a large proportion of Kenya’s private sector would not be
able to meet the foregoing basic listing requirements, meaning that a large proportion of the
country’s private sector is structurally excluded from the country’s equity markets. As an
economic tool for enterprise development, therefore, the NSE is yet to become a strategic
development partner in Kenya, 57 years on.
With the proposed establishment of a new market segment as a regulated exchange to
serve microenterprises, this legacy might change.60 To list, a microenterprise will be required
to meet a lowered asset threshold, but be required to have sound management standards
sufficient to engender investor confidence and market probity.61 This is not a novel idea – it
has been adopted, with varying outcomes, in other jurisdictions in the past.62 However, the
manner in which a country’s capital markets are organised could have a lasting effect on how
businesses are created and grown – and the law has been a popular instrument in achieving
these goals.63 To understand the character and size of the demand for private equity in Kenya,
the next section considers the quality of Kenya’s private sector.
60 John Gachiri, ‘Bourse plans to lower barriers and attract SMEs’ (Business Daily, Nairobi, 6 April 2010)
<http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Bourse+plans+to+lower+barriers+and+attract+SMEs/-/1248928/893458/-
/qw5k5m3/-/index.html> accessed 10 October 2011.
61 Capital Markets Authority, ‘The Capital Markets (Securities) (Public Offers, Listings and Disclosures)
(Amendment) Regulations 2011 – yet to be approved: propose to set up the Small and Medium Enterprise
Market Segment, and to regulate a new cadre of investment advisors named ‘nominated advisors’
<http://www.cma.or.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=9&Itemid=32 >
62 Laura Bottazzi and Marco Da Rin, Europe’s New Stock Markets, CEPR Discussion Paper 3521/2002 – during
the 1990s, many European countries opened such platforms within their stock exchanges.
63 Claudio Michelacci and Javier Suarez, ‘Business Creation and the Stock Market Studies’ (2004) 71:2 Review
of Economic 459-81.
4.4 Analysing Kenya’s Capital Consumers: The Private Sector
4.4.1 High-Level Demographics
Kenya had a population of 38,610,097 million according to the 2009 Population and
Housing Census report.64 32.3% of Kenyans under that report are urbanised, while 67.7%
remain rural. Only 3.6% households own at least one computer, while about 63.2% own or
have access to a mobile phone.
Chart 4.1: Selected Economic Indicators
Source: Kenya Population and Housing
For consumer-orientat
with under-14s numbering more than 16.4 million, and the over
64 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Kenya Population and Housi
<http://www.knbs.or.ke/Census%20Results/KNBS%20Brochure.pdf
Census Report, 2009
ed industries, persons aged 15-64 years number 20.7 million,
-65s numbering only 1.3
ng Census Report’ (2009)
.> accessed 23 0ctober 2010
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million persons. This latter statistic is consistent with the low longevity among Kenyans (life
expectancy currently placed at around 58 years).65
These indices are illuminating when viewed as proxies to an entrepreneurial culture.
A majority of the populace is un-urbanised, and there are very low levels of internet
technology penetration – proxied by computer ownership and mobile phone ownership.
These facts suggest a low information and communication technology uptake in the country,
implying innovative entrepreneurship in this sector remains shallow. As drivers of risk capital,
therefore, the foregoing development indices would have a strong bearing on the type of
business enterprise that is likely to be preponderant in Kenya: one that is likely to be small or
informal.
Access to modern living amenities remains low: 74.1% of Kenyans use a pit latrine,
while a substantial 20.7% still go to the bush: a poor human development indicator. Access to
piped water remains low as well, with only 15.6% of the rural and 52.6% of urban
populations having access to piped water. The rest of the population draw their water from a
variety of sources including ponds, dams, rivers/streams, boreholes, lakes, rain-harvest and
water vendors.66 With a largely rural population, and strong indices of human under-
development, it is not surprising that the unbanked population stood at 77.4%, as shown in
the chart above. This has contributed to a low capital formation in the country – placed at
about 20%, also depicted in the chart above.67 Financial exclusion (a term used to describe
lack of access to any form of banking services) has a negative effect on the quality of
65 ibid 4,5
66 ibid 5,6.
67 ibid
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collateral that organisations or business people are able to consolidate, complicating the
prospects of accessing different types of external finance.68
The debt literature suggests that ability to raise debt finance into a company’s balance
sheet operates as a positive signal to other external investors. 69 Firstly, it might indicate that
the company’s shares are not over-valued; secondly, since debt finance is usually through a
bank loan, the ability to acquire debt funding signals the lender’s confidence in the borrower
as a creditworthy and stable (profitable) bet; thirdly, it suggests the borrower’s ability to
generate free cash flows while still meeting its debt finance obligations. Companies without
sufficient asset depth would usually have thin balance sheets that cannot support formal bank
loans – a factor that could operate to turn private equity away.70
Applying Porter et al’s (2002)71 taxonomy of factor-driven economies (that is, under-
developed economies facing multiple development challenges) to Kenya based on the
demographic profile laid out above, Kenya is a factor-driven economy with institutional,
infrastructural, macro-economic, health and primary education challenges. In World Bank
parlance, it is a ‘low income’ economy, denoting widespread under-development across all
sectors of development.72 Under these conditions, the private sector labours under various
68 FSD Kenya, ‘Costs of Collateral in Kenya: Opportunities for Reform’ (September, 2009) 8
<www.fsdkenya.org/pdf.../09-11-24_Costs_of_Collateral_Study.pdf> accessed 21 December 2011
69 Bengt and Tirole, Financial Intermediation, (1997) ( n 7) 663.
70 H. Kent Baker and Halil Kiymaz (eds), The Art of Capital Restructuring: Creating Shareholder Value
through Mergers and Acquisitions (new Jersey, John Wiley & Sons, 2011) 210, 211.
71 Michael E. Porter, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and John W. MacArthur, ‘Executive Summary: Competitiveness and
Stages of Economic Development’ in M.E. Porter, J.J. Sachs, P.K. Cornelius, J.W. MacArthur and K. Schwab
(eds), The Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002 (2002, New York, NY, Oxford University Press) 16-25.
72 World Bank Country Classification: Kenya – using the GNI methodology, <
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups#Sub_Saharan_Africa>
accessed 23 October 2011
126
structural inefficiencies, and the entrepreneurial culture is necessity-driven, meaning people
are forced to create self-employment to survive.73
Private equity, chapter 3 illustrated, follows fast-growing and innovative firms. Given
the statistics set out above, it is defensible to observe that an economy that fails to address
human development issues would find it extremely difficult to culture and nurture conditions
that support creative enterprise, and consequently would not be likely to support the growth
of an influential private equity industry. Public policies aimed at addressing the preceding
human development needs would indirectly help unlock entrepreneurship in Kenya. It was
suggested in the introduction to this chapter that the type of private sector that prevailing
economic conditions permits to emerge would significantly shape the forms and types of
financing solutions that emerge and develop within that economy. These are thus
interdependent factors.
4.4.2 Selected Economic Indicators
According to the World Bank, in 2010, Kenya’s GDP stood at USD31,408,632,915,
while GNI per capita stood at USD790, and the estimated population stood at 40,512,682.74
As depicted in Chart 4.1, above, dependency on agriculture (27% of GDP), exports (27% of
GDP) and services – including financial intermediation - (54% of GDP) are the defining
symptoms of the developing nature of Kenya’s economy. 75 These features are largely
73 N. Bosma and J. Levie, ‘Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2009) Executive Report’ 8
<http://www.gemconsortium.org/download/1280955713663/GEM%202009%20Global%20Report%20Rev%20
140410.pdf> accessed 3 August 2010.
74 ibid (employing the GNI methodology).
75 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Facts and Figures’ (2008)
<http://www.knbs.or.ke/knbsinformation/pdf/Facts%20and%20Figures%202009.pdf> 5, 11,17 accessed 23
0ctober 2010
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consistent with the demographic profile set out in the preceding section: that a majority of
Kenyans are remain un-urbanized
Inflation largely remained in single digits for the most part of the 2000s decade, save
the year 2008 when it hit 13.1% as a result of exogenous circumstances arising from a violent
protest at disputed presidential elections. In 2011, inflation jumped above 20%, and lending
rates increased as the cost of inter-bank borrowing rose. In effect, economic volatility in
Kenya is a substantial impediment to a robust entrepreneurial space. High interest rates, low
gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP, and an overwhelming section of the populace
remaining unbanked, limit opportunities for a high quality private sector to emerge, stifling
the demand for enterprise capital.
Between 2003 and 2007, Kenya’s economy was strongly resurgent, registering growth
rates between 4.5% and 7.1%.76 In 2008, it dipped to 1.8% in the first two quarters of that
year following political instability, but recovered during the fourth quarter and the following
year to the region of 5%.77 In 2011, the target growth rate was revised downwards as a result
of exogenous shocks in the global commodities markets, debt crises in Europe and the cost of
imports into Kenya.
Chart 4.2 below compares the growth trajectory of Kenya’s economy to a few
comparator African economies: Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt. The chart demonstrates that
it is only the South African and Egyptian economies that have sustained constant and
dynamic growth paths over the last three decades, with South Africa’s being more dramatic.
The Nigerian economy grew robustly in the 1970s, and fell sharply in the 1980s,
recovering modestly in the 2000s. Kenya’s economy, in comparison, recorded near-flat
76 ibid
77 ibid, Facts and Figures 2010.
growth in the two decades between 1970s and 1990s, recording some modest growth in the
early 2000s, and doubling up in the late 2000s.
Chart 4.2: GDP Per Capita in Current Prices
Source: UNCTAD 2008 Statistics, 8.2
It has been suggested
study is viewed as a contributing factor to Kenya’s poor economic performance over time
Private equity has in its short history tracked a clear pathway after robust economies.
It is of anecdotal significance to draw parallels based on this yardstick: the South African
private equity industry is the largest in Africa
largest and most sophisticated in Africa.
economy, and strikingly, Nigeria has enjoyed higher fundraising for private equity compared
to Egypt. These trends hold true for Kenya: a much smaller economy, whose private equity
industry is also much smaller.
From an economic growth perspective,
preceding short review of economic fundamentals in Kenya, for the proposition that public
policies that support robust economic growth are likely to contribute to private equity’s
78 Emerging Markets Private Equity Association, Quarterly Review, ‘The State of Emerging Markets Private
Equity: Turning a Corner’ 4/2008, 1 <
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4.4.3 Business Informality
The Government estimated that 65% of the small and microenterprise sector in Kenya
is informal – and this segment, as seen below, accounts for 80% of the private sector. Even
where businesses are ‘formal’, they demonstrate features suggesting relative under
sophistication. For instance, only 16% of surveyed business entities indicated th
business website, while a lower 14% indicated they operated regularly through their websites.
Source: Various (PSDS 2006-
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It can be seen from chart 4.3 that large companies in Kenya account for about 20% of
the country’s private sector, suggesting that the remaining 80% comprises small companies
and the informal economy. In contrast, however, the minority large firms control 80% of
private sector wealth in Kenya, while the majority small companies control only 20% of the
private sector wealth.
4.4.4 Preponderance of Small Companies
Large firms in Kenya are mostly subsidiaries of multinational corporations, and do
not have extensive links with the small firms – who account for 67% of all informal sector
operations.79 According to the Government, there were an estimated 1.7 million small and
medium scale enterprises in Kenya in 2006 – compared to just 40,000 large companies.80
Under-developed linkages between small and large businesses suggests an element of de
facto market dominance in favour of the large corporation. From an economic development
paradigm, this perpetuates the poor-rich divide, excluding the small enterprise from financing
as a proxy for lack of market access.
For innovation to flourish, a market must exist into which to sell the products of
innovative enterprise. Linkages between small and large enterprises is critical in building
such a market. It would drive research and development as lucrative commercial activities,
enhancing the attractiveness of Kenya to such creative capital as private equity.
Placing these realities in a market-making perspective, these ratios (large firm/small
firm; formal/informal) must metamorphose if private equity is to be cascaded across a more
79 id.
80 PSDS 2006-2012 (Ministry of Trade, Government of Kenya) <
http://www.psds.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=32> accessed 5 October
2007
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diverse economic landscape. As it stands today, the Kenyan private sector that is likely to be
attractive to private equity is associated with the 20% where economic development and
relative sophistication already exists. Private equity could become a development partner for
Kenya, but Kenya would need to improve frameworks for stronger small and
microenterprises. These would support a new niche for research and development activity as
the Kenyan economy rapidly progresses. It is not necessary for all small firms to transform
into large enterprises, but it is necessary for small enterprises to transform into mature
businesses able to innovate and supply the larger economic players, specialising in services
and solutions.
4.4.5 Negative Business Practices
Drawing from chart 4.3, corruption is a significant problem. From a statistical
perspective, 60% of the private sector – formal and informal, large and small – indicated in
the World Bank Enterprise Survey that they routinely under-report for tax purposes.81 Tax
evasion is thus a common practice in Kenya, suggesting a weak or inefficient legal and or
institutional regime for this purpose. Either way, this suggests the regulatory framework is
lacking a specific quality that would engender compliance. This is a strong piece of
circumstantial evidence supporting the broad themes in this work – that legal and regulatory
conditions are likely to wield a disproportionate amount of influence over the manner in
which financial markets shape up in a country.
Quite consistent with the high proportion of routine tax evasion, a very high 80% of
the respondents in the above survey indicated they were most likely to meet one form of
corruption or another involving a public official – either in the licensing process, during the
81 The World Bank Group,’ Kenya Enterprise Survey’ (Enterprise Surveys 2007)
<http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=101&year=2007> accessed 4 August 2010.
operations phases, or at the point of making tax returns. The cost of such bribes was
estimated to stand at about 8% of their annual sales values. A nearly equal 78% of the
respondents indicated they distrusted courts in Kenya, citing widespread corruption as the
main driver to such distrust.
To test how important corruption is in private equity investing, all fund managers
interviewed 82 were asked whether corruption is an important pro
operations. 100% answered
respondents indicating corruption in private equity
This is consistent with the general perception within the
of obtaining operating licences is riddled with corruption. Furthermore, some 32% of the
interviewed fund managers indicated they have had to deal with investors who cannot or are
unwilling to adequately explain their fu
Capital Regulations, fund managers are placed under express anti
obligations.83
Chart 4.4: likelihood of corruption impacting private equity
Source: Fund Manager Survey 2009/2010
82 Interviews with FM101-FM113, Nairobi, Kenya, between August 2009 and January 2010.
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4.4.6 Bureaucracy and Other Constraints
Closely linked to corruption is bureaucracy – which refers to the system of rules and
procedures that commercial entities must abide or otherwise satisfy to attain regulatory
legitimacy. For instance, there exist numerous licensing regimes governing business activity,
with variations across municipalities in the country. In the tax framework, businesses in
Kenya spend an average of 471 man hours annually to comply with tax obligations,
equivalent to around 5% of their business time annually.84 Similarly, World Bank’s Doing
Business Index 2012 shows that the times taken to obtain an operating licence, an import
licence, or registering business or property, are inordinately long, and involve a multiplicity
of procedures and institutions.
Bureaucracy and corruption combine to deliver a lack of institutional transparency.
The country’s ratings on the indices of corruption, bureaucracy and the burden of business
regulations suggest a close inter-dependence among these variables.85 This is significant in
formulating a law reform agenda around these issues.
Insecurity (both person and property) exacts a significant toll on Kenyan businesses,
with losses nearly hitting 4% from theft, robbery, arson and vandalism. In light of this, 74.6%
of firms pay for private security, at a cost of up to 3% of their sales. This is a substantial cost
on the operating capital of firms, an indirect tax as it were.86
Furthermore, businesses in Kenya operate under an environment of challenged
infrastructural services.87 Aside from a low penetration of ICT, critical infrastructure like
roads introduce high costs to business. Firms expend upwards of 1.6% of their sales value in
84 Kenya Enterprise Survey, 2007 (n 80)
85 World Economic Forum, ‘Africa Competitiveness Report 2009, Kenya 2007 Investment Climate Profile’ <
http://www.weforum.org> Accessed 10 July 2010.
86 World Bank, ‘Kenya Enterprise Survey, Kenya’ (2007)
<http://enterprisesurveys.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyId=101&year=2007 >accessed 2 November 2007
87 ibid.
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replacing products broken in transit. Access to electricity and water similarly remains
problematic at both the household and industrial levels, and bureaucratic red tape in fixing
outages and disconnections impose substantial costs on businesses (nearly 60 days in
combination, and over 6% of sales value).88
While corruption in the public sector may not per se be a direct problem in private
equity investing, these negative business practices complicate the business environment,
raising operational costs and introducing secondary uncertainties to investment dynamics.
4.5 Barriers to Finance
In section 4.2, it was shown that businesses can raise their financing needs from a
variety of possible sources: banks, microfinance institutions, investment companies as well as
listing on the national public equity market. Far from being able to access the right type of
enterprise capital at the right prices, however, it has been illustrated in the preceding section
that various structural features can either promote or degrade the ease with which needy
businesses can access finance. The following sections draw out the key barriers.
4.5.1 Collateral Quality
Collateral requirements vary for different types of financial products. A feature
common to all requirements, however, is the difficulty faced by the SME sector in
consolidating good collateral. This is partly owing to the widespread reality of business
informality, and secondly, historical difficulties in accessing finance. Collateral frequently
88 ibid.
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equates to assets, and the type of asset that banks can accept as security against lending is
narrow – usually an all-asset debenture.89
Factors like corruption operate to complicate collateral laws even more. For instance,
property titles would ordinarily be good collateral, but corruption at the Lands Registry has
given rise to a situation whereby false title deeds have been issued. It is a frequent occurrence
in Kenya to have several title deeds issued to different people over the same piece of property.
Establishing good title is problematic, and banks are wary of lending against certain property
deeds. This was compounded by a long practice by the government of allocating public land
irregularly.90
Several other factors combine to render the creation, perfection and enforcement of
security interests inefficient in Kenya, especially where such interests relate to or are
otherwise associated with land. The first is the multiplicity of statutory instruments on the
creation and perfection of security interests. There are over 20 legislations that govern the
creation of security interests, and they do not prescribe a consistently coherent regime.91 Each
piece of legislation lays down a different registration procedure, but there is no law that
prioritises interests so created.
On land-related security interests, more than five statutes govern land rights, creating
at least three different distinct legal frameworks for land rights – under the Government
89 FSD Kenya, ‘Costs of Collateral in Kenya: Opportunities for Reform’ (September, 2009) 8
<www.fsdkenya.org/pdf.../09-11-24_Costs_of_Collateral_Study.pdf> accessed 21 December 2011
90 A recent classic illustration is the Syokimau Demolitions saga: where scores of Kenyans were left homeless
following a decision by government agencies to flatten their homes citing impropriety in land titles. To access
video footage, follow: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0X8MczAumYU&feature=related>; for a trail on
newspaper reportage, see for instance, Mutinda Mwanzia and Judy Ogutu, ‘Court Stops Demolitions’ (East
African Standard, Nairobi, 16 Nov 2011),
<http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000046838&cid=4&> accessed 16 Nov 2011.
91 These legislations include: Transfer of Property Act, Group 8; Law of Contract Act Cap 23; Registered Land
Act Cap 300; Registration of Titles Act Cap 281; Government Lands Act Cap 280; Land Titles Act, Cap 282;
Sectional Properties Act No.21 of 1987; Companies Act Cap 486; Limitation of Actions Act Cap 22; Stamp
Duty Act Cap 480; Evidence Act Cap 80; Land Control Act Cap 302; Registration of Documents Act Cap 285;
Banking Act Cap 488; Traffic Act Cap 403; Chattels Transfer Act Cap 28; Advocates Act Cap 16; Agriculture
Act Cap318; Arbitration Act No.4 of 1995; Notaries Public Act Cap 17 of 1958.
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Lands Act of 1915, the Registered Land Act of 1963, the Registration of Titles Act of 1920,
the Land Control Act of 1967 and the Sectional Properties Act of 1987. The recently adopted
National Land Policy has as one of its core aims the consolidation and rationalisation of laws
relating to land.92 In addition, the legal framework on land creates two estates in land –
freeholds and leaseholds.93 To make matters worse, the Land Control Act of 1967 voids any
transaction in land unless the Land Control Board consents thereto. These boards are
administrative, dispersed across the country in every district, sit once a month in most cases,
but generally apply no predictable system in their decision-making processes, rendering the
process of granting consent non-predictable.94
Section 96 of the Companies Act of 1962 lists a limited range of registrable interests
that include fixed and floating charges. In Kenyan practice, floating charges are not preferred
by funders for three reasons: first, they are defeated by priority creditors; secondly, they are
subject to a hardening period during which they can be challenged in a liquidation process;
and thirdly, the holder’s rights are limited to payments made into a specific account.
Dishonest borrowers could easily default through asset management schemes.
To further complicate the foregoing scenario, there is no single registry for the
lodgement of security instruments – meaning that the multiplicity of registries renders the
discovery of priority securities difficult. Besides the different registries, the laws prescribe
different time periods within which securities must be registered. For instance, under the
Chattels Transfer Act of 1930, it is 21 days;95 under the Companies Act of 1962, it is 42
92 Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Lands, Sessional Paper 3/2009 on National Land Policy (Government Printer,
2009) < http://www.ardhi.go.ke> accessed 5 July 2010
93 ibid 18,19
94 For more detailed reviews, see Jose E Mantilla, Peter M Mwangi and Jennifer W Kibaara, ‘Costs of Collateral
in Kenya: Opportunities for Reform’ (Financial Services Deepening Kenya, September 2009)
<http://www.fsdkenya.org/pdf_documents/09-11-24_Costs_of_Collatral_Study.pdf> accessed 19 October
2011.
95 s 6
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days;96 and under the other laws providing for security interests, it is on average 30 days.
Computerisation of government functions has just recently started, meaning that in the past
and even now, most security interest registries operated manual databases, and remain
isolated. Validating titles and interests is an odious and imprecise process. The effect of the
preceding difficulties is that even in cases where capital-seeking enterprises show collateral,
the ‘bankability’ of the collateral is not assured.
To address these issues, law reform offers an important part solution. The law reform
agenda stands out clearly in each of the preceding paragraphs, and include, in summary, the
need to deal with corruption, the creation of stronger regulatory frameworks around
registration of interests in land, the consolidation and clarification of the legal regime on
security interests that includes systems for the establishment of a national registry of
securities, with all supporting institutions.97
4.5.2 Cost of Bank Credit
It has been shown under section 4.3.3 that accessing bank credit is costly in Kenya.
Lending rates are controlled by a disparate range of economic and regulatory factors, as
development literature has documented. In the latter part of this chapter, a range of barriers to
finance are explored with respect to the issues already addressed in this chapter. When
lending rates are high, and collateral requirements steep, enterprises suffer. Institutional
lenders are known to hedge against ‘risk’, as the experience of the UK, reviewed in chapter 3,
illustrated. 98 Improving the quality of the private sector through increasing institutional
transparency might be one method to driving down the risk aversion pervading formal credit
96 s 96
97 FSD Kenya, Costs of Collateral (2009) (n 88)
98 ch 3, 73
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markets. Yet access to finance, this chapter suggests, is itself fundamental to supporting the
consolidation of good quality collateral. Legal instruments are likely to be valuable tools in
achieving these private sector development policies.
4.5.3 Business Informality and Financial Reporting Standards
Business informality and firm opaqueness driven by a weak financial disclosure
environment generate negative reputational effects on businesses, making credit access steep
because of the difficulty of establishing the soundness of collateral and creditworthiness. 99
Business informality and low capital formation are inimical to asset tangibility, that is, the
consolidation of assets that can serve as good collateral.100 Other factors include general
regulatory arbitrage (as tax evasion, considered in the next chapter, suggests), and the non-
standardised application of the IFRS reporting template.
Kenya applies the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) model in its
accounting and auditing practices, officially adopted in 1999. 101 The duty to apply IFRS,
however, is not statutory-based: it is the administrative edict of the Institute of Certified
Public Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK),102 but the duty to produce accounts is variously
mandated under securities-related laws including Companies,103 Securities104 and Banking
Acts.105 A World Bank Enterprise Survey in 2007, however, found that less than 50% of the
companies in Kenya employ an auditor on annual basis.106 More problematic, however, is the
99 Bengt and Tirole, Financial Intermediation (1997) (n 7) 663 - 66.
100 ibid
101 Interview with Mr. Evans Mulera, Director of Professional Services, Institute of Certified Public
Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK offices, Nairobi, Kenya January 2010)
102ibid
103 Companies Act of 1978 Cap 486 1962, ss 147-176, Laws of Kenya.
104 Capital Markets Authority Act Cap 485A 1989, s 23, Laws of Kenya.
105 Banking Act 1989, Cap 488 s 21, Laws of Kenya.
106 World Bank, Enterprise Survey 2007 <
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=101&year=2007> accessed 14 July 2008
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fact that the widely accepted accounting standards are, from a regulatory perspective, only
required of listed companies (that is, public companies) and other capital markets regulated
persons (for example, entities regulated by the Capital Markets Authority).107
According to a representative of a leading multinational tax and audit firm in Kenya –
“Most companies engage in special-purpose accounting – primarily to
comply with KRA requirements, hence driven by end-user of prepared
accounts. Implementing IFRS is expensive, and while Kenyan accountants
have the skills generally, the IFRS system requires continuing research and
engagement with international developments, and associated routine staff
training: most companies do not have the budgets for that. We can do it
because part of our market-leading role is grounded in a fully resourced
R&D unit, one of whose mandates is to keep constant tabs on happenings in
the IFRS field – these standards change almost on an annual basis, and to be
truly IFRS compliant, one would have to constantly update one’s systems
and skills. That is why IFRS compliance as a concept for most companies in
Kenya is a fairly relative concept in practice – and it will remain a tough task
for financial regulators to enforce here.” 108
TX1 and TX2 echoed these viewpoints, with TX1 adding the observation that
“financial reporting, and the IFRS model, are really a question of economic development.”109
TX2 clarified that this means “when everybody plays by the same rules, conditions are
107Interviews with Mr. Mulera, Director, ICPAK (n 100) and with RG201, Financial Accounting, (CMA
Offices, Nairobi, Kenya, January 2010).
108 Interview with TX3, Legal and Tax Manager, Nairobi, Kenya, August 2009.
109 Interview with TX1, Compliance Manager, Nairobi, Kenya, August 2009.
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created for greater trust within the markets, which can promote greater synergy and
commercial partnerships between private companies.”110
These deductions were intriguing, and private equity fund managers were surveyed
for opinions over their levels of trust in Kenyan financial statements. A low 40% of
interviewed fund managers believe private company financial statements in Kenya present a
true and fair view of the corporation in question, and therefore can be relied upon. In contrast,
30% of the fund managers believe such accounts to be open to manipulation, carry minimum
disclosure, and therefore not in substantial compliance of IFRS standards – as chart 4.5,
below, demonstrates. As the chart shows, 8 questions were put to each interviewee, and the
statistical instances of answers to a ‘yes’/’no’ response matrix were captured. The first 5
questions elicit general opinions, and the last 3 questions interrogate the reasons for their
choices. Their responses are captured in chart 4.5 below.
It is significant that about 33% of the interviewees felt that financial statements in
Kenya are open to manipulation, and do not present a true and fair view of the corporation.
This group of fund managers also believed that reporting companies in Kenya do not disclose
fully, and did not comply with IFRS standards, opinions that generally support the deductive
observations of TX3.
In contrast, about 44% of the interviewees believed that Kenyan financial statements
presented an authoritative view of the reporting organisation, carried sufficient disclosure in
compliance with the IFRS reporting template, revealing a true and fair view of the company.
This group of fund managers consistently felt that financial accounting in Kenya was not
readily open to manipulation.
110 Interview with TX2, SMEs Section, Nairobi, Kenya, August 2009.
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It was related earlier how a number of licensed stockbrokers went into financial
distress between 2007 and 2010, and RG201 was asked whether the failures were because of
poor financial accounting or the regulator’s inability to effectively police the sector. RG201
opined that –
“there were too many factors at play, and certainly, truthful accounting was
one of the key issues, but it cannot be said this was the main reason they
failed. Just a few entities have not done well, but most of the others are doing
alright. We cannot say the system is perfect, but there is a lot of effort into
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making the capital markets a lot stronger from an institutional oversight
perspective.”111
RG201 was unwilling to be drawn into more nuanced debate on the full set of factors
behind the failures. There have been investigations into the failing stockbrokers, but none of
the reports had been made public at the time of completing field study.
The foregoing findings suggest, on a par, that more fund managers had higher
faith in Kenyan financial reports than those that doubted their integrity. To the extent,
however, that less than 50% of the market in the aggregate placed substantial faith in the
reliability of financial statements, it is worrying that financial reporting standards remain
problematic. This suggests that the doctrine of corporate transparency has achieved shallow
penetration in Kenya today – supporting the minority opinion of local fund managers about
the unreliability of financial statements.
About 22% of the interviewees felt, however, that there were no links between the
quality of financial reporting and a company’s corporate governance framework and practice.
This perspective is sceptical of financial reporting generally. All fund managers indicated, in
answer to a related question, that they place great importance on the discovery process (due
diligence) as a vital pre-investment condition.
In view of the opinions of fund managers on financial reporting and corporate
governance, it was necessary to ask of the same set of fund managers whether the quality of
financial disclosure was an important factor to the practice of private equity in Kenya.
111 Interview with RG201, August 2009 – it is on record, however, that even listed companies are struggling to
comply with IFRS standards: in the Capital Market Authority’s Annual Report for 2010, it is reported at pages
15-16 that not all regulated entities complied fully with the requirements of regulation on financial reporting and
corporate governance.
<http://www.cma.or.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=191&Itemid=30 >
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100% of the respondents opined that improved disclosure standards would improve
company valuation, while 33% believed it would reduce agency costs and lower price
protections – all bottom-line improving dynamics. Importantly, none of the interviewees
believed that improving financial reporting standards would have no impact on valuation.
About 22% indicated that improved reporting requirements would improve
profitability through raising return on equity, while 33% felt it would lower transaction costs.
11% of the interviewees believed improved disclosure standards would also lower agency
costs, while another 33% believed it would lower the motivation for price protection at the
time of investment exit, greatly aiding the efficiency of the divestment process.
These are important findings. They confirm anecdotal evidence indicating that target
assets in African private equity are routinely undervalued for want of transparency – as much
as 50% of deal value rides on the quality of the target from an accounting perspective,
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according to one leading fund manager.112 In light of the findings in chapter 5 about the main
focus of Kenyan private equity on growth companies, a case is made for strengthening the
regulatory framework for financial reporting.
Clearly, the quality of financial reporting is an important issue to investors as it
impacts various aspects of an investment. It can also be an important tool in corporate
governance, instilling accountant, management and director discipline in resource
management.
To improve the quality of financial reporting, however, requires multiple
interventions. On the one hand, legal instruments may be necessary – including the use of
statutory instruments to strengthen the framework for financial reporting. Secondly, it may
require stricter enforcement for violations. Thirdly, it might require further engagement
between the regulator and the regulated with the view to broadening a framework for
continuous learning. Fourthly, there might be need to review the legal framework for
misconduct by auxiliary institutions supporting the financial disclosure industry. Fifthly, and
at a broader macroeconomic level, there might be need to deepen the increasing predictability
and efficiency of the judiciary at managing disputes that stem out of corporate governance
failures and misconducts.
4.5.4 Negative Business Practices
From an access to finance perspective, corruption is an environmental factor that
drives and complicates the main parameters determining access. For instance, in the area of
title to property, corruption often undermines the soundness of title, casting doubt on the
quality of collateral, thereby directly inhibiting access to sought after capital. Similarly, if a
112 Interview with FM105, Nairobi, Kenya, September 2009.
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critical licence or business permit takes inordinately long to obtain owing to barriers
introduced as a result of corrupt practices, access to finance based on or dependent upon the
obtaining of such licence or permit becomes delayed. For most business operations, timely
access is fundamental to business efficiency. Corruption thus introduces unnecessary and
disruptive costs to businesses.
Kenya’s problem with corruption appears to ride on weak institutional ability to
enforce regulations. With respect to the issues addressed in the preceding paragraph, it is
public sector corruption that is problematic. The legal framework for dealing with corruption
exists in (i) the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act Cap 65 of 2003, which punishes
all corruption and economic crimes set out in the law; (ii) the Public Officer Ethics Act Cap
183 of 2003 which requires public officers to act with propriety, and sets out a series of
offences pegged to integrity, and (iii) the Constitution of Kenya 2010, Cap 0, which under
Article 10 and in Chapter 6 dedicates considerable space to questions of integrity in public
service. The country additionally has an anti-corruption watchdog in the form of the Ethics
and Anti-Corruption Commission, established under Act No.22 of 2011. Institutionally, the
Office of Director of Prosecutions, the Police Department and the Judiciary are all, prima
facie, well-positioned to address corruption. For the foregoing reasons, the problem of
corruption is more an institutional reform question rather than a law reform issue.
4.5.5 Weak Financial Institutions: History of Bank Failures
The Kenyan banking sector has not always been stable. Between 1984 when the first
bank failure occurred, and 2005, there have been no less than 30 bank failures and 10 cases of
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bank crises that have involved varied interventions including financial institutions being
placed under receivership or being consolidated.113
Source: Central Bank of Kenya
Source: Adapted from Central Bank of Kenya statistics
As the two charts above illustrate, the period between 1987 and 1994 was the most
volatile, with 24 bank failures. 1993 was the worst – with eleven banks being placed under
113 Central Bank of Kenya, ‘Bank Crises Failures and Closures in Post-Independence Kenya’ (CBK, Nairobi)
<http://www.centralbank.go.ke/dpfb/background.aspx> accessed 15 July 2008.
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liquidation. This period was characterised by the strange phenomenon of politically correct
funds – a situation that saw the proliferation of banks licensed for political exigencies.114
After the year 2005, there has been no bank failure. Between 2001 and 2005, there
were five failures (one in 2001, 2 in 2003, and 2 in 2005).115 At least one of the banks,
Charterhouse Bank, was implicated in extensive money laundering. It was put under
receivership for two years, then its banking license was withdrawn five years ago.116
This history suggests that commercial banking in Kenya is slowly coming out of a
prolonged period of instability – offering an explanation on why until the 2000s decade, the
range of financial products and the stock of loans was narrow. The government has tightened
the regulatory framework for all banks, starting with the enactment of the Finance Act 2008
which requires banks and mortgage companies to raise their core capital to KES1 billion by
December 2012 and encouraging smaller banks to merge to create stronger brands.117 Certain
macroeconomic factors added to this benevolent state of being: the economy grew robustly
between 2004 and 2007, achieving an average of 6% year on year growth rate. This progress
was set back by a series of both internal and external shocks starting at the end of 2007
(including political turmoil over a disputed presidential poll, escalating commodity prices and
the global credit crisis).118 With the strong macroeconomic performance between 2003 and
2007, private sector activity picked up, driving up the demand for business finance. This
114 ibid
115 ibid.
116 John Ngirachu, ‘Anti-Corruption Commission Backs Bank’s Re-opening’ (Daily Nation, 2 September 2010)
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201009030194.html> accessed 1 January 2012 – it is ludicrous that investigations
should last 7 years, and signals either deep-seated institutional weaknesses in financial sector regulation or
entrenched sectarian interests (more candidly, a compromised institutional network).
117 PwC Kenya, ‘Key Issues Facing the Banking Industry in Kenya’ (PwC, 2011)
<http://www.pwc.com/ke/en/industries/banking-issues.jhtml> accessed 20 October 2011.
118 International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2009 Article IV Consultations with Kenya
(PINs: January 7, 2010) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2010/pn1002.htm> accessed 1 January 2012
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allowed most commercial banks to deepen their profits, emboldening them to innovate their
range of products.119
Another factor that spurred bank sector reforms was the shrinking of government
stakes in commercial banking – currently it maintains significant ownership stakes in just
three institutions.120 Nonetheless, it has been shown above how accessing bank finance
remains constrained, in spite of increasing evidence the financial market is slowly becoming
innovative, responsive and more equipped to assume risk-types they hitherto could not
assume, or were ill-equipped to manage.
In spite of these fundamentals, the Doing Business Index 2012 ranks Kenya 8th in
terms of access to credit. What the Index does not state, however, is that this is restricted to
the kind of firms that are capable of collateralizing loan applications – which remains the
core feature of formal credit in the country. The index does not consider the range and type of
financial products available in a country. The matrix assesses how quickly and easily an
applicant meeting all lending requirements is able to get a decision on the application. Most
commercial banks would reach a decision within seven working days currently. This
efficiency belies the fact that many would-be capital consumers are not able to muster
sufficient or acceptable collateral – so the index is partially correct. 121
119 FSD Kenya, ‘Financial Inclusion in Kenya: Survey Results and Analysis from FinAccess 2009’ (July 2011)
<http://www.fsdkenya.org/finaccess/documents/11-06-27_finaccess_09_results_analysis.pdf> accessed 4
January 2011
120 Central Bank of Kenya, ‘Commercial Banks and Mortgage Finance Institutions’ (CBK, 2008)
<http://www.centralbank.go.ke/financialsystem/banks/introduction.aspx> accessed 15 July 2007.
121 World Bank Doing Business Index 2012 – Kenya – Country Tables:
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-
reports/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB12-Chapters/Country-
Tables.pdf >
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4.5.6 Narrow Range of Creative Financial Products
Prior to 1995, the banking industry in Kenya was not liberalised.122 Exchange controls
were only lifted in 1992.123 Banks operated under difficult regulatory environments, stifling
their freedom to commercialise and merchandise. 124 For nearly four decades following
independence, only short-term loans were available from Kenyan banks, and these were
accessed against collateral.125 This scenario is slowly transforming, as lending windows are
incrementally expanded.126
4.6 How Private Equity Intermediation Resolves Barriers Identified
This chapter has established the existence of the ‘proverbial’ “funding gap” in Kenya.
It was shown in chapter 3 how private equity by its very character is well-suited to
overcoming some of the challenges identified in this chapter. Barriers related to collateral
quality, for instance, are not significant impediments to a private equity financier, since
private equity is not a ‘lending’ business, it is an equity investment. It is grounded in the
business ‘idea’, and is structured in a participatory manner, as chapter 3 explored in great
detail.
A key feature of private equity investments is the leadership development emphasis:
the investor provides both finance and leadership to companies. It strengthens, through very
close monitoring, a company’s ability to make strategic and market-sensitive decisions. It
122 FSD Kenya, Financial Inclusion Survey 2009 (n 116)
123 The Exchange Control Act was repealed in 1992:
<http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/RepealedStatutes/Exchange__Cap_113_.doc > accessed
20 October 2011.
124 PwC Kenya, ‘Banking’ (PwC, 2011) <http://www.pwc.com/ke/en/industries/banking.jhtml> accessed 20
October 2011.
125 FSD Kenya, Costs of Collateral (2010) (n 88)
126 FSD Kenya Financial Inclusion Survey 2009 (n 116)
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disciplines corporate performance through various strategies explored in the previous chapter.
It also frequently unlocks additional financing into the business through strengthening the
company’s balance sheet.
Private equity is also capable of maximising ‘local knowledge’ through building
partnerships with intermediaries already working within a specific market. For instance, in
2011, a venture capital fund (Acumen Fund) and a microfinance institution (Grameen
Foundation) partnered in co-lending a quasi-equity facility of USD1.75 million to an
agricultural microfinance institution in Kenya (Juhudi Kilimo Ltd).127 Juhudi Kilimo has
demonstrated impressive success in supporting agricultural businesses that would neither
meet the ‘safe investments’ threshold that primary lenders like banks demand, nor the ‘scale’
preferred by most private equity investors. This new strategy offers one way of mitigating the
risk of direct investment in a sector or section of the economy about which high-end investors
feel uncertain. Through such innovative partnerships, the financial divide can gradually be
bridged. More importantly, it offers an opportunity for private equity to be spread more
creatively into the really productive sectors of the economy. This is a unique feature of
emerging markets private equity.
According to the International Finance Corporation, emerging market opportunities
are small in value (like the Acumen-Grameen investment above), but lucrative. 128 The
structure of Kenya’s private sector bears this fact out. For private equity in Kenya, therefore,
there opportunity to conclude multiple investments of a much lower cross-portfolio value
exists in abundance. The opportunity invites flexibility in the investment strategy of private
127 Grameen Foundation, ‘Acumen Fund and Grameen Foundation Invest in Agricultural Microfinance
Company Juhudi Kilimo Company Limited’ (9 May 2011) < http://www.grameenfoundation.org/press-
releases/acumen-fund-and-grameen-foundation-invest-agricultural-microfinance-company-juhudi-ki > accessed
19 October 2011.
128 International Finance Corporation, ‘The Case For Emerging Markets
Private Equity’ (February 2011) <
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/cfn.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/EM_PE_SharingIFCsExperience+February2011/$FILE/E
M_PE_Sharing_IFCs_Experience_v9_February2011.pdf> accessed 2 October 2011
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equity funds. Leeds and Sunderland suggested that transaction structures, approaches and
tools for emerging markets private equity would be different from those that prevail in
developed markets of Western Europe and North America.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that market conditions in Kenya create
attractive justifications for the role of private equity intermediation. This attractiveness is
driven by the quality of Kenya enterprises, the depth, accessibility and responsiveness of the
locally available sources of business finance, the prevailing constraints to financial access, as
well as the general state of development within the capital markets framework. The general
idea achieved suggests that the more enterprises are able to access business finance, the more
sophisticated that country’s economy becomes. Where sources of finance are limited, private
sector efficiency is compromised. In the case of Kenya, this chapter has demonstrated how
varying structural inefficiencies have compromised its ability to leverage the kind of
enterprise capital it would require to grow.
Legal development appears to be a key driver of many of the structural inefficiencies
identified within the Kenyan economy. It would appear that improvements to the legal
framework for enterprise would lead to improved outcomes for Kenyan private enterprise.
Legal and institutional interventions can be useful tools in this process, and in improving the
framework for the macroeconomic factors to flourish.
It was proposed in chapter 1 that out of the four categories of ‘country factors’ that
drive the emergence of private equity industries in countries, availability of enterprise finance
belongs to the cluster styled ‘external factors’ in that chapter – that is, the ‘macroeconomic’
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elements. Access to finance, however, has been constructed in this chapter as an ‘internal
factor’, facilitated by an efficient legal system. It is the submission in this chapter that this
view is consistent with the core thesis in this work: that to support the growth of private
equity, introducing efficiencies to systems supporting entrepreneurship would be fundamental
if developing economies are to deepen their ‘financial systems and infrastructure’. Only then
can the private sector be enabled to play its lead role in driving economic growth – and
employing legal instruments is a viable strategy.
Perhaps more fundamentally, however, this chapter’s findings on the constraints
affecting the private sector in Kenya (including the negative practices of corruption,
bureaucracy and institutional weaknesses) are capacity issues, that raise the important notion
that reflecting close and hard on the foundational elements necessary to secure a sustainable
basis for financial development would be an important development exercise for Kenyan
policy makers and industry players. This ‘capacity’ need introduces a wider nuance to the
institutional paradigm canvassed at chapter one: beyond the legal institutions of secure
financial contracts, strong private property rights doctrine and integrity in financial reporting,
the human capacity elements, the aspect of institutional effectiveness among regulatory
agencies, and the capacity of policy makers to model national conditions and market
principles that would promote sustainability in market development. In the end, this
deduction is perhaps the most fundamental finding in this chapter.
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FEATURES OF KENYA’S PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY
5.1 Introduction
Like all private sector activity, private equity in Kenya operates within the same
difficult business environment that supports all entrepreneurs in Kenya – canvassed in the
preceding chapter. It is of great interest to explore the extent to which it has adapted its
practices and methodologies to internalise the inevitable negative externalities these
conditions gives rise to. This chapter consequently explores the makeup of the Kenyan
private equity industry: who are the players, what is the personnel structure like, who are the
investors, and the extent to which it is possible for Kenyan institutional investors (e.g.
pensions and insurance funds) to invest in private equity. The investment strategy, including
capital structuring preferences, investment life cycles, whether investments are syndicated,
and how exit strategies are managed are additional themes explored in this chapter. In
exploring these issues, this chapter is extensively grounded on survey findings of Kenya-
based fund managers and other market intermediaries conducted between 2009 and 2010.
The survey for this purpose is styled ‘Fund Manager Survey 2010’.1
The empirical findings in this chapter help in crystallising issues which public policy
designed to support private equity can help address. Through understanding how the industry
works, an evidence base is created that can support a structured framework for consultation
over a policy framework that serves the needs of the industry and the legitimate ends of
regulation. In this sense, this chapter is crucial in contextualising the next part of the thesis
which is devoted to an analysis of the legal framework for this industry.
1 Ch 2, 53-60
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This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 traces the manner in which private
equity was brought into ‘the public consciousness’ in Kenya. This is followed in section 5.3
and 5.4 by an evaluation of private equity fund characteristics in Kenya, starting with the
features attaching to fund managers, as well as the structure of the funds themselves. Section
5.5 through 5.8 analyse the design of private equity investment through assessing disclosed
investment strategies, how long private equity investments generally last, how rights and
obligations are allocated within the financial contract, and whether private equity financing is
syndicated at all in Kenya. Section 5.9 evaluates the exit framework, and the chapter closes
with a report of the survey findings on fund manager perceptions about the direction in which
they saw the industry taking in the medium-term. Their opinions provide a picture of current
unfolding market practice.
5.2 Private Equity in the Public Consciousness
Reflecting the trend in many emerging markets, 2 field research for this study
documented a substantial increase in the number of private equity companies setting up
commercial operations in Kenya, especially since 2005. At the time of conducting the field
work between 2009 and 2010, 43 investment companies whose business involved the making
of investments of a financial nature and involving aspects of hands-on engagement in
addition to capital provision were identified. As reported in the study’s methodology,3 there
were six inclusion criteria in sample selection, and only 27 out of the 43 companies included
in the initial sample answered to all the inclusion criteria.4 The six criteria were specially
2 Ch 1, 12-14
3 Ch 2, 55
4 ibid, 55,56.
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designed to discount investment companies that are not in the proper business of private
equity.5
Out of the 27 private equity companies selected for study, it was informative of
market trends that only 10 funds had been set up in Kenya before the year 2005, while the
remaining 17 funds established their local presence between 2006 and 2010. This is explained
further in the paragraphs below.
Chart 5.1: Number of Private Equity Firms in Kenya
Source: Various
From a purely statistical perspective, the period after 2005 has witnessed phenomenal
growth in Kenya’s private equity landscape: compared to the sluggish growth of 10 funds
setting up office in Kenya over a 50 year period. Reflecting the increase in private equity
market activity since 2005, reports on private equity in the local press have become frequent
5 Because private equity, as an alternative investment, is not open to retail investing like regular investment
funds are, and employs specific methodologies not employed by other types of investment vehicles.
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since 2005, suggesting there is a growing awareness and recognition of private equity in the
Kenyan economy.6
A number of private equity investments in Kenya serve to illustrate why and how it
has been brought to the public consciousness so strongly and so quickly. On the one hand,
there was the high-profile private equity investment in the Kenya Railways Concession
project, a highly visible and critical piece of public infrastructure, which initially saw two
local private equity companies – Trans-Century Ltd and Centum Investments Ltd 7 –
purchasing significant minority stakes in the project’s ownership structure.8 The project’s
lead investor experienced difficulties reaching financial closure on the project,9 and after five
years of unsuccessful fundraising for the project, sold its ownership stake to the Egyptian
private equity company, the Citadel Capital S.A.E.10 This project has had a difficult history,
grounded in part in the Corporation’s severe loss-making history, and partly in its high-
profile public standing. Being an important piece of public infrastructure, the slow turnaround
following the concession programme attracted criticism from the government, and negative
press reviews.11
On the other hand, there have been less contentious but substantial investments of
private equity in some of Kenya’s leading brands. A case in point is the investment of
USD178.7 million by Helios Investments LLC into Equity Bank in 2005, with the approval
of the Central Bank of Kenya, to enable the bank to expand its services extensively across the
6 George Omondi, ‘Small Firms Shy Away from Private Equity Lenders’ (All Africa, 4 May 2010) <
http://allafrica.com/stories/201005040973.html> accessed 4 May 2010.
7 ‘Exit’ is a term used in private equity practice to mean ‘divestment’ of an investment through a sale of shares
held in a corporate entity. ‘Acquisition’, conversely, denotes the purchase of ownership through a share buy.
8 TransCentury Limited, ‘Rift Valley Railways Secures USD 164 million Debt Package’ (Press Release, 23
August 2011) < http://www.transcentury.co.ke/main-news-gid-26> accessed 20 October 2011.
9 Nick Wachira, ‘How Plan to Privatise Railways Became Country’s Public Sector Reform Nightmare’ (All
Africa, 24 January 2010) < http://allafrica.com/stories/201001250112.html> accessed 20 October 2011.
10 Citadel Capital has for three consecutive years been ranked Africa’s largest private equity firm
<http://citadelcapital.com/about/who-we-are/> accessed 2 January 2012
11 Jeff Mbanga, ‘RVR Gets New Investor as Sheltam’s Empire Crumbles’ (The Observer, 24 February 2010) <
http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7388%3Arvr-gets-new-investor-as-
sheltams-empire-crumbles&catid=38%3Abusiness&Itemid=68> accessed 21 October 2011.
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country.12 Centum Investment Ltd had earlier in the 1990s invested in to General Motors of
Kenya, helping to modernise production and expand the assembly plants at GM, an
investment that saw GM’s market share achieve dominance of the new car market in the
country, in the process it became a hugely profitable investment for Centum Ltd. More
recently, AfricInvest acquired 24.99% of Family Bank – in a deal that mirrors the 2005
Equity Bank deal with Helios LLC.13
Private equity investments in public infrastructure was pioneered by Trans-Century
Ltd. Prior to its investment in to Rift Valley Railways, this fund had invested heavily in the
power sub-sector and in specialised engineering equipment. Fanisi Venture Capital Fund,
established in Kenya in 2009, made its third investment in 2010, valued at KES 124 million
in to Elris, a telecommunications company in Kenya, a Kenya-based company that provides
network implementation and management services to the telecommunications and
broadcasting sectors in Kenya.14 Earlier the same year, it invested KES80 million into card
payment company Paystream Kenya to expand visa card technology in Kenya.15
An important element that continues to define public consciousness of private equity
is the sector focus or investment strategy of local funds. As illustrated further below, the
strong investment presence in healthcare, financial services, agribusiness, infrastructure,
retail, manufacturing and other service sectors means that Kenyans are increasingly coming
12 Helios Investment Partners, ‘Representative Investments’ <http://www.heliosinvestment.com/representative-
investments> accessed 11 October 2011; cf: Michael Omondi, ‘Equity Races Ahead of Rivals with Sh.11 billion
Capital Injection’ (Business Daily, 15 November 2007) <
<http://www.heliosinvestment.com/support/uploads/1208187763equity-races-ahead-151107.pdf> accessed 11
October 2011.
13 Johnstone Ole Turana, ‘Private Equity Fund Acquires Major Stake in Family Bank’ (Business Daily, 18
October 2010) <
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate%20News/Private%20equity%20fund%20acquires%20major%20
stake%20in%20Family%20Bank/-/539550/1034628/-/13mu2ie/-/index.html> accessed 18 October 2010.
14 Fanisi, ‘Fanisi Invests in Elris Communications Ltd’ (Nov 12, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya)
<http://fanisi.com/news.php?id=8> accessed 2 January 2012
15 Fanisi, ‘Investments’ <http://fanisi.com/page.php?id=10> accessed 21 October 2011.
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into daily contact with private equity by way of products and services financed by private
equity.
It was also observable that during the post-2005 period, there was an increase in the
number of debt-providing companies, including micro-finance companies, in Kenya. Their
investment strategies in certain respects mimicked private equity investment strategies, and in
some cases, have led to investment syndication, as the Acumen Fund and Grameen Bank
joint lending to Juhudi Kilimo, discussed in the last chapter, illustrated.16 This is a significant
new trend towards improving liquidity in the market. These issues are reviewed in more
detail in section 5.8 of this chapter, titled ‘syndicating Transactions’ .
5.3 PE Funds in Kenya: Statistics
Excluding dedicated debt-providing companies, the cumulative Kenyan private equity
market in 2010 exceeded an estimated USD1.5 billion in capital raised, since the first
investment vehicles were set up in 195417 and 1967,18 respectively. This capital has been
invested in over 180 Kenyan companies over that period.19
16 ch 4, 149-150
17 The Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation , incorporated in 1954 as a government-affiliated
investment entity < http://www.icdc.co.ke/about-icdc.html> Accessed January 2010.
18 Centum Investments Company Limited, ‘History of Centum’
< http://www.centum.co.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=99&Itemid=97.> Accessed 20
January 2010.
19 Caution in interpreting these numbers is necessary: they are estimates based on publicly available information
– and the Kenyan private equity industry does not collect statistics in any known structured way. Hence it is
incomplete.
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Less than 11% of the fund managers are government private equity. This is significant
when placed into the context of the vexed literature arguing that too much direct government
private equity has a stifling effect on private equity.20
The remaining nearly 90% of the Kenyan private equity market is made up of
independent fund managers – meaning funds funded and managed by private actors. It is
notable that ‘captive funds’, that is, funds that are part of financial institutions such as banks,
are not yet part of the Kenyan private equity landscape.21 The ongoing strong shift in attitudes
by banks towards the SME sector and their expanding risk appetite coupled with
government’s policy shift in its approaches to financing large public infrastructure projects,
indicate that it is likely that the Kenyan private equity market will in the medium term
witness the emergence of captive funds – that is, institutional venture capital.22
5.4 Fund Characteristics
Chart 5.2 below reports on available fund structures in Kenya, the sources of private
equity funds, the structure of fund management, the question of fund size and how the market
is split between local and foreign funds.
Under the Companies Act of 1962, three types of private companies can be
incorporated in Kenya: companies limited by shares; companies limited by guarantee; and
unlimited companies.23 The Capital Markets Authority Act of 1989 specifies that a private
20 James Brander, Thomas Hellman, Qianqian Du, ‘Government as Venture Capitalists: Striking the Right
Balance’ in the Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2010 (World Economic Forum 2010) 3
Globalization of Alternative Investments Working Papers 26.
21 Barclays Bank of Kenya has since launched its own private equity fund (in 2011) – hence the situation that
prevailed at the time of field study has since changed.
22 This ‘prophecy’ has actually come to pass.
23 Cap 486, s 4(2)(a)(b)(c).
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equity company must be a company limited.24 This is a legal requirement – meaning that
currently, only one form of fund structure is available to private equity in Kenya.
The limited partnership fund structure, discussed in chapter three, was not available in
Kenya at the time of study. Ongoing review of company law, however, led by the Kenya Law
Reform Commission (KLRC), include the creation of a new legal framework that would for
the first time allow the formation of limited liability partnerships in Kenya – similar to the
British limited liability partnership.25 The instrument for this purpose is a proposed new law,
embodied in the Limited Liability Partnership Bill 2010.26 According to the KLRC, which led
in the drafting of the bill, the new LLP framework incorporates many attributes of a private
company, and it is intended to serve the needs of professional business organisations like
law firms, accounting and audit firms, fund managers and other services.27
FM109 and FM106 observed, virtually identically, that “adopting a legal framework
that accommodates choice over fund structures would improve the attractiveness of Kenya to
global private equity funds seeking investment opportunities in emerging markets.”28
Secondary evidence by Emerging Markets Private Equity Association (EMPEA), and
the position taken in some Western literature, corroborates this view.29 The central argument
here is that unfamiliar fund structures in foreign markets are perceived to require different
approaches to investment design.
24 Cap 485A, sections 23 and 28 - to be registered as a private equity company or a fund manager, the applicant
must be a limited liability company.
25 United Kingdom, Limited Liability Partnership Act of 2000 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/12>
26 Parliament of the Republic of Kenya, (Bill Tracker 2011) 4
<http://www.parliament.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=113:bill-
tracker&catid=46:house-business> accessed 11 October 2011. The Cabinet has endorsed the Bill, but it awaits
the third reading (Committee of the whole House) before presidential assent.
27 Interview with Mr. Johnston Okello, Senior State Counsel, Kenya Law Reform Commission (KLRC, Nairobi
Kenya, 5 January 2010).
28 Interviews held at Nairobi, Kenya, in September 2009 and January 2010 – both fund managers in Kenya.
29 Roger Leeds and Julie Sunderland, ‘Private Equity in Emerging Markets’ (2003) 15(4) Journal of Applied
Corporate Finance 8-17 < http://www.sais-jhu.edu/sebin/y/i/journal_of_acf_final_5102.pdf> accessed 12
September 2010
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It is significant, therefore, that current law reform in the area of fund structures is at
an advanced stage. Signalling the government’s commitment to improving the business
environment for alternative investments, the Minister for Finance in the 2011 Budget Speech
urged Parliament to prioritise the enactment of the proposed LLP corporate vehicle30.
In terms of role delineation, it was observable that the organisation of the Kenyan
private equity industry evidenced a clear differentiation of roles between fund managers (GPs)
and fund investors (LPs). The GPs in Kenya are responsible for the day-to-day management
of the funds, and are responsible for sourcing investment opportunities. LPs lay down the
conditions attached to their investments within the framework of the limited partnership
agreement. As far as the form and structure of the limited partnership relationship is
concerned therefore, Kenyan private equity follows global practice – and this is significant in
demystifying what to expect in Kenya.
Chart 5.2 below indicates that the preponderant majority of private equity funds
operating in or out of Kenya have finite lifetimes, on average about 10 years, but which can
be extended by agreement of the LPs. Among the interviewed GPs, 89% were closed-ended
funds, while only 11% were open-ended funds. Among this latter category were a
government private equity fund, and two local funds. These trends are good because to global
private equity funds looking to set up operations in emerging markets, the Kenyan private
equity landscape does not present unfamiliar features – as far as the investment lifetime is
concerned.
30 Hon. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, EGH, MP, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, ‘Budget Statement
for the Fiscal Year 2011/2012’ (Government of Kenya, Ministry of Finance, 8th June 2011) 10 para 36.
<http://www.finance.go.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=110&Itemid=86> accessed 9
June 2011– besides the bills on companies and insolvency, both of which are part of the package of reforms to
Kenya’s company law – in order to support the growth of specialised investments
Over 74% of the funds are sized below US
profile, the prevalent deal size in Kenya ranges between US
This finding correlates with
structure of Kenya’s private sector. Whereas the narrow segment of the private sector
comprising medium and large enterprises can support larger private equity investments, the
preponderant bulk of deals flow from the innovative, but small
sector. It was illustrated in the previous chapter that 80% of Kenya’s private sector is made
up of small micro-enterprises
flow and deal size mirrors the prevalent firm size.
This reality has ramifications for the global private equity investor
matters. According to FM111, one of the larger foreign
31 Ch 4, 129, (chart 4.3)
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companies interviewed, deals valued at over USD50 million in Kenya are few and far
between, while those valued at less than USD20 million abound. FM111 indicated it was
winding down its affairs in Kenya as it was not generating sufficient deal flow at the desired
size thresholds. It was thus astounding, however, when FM104, one of the locally-owned and
locally-led, and older, fund managers roughly corroborated the challenge of deal sizes where
global private equity firms are concerned. FM104 related how it had to turn down potentially
lucrative partnership deals with a foreign, non-Kenya based, investment fund that was
attracted by the generally good returns Kenyan private equity has demonstrated. That global
investor conditioned the proposed partnership on an annual deal flow of four investments
valued above USD50 million annually. FM104 could not guarantee deal flows at the deal size.
Interestingly, 69% of the Kenyan private equity market in 2010 was under the control
of foreign-led private equity funds, with the remaining 31% of the market being controlled by
local funds.32 Consistent with the respective market shares, it was found that 78% of the
funds operating in Kenya featured senior managements comprising over 50% expatriate (non-
Kenyan) workers, while only 22% of the funds featured senior managements with more than
50% local (Kenyan) workers. The proportion of foreign-owned and foreign-led funds
suggests that local ownership of private equity is still under-developed, giving rise to issues
over strategic financial sector development. This reality might also have implications for the
policy behind investment restrictions in private equity (discussed further below). These
realities perhaps warrant an argument in favour of retaining such restrictions, but in the
absence of a clear, written policy on alternative investments such as private equity, it will
remain a difficult regulatory point to debate. Focused work in this area would be a
worthwhile extension of this work.
32 By foreign fund is meant a fund led by expatriates and domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction, and the converse is
true for ‘local’ funds: led by Kenyans and domiciled in Kenya.
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These features motivated the need to seek an understanding of fund sources. The
evidence shows that 92% of all funds made available for private equity investments in Kenya
was sourced from foreign investors, meaning that only 8% of the private equity capital was
raised within Kenya. The local funds (excluding government-invested funds) have a
combined capital of more than USD300 million dedicated to private equity, and have
invested in 23 companies – out of over 181 traced private equity investments in the country
up to 2010 July: or 30.7% of all private equity investments in Kenya.33 A number of the post-
2000 independent funds have also attracted some local institutional support, signalling the
potential of the local market to generate substantial investment funds for this investment
class. 34 The trends above suggest, nonetheless, that even the locally owned funds
substantially fundraise externally. Local fundraising, therefore, remains constrained, and,
industry-wide, the number of local experts engaged at management levels remains low.
Recent newspaper reportage confirms this situation prevails.35
Chart 5.3 below illustrates that fund managers in Kenya mostly draw their investment
capital from government and development finance institutions (75% of the funds), including
European, American, and African development finance institutions.
33 Caution in interpreting these statistics is necessary: without a pre-existing and historically significant
databank of private equity in Kenya, and the inherent inclination within the industry towards limited disclosure,
these statistics are without doubt incomplete. Abstractions therefrom must hence relate to the universe of studied
instances, as opposed to generalising for the industry as a whole. Their value, however, lies in typifying market
trends.
34 Variously sourced: including through interviews with FM102, FM103, FM 105, FM106, FM107, FM108,
FM109, FM110, FM111 and FM113, as well as survey questionnaire responses and information from websites.
35 Cosmas Butunyi, ‘Africa-focused “PE” Way to Go’ (The EastAfrican, Nairobi, 18 February 2012)
<http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Africa+focused+PE+way+to+go/-/2560/1330202/-/shvsj6/-
/index.html > accessed 19 February 2012
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Source: Fund Manager Survey 2010
This is an illuminating finding – suggesting that ‘government’ and ‘government-
linked’ institutional investors predominate emerging markets private equity, a position local
media anecdotally corroborates.36 In view of the market split between local and foreign
funds in Kenya, there is evidence indicating the increasing attractiveness of Kenyan private
equity to international institutional investors, supporting the notion of a portfolio
diversification strategy.37
Going back to the type of investors in Kenyan private equity, chart 5.3 indicates that
pension funds (63%), insurance funds and high net worth individuals (50% respectively)
constitute other substantial sources. It is significant, however, that the pension fund investors
are largely foreign funds. Pension fund regulations in Kenya limit the exposure of local
pension schemes to private equity, a structural barrier to more robust local fundraising for
private equity.
36 ibid
37 Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (MIT, 2004) ‘What Drives Venture Capital
Fundraising?’ ch 3, 38-9.
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Under the Retirement Benefits Authority Act of 1997, the Investment Guidelines
classify private equity as “unquoted equities” and “any other asset” – with specified caps on
investment exposure. Where a scheme fund makes a direct investment in ‘unquoted equities’,
the maximum exposure is capped at 5% of the pension scheme’s net value. Where an
investment is made through a structured investment vehicle like a private equity fund, which
falls under “any other asset”, that threshold rises to 10%, but is subject to approval by the
Authority.38 These conditions stem from Government Financial Regulations, issued by the
Ministry of Finance - the official policy is to invest secured funds in government or
government-approved securities.39
These limitations are intended to serve prudential goals. The Minister’s statement
explained that the directive requiring all scheme funds to be invested in government security
papers was driven by a documented string of imprudent investments which had occasioned
losses to some schemes, leading to difficulties in meeting annuity demands.40 The unintended
effect, however, has been a holding back of wider exposure to private equity funds in Kenya,
suppressing the role and impact of local institutional investments into private equity.
The Retirement Benefits Authority (RBA) ascribes the uncertainty over private
investments to a poor understanding of private equity. According to the Chief Executive
Officer at RBA, private equity’s long-term profile offers a good fit to the long-dated
liabilities of the pension fund industry, and that greater understanding of the dynamics and
nature of private equity was clearly called for.41 He also opined that the pension fund industry
could be engaged as a home-based financing solution in structured investments forming part
38 Act No.3 Laws of Kenya, ss 18, 37, and Column 2 Table G, First Schedule.
39 Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, ‘Budget Speech for Fiscal Year
2009/2010’( Government of Kenya, Ministry of Finance, 11 June 2009) Para. 137
<http://www.finance.go.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=88&Itemid=54> accessed 17
June 2009.
40 ibid para.136-137.
41 Interview with Mr. Morris Odundo, Chief Executive Officer, Retirement Benefits Authority (RBA, Nairobi,
Kenya, 29 August, 2009).
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of the flagship programmes under Vision 2030. The Government echoed these themes in the
2011/2012 budget round, acknowledging that partnerships with the private sector were the
only realistic and sustainable mechanism in delivering the country’s development agenda.42
It is instructive that in 2011 the Kenyan pension fund industry has exceeded KES450
billion– a substantial pool of investable capital.43 31.9% of these funds were invested in
government securities, while 28.9% were invested in quoted equities. 17.8% was invested in
immovable property and 7.4% was invested in guaranteed funds.44 Fixed income and fixed
deposit investments accounted for 8.5% of that asset base, while offshore investments
accounted for a shallow 3.5%, and, more tellingly, only 0.6% was committed to unquoted
equities.45 This investment portfolio mirror government regulations on the investment of
scheme funds.
The Minister for Finance’s directive on how pension scheme funds are to be invested
in Kenya is prescriptive, and does not allow room for informed risk taking in the allocation of
investments – potentially a ground for moral hazard in asset management.46 Adopting a risk-
based supervisory model would permit fund managers the flexibility to adopt responsive risk
management protocols in allocating investments.
In evidence of the level of keenness to demystify private equity, the RBA in
partnership with the CMA have initiated ‘educational’ workshops on how pension fund
42 Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, EGH, MP, ‘Budget Speech 2011/2012 (n 31) 5, 6 para10-13
43 Retirement Benefits Authority, ‘Pension Assets Hit 451 Billion Mark’, (Press Releases, June 2 2011)
<http://www.rba.go.ke/media/docs/press-releases/pension-assets-hit-451-billion-mark.pdf> accessed 9 October
2011.
44 id
45 id
46 Budget Speech 2009/2010, (n 43)
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managers can invest in private equity, starting with a workshop held in March 2011 –
appropriately titled ‘Private Equity Workshop for Pension Fund Trustees’.47
Nonetheless, Government Financial Regulations – as depicted in the Budget Speech
of 2011/12, and as entrenched in the Investment Guidelines in Schedule 1 of the Retirement
Benefits Act No.3 of 1997 – still operate to impede exposure to private equity and other
structured alternative investments beyond the stated thresholds. To consolidate these positive
developments, there is a case for law reform to the Retirement Benefits Act of 1997 to reflect
the emerging policy shift.
Developing mechanisms by which structured investments can benefit from this and
other massive fund pools – like the insurance industry – would open up new frontiers in the
financing of critical development projects. To support these aims, the Government is now
positively predisposed to creating legal frameworks for structured investment vehicles such
as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS).48 Drawing lessons from ‘successful’ models in
this regard (notably USA and Dutch models reviewed in chapter 3) would be a practical
strategy to adopt.
87.5% of the interviewed fund managers believe the local pension funds represent
immense fundraising possibility for private equity funds. The same respondents indicated
they would be happy to fundraise locally were investment regulations governing the pension
fund industry further relaxed. This is a significant reform agenda for the country if local
private equity fund sources are to be improved in a sustainable manner.
47 Retirement Benefits Authority, Held at the Serena Hotel, Nairobi, 23-24 March, 2011
<http://www.rba.go.ke/index.php?option=com_newsarticle&view=newsarticle&n=3> accessed 9 October 2011.
Key presentations were made by the EMPEA, the United States of America International Development Agency
(USAID), Africa Venture Capital Association (AVCA) and a range of private equity fund managers.
48 Budget Speech 2011/2012, para.135 – including proposed amendments to Income Tax Act of 1974 to exempt
REITs from corporation tax and not to levy withholding tax on dividends earned from investing in REITs.
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For 37.5% of the fund managers interviewed, banks are a substantial source of private
equity funds. Like for the current sources of pension funds into private equity, bank finance
into private equity is sourced mostly from foreign countries and non-local banks. 33% of the
interviewed fund managers revealed they had investments by Kenyan banks, suggesting a
growing predisposition towards private equity and other structured alternative investments in
portfolio risk diversification within the country’s money markets. For 25% of the interviewed
fund managers, corporates and fund of funds represent additional investors respectively.
To summarise the evidence on fund sources above, and to put a face to the term
‘foreign’ fund sources, chart 5.4 below illustrates the geographic source of funds for Kenyan-
active private equity firms.
Source: Fund Manager Survey 2010
It is significant that European and African fund sources top the chart (at 75%
respectively), while Kenyan and American sources closely follow at 62.5% respectively. This
is largely consistent with the findings depicted in chart 5.2 that the market share of locally
raised funds in Kenya stood at 31% of the Kenyan private equity market in 2010, while that
of foreign-sourced and foreign-owned funds stood at a substantial 69%.
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A review of fund ownership by nationality revealed an interesting fact: funds linked
with specific European countries for instance (in terms of domicile) sourced the bulk of their
investment capital from the country of their domicile. This relationship between fund
domicile and fund sources was intriguing. Fund managers, however, did not see this as being
particularly significant, based on responses to the structured questionnaire. From a policy
agenda framework, however, it should be instructive that this trend suggests investor
confidence in investment vehicles within the alternative investments sector substantially
determines the extent to which domestic sources of funding can be generated.
As far as the job spread generally across the fund is concerned, the findings (depicted
in chart 5.2, above) revealed that most funds recruit locally at the technical level. These are
the mid-level officials who facilitate deal sourcing, deal evaluation (due diligence), and
provide local understanding to Kenyan investments. The fact that the technical roles are
staffed by locals even among the foreign-owned and foreign-led fund managers indicated
recognition of the importance of local expertise to the success of the investment. This view is
consistent with the research strand suggesting that emerging markets private equity needs to
have local connections to succeed.49
5.5 Investment Strategy
Chart 5.5 below is a depiction of the investment focus of Kenyan-based private equity
funds, both foreign and local. It is notable that there is a strong focus on financial services
(87.5% of the respondents), and manufacturing and agribusiness (62.5% of the respondents
respectively). Other key investment sectors for the locally active funds include infrastructure,
49 Leeds and Sunderland, ‘Private Equity Investing in Emerging Markets’ (2003) ( n 30)
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other service sectors, retail and healthcare (50% of the fund manager respondents
respectively).
Entertainment, media and telecommunications investments represent attractive
investment sectors for a small 12.5% of the respondents. Information technology is an
attractive investment segment for 25% of the fund managers interviewed – consistent with
the results reported in the preceding chapter illustrating the shallow penetration of
information and communication technology in Kenya.50
Source: Fund Manager Survey 2010
These preferences are not indicative of exclusive investment strategies. In fact, all
respondent funds pursue a largely generalist investment strategy – suggesting that local deal
flow realities guide a fund manager’s overall investment strategy. Kenya’s economy is highly
50 Ch 4, 123, 129
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liberalised, and these investment preferences are not driven by regulatory restrictions: they
are driven by the strong economic performance of the preferred sectors and opportunity for
growth that Kenya offers.
Two key observations appear pertinent here. Firstly, the substantial interest in
financial services and retail investments appear to directly go counter to Regulation 8(2) of
the Capital Markets (Registered Venture Capital Companies) Regulations of 2007, issued
under the Capital Markets Act of 1989, Cap 485A of the Laws of Kenya, which provides:
8.(2) The eligible venture capital enterprises for purposes of these
Regulations shall be enterprises whose primary business activity does not
include any of the following-
(a) trading in real property;
(b) banking and financial services;
(c) retail and wholesale trading services. (emphasis added).
In the express language of the law, these types of investments are treated as excluded
economic sectors, meaning that private equity investments into these economic sectors would
not ideally be permissible investments. In fact, private equity deals in these sectors have
happened in Kenya, including in the banking sector, and with the express recognition and
approval of the Central Bank of Kenya.51 It was reported earlier in this chapter that private
equity investments into Kenyan banks have taken place (Equity Bank Ltd and Family Bank
Ltd). These were not transactions aimed at shoring up the banks’ liquidity – both banks were
simply seeking additional investments to finance their growth strategies.
51 Section 13(1) of the Banking Act of 1989, Cap 488: cf: Omondi, ‘Equity Races Ahead’ (2007) (n 12) and Ole
Turana, ‘Private Equity Fund Acquires Stake in Family Bank’ (2010) (n13)
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This reality indicates a conflicting regulatory framework that could drive a degree of
market uncertainty. The investment restriction under Cap 485A of 1989 is worded in terms
that do not, prima facie, suggest there is room for derogation of the statutory principle of
excluded investment sectors for private equity.
Discussions with the CMA did not establish a clear policy motivation for exclusions
under the Venture Capital Regulations of 2007. The CMA respondent observed that -
“As a regulator, our primary business is to ensure market players follow the
laid down rules, as they are for the time being. It may well be that the law
will change; if it does, we will implement the new system.”52
When asked whether the law was, in the regulatory experience, equivocal on these
particulars, the respondent observed that the whole question of private equity was not, at the
time, a regulatory priority for the CMA. Under these circumstances, it looks set that bank
sector regulators will continue acting differently from capital markets regulators.53 This is an
undesirable status quo, and there is, in the view of this study, justification for regulatory
debate on how to harmonise the country’s legal framework for private equity, including on
the contested question of investment restrictions.
The second key observation arising from chart 5.5 is the similarity of the investment
focus of Kenyan-based private equity funds to the general trends within the wider emerging
markets as documented in Emerging Markets Private Equity Association surveys. Most
emerging market private equity funds are generalist in strategy. 2007 statistics indicated that
58% of the emerging market funds (representing 66% of capital commitments) were
generalist funds. The remainder focused on infrastructure, energy, mining, agri-business,
environment and consumer sectors. 50% of the funds targeted growth opportunities, while
52 Interview with RG201, Nairobi, Kenya, (January 2010).
53 ibid
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25% were venture, 7% were mezzanine funds, and 21% were buyout funds respectively.
These trends have remained roughly consistent with trends in 2006 and 2005.54
5.6 Investment Life Cycle
The respondent fund managers were asked about their investment hold periods (or the
average investment life cycle for their Kenyan positions). It was significant that none of the
respondents indicated an investment life-cycle of less than two years. This means that “quick
flip” investments are not the norm in the Kenyan market, consistent with the inherent illiquid
profile of private equity as a financial asset.55
Source: Fund Manager Survey 2010
A solid 50% of the fund managers interviewed indicated a preference for the two to
five year investment hold period, while a larger 63% indicated their expected investment life
cycles to be greater than five years. This is consistent with the few publicly available records
54 EMPEA 2007 Fundraising Review, 7 < http://www.empea.net/fundraisingreview/2007.> accessed 2 August
2010
55 ‘Quick flip’ is a term used to refer to the practice of acquiring a corporate asset and disposing of it in under
two years, a practice observed in early leveraged buyout transactions.
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general profile of investment life cycles among respondent fund managers, most of whom
keep their investment positions on average between 5-7 years.
Another 11% believe the contrary: that longer investment life cycles actually does
harm to risk-adjusted returns on equity, primarily through upping transaction costs and
heightening losses accruing from opportunity costs. One of the recently established fund
managers opined –
“Investment turnover is important. There is an opportunity cost to holding
onto investments too long, regardless of whether the investment is
performing well. The way I see it, it is better to exit a position as soon as pre-
targeted thresholds have been hit, and move onto new opportunities. You
might be earning good from the one in hand, but you do not know the
prospects of what you are letting go by holding onto this one.” 57
This crop of fund managers in the Kenyan market favour a divestment strategy of 2-5
years. It was notable that all of those who held this view started operations as fund managers
in Kenya after the year 2005 – as chart 5.1 illustrated. Several of them were in fact in the
fundraising stage for their first funds, and keen to break apart from the investment model of
older funds.58
In contrast, one of the home-grown funds observed –
“The whole purpose of investing is the opportunity to build great companies
and turn a neat profit. If the one investment in my hand is yielding good
returns and I can see another potentially lucrative opportunity, it is not a
question of ‘either’ ‘or’ – our strategy is to hold onto both. If necessary, we
57 Interview with FM113, Nairobi, Kenya,( August 2009)
58 Interviews with FM109, FM106, FM102, FM103, FM113, Nairobi, Kenya,( August, 2009; January 2010).
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liquidate a small portion of what we hold to facilitate a new acquisition. A
good investment for us is good for the long haul, and that is not necessarily
opposed to the private equity strategy.”59
Both viewpoints summarise the interesting mix of private equity intermediaries currently
operating in Kenya. From the framework of this study, the issue of investment hold periods
simply relates to institutional efficiencies around contract management.
5.7 Capital Structuring in Private Equity
Under the Companies Act of 1962, a company in Kenya can raise capital through
share placement, either in public equity markets or among private investors. This is the
process termed capital structuring, and there are, under the law, several types of possible
shares that a company can issue in exchange for capital investments into the company. These
include common equity or ordinary voting stock,60 redeemable preference shares61 and other
special share classes including share warrants,62 debentures and other securities bearing debt
features.63
Issuing shares alters a company’s capital structure, for which special authority is
required under the law. Such authority exists under Kenyan company law. Section 63 of the
Companies Act of 1962, provides as follows:
“63. A company limited by shares (…), if so authorized by its articles, may alter
the conditions of its memorandum as follows (…) it may –
(a) Increase its share capital by new shares of such amount as it thinks
expedient;
(b) Consolidate and divide all or any of its share capital into shares of larger
amount than its existing shares;
59 Interview with FM112, Nairobi, Kenya, (August 2009)
60 Companies Act 1962 Cap 486, ss 49, 50.
61 ibid s 60.
62 ibid s 85(1).
63 ibid ss 88, 89.
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(c) Convert all or any of its paid-up shares stock, and reconvert that stock into
paid-up shares of any denomination;
(d) Subdivide its shares, or any of them, into shares of smaller amount than is
fixed by the memorandum, so, however, that in the subdivision the
proportion between the amount paid and the amount, if any, unpaid on each
reduced share shall be the same as it was in the case of the share from which
the reduced share is derived; (…)”
A company can thus raise capital through new share issuance, and in the process it can
consolidate or divide all or any of its existing share capital into new share types and
categories, including converting common equity into redeemable preference shares or vice
versa, and can subdivide existing shares into lower-denominated securities provided the
overall effect is not to reduce the company’s share capital. According to section 69 of the
Companies Act of 1962, a special resolution by all shareholders, and court approval, is
necessary prior to any share capital reduction. Any capital structuring process following a
private equity investment into a venture company therefore needs to ensure the company’s
share capital is either varied upwards or preserved after the conclusion of the share re-
distribution following an investment.
In practice, a condition attached to private equity investments is the requirement for
amendments to a venture company’s memorandum and articles of association to entrench
necessary powers and commitments in those constitutive instruments so that the investment
can be supported under law.64
Section 61 of the Companies Act of 1962 enables companies to ‘issue shares of
difference’, that is to say, shares of the same class but carrying different amounts and subject
to different times on payment calls. This is an important instrument in the hands of both the
venture company and the private equity investor. It allows for the navigation of potentially
64 For instance, FM 101 and FM104 and FM112, in their Share Subscription and Shareholders Agreement, all
carry the similarly worded clause: “The Company shall deliver to …… a certified copy of a duly executed
shareholders’ resolution and adopting the new Articles and Memorandum of Association and shall carry out
amendment of the said Articles and Memorandum of Assocition to recognize the provisions of the Option
Agreement relating to….”
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difficult financing propositions, enabling the contracting parties to institutionalise their
respective positioning in light of the intrinsic characteristics of the investment opportunity.
Section 74 of the Companies Act of 1962 makes provision for variation of share class
rights – a powerful tool in the structuring of relationships within a financial contract
framework. The provision reads as follows:
“74. (1) If in the case of a company, the share capital of which is divided
into different classes of shares, provision is made by the memorandum or
articles for authorizing the variation of the rights attached to any class of
shares in the company, subject to the consent of any specified proportion of
the holders of the issued shares of that class or the sanction of a resolution
passed at a separate meeting of the holders of those shares, and in
pursuance of the said provision the rights attached to any such class of
shares are at any time varied, the holders of not less in the aggregate than
fifteen per cent of the issued shares of that class, being persons who did not
consent to or vote in favour of the resolution for the variation, may apply to
the court to have the variation cancelled, and, where any such application is
made, the variation shall not have effect unless and until it is confirmed by
the court.”
What the provision means in practice is that where ordinarily holders of preference
shares may not be entitled to voting rights, or to regular dividend payments, a company may
under section 74 of the Companies Act of 1962 introduce new class rights for this special
share category to allow them a form of voting rights, including veto rights, as well as entitle
them to periodic dividend payments. Conditions could also be attached to the vesting of
shares, whatever class the shares may fall into. These conditions could include performance
indicators, and triggers to conversion based on exigencies defined under the financing
agreement (also known as anti-dilution rights).65
Section 85 of the Companies Act 1962 empowers companies to issue share warrants –
with or without coupons for the payment of future dividends on the shares included in the
65 Jack S Levin, Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions Martin D
Ginsburg, Donald E Rocap and Russell S Light (eds), (Aspen, 2011) ch 2, 2-10 to 2-27.
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warrants. Section 88 grants power to issue debentures, and provides for administrative
incidentals integral thereto.
Kenyan company law therefore supports a range of corporate securities useful in
capital structuring for private equity investments into venture companies. Chart 5.8 below
details the capital structuring preferences observed in Kenyan private equity. It is shown that
the capital structures in Kenya favour straight common equity and debt (over 60% of fund
manager interviewees), followed closely by both convertible and mezzanine shares (over
40% of respondents). Fewer than 30% of the fund managers employ preference shares in
their capital structures, and less than 10% employ warrants.
Source: Fund Manager Survey 2010
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Furthermore, 100% of the independent fund managers take out either a controlling
stake in the venture companies they invest in (over 25%), or a significant minority stake that
incorporates investment control rights (under 25%). Information in the public domain bears
this strategy out.66 The Africa Venture Capital Association directory of members reveals that
most investments in African venture capital adopted a similar ‘significant minority’
strategy.67 Information gleaned from the websites of such fund managers as InReturn Capital
Ltd and TransCentury Ltd demonstrate a similar investment strategy.68 Vindicating the tested
wisdom of this strategy, the International Finance Corporation has reported that its emerging
markets funds and investments, structured into minority stakes (of as little as USD2 million)
in invested companies have performed as admirably as the larger ticket transactions.69
Given the strong preference for debt (debentures) in private equity capital structures
in Kenya, it is not surprising that warrants do not play a strong role. Warrants with or without
coupon payments are preferred where the capital structures favour the use of preference
shares70 – and in the chart above, preference shares appear not to be very popular in Kenyan
private equity.
Convertible securities and mezzanine-type deal structures feature frequently in
observed transactions. The convertibility was in many instances tied to exigencies brought on
by changes in the circumstances of the company, for instance, where a company varies its
share structures, or class rights, or executes a given transaction whose effect is to vary or
66 For instance, Centum Investment Ltd’s private equity portfolio, set out in its website, shows a ‘significant
minority’ strategy with shareholdings mostly above 17% and below 45%: < http://www.centum.co.ke/our-
business/private-equity/pe-portfolio> accessed 21 October 2011.
67 Africa Venture Capital Association, ‘2005 Yearbook’
<http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5327/is_315/ai_n29225750/> accessed 19 August 2011
68 InReturn < http://www.inreturncapital.com/portfolio/portfolio>; TransCentury<
http://www.transcentury.co.ke/> both accessed 20th August 2011.
69 International Finance Corporation, ‘The Case For Emerging Markets Private Equity; (February 2011)
<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/cfn.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/EM_PE_SharingIFCsExperience+February2011/$FILE/
EM_PE_Sharing_IFCs_Experience_v9_February2011.pdf> accessed 2 October 2011
70 Thomas F Hellman, ‘The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts’ (1998) 29 Rand Journal
of Economics 57-76; cf: Stephen Kaplan and Johan Per Stromberg, ‘Financial Contract Theory Meets the Real
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts’ (2003) 70 Review of Economic Studies 281-315
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otherwise dilute the rights and entitlements of existing shareholders. The convertibility
feature therefore serves as an anti-dilution protection, but also as a participating enabler,
ensuring that the investor partakes in the company’s success. Where a venture company
executes an initial public offering during the subsistence of the private equity investment, for
instance, a number of the seen agreements provide for the conversion of all preference shares
held by the investor at the time of listing to convert into common equity and be made part of
the stock of shares sold in the initial public offer. 71 The conversion price can be
predetermined, or it can be pegged onto an agreed valuation criteria to be implemented at the
time of conversion.72
As discussed later in this chapter, two prevalent exit strategies are buybacks (i.e.,
share redemptions) and dividend payouts. These strategies make sense when assessed from
the prevalent capital structuring options in Kenyan private equity. Debt is by nature self-
liquidating, and its repayment assures the private equity investor a steady stream of interest
earnings. This translates to an early realisation of part of the investment’s value. Regular
dividend payments attaching to a number of class rights also secure an early return to private
equity investments. Both value extracting mechanisms progressively alter the balance in the
relationships between the investor and the venture company – as the debt is paid down, the
investor’s power in the venture relationship progressively reduces. In effect, repayments of
debt, redemption of debentures, and liquidation of any mezzanine facilities operate as
progressive sale-back of the venture to the company. The financing agreements seen make
provision for a lump sum (bullet) payment at the end of the investment period representative
71 Confidential contract documents accessed in location at the premises of FM104, FM112, FM101, August –
September 2009; January 2010.
72 Confidential contract documents, accessed at FM 104, FM112, FM113, FM101 - on shareholding ‘options
agreements’, August – September 2009; January 2010, Nairobi Kenya.
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of the value addition into the company by the investor, on top of any dividends and or interest
payments made to the investor over the life of the investment.73
An important driver of the capital structures observed (depicted in Chart 5.8, above)
was stated to be a desire to control for exit (over 40% of the respondents), and the nature of
the regulatory environment (33% of the respondents). The first is keyed to the profit objective,
the core aim of the investment activity: a natural and rational self-interest. The second is
linked to the qualitative aspects of the overall framework for the investment activity – the
subject of the next four chapters.
As there is no capital gains tax on investment earnings under Kenyan law, tax
considerations have no impact on capital structures. None of the respondents indicated tax as
a factor in security design. Similarly, the framework for entering into contracts, as well as the
framework for their enforcement, did not appear to play a significant role in capital
structuring options – only 11% of the fund manager respondents indicated this parameter
might influence their capital structuring decisions.
Intriguingly, while contracting conditions are not a concern for most respondents,
‘regulatory conditions’ was a cause of concern to 33% of the aggregate interviewees.74 This
suggests that contract conditions viewed in isolation are not substantially problematic, but the
dynamics change when lumped with other factors surrounding the investment decision. This
finding is important as it informs broad principles impacting investment promotion policies.
73 Confidential documents viewed at FM101, FM104, FM112, FM105, FM113, August-September 2009,
January 2010 - suggesting that the notion of ‘large’ is ‘lucrative’ because of ‘higher rates of return’ and that ‘it
takes longer to exit the ‘J-Curve’ in emerging markets because of smaller deal size’ (that is, move from negative
annualised performance to positive performance) may not necessarily be truisms typifying private equity in
emerging markets.
74 By ‘regulatory conditions’ was meant the general framework for financial contracts, the framework for share
structures under company law, the state of local institutions in contract enforcement, as well as compensation
structures (including legal framework for stock options) and taxation.
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The issuance of redeemable preference shares is subjected to a string of conditions
under the Companies Act of 1962 – which might partly explain the higher prevalence of other
types of corporate securities in Kenyan private equity. The conditions under section 60 of the
Companies Act of 1962 are -
“(i) no such shares shall be redeemed except out of profits of the company
which would otherwise be available for dividend or out of the proceeds of a
fresh issue of shares made for the purposes of the redemption;
(ii) no such shares shall be redeemed unless they are fully paid;
(iii) the premium, if any, payable on redemption, must have been provided
for out of the profits of the company or out of the company's share premium
account before the shares are redeemed;
(iv) where any such shares are redeemed otherwise than out of the proceeds
of a fresh issue, there shall out of profits which would otherwise have been
available for dividend be transferred to a reserve fund, to be called the
capital redemption reserve fund, a sum equal to the nominal amount of the
shares redeemed, and the provisions of this Act relating to the reduction of
the share capital of a company shall, except as provided in this section,
apply as it the capital redemption reserve fund were paid-up share capital of
the company.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this section, the redemption of preference
shares thereunder may be effected on such terms and in such manner as may
be provided by the articles of the company.
(3) The redemption of preference shares under this section by a company
shall not be taken as reducing the amount of the company's authorized share
capital.
(4) Where in pursuance of this section a company has redeemed or is about
to redeem any preference shares, it shall have power to issue shares up to
the nominal amount of the shares redeemed or to be redeemed as if those
shares had never been issued, and accordingly the share capital of the
company shall not for the purpose of any enactments relating to stamp duty
be deemed to be increased by the issue of shares in pursuance of this
subsection:
Provided that, where new shares are issued before the redemption of the old
shares, the new shares shall not ,so far as relates to stamp duty, be deemed
to have been issued in pursuance of this subsection unless the old shares are
redeemed within one month after the issue of the new shares.
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(5) The capital redemption reserve fund may, notwithstanding anything in
this section, be applied by the company in paying up unissued shares of the
company to be issued to members of the company as fully paid bonus shares.”
These conditions in isolation are not sufficient to explain the low presence of
preferred share capital in Kenyan private equity. When viewed in combination with other
factors, especially the desire to control for exit, the conditions attached to preference shares
may be seen in practice to introduce onerous requirements that can be avoided through the
adoption of alternative capital structures.
5.8 Syndicating Transactions
The process of syndication involves the coming together by two or more investors for
the financing of a single investment opportunity.75 Several factors can motivate investors to
partner in financing a venture company. Firstly, the transaction value could be very large, and
most investors limit the risk of over-exposure by capping maximum investment per venture
company. Where an opportunity exceeds permissible thresholds, the venture company could
approach one funder and request it to front-run the syndicating process, to find partners, and
to work out dynamics around syndication terms.
Secondly, the transaction could be in a new economic context or a new legal
jurisdiction, with the ‘newness’ driving risk. In this sense, syndicating the financing of the
opportunity could be a confidence-building strategy that sees a local investor partnering with
an international investor. The local investor brings the local knowledge into the transaction,
building the confidence of the foreign partner. Syndication in this sense is a confidence-
signalling strategy, as well as a risk-mitigation strategy.
75 Agasha Mugasha, The Law of Multi-Bank Financing: Syndicated Loans and the Secondary Bank Market,
(Oxford University Press, 2007) para.1.02, 2
Thirdly, an investor might want to syndicate primarily to expand its portfolio. This is
frequently the case where the investor has a small fund at its disposal, but wishes, for
strategic reasons, to increase its economic presence.
Fund managers were asked whether they syndicate their investments in Kenya, and if
they did, what their motivators for so doing were. Their responses are captured in the chart
below.
Source: Fund Manager Survey 2010
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funds that dominated the market during the study period applied varying levels of country
risk premia, with most charging between 5% and 10%.
5.9 The Exit Framework
The chart below is a representation of preferred exit strategies among interviewed
fund managers. A cautious interpretation is in order, however, in light of the very few
instances of documented and reported private equity exits in Kenya. Very few exits relative
to the total number of traced investments could be documented, and several of the
documented exits were partial exits to the extent that fund managers retained substantial
ownership thresholds in investee companies, entitling them to dividend streams.
Source: Fund Manager Survey 2010
The preferred exit vehicle is a trade sale/sale to another private equity firm (62.5% of
the respondents) as shown in chart 5.10 above. Buybacks (or re-sale to investee companies,
that is, a process whereby company owners buy out the private equity investor through share
re-purchase) is an attractive exit strategy to 50% of the respondents. These favoured exit
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their contracts, the most prevalent clauses being drag along rights, warrants and put options
in fairly equal proportions, and warrants as a less common exit control mechanism. These
contractual choices are entirely consistent with the strong preference for voting equity
thresholds in local investments.
equity contractual coalition conveys to the private equity investor a substantial set of control
rights that enable it to engineer a desired exit strategy, at a time most conducive to the
investor.
The absence of registration rights clauses in Kenyan private equity contracts is
consistent with the low profile that the country’s capital markets play in private equity exit
strategies as the market stands in 2010.
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exit control mechanisms is consistent with the capital structuring observed in Kenyan private
equity reported under section 5.7.
5.10 Future Outlook of Kenyan Private Equity
Chart 5.13 below sets out the prevailing attitudes of fund managers to private equity
in Kenya. Out of all those active fund managers interviewed in 2009 and 2010, 37.5% were
focused on investing their current funds, while 62.5% were planning to raise a new fund.
Asked about their perceptions of the attitude of the local business community to private
equity, 75% thought the attitudes were improving, while about 25% thought the attitudes to
private equity remained the same. This is consistent with responses to the question “what are
the main constraints to private equity in Kenya?”
Source: Fund Manager Survey 2010
62.5% of the fund managers believe private equity as a financial asset class is still
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considered private equity an ‘exotic’ type of financial product. These perceptions have
contributed to the still-low uptake of private equity in Kenya.
In a country whose private sector suffers various structural constraints, and where
access to bank credit for business finance is expensive, it is interesting to note that
investments focused on early stage private equity represent only 25% of market activity. In
sharp contrast, growth-stage investments represent a considerably larger 87.5% of market
activity, while about 50% of the funds are interested in buyout opportunities. According to
the respondent fund managers, these current trends are set to hold over the medium-term.
Source: Fund Manager Survey 2010
The inter-segment spread of private equity revealed in the preceding paragraph
creates an opportunity for public policy consideration. In the preceding chapters, the role of
the private sector in driving economic growth was considered. It was seen how the small and
microenterprise sector is particularly axiomatic to Africa’s resurgent economies. In its current
manifestation in Kenya, however, the private equity ‘miracle’ remains elusive to the SME
sector – the sector that matters most to the country’s long-term economic sustainability. The
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Acumen Fund-Grameen Bank co-investment into Juhudi Kilimo, reviewed in chapter 4,
offers a functional model for public policy design.79
The preceding chart illustrates further that a lack of liquidity in Kenya is seen by
37.5% of the interviewed fund managers as a constraint to deal closure in Kenya, while a
small 12.5% of the funds have experienced poor risk-adjusted returns. This latter view could
be consistent with the wider state of the business climate in the country. Nonetheless, it is
significant that the remaining 87.5% of the active funds in Kenya do not think the market
suffers poor returns.
It would seem that one of the main constraints facing private equity in Kenya is that it
still remained little understood by the business community. Secondly, deepening the financial
markets appears to be an important agenda going forward if the liquidity constraint is to be
resolved. This second deduction reinforces the nexus between private equity and the wider
financial and capital markets, supporting the tentative proposition, based purely on the factual
findings so far, that strong financial and capital markets positively influence the growth
trajectory of private equity markets. For public policy, the question is to decide what mix of
tools to deploy, and in what priority or sequence or combinations, in culturing, nurturing and
nudging environments that accelerate growth across sub-segments of the financial and capital
markets.
All the respondent fund managers were asked to indicate their projections on the
private equity investment climate in Kenya over the next 18 months on a variety of issues
depicted in the chart below. Their responses in the aggregate suggest a fairly optimistic
attitude of fund managers, who appear confident about their Kenyan private equity
investments.
79 ch 4, 149-151
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Source: Fund Manager Survey 2010
First of all, 62.5% believe that in 2010 and 2011, investment entry multiples are likely
to increase; while 75% of the respondents believe that transaction volumes will increase. In
contrast, only 37.5% of the respondents believe the entry multiples will remain the same, and
25% believe transaction volumes will remain at current (2009) levels, respectively. On deal
size, the market mood is mixed, with 50% believing Kenyan deals will increase in size, while
an equal 50% think the deal sizes will remain at current levels.
As far as capital structuring is concerned, 87.5% believe that local deals will benefit
from increasing debt financing (which in certain respects is largely consistent with the
viewpoints on anticipated increased deal flow), while only 12.5% of the respondents believe
debt financing thresholds will hold constant at the 2009 levels.
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Consistent with the findings in Chart 5.15 above, 62.5% of the respondent fund
managers said they will be net-buyers of businesses in 2010 and 2011. A straight 37.5% of
the respondents indicated they will be focused on divesting their positions over the same
period. A significant 37.5% of the respondents also indicated that their sales are likely to
equal their purchases over the same period.
Significantly, however, about 75% of the respondents believe that exit valuations will
increase over the projected period, while 25% of the fund managers think that exit valuations
will hold constant at the current (2009) levels.
On exit volumes, the market is ambivalent: an equal 37.5% presents contrarian views:
with one group of respondents believing exit volumes will increase, while the other group
believe the volumes will remain constant. However, a significant 25% of the respondents
believe the exit volumes will actually decrease going forward. The latter is a rather dim view,
especially in light of the preponderant viewpoint of all respondents on the question of their
perception of the economic conditions within sectors of investment. 87.5% of the respondents
thought the overall economic climate in Kenya would improve. Nonetheless, it is significant
that the overall perception of the exit climate is understated, and not quite as robust compared
with, for instance, the perceptions on deal volumes, or entry multiples. Clearly, the exit
framework in the country is a problematic area for private equity investments.
Interestingly, the foregoing views are vindicated by independent reviews by EMPEA,
which has consistently since 2008 reported that Sub-Saharan Africa is no longer an over-
looked region, having attracted fundraising worth USD2.2 billion in 2008, USD2.3 billion in
2007, USD2.4 billion in 2006, and only USD800 million in 2005. In effect, Sub-Saharan
Africa is one of the biggest growth stories in emerging markets private equity – and the level
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of market activity in Kenya by fund registration since 2005 entrenches this view.80 While
fundraising between 2006 and 2009 has roughly stagnated, investment activity has
consistently increased. In EMPEA’s view, the region has continuously improved and proved
its investment brand, hence its growing allure.81
5.11 CONCLUSION
This chapter has established that Kenya’s private equity industry is a rich mixture of
independent, local and foreign funds, as well as government-initiated private equity. The
investment strategy unveiled mirrors trends across the emerging markets, with the distinct
variation that technology is not a core driver of private equity in Kenya - yet. The Kenyan
market turns out to be a lucrative market in the experience of the few traced exited positions,
but capital structuring circumvents the challenges of a still-nascent public equity market.
Investment lifecycles mirror general international practice (between 3.5 and 7 years between
investment decision and exit).
This chapter further finds that private equity returns are driven strongly in Kenya by a
combination of deal size, capital structures, investment hold period, the general conditions of
the market and exit conditions. Significantly, regulatory standards do not feature as a driver
of returns among the fund managers interviewed. Similarly, the number of deals (portfolio
size) does not appear to be a substantial earnings determinant either. Regulatory conditions
appear to be important to contract design and execution, however. Exit conditions appear to
be an important driver of fund performance, though not of security design. Contract design,
conversely, appears to be an important exit determinant.
80 EMPEA Insight: Sub-Saharan Africa (October 2008, October 2009) <http://www.empea.net/Main-Menu-
Category/EMPEA-Research/copy%20of%20EMPEA-Insight.aspx> accessed 21 October 2011.
81 ibid, Special Edition Insight Sub-Saharan Africa, November 2010.
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In the preceding chapter, the Kenyan financial system was found to be fairly
sophisticated by international standards – meaning that there exists a market for transaction
debt. Although a section of the respondent fund managers expressed the view that liquidity
was likely to become problematic in the medium term, a majority of the players indicated
plans to fundraise – suggesting confidence in the underlying fundamentals supporting the
investment decision.
In view of prevailing themes in Western literature about transaction structures in
emerging markets, it was anticipated that capital structures in Kenya would evince a
sophisticated mix of equity securities.82 In fact, it has been established that private equity
investments in Kenya are concentrated in the growth segment – employing common equity
and substantial amounts of debt finance.
To the extent that this capital structure found explanation in an exit strategy
calculation, it suggests the qualitative deduction that the exit environment is a source of
worry in private equity investing in Kenya. This is a legitimate policy agenda.
Features and rights attaching to different share classes are remarkably unsophisticated:
the debt is simple debt, for instance, and the ‘common stock’ is not structured as ‘common
preferred’ or ‘convertible commons’ or ‘superior commons’ or ‘commons with warrants’ –
among a host of other shades and qualifications. This indicates an ethic of ‘simple is clear’ in
Kenyan private equity practice. This relatively unsophisticated deal structure has not
negatively impacted returns.
The available fund structure has no demonstrable impact on performance – at least
none that the fund manager respondents admitted to. The only noticeable drawback of the
available fund structure – and something public policy would do well to resolve – is to render
82 William L. Megginson, ‘Toward A Global Model of Venture Capital?’ Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,
Vol. 16, No.1 [2004], pp.8-26.
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Kenya a non-attractive jurisdiction for fund registration. Most of the funds are registered in
jurisdictions such as Mauritius that offer tax advantages not available in the Kenya legal
system. There is a benefit to improving legal environments for fund registration – besides the
obvious impact on stimulating the deepening of a local culture toward innovation, more funds
based in and operating out of Kenya would promote the country’s leading position as a hub
for financial services, in addition to deepening local capacity.
Lastly, it has been shown in this chapter that there is some government involvement
in Kenyan private equity, but there is no recognisable official policy on either private equity
specifically, or alternative investments generally. In light of the prevailing positive policy
environment for support to SMEs in Kenya and hence financing solutions targeting private
investments, there is opportunity for stronger policy support for private equity. One clear area
for government policy relates to the regulatory framework for private equity, which the next
chapter explores in detail. Expanding structures and avenues for investment exits, including
through further developments of Kenya’s capital market institutions, presents another policy
arena for government support for Kenyan private equity. Overall, this chapter’s findings
support the proposition that the future looks bright for Kenyan private equity. From an
economic development perspective, this is a good prospect for Kenya.
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THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATE EQUITY
6.1 Introduction
A legal jurisdiction that offers its entrepreneurs choice in organisational forms
for business activity is attractive to investors for being sophisticated.1 Different legal
structures deliver different functionalities to businesses. It was established in the
preceding chapter that for private equity in Kenya, the available organisational vehicle
for private equity business is the limited liability company, without option. It was
argued that this limitation potentially slows the rate of entry for global private equity
firms seeking opportunities in emerging markets – for want of tax transparency.2
Organisational vehicles are subject to varying levels of regulation across
jurisdictions.3 The motivation for regulation stems from a diverse range of possible
justifications,4 and could be aimed at achieving different outcomes including either to
create better market efficiency (establishing rules for economic activity),5 to promote
the ends of regulatory supervision and oversight of market actors,6 or to protect the
public interest, 7 or even national security. 8 Regulation can also be grounded on
1 David Milman, Regulation of Business Organisations: Into the Millennium (Hart Publishing, Oxford,
1999) 1, 2
2 Ch 5, 160
3 Anthony Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford, 1994) ch 3
4 Richard A Posner, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’ (1974) 5 Bell Journal of Economics 335
5 James Q Wilson, The Politics of Regulation (New York, 1980) 357-94
6 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, 1957) 1
7 Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (Cambridge, Mass., 1982) ch1
8 Barry M Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation (CUP, 1982) ch 3 – for a detailed review of
regulatory theories.
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justifications of ‘market failure’ – when private economic actors engage in activities
deemed harmful to the wider society of civilised states.9
Private equity, as has been shown, is a form of financial intermediation that
facilitates the pooling of capital that is then channelled into the economy, financing
corporate investment. Besides its intermediation characteristics, it is a corporate and
capital market activity. It is thus a financial activity whose impact can to varying
levels fall on sections of society usually protected under law.
While the practice of private equity has generally escaped robust regulatory
oversight around the world compared to other forms of regulated financial activities –
such as the banking sector, or the capital markets – the legal forms through which it is
conducted have been subject to regulation, and most countries where it has emerged
have adopted varying forms of legal frameworks that enable private equity investing
activity. This chapter, thus, explores the broad regulatory framework governing the
practice of private equity in Kenya. The core aim is to assess the extent to which the
current state of the law promotes or inhibits the emergence of a stronger, more
economically significant private equity industry in Kenya.
To motivate the discussion, then, on how Kenyan law addresses private equity,
section 6.2 reviews the high-level aspects of private equity practice open to regulatory
action. Section 6.3 follows with an assessment of what can be found in Kenyan law
about private equity practice. This discourse canvasses securities, corporate, and
competition law provisions. Section 6.4 evaluates the extent to which there exists
compliance with the law, and evaluates whether the current legal framework is fit for
purpose. Section 6.5 offers a short review of international experience, to provide
9 Emmette S Redford, Administration of National Economic Control (London 1952) 251-2. cf: Cass R
Sunstein, ‘Paradoxes of the Regulatory State’ (1990) 57 University of Chicago LR 407
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qualitative counterpoints with which to evaluate the Kenyan reality. Section 6.6
analyses the Kenyan experience, and section 6.7 concludes.
6.2 Regulating Private Equity – which way?
Global practice on the regulation of private equity is varied, with each
jurisdiction selecting aspects of private equity practice to subject to regulation. This is
because private equity, as a commercial activity, comprises a range of distinct
components including:
a) Fund management activity
b) Fundraising activity
c) Investment activity
d) Business management activity
e) Employment activity
f) Trading activity (including the purchase and sale of ownership stakes in
companies).
These features are not peculiar to private equity, however: most private
companies would fit this profile. What sets private equity apart, however, is its
methodology and its clientele at both ends of the private equity stream – investors at
the top, and venture companies downstream. Regulation, where it occurs, is directed
at one or more of these features or manifestations of private equity.
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There are thus three possible approaches to the regulation of private equity,
guided by the intrinsic structure of the industry. The first is to regulate the private
equity fund. The second is to regulate the private equity fund manager. The third is to
regulate the private equity activity. And there is a residual fourth – which combines
two or more of the preceding models. From a public policy framework, risk analyses
of electing to place regulatory focus on either is necessary.
The fund is merely a legal structure that facilitates the pooling of resources
that can then be disbursed at the whim of the fund manager. Of itself, the fund,
regardless of size, is passive.
The fund manager, unlike the fund itself, is not passive. The fund manager
controls the fund: applying it to investments, employing it to design differently
structured deals, using it as a tool in determining governance structures, and in a host
of other disparate ways. It can be argued, drawing from this characterisation, that a
measure of regulatory risk lies with the fund manager.10 Regulatory effect on the fund
manager could be designed around the following key areas:
(i) decisions on investment;
(ii) use of leverage;
(iii) governance structure and internal systems of risk management and the
avoidance of conflicts of interest;
10 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Commission Staff Working Document’ Accompanying
the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment
Fund Managers and amending Directive 2004/39/EC and 2009/…/EC: Executive Summary of the
Impact Assessment, Brussels, 30/4/2009, SEC(2009) 577, 6
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/docs/alternative_investments/fund_managers_executiv
e_summary.pdf.> accessed 15 October 2010.
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(iv) the management of relationships with investors, counterparties and
regulators, including the provision of information;
(v) organisation of administrative functions – including valuations;
(vi) safe-keeping of assets; and
(vii) audit.
As the discussion at section 6.3 suggests, different jurisdictions follow different
models in their legal frameworks for private equity, supporting the notion that public
policy perception of ‘risk’ posed by private equity varies across jurisdictions. These
cross-jurisdictional differences centre on the elements of the private equity
phenomenon, enumerated above. One jurisdiction might view investor protection and
transparency to public authorities as frontline issues of regulatory concern. Another
will view market access, integrity, and perhaps financial transparency and
accountability of the industry as the main regulatory drivers. Yet others will view
governance, the use of leverage and risk appetite in the riskier end of market
structures – effectively systemic stability - as the main issues. The common
denominator among all of these approaches is the firm focus on the activities of the
fund manager, rather than the fund itself.
Is any single model superior to the other? Is it preferable to create a unified body
of law that can be styled ‘private equity law’ or to adopt a set of enabling principles
that can be translated into both legal and institutional edicts to support the industry?
Some of the more well-known concerns about private equity (for example, the use of
too much leverage, asset stripping, corporate raids) are questions that could be
addressed under a country’s corporate and securities legislations. These issues are
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important when considering how best to evaluate the legal and institutional needs of
the private equity industry.
With the preceding reflections to hand, the next part of the chapter, turns to an
analytical description of the structure of Kenya’s regulatory framework for private
equity. This review provides a contextual framework within which to further reflect
on the broad aims of this study – that is, the extent to which the law and legal
institutions are important variables in the growth of private equity in a developing
country.
6.3 Private Equity in Kenyan Law
6.3.1 Definition of Private Equity
Under the Capital Markets (Registered Venture Capital Companies)
Regulations 2007, a venture capital company is defined as one incorporated under the
Companies Act of 1962, with its main business being the provision of substantial risk
capital to small and medium-sized businesses in Kenya through equity, quasi-equity
and other financial securities including convertible securities.11 Furthermore, such a
company must structure its financing with substantial levels of managerial or
technical expertise to qualifying enterprises.
It is notable that nowhere in the law is a meaning assigned to the phrase
“substantial risk capital”. In practice, delimiting its threshold is problematic, raising
issues around regulatory in-exactitude. If a regulator is unable to precisely isolate a
11 R.2, Legal Notice No.183 of 2007, promulgated under S 12, Capital Markets Act 1989, Cap 485A,
Laws of Kenya
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violation of a regulatory standard because that standard is vague, regulatory certainty
cannot be claimed on that specific regulatory aspect.
Secondly, the phrase “private equity” as distinguished from venture capital is
nowhere referred to in the Venture Capital Regulations of 2007. It is notable from the
Regulations that the following types of venture financing are contemplated:12
(i) seed capital – defined as financing targeted at research, assessment and
development of initial concepts, prototypes for product development and
initial marketing;
(ii) start-up financing – defined as financing to aid in commencing operations,
production or concept/prototype implementation;
(iii) mid-stage financing – defined as investment to provide working capital or
capital expenditure in the commercialisation process, or additional capital
injections to increase production capacity, marketing or product
development, and funding in aid of the listing/going public process;
(iv) subsidiary financing – defined to mean financing for trade sale
transactions that provide investment exits to venture capital funds.
From the stage dynamic of the private equity business model, the private equity
landscape defined under the Kenyan regulations encompasses the following stages of
the firm life-cycle: seed, start-up, growth/expansion, and aspects of the buyout
segment. From the analyses in the preceding chapter, it is notable that in practice,
private equity activity in Kenya eschews the early stages of the firm, focusing on the
mid-stage enterprise seeking to expand its business in terms of output or through
12 ibid s 2
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introducing higher efficiencies in supply-chain management. What the law
contemplates appears to be private equity in everything but name.
A qualifying enterprise under the Venture Capital Regulations 2007 is termed a
“venture capital enterprise”, and is defined as a small or medium-sized business entity
incorporated under the Companies Act of 1962 and standing in need of venture capital
investment to enable it to finance a new product or expand its business. The Venture
Capital Regulations of 2007 define a ‘small and medium-sized business’ to be one
with an asset net-worth or annual turnover of less than five hundred million Kenya
shillings.13
In sum, private equity under Kenyan law is defined as the provision of medium-
to-long term risk capital/finance to small and medium-sized enterprises at various
stages of the firm-cycle (start-up/growth/buyout), mostly in the form of equity
injections, and accompanied by technical and managerial support.
6.3.2 The Law on Registration
The law on private equity is contained in the Capital Markets Act of 1989.
Section 12 empowers the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) to issue necessary
regulations periodically for the better implementation of the Act, while section 23
empowers the CMA to regulate all persons carrying on businesses relating to dealings
in securities – either as advisers, issuers or buyers.14 Section 23 of the Act provides as
follows:
13 Venture Capital Companies Regulations (2007) (n 11) R.2
14 s 12(1)(g)(k), Cap 485A.
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“23. (1) No person shall carry on business as a securities exchange,
stockbroker, dealer, investment adviser, fund manager, investment
bank, authorised securities dealer, authorised depository, or hold
himself out as carrying on such a business unless he holds a valid
licence issued under this Act.
(2) No person shall carry on or hold himself out as carrying on
business as a registered venture capital company, collective
investment scheme, central depository or credit rating agency unless
he is approved as such by the Authority.
(3) A person approved by the Authority to carry out any business
required by this Act to be approved shall comply with all
requirements of the Authority and pay an annual fee to the Authority
at such rate as the Authority may prescribe.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the powers
of the Authority to approve or license any other person operating in
any other capacity which has a direct impact on the attainment of the
objectives of this Act.”
It emerges from this provision that Kenyan law regulates two aspects of
private equity practice: firstly persons requiring licensing and, secondly, businesses
requiring authorisation. The lexicon is ‘approval’ and ‘licensing’. There are no
definitions for the terms ‘approval’ and ‘authorisation’ in the Capital Markets Act of
1989. The Interpretation and General Provisions Act, Cap 2 of 1956 (the residual
legislation ascribing meanings to legal terms not otherwise or specifically defined
under a substantive piece of legislation) does not carry definitions for any of these
terms, either.
The contextual meaning of the terms ‘authorise’ and ‘approve’ can be gleaned
from the Foreign Investments Act Cap 518 of 1964, which defines an ‘approved
business’ as one that receives an ‘approval certificate’. This imports the suggestion
that the authorisation and or approval process involves a certification exercise.15
Licensing, on the other hand, has a meaning attached to it from general business
practice, and can be said to entail the process of vetting a business entity for
15 ss 2, 3
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compliance, and the issuance of a business permit, with or without conditions, and
valid for a specified period of time.
Investment advisers and fund managers are required to be licensed under the
law.16 The business of a venture capital company is included in the list of businesses
requiring the Authority’s approval.17
Prima facie, there is a supposition that the law views the licensing process as
different from the approvals process – hence the employment of two specific terms as
regulatory alternatives, as opposed to equivalents. If to ‘approve’ were the same as ‘to
licence’, logic suggests it would have been legislatively sensible to elect on one or the
other of the terminologies. The law, however, embeds both terms within the
provisions relating to fit and proper requirements for organisations seeking to carry on
the listed types of commercial activities. No case law was found on point to deduce
how Kenyan courts have or might interpret the language of the law.
Section 26 of the Capital Markets Act of 1989 also employs the terms
‘licensed’ and ‘approved’ within the context of licence revocations. The sub-title to
that section reads ‘revocation of licence’ – importing the idea that to be ‘approved’ is
equivalent to, or is evidenced by, the holding of a ‘licence’. This idea of the possible
inter-changeability of the two terms in practice – ‘licensed’ and ‘approved’ - is
strengthened by the wording of section 27 of the Act, set out below:
“27. (1) The Authority shall -
(a) before the thirtieth day of April in each year, cause the names and
addresses of all persons licensed or approved during the current year
to be published in the Gazette; and
16 Capital Markets Act (1989), s 23(1)
17ibid, s 23(2)
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(b) within thirty days of revocation of a licence, cause the names of
any persons whose licence is revoked to be published in the Gazette.
(2) The Authority shall keep in such form as it deems appropriate a
register of the holders of current licences specifying, in relation to
each holder of a licence -
(a) his name;
(b) the address of the principal place at which he carries on the
licensed business; and
(c) the name or style under which the business is carried on if
different from the name of the holder of the licence.”
Licensing and approval requirements are stipulated under sections 24 and 29
of the said Act of 1989. Regulations issued under section 12 of the Act provide
elaborate rules relating to setting up, conduct and governance of private equity funds
in Kenya – and even within the Regulations, the apparent inter-changeability of the
terms is noted.18
To be licensed as a fund manager, investment advisor or private equity
company, all licensees must be entities incorporated under the Companies Act of
1962 – or foreign companies recognised as such under the registration requirements in
the Act. 19 Secondly, all directors of licensees must be above reproach and meet
minimum requirements – meet what the law terms ‘fit and proper person’ criteria.20
Thirdly, executive directorships are restricted to individuals owning no more than
25% of the ordinary voting equity of a given corporation.21
From a legal policy perspective, these requirements are in the first instance
aimed at promoting legality in the practice of private equity (only legitimately
incorporated entities can be licensed). The fit and proper requirements for a private
18 Venture Capital Companies Regulations, 2007 (n 11)
19 Capital Markets Authority Act, 1989, s 29(1)(a)
20 ibid s 29(1)(b-i,ii,iii)
21 ibid s 29(5),
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equity fund or company to be registered in Kenya are enshrined in sections 3 and 4 of
the Venture Capital Regulations of 2007, which are reproduced below.
“3. A venture capital company shall be entitled upon making an
application to the Authority in the prescribed form and on payment of
the prescribed fee to be registered under these Regulations as a
registered venture company if it has–
(a) been duly incorporated under the Companies Act as a company
limited by shares;
(b) as its principal object the provision of risk capital to small and
medium size businesses in Kenya;
(c) a minimum paid up share capital of one hundred million shillings;
(d) a minimum fund of one hundred million shillings;
(e) audited financial statements for the three years immediately
preceding the date of
application, the latest of which shall not be older than six months as
at the date of application (where applicable);
(f) have a demonstrable track record as a venture capital company of
at least three years or in the alternative, one or more of its directors
shall have a demonstrable track record in the management of venture
capital funds for a period of at least three years;
(g) engaged a fund manager duly licensed by the Authority;
(h) a board of directors of which at least one third of the directors
are independent directors;
(i) appointed an auditor who is a member of the Institute of Certified
Public Accountants of Kenya; and
(j) appointed a secretary who is a member of the Institute of Certified
Public Secretaries
of Kenya.
It can be seen from Rule 3 of the Venture Capital Regulations of 2007,
reproduced above, that an applicant needs to have as its principal object the provision
of risk capital to medium sized businesses in Kenya. It must also have a minimum
paid-up share capital of one hundred million Kenya shillings, and have a minimum
fund of one hundred million Kenya shillings.
In addition, the fund needs to have contracted a fund manager to oversee and
allocate investments,22 and be capable of demonstrating a three-year track record of
operating as a venture capital company, evidenced in investment practice, and backed
22 In chapter 5, it was shown that fund managers in Kenya are both local and foreign – 161-162.
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up by audited accounts dating three years previous to the date when the application
for registration is made. The applicant is furthermore required to produce bank
references to accompany the registration application.23
These rules establish a minimum capital requirement for persons seeking to
get into the business. Under section 23 of the Capital Markets Act of 1989, the all-
inclusive tone of the law’s letter means that it is a contravention of the law to hold out
as a private equity company or fund in Kenya if the person does not meet the share
capital and minimum fund size requirements. There is no provision for exemptions
under Kenyan law similar to the section 203(b)(c) in the American Investment
Advisors Act of 1940, which exempts investment advisors from certain registration
requirements.24
Regulation 4 of the Registered Venture Capital Companies Regulations 2007
(excerpt below), sets out requirements relating to capitalisation, organisational
structure, board constitution, and general qualifications of fund managers. These
requirements must be met at the time of making an application for registration as a
registered venture capital company in Kenya.
4.(1) An application for registration shall (…) be accompanied by the
following– (…)
(d) details of the investment policy in respect of each fund to be
operated by the applicant setting out the following particulars-
(i) investment objectives;
(ii) minimum and maximum investment amounts in any single
enterprise;
(iii) investment rules, investment process (including minimum
commitment and investment periods and procedures for draw down)
and exposure limits to individual eligible venture capital enterprises;
(iv) preferred mode of divestiture from eligible venture capital
enterprises;
23 R. 3, R.4, Venture Capital Companies Regulations 2007, (n 11)
24 15U.S.C. s80b-1 to s 80b-21
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(v) disclose a clear strategy for the diversification of investments in
eligible venture capital enterprises.
(vi) policies on fees and charges;
(vii) profile of companies invested in (where applicable); and
(viii) details of risks factors that are specific to the chosen investment
sectors, or sectors intended to be invested in;
(g) audited financial statements of the applicant for the last three
financial years immediately preceding the date of application (…)
The requirement on bank references could be understood from the “know-
your-customer” ethic, and perhaps from money-laundering concerns.25 This deduction
presupposes the need for systems and procedures that would ensure this is undertaken
by relevant institutions – importing the recurrent theme of capacity requirements.
Institutional capacity to implement systems supporting financial market institutions
remains a key constraint in emerging markets, and a matter for closer public policy
and governance reform. For most of the funds that set up in Kenya after 2005, for
instance, there was no capacity to satisfy the longevity of operations requirement. But
set up shop they did. Law and policy reform can be useful tools in redressing this.
Furthermore, the company’s incorporation documents need to disclose the
applicant’s investment policy through a declaration of: (i) the investment objectives,
(ii) minimum and maximum deal size contemplated under each fund raised and
managed by applicant, (iii) investment rules and process – including minimum
commitment and investment periods and draw-down procedures, and exposure limits
to any one company making up an investment portfolio, (iv) preferred exit strategy, (v)
portfolio diversification strategy, (vi) policies on fees and charges, (vii) profile of
portfolio companies where applicable, and (viii) a risk assessment of the chosen
investment sector.
25 R 29, Venture Capital Companies Regulations, 2007 ( n 11)
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A closer look at the theme underlying these Regulation 4 requirements appears
to be prudential management principles. The tone struck in the regulations is
strikingly similar to that surrounding prudential management of banking sector
financial institutions.
From a regulatory policy perspective, the level of statutory requirements
underpinning the registration process appears to straddle elements of public interest
and private interest goals. 26 For instance, sector risk assessment and exit strategy
declarations could arguably align with the public interest theory, 27 while portfolio risk
diversification strategies and investment rule declarations could align more closely
with the private interest theory. 28 It is not readily appreciable what regulatory ends
declarations around minimum and maximum deal sizes, or exposure limits to a single
venture company, or the profile of target venture companies serves from a regulatory
perspective. If the objective is to reduce the likelihood of corporate sector instability,
for example through reducing the chances for bankruptcies, that policy objective does
not clearly stand out. Judging from the CMA Enforcement Manual, however, it is
possible to deduce that the Kenyan regulatory model attempts a preventative
enforcement strategy, 29 a tool more efficiently linked to risk-based regulatory
approaches.30
26 Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation (1982) (n 8) ch 3
27 Posner, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’ (1974) (n 4)
28 Wilson, The Politics of Regulation (1980) (n 5)
29 Capital Markets Authority, Enforcement Manual, http://www/cma.or.ke/Enforcement , accessed 21
November 2011
30 Julia Black, ‘The Emergence of Risk-Based Regulation and New Public Risk Management in the
United Kingdom’ (Autumn 2005) P.L. 512-548
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6.3.3 A Dual Regulatory Framework
Section 23(1) of the Capital Markets Act of 1989 and Regulation 3(1) of the
Registered Venture Capital Companies Regulations 2007 have the effect of creating a
dual framework for the regulation of private equity activity. The Act, on the one hand,
requires fund management and investment advisory services to be subject to
regulation, and the provisions are not necessarily targeted at private equity per se. The
Regulations, on the other hand, are dedicated to private equity investment activity.
The problem, however, arises from the language of the both section 23(1) and
Regulation 3(1). The language of Regulation 3(1) reads as follows:
‘A venture capital company shall be entitled, upon application, to be
registered…’ R.3 (1), CM (Registered Venture Capital Companies)
Reg., 2007.
This wording suggests that an entity can operate as a venture capital company
without registering, and that registration as a venture capital company is optional –
hence left for companies that wish to register. While an applicant must meet the
minimum capital requirements to register, having a capital base larger than the
minimum required to qualify for registration does not give rise to a mandatory
requirement to register – under current law.
In effect, some venture capital companies will register as venture capital
companies, and be subject to the full measure of the law on compliance requirements,
while another set of venture capital companies will remain unregistered. There is
nothing in the law to suggest this latter set of private equity intermediaries are
required to abide by the full requirements of the Registered Venture Capital
Companies Regulations of 2007. The implication is that private equity companies in
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Kenya can effectively choose whether to subject themselves to regulation or to
operate outside of the capital markets regulatory framework. This is, prima facie, an
absurd regulatory outcome.
The language of section 23(1) of the Capital Markets Act of 1989, in
comparison, does not create two types of market players as the Regulations appear to
do. It is couched in the following terms:
“No person shall carry on business as (…) fund manager (…)”.
Assuming for the moment that the preceding deductions were contemplated by
the law makers, it remains difficult to see how toclassify unregistered companies,
unlicensed fund managers and unapproved investors without an exemption regime for
funds below one hundred million shillings. In an interesting twist, however, every
interviewed fund manager preferred the uncertainty over intrusive regulation.
It is not clear the foregoing regulatory effect was the intention of the
legislature. It was not clear from interviews with the Capital Markets Authority that
this was the intention. 31 A problem of construction arises under these statutory
requirements.
6.3.4 Control of Mergers and Acquisitions
The Competition Act No.12 of 2010 repealed the Restrictive Trade Practices
and Monopolies Act Cap 504 of 1988, which previously regulated, inter alia, mergers
and acquisitions in Kenya. Under the new legal framework, mergers are defined to
31 Interview with RG201, Nairobi, Kenya, January 2010
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include takeovers, however instituted.32 The Act applies to all persons engaging in
commerce, including Government. 33 Takeovers and mergers can be allowed or
disallowed on a number of grounds, including, how it would affect employment in the
takeover target. 34 Any party intending to undertake a merger or acquisition is
required to submit information to the Competition Authority detailing everything
listed under section 46 of the Competition Act of 2010. Under the same provision, any
interested party is permitted to make representations to the Authority on any matter
relevant to the proposed merger or acquisition. Importantly, no merger can take place
in Kenya without the Authority’s approval.35
In David Thuo & 8 Others v First America Bank of Kenya Ltd [2005] eKLR
(HCC 494/2005), HC, the defendant was the subject of an approved bank merger with
Commercial Bank of Africa Ltd, with the consequence that the employment contracts
of the Defendant’s employees would be taken over by the merged bank (Commercial
Bank of Africa Ltd). The employees sought injunctions against the defendant, arguing
their consent for the transfer of employment contracts had not been sought. They
relied on the decision of Viscount Simon, LC, in Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated
Collieries Ltd [1940] A.C. 1041 that - “contracts of a personal service are not
automatically transferred by an order.” p1021-1022. Judge JB Ojwang, dismissed
the suit, (taking judicial notice of the general state of unemployment in Kenya, and
the fact that the bank merger had received governmental approval under s.9 of the
now repealed Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act of 1988)
holding that there was no employment crisis as a result of the merger.
32 Competition Act 2010, Cap12, s 41
33 ibid s 5
34 ibid s 46(2)(e)
35 ibid s 42
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Under the Competition Act 2010, perhaps the outcome would have been
different, as there now exists a duty to demonstrate that all matters arising as a
consequence of a proposed merger must be given due consideration. Indeed, the
unfolding case of Shell Africa’s planned buyout by Vitol and Helios Investment
Partners,36 Kenyan workers moved to court for the protection of employment interests,
arguing, like in the case of First American Bank of Kenya Ltd, that they had not been
consulted about the merger and had not been informed how the merger would affect
their employment interests.37 The court granted an injunction against the completion
of the transaction in Kenya (as the deal involves the buyout of Shell operations in 15
other African countries) until employment questions were resolved.
The Employment Act of 2007 does not make specific provision for employee
rights under situations of corporate mergers and acquisitions – leaving the stipulations
of section 46 of the Competition Act 2010 to protect employee interests. It is arguable,
however, that under section 15 of the Employment Act of 2007, which imposes an
obligation on employers to inform employees of their general rights, a duty might
have existed on the part of Shell plc to inform its employees in Kenya of their rights
within the private equity buyout process. The fact that their case received court
backing suggests this might indeed be the law as applied by the Courts.
36 Shell, ‘Shell Vitol and Helios reach agreement on African downstream business’ (Shell Global,
19/02/2011)
<http://www.shell.com/home/content/media/news_and_media_releases/2011/shell_vitol_helios_agree
ment_19022011.html> accessed 5 October 2011- deal announced 19 February 2011; involve
divestiture of 80% Shell Africa; affects over 2,500 employees, storage facilities amounting to 1.2
million cubic metres, and 1,300 retail outlets covering 3.5 million cubic metres of retail space.
37 Cosmus Butunyi, ‘Helios Vitol To Buy Shell’s Africa Petrol Station’ (sic), (The East African,
Nairobi, Monday, November 1, 2010) <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/1043330/-
/item/0/-/79vcnbz/-/index.html.> accessed 1 November 2010 - workers demand choice over staying or
quitting: redundancy package should include 6 months’ gross salary for each year of service; 5 months’
gross salary in lieu of notice and 3 months’ gross salary resettlement allowance; transport and
relocation allowance as well as performance bonus for 2010 and other arrears from previous years. Any
taxes arising from the redundancy package should be borne by Shell. Where expatriate workers are
involved, they should receive payment in full for the period remaining on their severed contracts.
Similar unrest was reported in Ghana where Shell workers threatened to go on strike, and in Senegal,
where workers staged street demonstrations against the deal, saying they are not for sale.
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This value judgement finds resonance under the on-going registration
obligations under section 28 the Capital Markets Act of 1989 which require the
lodgement of compliance statements with the regulator each time a deal is being
concluded, a point illustrated in another Kenyan case – identity neutralised at the
request of interviewee. In that case, a fund manager sought the approval of the
regulator over a planned takeover in the beer manufacturing industry in Kenya, which
approval FM104 claims was granted. Subsequent to the conclusion of the takeover
transaction, a representative of the regulator sought to order a reversal of the
transaction on the basis that regulatory approval of the takeover was neither sought
nor received by FM104, hence the deal was null and void ab initio. FM104 protested
the threatened regulatory action, arguing the deal was legitimately concluded. The
regulator threatened to institute legal proceedings, and FM104 indicated willingness
to permit the matter to proceed to full hearing. In the end, the regulator did not bring a
law suit, and the fund manager scooped a symbolic win.38
This altercation is quite dramatic. Fund managers interviewed were
asked about their relationship with the regulator, RG201. 78% of the
respondent fund managers opined that RG201 is a weak regulator that seems
removed from the goings-on within the private equity market place in Kenya.
FM113 observed:
“RG201 does not understand the private equity industry in this
country –they went and borrowed some foreign rules and regulations
and just inserted them into the legal framework – they cannot work.
What we need is dialogue, and we can help RG201 to help us – but
38 Interview with FM104, Nairobi, Kenya (August 2009)
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there must be learning. But first, RG201 must fix the capacity
issues – they need to attract talent to provide critical leadership.”39
This is a fundamental finding for regulatory reform.
The foregoing general perception was largely corroborated by the oral
evidence of RG201 during interview, whose representative stated –
“Private equity is a sophisticated type of commercial activity, and
given the very high financial thresholds applying to entry, it is an
activity open to a privileged few in society. I believe that if one is
sufficiently wealthy to invest in private equity, such a one can
appreciate the special risks attendant on private equity investments.
Our current policy priority is in the area of protecting retail investors
within the listed market segment.”40
The problem between FM104 and the RG201, in the second case, it would
appear, was one of institutional incoherency on the part of the regulator, where
institutional knowledge does not approximate to individually-held knowledge: a
challenge around institutionalising procedures and decisions, and a key failing that
market intermediaries are exploiting. Regulatory efficiency, and therefore
intermediary compliance, appear to be very closely intertwined: two sides of the same
coin as it were.
39 Interview with FM113, Nairobi, Kenya (January 2010).
40 Interview with RG201, Nairobi, Kenya (January 2010).
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6.3.5 Regulating Corporate Governance in Fund Management
Corporate governance standards are also addressed by the Registered Venture
Capital Companies Regulations 2007 in Part V which stipulates that fund managers
are required to implement the investment policies disclosed under Part III of the
Regulations. The Regulations further stipulate the methods by which fund managers
may resign their offices, how fund managers can be removed from office, how
leadership changes to new managers should be effected, and how new fund managers
are to be appointed.41
Drawing on the experience between FM104 and RG201, the regulatory ability
to effectively enforce the law remains a challenge, leaving it open to market
intermediaries to play around the law. While opinion is mixed on where to place the
blame, it is on record that no less than five stockbrokers collapsed between 2007 and
2010, and that others are operating under the ‘extended licence’ provisions.42 RG201
at interview was hesitant to place entire blame on ineffective financial reporting that
ensured the failed institutions continued operating under the appearance they were
financially sound. Like all regulated entities, they were subject to stringent reporting
standards, as the next section explores. Their true state of affairs (like it was for Enron
in the USA43) was not picked up early to pre-empt institutional failure and losses to
investors. Was it a case of ingenuity on the part of market intermediaries or a
statement on the quality of regulation? The issues this question raises go beyond the
scope of this study, but serve to illustrate the point on regulatory capacity to enforce
market rules.
41 R 8-14, Venture Capital Companies Regulations, 2007 (n 11)
42 Capital Markets Authority, ‘Annual Report 2010’
<http://www.cma.or.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=191&Itemid=30>
43 Gary Fooks, ‘Auditors and the Permissive Society: Market Failure, Globalisation and Financial
Regulation in the USA’ (2003) 5(2) Risk Management 17
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A more poignant point for reflection is the question whether the issues
underpinning the corporate governance standards under the Regulations of 2007 do
not or should not apply equally to those private equity funds that opt not to register as
venture capital companies under the law. It certainly seems inefficient to subject one
set of market intermediaries to a stringent set of regulatory standards while creating
an ‘easier’ regulatory option for similarly placed market intermediaries. These factual
realities are likely to drive a choice against subjecting oneself to regulation, as the
facts at section 6.3.3 above establish.
6.3.6 Reporting Obligations
Once licensed or approved, the law imposes continuing compliance
obligations on such entities under sections 25 (renewal of licences) and 28 (obligation
to report changes) of the CMA Act of 1989. Licensees must report changes to the
name of the business entity, address of the principal place of business, shareholders,
directors, chief executives and key personnel.44 Any changes ought to be notified to
the CMA within 14 days of their occurrence.45 The CMA maintains a register of all
licensed persons, which includes the name, address and type of business of licensees.
This register is updated and published annually in April (and this is a statutory
requirement).46
In addition, fund managers are obliged to keep books of accounts and maintain
all necessary records of the operations of the fund for at least seven years after the
close of each investment. Fund managers are also under obligation to make both
44 Capital Markets Authority Act, 1989, s 24(8), s 27(2) and 28
45 ibid s 28
46 ibid s 27
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quarterly and annual returns, whose key tenets involve the disclosure of investments
undertaken, including disclosure of consideration paid, disclosure of divestitures, and
a statement of profits or losses incurred thereby. In relation to profits and losses, the
method by which they were calculated is required to be disclosed.47 Registered fund
managers thus have elaborate annual and quarterly reporting obligations. There is
cause to wonder whether the preference not to register with the regulator as registered
venture capital companies is reminiscent of the ‘death by documents’ syndrome
introduced by the post-Enron Sarbanes-Oxley law reforms in the USA in 2002.48
6.3.7 Investment Restrictions
Certain economic sectors are excluded from eligible private equity
investments in Kenya. These are real property, banking and financial services, and
retail and wholesale trading services.49 Other than these, the rest of the economy is
open to private equity.
It was discussed in the preceding chapter that this prohibition appears not to be
absolute, judged from the two documented cases of private equity investments into
two of Kenya’s commercial banks (Equity Bank Ltd and Family Bank Ltd).50 It was
also demonstrated that Kenya-based private equity fund managers are very interested
in the three restricted economic sectors.51
The complications raised by the apparent dual regulatory framework arise
under Regulation 8(2) as well: it is not clear, from a regulatory point of view, whether
47 R 19-22, Part VII, Venture Capital Companies Regulations 2007 (n 11)
48 Gary Fooks, Market Failures (n 43)
49 R 8(2), Part IV, Venture Capital Companies Regulations 2007 (n 11)
50 Ch 5, 156,157
51 Ch5, 170,171
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fund managers of unregistered private equity funds are free to invest in the three
excluded economic sectors, especially noting that there exists, prima facie, a conflict
between s.23 of the CMA Act of 1989 and R.8 of the Venture Capital Regulations
2007.
A second category of investment restrictions relates to investing in related
third parties: it is not permissible under Regulation 28 of the 2007 Regulations. This
prohibition extends to directorships in affiliate companies. The language employed is
(...) exposure to any of (its) directors, affiliate companies or
companies in which the fund’s directors and their close relations
hold substantial interest.52
The Kenyan Companies Act of 1962 does not carry such an explicit limitation
on impermissible associations within the institution of directors. This regulatory
prohibition rings in similar vein with the prohibitions under the American Clayton
Anti-Trust Act (Title 15), of 1914. 53 The practice implication is substantial: in
selecting an investment portfolio, fund managers would be under strict regulatory
requirement to ensure companies within its portfolio do not offend this rule on
permissible associations. Similar themes arise under competition rules, explored
under section 6.3.11, below.
52 R.28, Venture Capital Companies Regulations, 2007( n 11)
53 Title 15 U.S.C. ss12-27 (Pub. L. 63-212, 38 Stat.130) – section 13 (Discrimination in Price, Services
or Facilities).
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6.3.8 Fundraising Rules
Like in most jurisdictions, private equity companies in Kenya cannot fund-
raise by making offers to the public – the offers are made to private holders of capital.
However, they are required to file the private placement memorandum with the
Capital Markets Authority at least one month before publication. The memorandum
must contain details of the terms and conditions on which investors can invest in the
target funds. Within fourteen days of closing, fund managers are required to make
returns of the funds raised to the Authority.54
Extrapolating from the dichotomy between registered and unregistered venture
capital companies, there is a measure of uncertainty whether unregistered fund
managers are automatically exempt from the regulatory requirements, and whether
that effect was either intended or anticipated.
The following sections now turn to a consideration of corporate law issues in
private equity practice, and how Kenyan law addresses them. As a corporate activity,
private equity raises issues in interest conflicts, financial assistance, and minority
rights. It is necessary to establish the extent to which Kenyan corporate laws create
specific duties and obligations on private equity companies and their agents that
define the outer limits of permissible private equity corporate action.
6.3.9 Restrictions on Financial Assistance
Financial assistance relates to the giving of a loan, security, or other form of
financial guarantees, by a company to aid in the acquisition of its own shares, or
54 R.15-18, Venture Capital Companies Regulations (2007) ( n11)
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shares in its holding company. Section 56 of the Companies Act of 1962 prohibits
financial assistance in the following terms:
56. (1) Subject as provided in this section, it shall not be lawful for a
company to give, whether directly or indirectly, and whether by
means of a loan, guarantee, the provision of security or otherwise,
any financial assistance for the purpose of or in connection with a
purchase or subscription made or to be made by any person of or for
any shares in the company, or where the company is a subsidiary
company, in its holding company.
The position under English law is different from Kenya’s situation. Under Part
18, Chapter 2 of the UK Companies Act of 2006, sections 677 to 682 address the
question of financial assistance.55 Section 677 defines financial assistance to include
any gift, guarantee, security, loan, indemnity, release or waiver, as well as novation or
assignment. Under section 678, if for instance a private equity fund manager is in the
process of acquiring shares in a listed company, the listed company is not permitted
under law to offer any form of financial assistance to its acquirer, whether prior to the
transaction or post-acquisition, even if the buyout or share acquisition leads to new
liabilities on the part of the acquirer. This prohibition extends to all subsidiaries of
such listed company, whether the subsidiary is itself a public company or a private
company. Under section 679, the converse is true: if the acquisition involves a private
company which has a listed subsidiary, the listed subsidiary company is not permitted
under law to aid the acquisition process by granting financial assistance to the
acquirer.
The law creates a number of exceptions, however. Firstly, under section 678(2)
of the UK Companies Act 2006, a public company can give financial assistance
55 UK Companies Act, 2006, ss677 – 682,
<www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/.../ukpga_20060046_en.pdf> accessed 11 January 2012
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provided such assistance is not directed at aiding prohibited kinds of share
acquisitions, or where the giving is merely incidental to a larger corporate purpose.
Under section 679, it is also provided that where the giving of financial assistance
forms part of the company’s ordinary business (such as the making of loans), then the
prohibitions do not apply.
Section 681 of the UK Companies Act 2006 sets out a list of unconditionally
excepted kinds of financial assistance, including dividend distributions in the ordinary
course of the company’s business, the allotment of bonus shares, reduction in the
capital of the company under relevant provisions of the Act, the redemption of its own
shares in the ordinary course of business, and anything done pursuant to financial
distress under insolvency provisions in the Act.
Under section 682, private companies in the UK are generally excepted from
the provisions of sections 678 and 679, and public companies with sufficient asset
depth can give financial assistance, so that the net assets of the company are not
reduced beyond a certain threshold post-assistance, or the company is left without any
assets.
By contrast, under section 151 of the old UK Companies Act of 1985, the
prohibition had extended to both private and public companies,56 which generally
prohibited financial assistance given by a company in the acquisition of its own shares.
56 UK Companies Act of 1985
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6/pdfs/ukpga_19850006_en.pdf?timeline=true > Section
156 of the UK Act created a special exception in the case of private companies where the private
company’s board of directors gave a solvency declaration, and the company’s auditor issued a report
evidencing the solvency of the corporation. These liquidity guarantees were in law required to
demonstrate that the financial assistance would not reduce the company’s net assets by more than the
amount of its accumulated distributable profits.56 Secondly, financial assistance could be given where
there existed, in addition to the liquidity guarantees, a special resolution of the company’s shareholders
authorising the company to give such financial assistance.56 Thirdly, the exception would not apply if
the financial assistance was intended to aid the purchase of shares in a holding/parent company, where
that holding company was a listed company.56
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The section 151 prohibitions related to the giving of guarantees, upstream loans, gifts,
contribution of assets and assumption of liabilities of all kinds – very much akin to the
stipulations of section 56(1) of the Companies Act Cap 486, laws of Kenya, quoted
above.57
Where private equity transactions involve the acquisition of shares in a private
company, the current law in the UK permits such private company to aid in the
acquisition transaction. They would, however, still be subject to general business
conduct rules, and the common law duties relating to fiduciaries, discussed elsewhere
in this chapter.
The prohibition on financial assistance in Kenya is absolute. There do not
exist any exceptions to the general rule that make it possible for financial assistance of
the kind desired by Kenyan private equity intermediaries to be granted. One fund
manager expressed it this way:
“Section 56 of the Companies Act continues to frustrate LBOs in this
market: we would like to do LBOs here, and given Kenyan private
equity’s conservative deal structures, LBOs would be both lucrative
and sustainable financing strategies for Kenyan companies, especially
the new crop of cross-border corporations. The East African
Community presents an unparalleled opportunity: we would be happy
57 ibid, s 157 (UK law) - Where a holding company’s shares were the subject of acquisition, the law
required a special resolution of the shareholders in the parent company authorising such acquisition.
The law further required the directors of each company concerned in the acquisition to swear statutory
declarations to the effect that the company would remain solvent immediately after the assistance was
given, and for a period of twelve months thereafter. Finally, an auditor’s report speaking to the
reasonableness of the solvency declarations was required.
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to engage regulatory agencies on the merits of evolving the law on
LBOs and financial assistance.”58
In Standard Bank Ltd v Mehotoro Farm Ltd & 2 Others CC 54 [1972] CA, the
appellant provided a loan to the company to enable the respondents to purchase the
company’s shares. This was completed by the making of a direct payment to two
directors through the company and releasing the directors from their joint and several
guarantees in respect of outstanding bank overdraft. The share acquisition transaction
was secured by fresh guarantees by the acquiring directors in respect of the cost of the
shares to be purchased, which guarantees were up-stamped by instruments of
variation, and charged on the immovable assets of the company. Justice Lutta, BCW,
JA, held the transaction amounted to financial assistance under section 56 of the
Companies Act, and was void for illegality. 59
A private equity transaction that raises the opportunity for such guarantees
would, under current law, be illegal in Kenya. Judge Lutta, BCW, observed, orbiter,
in the Mehotoro Farm Case, that -
“[financial assistance] covers any transaction where not only money
but also security or guarantee and indemnity, is provided by a
company in order to enable a person to purchase or acquire its
shares”. P.12.
A private equity transaction that involves the raising of debt as part of the
acquisition finance might require the target company or its subsidiaries to give
security or other guarantees to collateralise the acquisition loan. The board of
directors in the target company would usually pass a resolution authorising the
58 Interview with Legal Manager, FM112, Nairobi, Kenya, August 2009.
59 Pp.12-14. <http://kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/>
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issuance of such guarantees or security. This action, however, would, under current
law in Kenya, give rise to two corporate law problems: a public policy question on
corporate stability, and a conflict of interest question on the part of the directors. From
a company law point of view, any action by company directors ought to be bona fide
in the interest of the company. A private equity takeover may not necessarily be in the
interest of a target company. Section 56 of the Companies Act of 1962 has the effect
of expressly prohibiting any form of financial assistance relevant to the conduct of
private equity transactions.
6.3.10 Conflicts of Interest – Directors
Closely related to the prohibition against financial assistance is the question of
interest conflicts relating to actions of company directors. Directors in Kenya are
required, under section 200 of the Companies Act of 1962 to disclose any interest
they might have in either the affairs, contracts or information of the company. In Azim
Virjee & Two Others v Glory Properties Limited [2007] eKLR, CC559/1999 (HC), it
was held by Justice OK Mutungi that a director who holds 50% beneficial ownership
in a property owned by the company suffers a direct conflict of interest, in
contravention of the law.
Under English law by comparison, the UK Companies Act of 2006 in s.170
provides that general fiduciary duties of company directors are based on common law
rules and equitable principles, and are to be interpreted in the same way as common
law rules and equitable principles. This common law duty was confirmed in
Thermascan Ltd v Norman [2009] EWHC 3694 (Ch), where it was held that English
courts are under a duty flowing from section 170(4) of the Companies Act, 2006, to
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apply common law rules and principles in the construction of new provisions of the
Act.60
In a buyout context, the directors of a company will usually need to align
themselves with the external private equity investors, while at the same time still
remaining directors of the target buyout company. This is a case of split allegiances,
falling under section 200 of the Companies Act of 1962.
The duty to act in the best interests of the company may operate to fetter the
freedom of directors to divulge confidential corporate information to third parties
unless such disclosure is in the course of the company’s business. A buyout, however,
does not qualify as ‘company business’. Special authorisations may be required prior
to such engagement with external buyers commencing. The private equity process,
however, raises additional issues: it is frequently the case that parties to a takeover
negotiation must enter into confidentiality and non-disclosure undertakings. But the
target’s board of directors may need to disclose the elements of the deal to their
shareholders with the view to obtaining their consents to the transaction – amounting
to a violation of the non-disclose undertaking, but congruent with statutory
requirements. The options under Kenyan law are not entirely clear, as a search of case
law on point returned zero hits in the Kenya Law Reporting database.
On another level, all types of private equity involve the private equity partner
playing different roles at the same time – in the corporate sense. One role is that of the
60 UK law on the duties of directors is very well developed: s171 requires directors to act strictly within
their powers; s172 imposes the general duty to act in the company’s best interest; s.173 imposes the
duty to exercise judgement independently; s.174 requires directors to act with reasonable care, skill and
diligence; s175 creates the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and under UK law, this duty is both actual
and constructive: even the appearance of conflict of interest is disallowed. Section 176 creates the duty
not to accept external inducements in the discharge of corporate affairs; s177 creates the duty to declare
interest in proposed transactions; while s.182 imposes the duty to notify interest in existing
transactions.
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financier. The second role is that of a business partner, which allows him to actively
influence the direction which business actions should take. This ‘hat’ enables the
private equity partner to veto, overrule, or otherwise colour corporate decisions (a
corporate governance question). The third role is that of an ‘inspector,’ or ‘judge’.
The private equity provider is enabled by this ‘hat’ to evaluate contract performance,
to enforce remedies to contractual breaches – either by way of withheld funding, or
other contract law enforcement mechanisms. It is this third hat that complicates
matters under the legal construct of conflicts of interest: does the third ‘hat’ free the
private equity intermediary from responsibilities flowing from the first two?
The law on interest conflicts is not fully developed under the Companies Act
of 1962. For instance, the question of multiple directorships is not addressed under
that Act. However, the new Competition Act of 2010 has provisions relating to
multiple directorships, addressed next.
6.3.11 Limitations on Multiple Directorships
Section 21 of the Competition Act, 2010, provides as follows:
“21. (1) Agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations
of undertakings, decisions by undertakings or concerted practices by
undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention,
distortion or lessening of competition in trade in any goods or
services in Kenya, or a part of Kenya, are prohibited, unless they are
exempt in accordance with the provisions of Section C of this Part.
(…)
(5) An agreement or a concerted practice of the nature prohibited by
subsection (1) shall be deemed to exist between two or more
undertakings if― 
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(a) any one of the undertakings owns a significant interest in the
other or has at least one director or one substantial shareholder in
common; and
(…)
(6) The presumption under subsection (5) may be rebutted if an
undertaking or a director or shareholder concerned establishes that
a reasonable basis exists to conclude that any practice in which any
of the undertakings engaged was a normal commercial response to
conditions prevailing in the market.
(7) For the purposes of subsection (5), “director” includes― 
(a) a director of a company as defined in the Companies Act
(…)”
Multiple directorship would occur within what the cited law terms horizontal
relationships, and by virtue of section 21(5), there arises a presumption by default that
a concerted practice potentially restrictive of trade exists where two or more
undertakings share a director – or where one entity owns a substantial interest in more
than one entity.
Section 21(6) of the Competition Act of 2010 offers a reprieve to the
automatic liability that arises under subsections (1) and (5), placing the burden of
proof, however, on the entity in question to establish that an impugned act is a normal
commercial response by the economic entities in question, as opposed to a concerted
restrictive practice. From a private equity perspective, this reality is a factor to
constantly evaluate in management decisions on portfolio selection.
The following illustration clarifies why the problem of multiple directorships
is a matter of regulatory interest, not just in Kenya. The context is simple: if a private
equity investment manager buys stakes in two companies operating in the same sector,
and such stake entitles them to sit in the boards of the invested or acquired companies,
(as it does in most private equity transactions), the director might act as a conduit,
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conscious or unconscious, of commercially sensitive information between the
portfolio companies, and could easily motivate sector behaviour.
Multiple directorship is regulated by some countries around the world. For
instance, in the USA, the Clayton Antitrust Act (Title 15) of 191461 and the Federal
Trade Commission Act of 1915 prohibit such directorships. 62 The effect of the
prohibition is that a director shall not serve in two competing companies.
In Robert F. Booth Trust v Crowley et al & SEARS Holding Corporation, Hon.
Judge Ronald Guzman found the defendants in breach of the rule against locked
directorships under section 8 of the Clayton Act of 1914. William Crowley, as
President and Chief Operating Officer of ESL Investments, a hedge fund, was forced
to resign his board seat in Sears Inc., which he owned 54% through his hedge fund.
Crowley sat on three boards of corporations owned by ESL Investments (Sears,
AutoNation and AutoZone), while his co-director at ESL, Ms Reese, held 29% in
Jones Apparel – all competitors in auto spares, repairs and auto service.63
In Oaktree Capital LLC,64 a private equity firm, was also sued under section 8
of the Clayton Act of 1914 when it acquired 40% of Loews Cineplex Entertainment
Group and 17% of Regal Entertainment Group, both operating cinema chains, and
placed representatives on both boards. The US District Court of the Southern District
of New York ruled that ‘deputization’ occurs when two representatives of one
61 US Laws, ss 8, 18
<http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/n_america/USA/The%20Clayton%20Antitrust%20A
ct.pdf> accessed 15 October 2011.
62 FTC Act s 5 < http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/pdf/VII-1.1.pdf> accessed 15
October 2011.
63 No. 09 C 5314 N.D.I.[2010], In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, <http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/illinois/ilndce/1:2009cv05314/234810/65/0.pdf?1269886256>
64 Reading Intl, Inc., v Oaktree Capital Management LLC, 317 F.Supp. 2d 301 – 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
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company sit in two separate boards, especially if it is established they act pursuant to
some defined corporate will.
In US v Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 850 – 855 (6th Cir. 2005),65
Dairy Farmers Association sought to acquire 50% beneficial ownership in Southern
Belle Dairy company. At the time, Dairy Farmers of America Inc owned 50%
shareholding in National Dairy Holding, L.P. The latter was a direct competitor in the
same market for school milk. The court found that a bar arose under section 7 of the
Clayton Act of 1914, and went further to find that for a violation to arise, mere
evidence of substantial ownership was enough, rather than proof of actual abuse.
In the UK, substantial case law on the question of multiple directorships exist.
In Mashonaland Exploration Co. Ltd,66 the court held that there did not exist any rule
of law that prevented a director from becoming a director in a competitor company.
Similarly, in Headline Filters,67 it was held that a director who formed a company and
took orders for future delivery and agreed a leasing arrangement with the new
company did not breach the duty on conflict interest. More recent cases, however,
take a divergent view, for instance, in Bristol and West Building Society,68 it was held
by Millett J that a director that works for two competitor companies “without
obtaining the informed consent of both” breaches the duty of undivided loyalty,
giving rise to a conflict of interest. But in Shepherds Investments Ltd,69 it was held
that each case must turn on its own facts, but overt actions that clearly show a conflict
of interest are prohibited (e.g., staff and customer poaching schemes sometimes
65 US v Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 850 – 855 (6th Cir. 2005)
66 London and Mashonaland Exploration Co. Ltd v New Mashonaland Exploration Co. Ltd [1891] WN
165
67 Balston v Headline Filters [1990] FSR 385
68 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 18 CA
69 Shepherds Investments Ltd v Walters [2007] 2 BCLC 202
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observed in private equity transactions). Tunnard70 does not find the development of a
competing product and formation of a company to amount to ‘overt’ actions giving
rise to a conflict of interest.
The combined effect of these cases is to render the actual content of ‘common
law rules and principles’ under sections 170 and 175 of the UK Companies Act of
2006 uncertain, leaving it open for courts to apply the law on the unique facts of each
individual case.
A case search on the question of interest conflicts relating to multiple
directorships in Kenya returned zero findings. It will be interesting to see how the law
develops in the future, noting that the Competition Act of 2010 is still a recent
regulatory framework. For private equity investment planning, however, these are
important issues to keep in mind when designing a portfolio.
6.3.12 Minority Shareholders
Kenyan company law protects against squeeze-outs and sell-outs, albeit
inexhasutively. Under section 210 of the Companies Act Cap 486 of 1962, minority
shareholders can only be coerced into selling out to the acquisition shareholder where
the buyout involves the transaction of over 90% of the shares in the company acquired.
In addition, section 47 of the Competition Act No.12 of 2010 conditions mergers and
acquisitions on, among other things, the protection of the legitimate interests of all
stakeholders affected by the transaction. The law furthermore entrenches minority
shareholder protections through guaranteeing that where shareholders holding at least
10% of the company’s issued share capital demand an extraordinary meeting of the
70 Helmet Integrated Systems v Tunnard [2007] CA
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company, directors must convene such meeting. In addition, 15% or more minority
shareholders aggrieved by a decision or action of the directors can petition the court
for protection.71
It is thus easy, on the face of the law, for minority shareholders in Kenya to
force corporate dialogue or bring legal action against the majority shareholders
whenever majority oppression is perceived. 72 Nonetheless, the Kenyan board of
directors is typically a powerful institution, frequently able to manipulate
circumstances in their favour. One of the law reform points in the proposed
framework for a new companies law is to strengthen the de jure and de facto rights of
minority shareholders. 73 These are important issues in designing private equity
investments.
Kenyan law furthermore does not expressly prohibit corporate raids and such
negative practices as “greenmails” and “poison pills”.74 Being strategies that private
equity has employed before, the tenor of a given country’s corporate law would be an
important issue informing the legal infrastructure for private equity in that country.
6.4 State of Regulatory Compliance
Among the independent private equity funds (meeting the inclusion criteria),
only one is licensed as of 2011. 75 In the surveys, over 90% of the post-2005
71 Companies Act 1962, Cap 486, s132.
72 Companies Act, 1962, s 210; Competition Act No.12, 2010, s 47 – Kenyan shareholders in most
public companies are highly dispersed, a fact that militates against their ability to leverage the statutory
facility that empowers them against majority oppression.
73 Interview with Mr. Johnstone Okello, Senior State Counsel, Kenya Law Reform Commission
(Nairobi, Kenya, January 2010)
74 Generally, Companies Act of 1962 and Competition Act, 2010.
75 Capital Markets Authority, Annual Licensees, Gazette Notice No.4937 of 29th April 2011
(Government Printers, Kenya) <
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independent funds did not indicate they were bothered to comply with the licensing
requirements. This is significant, and could find possible explanation in three main
factors. The first could be the minimum paid-up share capital and fund thresholds
required to qualify for registration. The second could be issues to do with the strength
of enforcement under the regulatory framework applying to this segment of
intermediation. This second factor takes on substantial force when the regulatory
focus is taken into account. In the alternative, it could have everything to do with the
language embodied in the law, canvassed above.
While Kenyan law prescribes a minimum capital requirement for registration
as a venture capital company in Kenya, the law does not prescribe prima facie that a
fund manager subject to licensing requirements under the law must be a fund manager
of a registered venture capital company or one seeking such registration. Rule 3(1) of
the Venture Capital Regulations of 2007 simply prescribes that for a venture capital
company to be registered, one of the requirements is that the applicant must have
appointed a fund manager licensed by the Regulator, besides complying with other
licensing preconditions.
This suggests that a private equity business in Kenya can be conducted
without registration and without necessarily appointing a licensed fund manager –
unless one wishes to be registered at some point. In the alternative, a fund manager
can be licensed, but need not necessarily at the same time register as a venture capital
company.
The parent legislation, however, is authoritative and all-encompassing in
language: section 23(1) of the Capital Markets Act, Cap 485A, Laws of Kenya, states:
http://www.cma.or.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=15&Itemid=30> accessed
7 October 2011.
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“23. (1) No person shall carry on business as a securities exchange,
stockbroker, dealer, investment adviser, fund manager, investment
bank, authorised securities dealer, authorised depository, or hold
himself out as carrying on such a business unless he holds a valid
licence issued under this Act.” (emphasis added)
Prima facie, fund management, whether private equity or not, is a regulated
activity, importing the principle of universality of application. The norm within the
parent law does not appear to be faithfully translated into the subsidiary level. Had the
law employed the terms “no person shall carry on business as a ...fund manager of
a...”, a different extrapolation might have been possible.
The preponderant majority of fund managers in Kenya could then simply
argue that as fund managers of funds not meeting the regulatory threshold re: capital
requirements and type of activity, they are not obliged to seek and maintain
investment licences.
In response to the question why RG201 had not implemented the law
stringently, over 75% of the interviewed fund managers cited the regulator’s capacity
constraints. In their view, the Regulator either had not applied punitive measures for
non-compliance, or simply did not have the resources (institutional, knowledge and
human) to implement the law to the letter. Furthermore, concern over the perception
within the industry that the Kenyan law on private equity is built on a non-growth-
oriented model was pervasive. Below is provided a small sample of the oral evidence
by respondent fund managers supporting this deduction:
a) FM113: “The regulations are not based on a formal, declared policy.”
238
b) FM112: “The regulations have features alluding they were borrowed from
different jurisdictions and were not and have not been consistently adapted
and modelled into the Kenyan context.”
c) FM104: “There have not in the past been any frameworks for regulatory
consultations between the private equity industry and the Regulator –it is
the prerogative of the Regulator to facilitate such dialogue.”
d) FM106: “The private equity business model is still a puzzle to the
Regulator, which is playing catch up, and is hampered by other more
politically-correct pressures such as the troubled stock-broking industry
and corporate governance challenges within the Nairobi Stock Exchange.”
e) FM108: “The regulations are very prescriptive, foray into areas difficult to
police, and is self-defeating on the amount of information it demands
reporting organisations to produce in compliance – formal compliance
would yield more information per regulated entity than the regulator would
be able to put to good use.”76
It is readily observable that both the law and the legal institutions
underpinning the practice of private equity in Kenya continue to drive a certain
measure of market uncertainty that introduces varying levels and types of
inefficiencies. Firstly, clarifying the law on each of the headings reviewed above
would be a useful exercise for the country. Secondly, strengthening regulatory action,
76 This opinion is vindicated partially when one takes into account the Capital Markets Authority
Enforcement Manual – which runs to 91 pages with hundreds of offences and enforcement formulas
(and corporate governance scandals still abound within the capital markets framework) – for details:
Capital Markets Enforcement Manual 2008 (CMA, Kenya)
<http://www.cma.or.ke/images/stories/docs/ENFORCEMENTMANUAfinal.pdf> accessed 15
December 2009.
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once the legal framework has been rationalised, is the next most critical aspect for
reform in Kenyan private equity practice.
Competition concerns appear to be key motivators to fund manager resistance
to registration, and notions under data protection legislations would appear to be
pertinent. Corruption was noted to be a key institutional factor in Kenya, and there
could be legitimate apprehension about security of disclosed information. Without a
clear legislated duty to protect data, it is uncertain the extent to which market data
disclosed to the regulator will remain confidential. The fact that Kenya in 2010 did
not have a law on data protection only exacerbates matters.77
In response to the same question, the CMA admitted two constraints.78 Firstly,
there is a capacity problem: institutional incapacity to effectively regulate private
equity intermediaries. Secondly, the Regulator’s first concern for public interest
protection – which essentially interprets investors in private equity to be sophisticated
entities and individuals who are assumed to appreciate the risks the investment entails.
In fact, the law treats private equity placements as offers to a sophisticated circle of
investors believed to be knowledgeable about the risks attendant on that type of
investment. To aid in entrenching this regulatory assumption, the law restricts private
placements to no more than 100 persons, whose minimum subscription is pegged at
one hundred thousand shillings. Furthermore, securities issued in pursuance of a
private placement are not freely transferable, establishing the illiquid nature of private
equity as a financial asset.79
77 See: <www.kenyalaw.org>
78 Interview with RG201, CMA Offices, Nairobi, Kenya (January 2010).
79The Capital Markets (Securities) (Public Offers, Listing and Disclosures) Regulations, (2002) under
the Capital Market Act 1989, Cap 485A, Regulation 20.
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In light of the preceding review on the general design of the law in Kenya as it
relates to private equity, it seems worthwhile to explore, briefly, the thinking in other
jurisdictions. To do this, experience is sourced from the European Union, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America, as the next section attempts to achieve.
6.5 International Perspectives on the Regulation of Private Equity Activity
6.5.1 Experience of the European Union
The European Union is an international legal institution, while Kenya is a
country, and, at first glance, there does not exist a basis for comparability between the
two. However, the EU has been catalytic in spearheading the development of a pan-
European regulatory framework for alternative investments, although leaving
untouched the prerogative of nation states within the membership to regulate fund
structures nationally. Kenya will therefore need to carefully assess what elements to
consider for transplantation.
In the European Union, private equity is classed as an alternative investment,
subject to regulation under the EU Directive on Alternative Investment Fund
Managers, which came into force in 2011.80 EU Regulatory focus is on fund managers
as opposed to private equity funds.81 The regulatory justification is grounded in recent
turmoil within global financial markets, with EU legislators arriving at the conclusion
that alternative investment fund managers employ strategies that are ‘vulnerable to
some or several important risks in relation to investors, other market participants and
80 European Union, Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 8 June 2011
on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and
Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, in L. 174/1 Journal of the European Union 1
July 2011.
81 EU Directive 2011/61/EU (2011) 2 para. 10
241
the markets’.82 The EU AIFMD establishes a single harmonised internal market for
fund management in the EU, but leaves the regulation of alternative investment funds
(AIFs) to Member States to deal with under national law, given the wide variety of
AIFs. The regulation of private equity is driven by concerns over financial stability,
transparency and investor protection. With an asset base of over Euro 2 trillion as at
end 2008, AIFs and AIFMDs constitute significant actors within the EU financial
markets.83
Most EU countries already regulate private equity funds, fund managers and
the private equity investment activity in different ways, yielding a fragmented
approach to regulation at the pan-European level.84 The main areas of concern include
interest conflicts management, management of risk-taking behaviour, adequate
capitalisation, asset valuation standards, among a whole spectrum of other issues that
cascade across the investment process in private equity activity.85
6.5.2 Experience in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, regulatory concerns over private equity are driven by
concerns over institutional leverage and a desire to identify relevant risks posed by the
industry to financial stability. To achieve these policy goals, the UK Financial
Services Authority in 2006 published a discussion paper on risk and regulatory
engagement, document DP06/06.86 The FSA summarises87 the key risks the private
82 EU Directive 2011/61/EU 1 para.3
83 Commission of the European Communities, Staff Working Document(n 11) 3
84 ibid 3
85 EU Directive 2011/61/EU (n 80) from para.22.
86 Financial Services Authority, ‘Discussion Paper ‘Risk and Regulatory Engagement’
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/ > accessed 17 February 2010.
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equity industry poses to include (i) excessive leverage,88 (ii) unclear ownership of
economic risk, 89 (iii) reduction in overall capital market efficiency, 90 (iv) market
abuse,91 (v) conflicts of interest,92 (vi) market access constraints,93 and (vii) market
opacity.94
The FSA already regulates the private equity industry, however, albeit in a
light manner. Firstly, it has close and continuous supervisory relationship with 14 of
the largest private equity and venture capital fund managers operating out of the
United Kingdom. Secondly, it develops risk mitigation programmes for the
relationship-managed firms. Thirdly, it undertakes frequent dialogue with market
87 Financial Services Authority: Private Equity ‘ A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory Engagement
Briefing’ (Note 028/06 of Nov. 6, 2006)
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/Media/notes/bn028.shtml> accessed 17 February 2008.
88 ibid, The question is whether to cap leverage or to tighten controls on imprudent lending practices.
89 ibid, Private equity transactions can get complex, especially where secondary deals are concerned.
For instance, the duration and potential impact of credit events could get complicated by operational
issues which make it difficult to identify who ultimately owns the economic risk associated with a
leveraged buyout deal and how these owners will react in a crisis. This can be complicated by the
employment of complex deal structures such as assignment, participation and credit derivatives –
frequently opaque and time-consuming. Particularly with the latter, a main problem is the mismatch
between communication and transaction time, often meaning transacted amounts exceed underlying
asset values. Furthermore, new market participants may favour business models that disfavor
turnaround of distressed firms. All these issues could create confusion which could damage the
timeliness and effectiveness of workouts following credit events and could unwind sound
restructurings.
90 ibid, Regulatory rationales on this head surround the questions: how could the types and sources of
capital be widened, company valuation made more precise, capital structures optimized, and corporate
development and transformation be facilitated – especially in light of the huge wall of money thrown at
private equity firms?
91 ibid, Driven by the substantial flow of price sensitive information to private equity transactions, and
complicated by cross-border transactions and the ever-widening participant base.
92 ibid, Between fund managers and their investors; between fund managers and their investee
companies. In addition, advisors and providers of leverage finance experience interest conflicts
especially where they play multiple roles in relation to an individual transaction – either between their
proprietary and advisory activities or between their different clients.
93 ibid, This relates to concerns over mechanisms for expanding retail investor participation in private
equity.
94 ibid, While transparency to existing investors in private equity is extensive, there exists substantial
opacity on the fee structures, valuation methodologies and formats as far as the wider market is
concerned, rendering performance comparisons difficult and inexact, and potentially a barrier to
investments as well as potentially a basis for misguided investment decisions.
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participants on private equity sector issues. Fourthly, it includes private equity firms
in its thematic reviews on market issues.95
6.5.3 Experience in the USA
In the United States of America, private equity has also largely escaped
burdensome regulation, notably under the “private advisor exemption” clause in
section 203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940,96 and the extensions of that
exemption under Part IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act 2010).97
Under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, fund managers and investment
advisers that had fewer than 15 clients during a given financial year, did not advise
registered investment companies or business development companies, and whose total
assets under management did not exceed USD25 million, were exempted from
registration requirements with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).
A regulatory decision by the SEC in 2005 to equate ‘clients’ with ‘investors’
was challenged in Phillip Goldstein, et al. 98 Under the new rule, the SEC had
effectively pierced the veil behind the term ‘client’, numbering instead “shareholders,
limited partners, members or beneficiaries” as clients.99 The historical interpretation
under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 and within the industry was to count
95 The Financial Services Authority (n 86)
96 Securities and Exchange Commission, Investment Advisors Act 1940
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/extra/ia1940.htm> accessed 4 April 2010.
97 H.R. 4173 - United States Government Printing Office, Dodd-Frank Act of 5 January 2010
<http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf> accessed 4 April 2010.
98 United States Court of Appeals, for the District of Columbia Circuits, No. 04-1434, Phillip
Goldstein, et al, Petitioners, vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, Respondents, argued Dec. 9,
2005, decided June 23, 2006. Decided by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.
99 ibid 2.
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clients at the level of the fund rather than its investors. Goldstein brought a legal
action against the SEC, successfully challenging the constitutionality of the new rule.
The court held that the SEC was wrong in piercing the veil of the fund structure, and
upheld the historical interpretation of ‘client’, effectively reinstating the private
adviser exemption ousted by the impugned SEC rule.
In arriving at its decision, the Court relied on earlier decisions,100 stating that
an agency construction of the statute could not survive judicial review, as such an
interpretation would be akin to saying just because a lawyer has a corporation as a
client, a client-lawyer relationship is thereby created between the lawyer and all
shareholders and other beneficiaries, as well as persons interested in, the corporation.
Furthermore, such a construction would raise interest conflicts between the advisor
and the fund, vis-a-vis the advisor and the investors behind the fund.101
The Court further recalled that the policy goal under the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940 was to exempt those advisors whose activities were not large enough
(scope-wise and geographically) to cause systemic trouble in the event they suffered
stress. 102 This impact was to be measured from the volume of assets under
management, or the extent of liabilities a fund has, not from the number of investors
in such funds.103
It went on to clarify that this law was a companion statute to the Investment
Company Act of 1940, mainly a registration and anti-fraud legislation that substituted
the philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor among
100 Including: Aid Ass’n for Lutherans v. United States Postal Serv., 321 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir.
2003); see also id. at 1177-78; Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and
Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
101 ibid, generally discourse at 14-17.
102 ibid 18.
103 ibid 19.
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investment advisors.104 Non-exempt advisors are required to register with the SEC,
but all investment advisors are prohibited from engaging in fraudulent and or
deceptive practices. The court further stated obiter that maintaining a census of
qualifying investment advisors served the regulatory purpose of focusing and
expediting necessary regulatory interventions within the investment advisory
services.105
Under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the minimum threshold of USD25 million
has been raised to USD100 million, ostensibly to allow the SEC to focus regulatory
oversight on systemically important market participants. While the new law removes
the ‘private advisor exemption’ in the 1940 Act, it introduces a new range of
exemptions.
Advisors with less than USD150 million assets under management in the US
and who only advise private funds are exempted from SEC registration
requirements.106 Secondly, advisors to venture capital funds are exempt.107 Foreign
private advisors are also exempt, provided they have no permanent establishment in
the USA, have fewer than 15 clients, manage assets worth USD25 million or less, do
not hold out as investment advisors, and do not advise any registered investment
company or a business development company.
Furthermore, the Act exempts family offices, which it distinguishes from
investment advisors. Finally, investment advisors that solely advise small business
investment companies are exempt. The Act also requires the undertaking of a study on
104 ibid 5, relying on the decision in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186
(1963)
105 ibid 5.
106 Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Title IV, s 403.
107 ibid s 407.
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a self-regulatory framework for private funds, to be completed within a year of the
date that Title IV came into effect.108
Notwithstanding the foregoing, earlier discussions under ‘multiple
directorships’ in this chapter demonstrated that private equity investment practice is
subject to anti-trust regulation as are all corporations in the USA.
6.5.4 Distilling Lessons from International Practice
The experiences of the three legal jurisdictions reviewed above with respect to
legal frameworks for private equity lend instructive object lessons. Firstly, the policy
rationales are well articulated, and the private equity market is dichotomized into
actors and instruments as embodied in private equity capital structures. The
overwhelming focus of regulatory discourse in each of those jurisdictions is on
activities of the fund manager and the impact of some of private equity’s favoured
capital structures.
Secondly, the regulatory discourse divides market participants into two main
categories: those that are sufficiently big to have a systemic impact in the event of
their investment portfolios becoming distressed, and those that operate small outfits
with little national or systemic impact in the event of similar distress. Regulatory
focus is on the former.
Thirdly, even where systemically significant operations are identified and
subjected to regulatory requirements, evidence suggests a very light-touch approach
to the regulation of the alternative investments sector. In Goldstein vs. SEC, Circuit
108 ibid s 414.
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Judge Randolph observed that this type of regulation serves the alternative
investments sector well because of its unique business models.109
In terms of the transplant effect, key lessons from the European, British and
American regulatory discourse include
(i) the need for clarity in the policy goals of any regulatory action,
(ii) clear analyses of risk factors, risk incidence, and risk sources in private
equity investing,
(iii) stakeholder mapping to determine the protected interest – whether
market orientated or consumer orientated regulation, and
(iv) whether the regulation should be prescriptive, that is, statutory, or
market-based, that is self-regulation.
These considerations would guide the proportionality of regulatory response,
as well as the proper distribution of regulatory burdens with the view to achieving a
benevolent balance between promoting the public interest vis-a-vis developing the
market.
6.6 Analysing the Kenyan Experience
This chapter reveals various shortcomings and inconsistencies between the
law and practice of private equity in Kenya. To all intents and purposes, the industry
operates as though the country had no overarching legal framework underpinning its
activities. Has this mismatch impacted either contract design, investment monitoring,
109 Goldstein v SEC ( n 98) 3-6.
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exit strategy or the overall attitude of fund managers to setting up office in the country?
These are interesting questions whose answers remain empirically untested.
The following key issues appear pertinent to the law and institutional prism of this
study:
(i) Uncertainty and imprecision in the use of regulatory terminology
(‘registration’, ‘approval’, and ‘licensing’) undermines the authority of the
law by creating room for unwarranted competing interpretations. These
can be fixed by adopting appropriate legislations or effecting amendments.
(ii) In prescribing a minimum threshold for registration based on share-capital
and fund size parameters, the law ought to be clearer what the policy
justification is – and the solution could be found in clarifying a clear
national policy on private equity and alternative investments.
In remaining silent on operations that do not satisfy the registration
requirements, the law tacitly creates an exempted class of private equity
practitioners, yet remains silent as to their general duties on, for instance,
investor protection, disclosure and fraud. This is a yawning gap in the law
that demands deliberate re-evaluation and redress. Parallels drawn from
the EU model indicate that funds that do not exceed the stipulated
minimum of Euro 100 million are not exempted altogether from regulation:
but are subjected to a lighter regime commensurate to their operational
levels. The unintended impact of the current state of the law in Kenya is
the likely introduction of distortion to economic competition among
market intermediaries.
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(iii) Corporate law litigation on the emerging areas of multiple directorships
under the Competition Act 2010 are yet to occur in Kenya, but in light of
the trends depicted in chapter 5, it is likely that cases of litigation over
interlocking directorships will increase as private equity activity increases.
(iv) The experience in Europe, UK and the USA on approaches to the
regulation of the private equity industry offer valuable lessons on the depth
of considerations and policy choices that must be made in designing
national markets for private equity.
(v) Enforcement of the law is essential for market discipline. While the
Regulator currently focuses on the public equities market, market
participants in the Kenyan private equity world are entrenching market
practices that may run counter to public policy. Impunity breeds arrogance.
From an institutional perspective, non-enforcement robs the Regulator of
the empowering opportunity to learn through regulatory action, and its
removal from the private equity market place robs it of the opportunity to
keep abreast with an industry that is continuously innovating products,
practices and other possible anti-regulation posturing.
6.7 Conclusion
In sum, while an elaborate legal infrastructure exists in Kenya that can support
private equity, there exist gaps and cross-negating overlaps and inconsistencies in the
law. These detract from an efficient legal infrastructural platform for financial
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intermediation, and raises issues in the practice of private equity as well as on an
agenda for law reform.
After analysing the state of Kenyan law on private equity practice, it is
possible to observe that it cannot definitively be concluded what regulatory model
motivates current design of the law on private equity. The relative detachment of the
CMA from the industry (save for the occasional interface with the industry in the
context of mergers and acquisitions especially where target companies are listed in the
national bourse) does little to clarify what that motivation might be. With the mooted
plans to establish a special SME counter at the Nairobi Stock Exchange, however,
stock market listings by small and medium enterprises are likely to peak in the
medium term, providing private equity investments with an expanded exit menu. It is
likely that regulatory interest in the industry is likely to expand as market activity
picks up.
Ongoing law reforms to the companies legal framework are also likely to
usher in new changes that will have an impact on how private equity is conducted in
Kenya. It is anticipated that there will be significant expansions in the corporate
governance standards which might trigger amendments to existing law. Financial
assistance prohibitions are likely to be softened too. In addition, it is likely that Kenya
will see more litigation around the question of multiple directorships. In short, the
regulatory landscape for private equity in Kenya remains unsettled. What this study
has established within the strict context of this chapter is the urgent need to work out
an evidence-based policy framework for private equity. This can only be done
through engaging the industry. A well-informed public policy is likely to highlight
areas for government to take a lead role in promoting the occurrence of private equity
in Kenya.
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7
TAX PLANNING FOR PRIVATE EQUITY
7.1 Introduction
The conduct of private equity, from a tax administration perspective, is similar to the
conduct of any commercial venture within an economy. On this basis, private equity business
is a legitimate target for tax policy, and rightly so. Industry-led evidence lend the wisdom that
the tax treatment of private equity business can have positive or negative consequences to
how deep a private equity industry can grow in any given legal jurisdiction.1 The theme here
is tax efficiency – and this is the principle issue explored in this chapter. The issue is wider
than merely the cost of tax to business.
For private equity practitioners, taxation laws and policies – as fiscal tools in the
regulation of business activities - are important beyond simply lowering the cost of doing
business and extending profit margins. Industry studies single out company tax rates, taxation
for individuals, tax rate for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), taxation of stock options
and capital gains tax as important determinants in tax law for private equity investments.2
This chapter explores the structure of tax law and policy in Kenya, and discusses how
tax planning within the private equity contracting market might occur. This chapter highlights
the legal obstacles that current tax law and policy presents in the quest to grow a robust and
efficient market for private equity in Kenya. Such an analysis has value to both policy maker
and private equity practitioner. For policy makers, it enables an understanding of how
innocuous legislative prescriptions can potentially yield dramatically different outcomes for
1 European Venture Capital Association, ‘Benchmarking European Tax and Legal Environments’ (October
2008) < http://www.evca.eu/uploadedFiles/Benchmark.pdf> accessed 30 October 2008
2 Christian Keuschnigg and Soren Bo Nielsen, Start-ups, ‘Venture Capitalists and the Capital Gains Tax’ (April
2004) 88(5) Journal of Applied Economics 1011-1042
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economic players in different economic sub-sectors, sometimes quite unintended. For
practitioners, including fund managers, it allows for an understanding of ways in which
investment choices promote efficiency across all regulatory fields of compliance, besides
facilitating the possible emergence of industry-driven regulatory reorganisation aimed at
improving the objectives of both regulator and economic players.
This chapter contributes to a deeper understanding of the legal and institutional
factors impacting the practice of private equity in Kenya. It builds on the expanding list of
constraints, both institutional and regulatory, that impede the efficient conduct of commercial
enterprise in Kenya. Any reform initiative aimed at improving legal and institutional
environments for private equity would thus do well to give account to issues raised in this
chapter. In fact, this study argues that to do otherwise is inefficient, and would not yield long-
term benefits in the development of Kenya’s financial markets.
With the foregoing themes in mind, this chapter is organised as follows.
Section 7.2 presents a short discussion on how tax law and policy impacts private
equity, setting the context within which the findings in the rest of the chapter will be analysed.
Section 7.3 discusses the general principles for taxation in Kenya. This discourse sets out the
principles under-pinning tax liability and avenues available for tax planning – pointing out
that while tax avoidance is illegal, tax planning is not.
In section 7.4, a wide-ranging discussion of the high impact tax elements for Kenyan
private equity is provided. These include a review of the country’s corporation and individual
tax rates, the tax treatment of management and professional fees, VAT and other business
taxes. Tax headings carrying very particular relevance to the structure of private equity
financial contracts are subsequently reviewed. These include consideration of the taxation of
capital gains, the tax treatment of dividends, and the levying of compensating and
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withholding taxes. Next the discussion turns to a consideration of deductible expenses in the
conduct of private equity investments, the question of state subsidies on certain types of
investments and earnings, and the risk of double taxation for income accrued in Kenya. The
extent to which these are available could determine the investment decision – by capital
holders. Furthermore, it could definitively determine whether entrepreneurs are encouraged
or motivated to innovate, which itself could be a substantial factor in determining the flow of
private capital.
Certain incentive structures employed to make private equity more attractive
(including the tax treatment of stock options and fiscal incentives for research and
development) are next considered. These are important questions in the design of private
equity investments, since they determine the efficiency of investment exits and return of
profits to investors. How stock options are taxed can definitively determine their efficiency in
employment compensation. Section 7.4 thus goes to the heart of the relationship between
private equity and tax law in Kenya.
In section 7.5, an analytical reflection is offered on the state of play between private
equity and tax law. An important element of this analysis is: To what extent is tax
transparency and efficiency possible in Kenyan private equity practice? From an investment
risk evaluation perspective, these are crucial questions. Section 7.6 concludes.
7.2 How Tax Law Impacts Private Equity
There are at least five ways in which tax law and policy can impact private equity in a
given legal system. Firstly, research has demonstrated that it can impact capital raising and
consumption. For instance, low capital gains tax rates and non-prohibitive pension fund
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regulations have been shown to positively influence investor commitments to private equity
on the one hand, and encourage increased research and development expenditures3, on the
other. This is historically borne out by American experience with pension fund regulations
following the 1979 ‘prudent man rule’ under the ERISA regulations.4
Secondly, research has suggested that state subsidies specific to private equity can
positively influence the decision to invest in private equity.5 This is a tax law and policy
question in the Kenyan legal system, as it indeed is in most legal systems. A South African
governmental review recommended that to promote private investments in small business,
fiscal reliefs for investments into private equity funds that invest in small businesses, in
addition to exemption from capital gains tax for investments held beyond five years, and
limited tax deductions for the acquisition of new shares in a venture capital trust, are some of
the necessary measures. These recommendations were hinged on the belief that tax
regulations impact private investments.6 Chapter 3 offered a wider discussion on tax policy
measures employed around the world in growing private equity.
Thirdly, tax law and policy has been shown to influence how fund managers structure
their investment vehicles, also known as ‘fund structures’. For instance, the findings in an
American study on the role of USA tax and securities laws on the USA venture capital sector
suggests that favourable tax structures support the formation of specialised fund structures
3 Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner, ‘What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?’ Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity – Microeconomics (1998) 149-92, in Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital
Cycle ( MIT Press 2004) ch 33.
4 Ibid, (2004) 8.
5 Josh Lerner, ‘The Government As Venture Capitalist: The Long-Run Effects of the SBIR Program’ (1999) 72
Journal of Business 285-318
6 Government of South Africa, Treasury, ‘SME’s Access to Finance in South Africa – A Supply-Side
Regulatory Review’ <
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/Access%20to%20Finance%20in%20South%20Africa%20-
%20A%20Supply-Side%20Regulatory%20Review.pdf> accessed 7 November 2010
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that maximise earnings for investors, while favourable capital gains tax rates spur
entrepreneurship.7
Fourthly, research evidence has shown that tax law and policy can influence capital
structuring options under the investment contract.8 In other words, the design of contractual
control and cash flow rights in the private equity contract could be determined by various tax
advantages and disadvantages in the employment of specific security instruments, such as
common or ordinary equity shares vis-a-vis preferred shares. That study offers a tax
explanation for the popularity of convertible preferred stock in USA venture capital contracts.
The use of convertible securities offers more favourable tax treatment for incentive
compensation paid to entrepreneurs and its employees by deferring taxation to the date when
the incentive compensation is sold, and often beyond the date of sale. In effect, the holder of
a convertible stock option has an incentive to defer or entirely avoid capital gains tax by
holding onto the investment for five years or more.9
Fifthly, tax law and policy has been shown to influence investment exit strategies and
how earnings (profits) are returned to investors. For instance, a study by Gompers and Lerner
(1998) provide a USA-specific explanation to the increasing use of share distribution for
investments exited through an IPO, rather than cash payments. In the USA, when a private
equity fund sells its shares in a public offering, that shareholding represents immediate capital
gains, and the fund manager, together with all taxable limited partners, realise a capital gains
tax upon sale. A share distribution does not amount to a sale, and does not attract capital
7 Christian Keuschnigg and Soren Bo Nielsen, ‘Tax Policy, Venture Capital and Entrepreneurship’ (2002) 87
Journal of Public Economics 175-203
8 Ronald J Gilson and David M Schizer, ‘Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for
Convertible Preferred Stock’ (2002-2003) 116 Harv. L. Rev. 874
9 ibid – an indirect benefit of holding onto stock options is that key workers within the invested company remain
within the organisation for most of the investment lifetime (see chapter 5), ensuring that key talents are locked
in. The dual benefit of this is that the investor is assured of reasonable investment performance through staff
continuity, and the industry cultures and develops a critical mass of investment managers for future investment
cycles. On a wider platform, this has long-term economic benefits to a country’s financial development.
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gains tax, and also does not raise registration requirements (in the USA). Share distribution
therefore allows limited partners to time their own market exits.10
7.3 General Principles of Taxation in Kenya
7.3.1 Tax Liability
The Income Tax Act, Cap 470 of 1974 (the Income Tax Act), is the primary
legislation governing questions of business and personal tax in Kenya. Tax policy in Kenya is
reviewed annually within the framework of the annual national budget, promulgated each
year in the month of June. The broad principles of tax liability, however, have remained static
over the years since the Income Tax Act was enacted nearly four decades ago.
Section 3 of the Income Tax Act lays down the broad principle that gains or profits
from business, employment or services are subject to taxation in Kenya. Furthermore,
dividends and interests, however defined, are also subject to taxation.11 The definition of
‘business’ is very broad: it includes any trade, profession or vocation within the meaning of
the Income Tax Act.12
Individual and corporate liability to tax in Kenya accrues on the ‘residency principle’
which is defined to mean all business gains or profits are taxable where a business is deemed
to be resident in Kenya, regardless of whether the entirety or only a portion of that income is
locally derived.13 For corporates, residency is deemed to arise where the management and
control of the enterprise or business or the affairs of a body corporate are exercised in Kenya
10 Paul A Gompers and Josh Lerner, ‘Venture Capital Distributions: Short-Run and Long-Run Reactions’ (1998)
53 Journal of Finance 2161-83, in The Venture Capital Cycle (MIT Press, 2004) ch19, 462
11 Income Tax Act, 1974, s 3(2), Cap 470 Laws of Kenya <
http://www.kenyalawreports.or.ke/kenyalaw/klr_app/frames.php,> accessed January 2, 2010.
12 ibid s 2
13 ibid s 4
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over the course of the year to which the income relates.14 Where the business presence
continues beyond a period of six months, the attribute of “permanent establishment” for tax
purposes is accorded that entity under the Income Tax Act.15
For individuals, residency means physical presence in Kenya during the course of
employment. 16 The same principles on the derivation or accrual of income applies to
employees: any income or gain that is realized in Kenya, whether an employee is resident or
not, is deemed to be taxable income in Kenya.17
What this means for private equity companies operating in Kenya is that tax liability
accrues on all private equity investment income generated in Kenya, regardless of the
nationality of the fund – that is, whether the private equity company is registered as a Kenyan
company or as a foreign company operating in Kenya. Further specifics are explored below
under consideration of the corporate tax burden in Kenya.
7.3.2 Tax Avoidance and Evasion
Tax avoidance is not permissible under law in Kenya. Firstly, the Income Tax Act
specifically addresses the question of tax avoiding business transactions and arrangements,
and makes provision for tax reassessment assumptions that enable the Kenya Revenue
Authority (KRA) to recover what it deems to be the due tax were the tax avoiding
transactions not undertaken.18
14 ibid s 2
15 ibid
16 ibid
17 ibid s 5
18 ibid s 23
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Secondly, decisions not to distribute income by corporate entities, deemed by the
KRA to be motivated by the desire to avoid tax liability, are illegal under the Act.19 The law
permits the KRA Commissioner to deem that portion of a company’s income that it should
have distributed as dividends to have been paid on a date twelve months after the end of that
accounting period. This means a readjustment of the company’s liability, and in most cases
attracts a penalty interest charge for the late payment. Because the attribution is calculated on
shareholder dividend entitlement, the net liability actually falls on the individual shareholder,
especially since the Act entitles the company to recover from the shareholder what it is made
to pay to the KRA following adjustments to its tax liability.20 In the end, a company engaging
in this type of activity is engaging in a losing game.
Similarly, tax evasion in Kenya attracts serious business and personal penalties,
ranging from business closure, hefty and painful fines, as well as possible jail terms that
could exceed two years.21
7.3.3 Tax Planning Principles
Unlike tax avoidance and evasion, tax planning is not illegal in Kenya. ‘Tax planning’
is a term used in this thesis to refer to the system that businesses and individuals employ to
achieve the greatest advantages in the manner in which their overall tax liability is calculated.
In the first instance, it involves activities that maximise available tax breaks for a specific
economic activity. Secondly, it involves the intensification of business activities that permit
the recognition of deductible expenditures. Kenyan law recognises a range of such economic
activities that fit within the mould of private equity investment activity, making it possible for
19 ibid s 24(1,2)
20 ibid s 24(3)
21 ibid s 107 - 120
259
businesses in Kenya – including private equity - to organise their affairs in a way that makes
their operations tax efficient.
The Income Tax Act recognises venture capital as a special economic activity for tax
purposes, embodied in The Income Tax (Venture Capital Enterprise) Rules of 1997, issued
under the Income Tax Act, and updated vide Legal Notice number 31 of 2008. This
subsidiary legislation provides a mechanism by which venture capital fund managers in
Kenya can register their businesses with the Commissioner-General for income tax
purposes.22
To register, the venture capital business must first have been registered with the
Capital Markets Authority of Kenya, under Cap 485A of 1990. Rule 3 of the Income Tax
(Venture Capital Enterprise) Rules, 1997 stipulates that such a company must be incorporated
in Kenya, must have a fund manager, must structure 75% or more of its investments as equity
or quasi-equity, and must not invest within the three excluded economic sectors (banking and
financial services, retail and wholesale trade, and trading in real property).23
Under Income Tax rules, a venture capital company is required to invest in “venture
companies”, defined as companies with a total asset value or annual turnover of less than five
hundred million Kenyan shillings at the time of first investment.24
In the following sections, a concise review of the full range of tax planning tools
available to private equity investors and investment managers under the Income Tax Act is
provided.
22 The Income Tax (Venture Capital Enterprise) Rules, (1997)
<http://www.kenyalawreports.or.ke/kenyalaw/klr_app/frames.php, > accessed 2 January 2011.
23 ch 6, 198, 212, for fuller treatment on venture capital company registration in Kenya.
24 Income Tax Act (n 12) s 2
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7.4 High Impact Tax Elements for Private Equity
7.4.1 Corporation Tax
Schedule Three of the Income Tax Act sets out the various tax rates applicable to
corporate bodies and individuals. These rates are set out in two main bands: rates for
residents, and rates for non-residents. ‘Residency’ is applied to both moral and legal entities
under the law. The corporation tax rate for resident companies is 30% since 2002, down from
32.5% in 1998. In contrast, foreign company subsidiaries in Kenya pay a corporation tax of
37.5%, down from 40% in 1998. In addition, whenever dividends are distributed, a
withholding tax of 5% (7.5% in 1998) is payable by resident companies, and 10% by foreign
companies. In addition, foreign companies pay 25% tax on payable interest income,
compared to 10% by resident companies.25
A foreign company is defined under Section 365 of the Companies Act of 1962 to mean
any company incorporated outside Kenya.26 To register a foreign company in Kenya, the
applicant is required under the Companies Act of 196227 to provide to the registrar -
(i) certified copies of the foreign company’s memorandum and articles of
association; and
(ii) a certified copy of the certificate of incorporation certified by a notary public
in the country of incorporation.
To support the application, the applicant needs to complete a set of prescribed forms:28
25 Income Tax Act 1974 (n 12) ss 30, 50; Schedule Three
26 Cap 486, Laws of Kenya
27 ibid s 366
28 Registrar of Companies, State Law Office <http://www.attorney-
general.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=100&Itemid=138> accessed 15 September
2011.
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(iii) Form 236 - List of documents delivered for registration by a company
incorporated outside Kenya;
(iv) Form 237 - List and particulars of the directors and secretary of a company
incorporated outside Kenya;
(v) Form 238 – List of names and addresses of the persons resident in Kenya
authorized to receive service on behalf of a company incorporated outside
Kenya;
(vi) Form 250 - Notice of situation of registered or principal office or change
therein of a company incorporated outside Kenya.
Once the Registrar is satisfied that the applicant has met all registration requirements as a
foreign company, a certificate of compliance is issued to the applicant. The Compliance
Certificate enables the applicant company to apply for a personal income number (PIN) for
tax purposes, a PAYE number for payroll administration, and a VAT registration certificate.
These latter documents are mandatory and no company can operate in Kenya without them.29
Contributions to employees medical insurance and to their pension schemes is
mandatory in Kenya for all companies, whether local or foreign. Medical contributions are
made into the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) as stipulated under the NHIF Act
No.9 of 1998 (NHIF Act).30 Pension contributions are made into the National Social Security
Fund (NSSF) as stipulated under the NSSF Act of 1965 (revised 1978, and hereafter ‘the
NSSF Act’).31 The NSSF Act makes provision for a limited number of exempted persons for
29 Kenya Revenue Authority, ‘Type of Taxes’ < http://www.revenue.go.ke/index.php/domestic-taxes/income-
tax/type-of-taxes> accessed 18 September 2011.
30 s 15, National Hospital Insurance Fund Act 1998, Cap 9, Laws of Kenya <
http://www.kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klr_app/view_content.php?ContentHistoryID=15536> accessed 18
September 2011.
31 s 5, National Social Security Fund Act Cap 258 <
http://www.kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klr_app/view_content.php?ContentHistoryID=2175> accessed 18
September 2011.
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whom contributions are not mandatory.32 For private equity businesses, these exemptions
would not apply.33 Every company must register for both NHIF and NSSF at the respective
offices of either fund. A number is issued to the applicant upon registration. In addition,
every business is required to hold a valid business permit – issued by the local authority of
the region the business is set up in. This is a function discharged by the relevant local
authority but the applicant must have obtained office space prior to submitting this latter
application.34
Kenya does not have a special tax rate for SMEs. All corporate entities constitute a
single tax class for income tax purposes. The question whether a lower tax rate for SMEs is
the right incentive is an open question, however, given that other elements defining the
business climate in Kenya remain challenging as chapter four discussed.
From a tax planning perspective, the statutory requirement in Kenya for venture capital
companies to be incorporated as limited liability companies,35 limits the flexibility of fund
managers to employ tax transparent fund structures.36 Tax transparent fund structures are also
known as ‘pass through vehicles’. They ensure that rather than tax recognition arising at the
point of earnings, it occurs at the point of distribution. That is to say, whenever a fund
manager disposes of its shareholding in a venture company by whatever exit strategy, the
earning from the shares sale is not open to taxation, but becomes taxable once it is distributed
to investors, and when fund managers receive their compensation under the investment
agreement. Tax liability is effectively not avoided; in fact, it is not even delayed. It is made a
32 ibid s 7
33 National Social Security Fund Act Cap 258 Schedule II <
http://www.kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klr_app/view_content.php?ContentHistoryID=18381> accessed 18
September 2011.
34 s163-165, Local Government Act Cap 265 of 1963
35 Rule 3, Income Tax (Venture Capital Enterprise) Rules 1997, under the Income Tax Act of 1974, cap 470
Laws of Kenya;
36 Capital Markets Authority Act of 1990, s 23, Cap 485A; Capital Markets (Registered Venture Capital
Companies) Regulations, 2007.
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little ‘smarter’ – ensuring taxation happens once on the same batch of earnings accrued. In a
sense, it qualifies the ‘accruals’ principle under the Income Tax Act, subjecting it, in the case
of private equity, to a time and party context.
The desirability of availing such tax transparent structures is defensible. Firstly, it affords
investors the possibility of maximum return, through obviating the inevitability of a double
tax effect: the income of the company is taxed, and the income of the shareholder is taxed. A
tax transparent fund structure would allow fund managers to realize maximum earnings, and
allow shareholders a potentially higher volume of returns. The Kenya Law Reform
Commission agrees with this analysis,37 and evidences the legal policy aim of availing such a
choice. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the Limited Liability Partnership Bill 2010 is
currently pending Parliamentary approval,38 together with the proposed Companies Bill to
replace the Companies Act of 1962. The limited liability partnership structure is intended to
avail the tax transparent functionality.39
7.4.2 Taxation of Management and Professional Fees
Management and professional fees that are deemed to accrue in Kenya are taxed at
20% for non-residents, and 5% for residents. Royalty is taxed at 20% for non-residents, and
5% for residents. Tax on rents (on moveable and immoveable property) and premiums stands
at 30% for non-residents, and 3% for residents.40
37 Interview with Mr. Johnston Okello, Senior State Counsel, Kenya Law Reform Commission, (Nairobi,
Kenya, January 2010)
38 Kenya National Assembly, Bill Tracker, Bills 2011, 4
http://www.parliament.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=113:bill-
tracker&catid=46:house-business accessed 24 February 2012
39 Interview with Mr. Okello, (n 38), 2010
40 Income Tax Act of 1974, Third Schedule,
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7.4.3 VAT and Other Business Taxes
Value Added Tax (VAT) is payable on most goods and services in Kenya since 1990
at the rate of 16%.41 VAT is payable on all taxable goods and services generally, except for
zero-rated supplies (including exports, machinery, agricultural equipment, pharmaceutical
products).42 From a tax planning perspective, this is an inconsequential tax strand for private
equity.
There are additional charges, however, that could pose significant and sometimes not-
readily-discoverable cost to business operations. The Local Government Act of 1963 43
empowers local authorities to regulate all aspects of business activity falling within their
municipal boundaries. This regulatory activity comprises licensing, the charging of fees, and
compliance enforcement with administrative/regulatory procedures.
It is significant that municipality charges are neither standardised nor published for
transparency. Besides, these charges are not contained in one centralised, searchable database.
From a business operational level, these municipal charges, while legitimate, tend to
impose additional ‘tax’ centres that vary by type and value, especially where a business has
operations and or offices in different municipalities across the country. The cost of discovery
becomes an additional cost to doing business. The lack of transparency in business regulation
with regard to municipal charges is an area that ought to be addressed if the business climate
is to be optimised for such investments as private equity.
41 Value Added Tax Act of 1990, Cap 476
42 Kenya Revenue Authority, ‘VAT Overview’ < http://www.revenue.go.ke/index.php/domestic-taxes/vat/66-
vat-overview> accessed 18 September 2011.
43 Cap 265 of 1963: for instance, s 148 (power to impose fees and charges for business licenses and permits), s
163A (powers in relation to the grant of business permits) and s 164 (powers in relation to licenses), Laws of
Kenya
265
World Bank Doing Business statistics for 201244 indicated that corporate tax, social
security contribution and value added tax involve significant bureaucracy in Kenya, with
each respectively taking up 60, 57 and 276 hours of corporate time in compliance (total: 393
hours). This is a substantial transaction cost for businesses, and it would greatly benefit from
policy review to reduce the bureaucratic burden.45
7.4.4 Capital Gains and Dividends
Capital gains could be defined as any income that is realised out of an investment, and
the simplest computation would be the difference between the eventual sale price and the
original purchase price of an asset (e.g. from stock or share disposal). Capital gains tax is a
tax that is payable whenever a property owner sells the property at a higher price than what it
was bought for. In this sense, the taxation of capital gains has come to be styled a “wealth
tax”. This tax can be imposed on earnings derived from the disposal of capital assets (such as
buildings, plant and machinery) or the disposal of property in corporate stocks. It is the latter
that is of direct interest to private equity investors, as all capital gains in the practice of
private equity derive from share dealings.
To appreciate the capital gains tax framework for private equity, it is useful to recall
the structure of the private equity revenue streams. Fund managers extract value from their
investments in several ways. These include earning a dividend stream annually from a cash-
generating business, linked to the capital structure of its investment in the venture company.
A dividend stream would usually be supported by a shareholder loan facility, or other debt-
44 The World Bank, ‘Doing Business’ ( Index 2012 - Kenya )
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/kenya/#paying-taxes> accessed 5 May 2010.
45 id
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like finance provided to the venture company (including mezzanine finance, and participating
preferred equity). Secondly, progressive share vestings in some of the shareholders could
involve periodic payouts to the investor, and these represent capital gains. Thirdly, when
investments are exited, the investor’s entire shareholding is frequently transferred either to
the company or to another investor (or to the public if the exit is through an IPO), with the
investor unlocking the full financial value of the share assets. It is clear thus that capital gains
can be realised at progressive stages of an investment’s life cycle.
In Kenya, there is currently no wealth tax on individuals under the Income Tax Act
following share disposals.46 Under section 7A(7) of the Income Tax Act , gains from trading
in venture capital enterprise shares are treated as dividends. Within the meaning of section 7
of the Income Tax Act 1974, dividends are taxable income in Kenya. However, the deemed
dividends under section 7A(7) are exempted from tax under Schedule One of the Income Tax
Act. Under paragraph 46 of Schedule One thereof, dividends received by a registered venture
capital company are exempt from tax.
Under paragraph 47 of Schedule One of the Income Tax Act, gains arising from trade
in shares of a venture company earned by a registered venture capital company within the
first ten years from the date of first investment in that venture company by the venture capital
company are exempt from tax, provided the venture company has not been listed in any
securities exchange operating in Kenya for more than two years. This is consistent with the
provisions in Schedule 8 of the Income Tax Act 1974, paragraph 21, where gains realised in
share transfers by corporate investors are exempted from income tax deductions.
46 Charles Muchuha and David Kabeberi, ‘Githongo Tax Consultants’ <
http://githongo.com/docs/Githongo_Tax_Newsletter_2006.pdf > - Capital gains tax (CGT) on property sales
(land and building) was suspended in Kenya in 1985, but, re-introduced in the 2006 budget and came into effect
in January 2007
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To take advantage of this tax planning option, a venture capital company must be
registered as such with the KRA Commissioner under the Venture Capital Enterprise Rules.47
Several observations are worth making with respect to the foregoing discussion of the capital
gains framework in Kenya.
Firstly, there is an apparent system of repeated data capture within the regulatory
requirement of ‘registration as a venture capital company’. This requirement applies to
private equity practice under the Capital Markets Authority Act, Cap 485A of 1989, the
Income Tax Act and the Venture Capital Enterprise Rules. Various regulatory and
governmental agencies require businesses to abide by prescribed bureaucratic processes in
order to access specific facilities. Because data has historically been generated and kept
manually in paper form, there was no framework for cross-government data capture. The
problem is exacerbated by a plethora of licensing regimes. For purposes of this chapter,
however, the point to note is that private equity businesses are required to provide the same
set of corporate information to each regulator on matters impacting taxation. It is a cost,
nonetheless.
Secondly, it would appear that capital gains realised from investments held for more
than 10 years, whether the venture company remains private or not, would attract a capital
gains tax – but the law does not seem to attach a specific tax band to the levying of such a tax.
The assumption is that at the elapse of the ten year window, tax liability accrues on the
regular principles as to threshold. This has interesting ramifications for investment design,
especially from a hold-period perspective. It was shown at chapter 5 that most fund managers
in Kenya prefer a strategy of holding investments for between 5 and 7 years. From the
framework of the discussion in this section, this appears to be a sensible strategy for tax
planning purposes. In other words, given the statutory reality of the tax-free window, it
47 Venture Capital Enterprise Rules, 1997 (n 36)
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makes sense to plan private equity investments in Kenya in such a way that would reduce the
total investment tax burden through divesting within the ten-year period.
7.4.5 Compensating and Withholding Tax on Dividends
Although there is no wealth tax on individual earnings, a compensating tax at the
corporate level is payable if a company distributes dividends out of capital gains. Where a tax
liability arises consequent upon dividend distribution, the distributed dividend is taxed at the
applicable company tax rate.48
Similarly, if a company is entitled to claim depreciation for tax at a rate higher than
the account depreciation (e.g., where differences in rates or capital allowances exist49), the
company will be liable to pay a compensating tax. Compensating tax is administered through
a Dividend Tax Account (DTA), which every corporation is required by law to maintain.50
The DTA traces the movement of dividends received or paid and taxes paid, and from a
purely functional perspective, appears to aid in the efficiency of tax administration.
Compliance with this requirement did not appear to be an issue to interviewed fund
managers – so it is probably working well for both regulator and economic players.51
The payment of withholding tax on dividends can be legally avoided if companies pay
dividends to shareholders in the form of bonus shares or through a share repurchase
programme (a process whereby a company redeems its own shares from selling
shareholders).52 Bonus shares issued on a pro rata basis to existing shareholders are not at
48 Income Tax Act 1974 s 7A(5); cf: Kairo Thuo, 2009: ‘Kenya – Compensating Tax: The Forgotten Levy’ (All
Africa, 10/10/2009) <http://www.allAfrica.com/stories/200909110078.html> accessed 11 September 2009.
49 In this case, the accounting profits will be higher than the tax profits, and the difference becomes liable for
compensating tax.
50 Income Tax Act 1974, s7A
51 Interviews with FM101 – FM113, Nairobi, Kenya, August 2009; January 2010.
52 Income Tax Act 1974, s7
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present taxable.53 Stock dividends ordinarily become taxable only in cases where they are not
issued on a pro rata basis (that is, according to the respective shareholdings) to eligible
shareholders.54 Dividend distributions under a share repurchase programme are not subject to
any capital gains tax.55
There are other circumstances under which dividends are taxed in Kenya. Under
section 7(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act of 1974, if a company issues debentures or redeemable
preference shares to its existing shareholders as part of a recapitalisation scheme, the
receiving shareholders are deemed to realise a gain in the form of dividend, of an amount
equal to the nominal or redeemable value of the issued securities, whichever is greater.
Under section 7(1)(e) of the Income Tax Act of 1974, where a company issues
debentures or redeemable preference shares to its existing shareholders at a price lower than
the nominal or redeemable value of the relevant security, whichever is greater, the receiving
share issue is deemed to include the payment of a dividend payment to the receiving
shareholder, on those held shares, of an amount equal to the difference between the nominal
or redeemable value and the market value of the under-priced securities. However, if the
price of the debentures or redeemable preference shares is greater than 95% of the nominal or
redeemable value, this requirement does not apply (as the excess is insignificant in value).
Under section 7(1)(f) of the said Income Tax Act, if a company issues ordinary shares
or other shares or rights to acquire shares to any of its shareholders pro-rated to their existing
shareholding in the company, the distribution is treated as a dividend to the receiving
shareholders to the extent of the proportionate increase in their ownership of the company.
53 ibid, s7
54 ibid, s7(1)
55 ibid
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For private equity, these are important law and policy points when it comes to the
design of portfolio management policies. Since cash flow rights are embedded in the shares
held by each class of investor, it would appear that share class rights assume a distinctly
important place in investment negotiations. In this sense, tax law is a potentially important
factor in investment design.
7.4.6 Deductible Expenses for Tax Purposes
Kenyan tax policy recognises that certain business costs constitute legitimate
justifications for deductions from overall tax liability. Maximum utilisation of available
avenues for lessening the tax burden through permissible deductions is a good tax planning
tool for any business venture, including private equity. The following paragraphs summarise
some of the more relevant tax deductible cost centres for a private equity investor or fund
manager.
Tax losses in Kenya are carried forward perpetually to be allowed against future
income. This is allowed only on income from specific sources, including business activities.56
But there is no tax-loss transferability between entities. Losses are not allowable as tax
deductions under Kenyan law. Expenses are also not allowable on the dividend income or
any other income of the taxable person. This is because dividends are taxed on a withholding
basis as a final tax.
For resident corporate shareholders controlling less than 12.5% shareholding in the
dividend-paying company, however, dividends are tax-exempt. 57 Dividends received by
financial institutions are also tax exempt. But should such non-taxed income (such as capital
56 ibid, s 36
57 ibid, s 7(2), Cap 470, Laws of Kenya
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gain or profits on capital allowances) be distributed, a compensating tax may arise.
Compensating tax is an additional charge levied by the KRA, technically penalising non-
payment of tax.
Expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in producing income or profits is tax
deductible.58 In this category, research and development costs are permissible deductions.59
Similarly, business advertisement costs are permissible deductions.60
Interest on corporate debt incurred wholly and exclusively in the production of
income is deductible, and companies can maximise this tax advantage. Section 16(2)(j) of the
Income Tax Act, however, offers a sobering regulatory stricture on thin capitalisation for
entrepreneurs inclined to over-leverage their companies with the view to minimising the tax
burden. This section provides that where a company (not being a bank) is controlled by a
non-resident person, interest deductibility is allowed only to the extent that the total
indebtedness of the company does not exceed three times the paid-up share capital and
revenue reserves.
Bad debts and doubtful debts incurred in the production of the company’s income and
which the Commissioner determines to be bad or doubtful, are also permissible deductions
under section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act. Expenditure of a capital nature in lease
acquisition for business premises, specifically as it relates to attendant legal and stamp duty
costs, are tax deductible under section 15(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act. Maintenance costs
(but not the costs of extending, remodelling or other new structures) for business premises are
58 ibid s 15(2)
59 ibid Second Schedule, para (n)
60 ibid, para (p)
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also tax deductible.61 The law makes provision for guidelines to govern the administration of
tax deductible bad debts.62
For fund managers thinking about public listing as an investment exit strategy, the
costs of authorisation and share issuance are legitimate deductible costs for tax purposes.63
Furthermore, the actual listing costs64 are tax deductible, and so are any rating costs for
listing purposes.65 Under the third schedule of the Income Tax Act, an extra tax break is
offered to businesses listing for the first time on any securities exchange in Kenya, and
provided it lists at least 30% of its shares: such a company would pay corporation tax rate at
25% for the first five full years following the listing (instead of 30%).66
Besides the foregoing, the employment of lease financing arrangements in asset
acquisition offers a useful tax-planning tool for business operators in Kenya. Lease payments
made under capital and operating leases are tax deductible on the lessee.67
7.4.7 State Subsidies
Generally, in Kenya, there are very limited tax incentives for investments, and
especially such as would be distinctly attractive to private equity. At the general economic
level, a few designated enterprises operating under Economic Processing Zones
manufacturing goods for export enjoy limited fiscal incentives. Such firms enjoy a tax
holiday of 10 years, and thereafter, for a limited period of time, enjoy a reduced tax rate of
61 ibid, para (f).
62 Income Tax Act of 1974 Cap 470, Guidelines on Allowability of Bad Debts 2011,
<http://www.kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klr_app/view_content.php?ContentHistoryID=25474> accessed 18
September 2011.
63 ibid para (s).
64 ibid para (ss).
65 ibid para (u).
66 Para.1(d), Third Schedule, Income Tax Act of 1974, Cap 470.
67 Income Tax Act of 1974, s 36
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25%. Tax exemptions are also available for organisations involved in charitable, medical,
alleviation of poverty and religious activities.
The main fiscal incentive for private investments in small and medium enterprises so
far relates to the provisions made under the Income Tax (Venture Capital Companies)
Regulations, 1997. This reality becomes an important law reform agenda in markets that
experience low impact of private equity.
7.4.8 Risk of Double Taxation
On the avoidance of double taxation and the reduction of the tax burden, Kenya
currently has only ten double tax treaties (DTAs) between herself and foreign governments.68
Foreign tax relief is limited only to these countries. This is a very narrow range of DTAs, and
could have implications for tax avoidance strategies of multinational and foreign investors.
The following illustration serves this point.
Spencon Ltd, a construction multinational corporation, headquartered in Kenya but
operating extensively in the East African region, found itself facing multiple double taxation
on its income generated in different East African countries, which did not have double tax
avoidance treaties. To overcome this barrier, Spencon incorporated a holding company for its
Africa businesses, in Mauritius, a Sub-Saharan Africa country that has extensive double tax
agreements with most countries in Africa.69
68 Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Finance, ‘Avoidance of Double Taxation’
<http://www.treasury.go.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=111&Itemid=151> accessed
05 October 2011 – the list includes agreements with the Kingdom of Sweden, Republic of Zambia, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Federal Republic of Germany, French Republic (2 agreements),
India, Kingdom of Denmark, Kingdom of Norway and Canada. This is a curious list when viewed from the
perspective of Kenya’s external trade statistics. One would imagine that DTAs would strongly follow the
direction of the country’s external trade and investment policy – but the Kenyan reality does not.
69 Spencon, ‘Company Profile’ < http://www.spencon.com/> accessed 5 October 2011.
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7.4.9 Taxing Stock Options
Stock options are a compensation and incentive tool used by companies to align the
interests of management with those of investors. In practice, they involve the issuance of
shares to employees as part of their compensation packages, subject to benefiting employees
achieving predetermined performance targets.
There are three possible methods of taxing stock options, and these differ across
jurisdictions. They can be taxed either upon –
(i) grant, or
(ii) vesting or
(iii) exercise.70
Whenever a company ‘grants’ stock options to its employees, the employees must ‘make
an election’ whether to take up the options or not. If they do, then the beneficial interest in the
option crystallises, but may not necessarily pass immediately to the grantee.71 They would be
conditioned on specified events. At the occurrence of the specified events, the benefit either
hardens in entirety, or is subjected to a progressive vesting programme.72 It is important to
note that crystallisation of the beneficial interest through the mere act of vesting or grant does
not, in fact, unlock the financial benefit in the option.73 That happens only upon exercise –
that is to say, when the grantee of the options liquidates those options through a share transfer
in consideration for the relevant equivalent monetary value.74
70 Jack S Levin, Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions, Martin D
Ginsburg, Donald E Rocap, Russell S Light (eds.), (Aspen, 2011), 2-26
71 ibid
72 ibid
73 ibid
74 ibid
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The taxation of stock options at ‘grant’ or upon ‘vesting’ would appear to be inefficient
because the gain potential of the stock option remains locked at either of these intermediate
stages. In this sense, such a taxation strategy is disadvantageous to the holder of the options,
making it an inefficient employment compensation tool. It is therefore reasonable to argue
that in jurisdictions that tax stock options at any of the two intermediate stages, the popularity
of stock options as an employment compensation tool would be low or altogether absent.
Taxing stock options upon ‘exercise’, in contrast, is more efficient since it is at this point
that the holder of the option realises the gain. In addition to taxing stock options at exercise,
the tax treatment of the gain is important. The gain could be treated as ordinary income, or
treated as a capital gain. Taxing stock options as capital gains has two potential effects: firstly,
it lowers the overall tax burden, since capital gains are generally taxed lower than ordinary
income; secondly, it can potentially defer the time when the tax becomes due, and, in some
cases, dissipate the permanent likelihood of a tax ever arising, especially where such options
are held over the long term. Where stock options are conferred in conjunction with a
restricted stock, taxation happens upon extinction of the restriction.
In Kenya, the gain in a stock option is deemed to be realised upon grant, hence taxed
upon grant.75 Furthermore, since capital gains are not taxable on investment income, tax
treatment of stock options is as ordinary income.76 It is thus unsurprising that as a general
practice, remuneration of employees by way of stock options is uncommon in Kenya. As of
2011, for instance, there were only 7 registered Employee Share Ownership Schemes
(ESOPs). For private equity practitioners in Kenya, this is an issue that policy makers could
review.
75 Income Tax Act of 1974, s 5(1)(a)
76 ibid, s 3(2)(f) and s 15(3)(f) – capital gains on property transfers are taxable – but gains from investment share
transfers is exempt.
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7.4.10 Fiscal Incentives for Research and Development
Research and development, though recognized to play a crucial role in the
development of a country, is practically absent as a business engagement in Kenya.77 Kenya’s
Vision 2030 which aims to convert Kenya into a middle-income industrialised economy by
the year 2030 is anchored on the three pillars of science, technology and innovation – yet
anecdotal data places the total stock of public funding for research and development at only
0.3% of the country’s gross domestic product.78 The private sector’s participation in R&D
activity remains low.
Research findings of the few state-funded research institutions generally reach the
policy implementation or commercialisation phase in inconsequential amounts. This is
generally corroborated in the 2010 UNESCO Science Report – which places patents
registered to Kenya at 24 compared to 462 registered to South Africa under the review period.
The experience of Kenya Industrial Research and Development Institute (KIRDI), established
by an Act of Parliament in 1979, illustrates why this is the case. In the last decade, it has
spent over KES500 million in research and development, yet on its website, there are no
published research findings. In the list of its ‘achievements’, research and patent registration
are not listed. Without knowledge management, aggressive commercialisation of ideas, and
clear pathways linking innovation to large industry, noble intentions contained within the
vision that created KIRDI will remain elusive.79
77 Government of Kenya, Ministry of Trade and Industry, ‘the Private Sector Development Strategy’ (2006-
2010) <http://www.psds.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=32> accessed 19
October 2011
78 Budget Estimates 2011/2012 – National Council for Science and Technology – KES 300 million assigned,
supporting 150 research projects.
79 KIRDI, ‘Achievements,’ http://www.kirdi.go.ke/AboutUs/Achievements.aspx accessed 28 February 2012
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The current realities in Kenya suggest that links between researchers and technology
developers on the one hand, and industry on the other, would be weak and shallow. It is
therefore not surprising that there is a chasm between university research and industry, and
weak uptake of academic research into the commercial world. Furthermore, expert mobility
between academia and industry, and vice versa, is yet to become widespread as a practice.
University research, on its own, remains low key, according to a recent ranking of
universities around the world.80
Apart from the tax deductibility of R&D expenses, there are no fiscal incentives for
research and development in Kenya. This partly explains why within the world of private
equity, R&D investments are not common in Kenya. In chapter 4, it was shown that ICT
penetration in Kenya remains very low, and ICT investments constitute a very low proportion
of the market segmentation of private equity in Kenya.81 This is set to change following
massive infrastructure development in ICT carrying systems in Kenya. Two undersea fibre
optic cables, 5,000km in length, have been landed in Kenya, delivering high-speed internet
connectivity.82 Overland, the government has completed the laying of 5,500km of terrestrial
fibre optic backbone cables all over the country – to support business process outsourcing,
digital villages around the country, and techno-cities currently under development.83
Over the same period, there have been investment-grade technology innovations
cultured in Kenya, with press reports asking questions like “Is Kenya the Next Silicon
80 One fund manager observed: “We really do not make time for researchers – we are busy.” Interview with
FM105, Nairobi, Kenya, January 2010.
81 ch 4, 123
82 Republic of Kenya, ‘Second Annual Progress Report, On the Implementation of the First MTEF (2008-2012)
of Kenya Vision 2030’ (Ministry of Planning and National Development)
<http://www.opendata.go.ke/api/file_data/zF8ojyoGLyfgA97OZZnZuRojLqC-FUCnDJgVVJOFD-
4?filename=Vision%25202030%2520progress%2520report.pdf >
83 ibid, xxv
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Valley?”84 Current trends demonstrate an increasingly rapid assimilation of ICT in Kenya,
and it is predictable that this is the next big thing in Kenya as the economy transitions into a
knowledge economy. 85 Significantly, this is a core pillar of the country’s development
blueprint, Vision 2030.86 Evidence from Israel and USA illustrate the potential financial and
economic benefit that a country could reap from policy reforms that entrench and high-profile
ICT investments, backed up by a strong R&D ethic.87
7.5 Evaluation of the Tax Environment for Private Equity
The chapter started by predicting five ways in which a country’s tax law and policy
would likely impact private equity. These were (i) possible impacts on fundraising for private
equity, (ii) impact on innovation through increased research and development activity, (iii)
impact on selection of fund structures, as well as on (iv) capital structuring (investment
design through choice of securities), and (v) impact on exit options and strategies.
After canvassing the structure of the tax framework as it applies to private equity
investing, it is illuminating to analyse the extent to which the overall tax environment
provides an efficient environment for private equity to thrive in Kenya. In doing this, it must
be remembered that tax law and policy is but one piece of the wider puzzle defining the
private equity environment in Kenya. While important, therefore, tax law and policy offer but
a small body of evidence explaining the condition of the private equity industry in any legal
jurisdiction, not just Kenya. It is an important little piece, nonetheless.
84 Harry Hare, ‘Kenya: Is Nation Inching Closer to Being Next Silicon Valley?’ (Business Daily, 25 March
2010) <http://allafrica.com/stories/201003250882.html> accessed 05 October 2011
85 (…), The Next Silicon Valley: ‘Mobile Apps Growth in Kenya Catches Tech Investors’ Eyes’
<http://thenextsiliconvalley.com/technews/7111/mobile-apps-growth-kenya-catches-tech-
investors%E2%80%99-eyes> accessed 05 October 2011
86 Republic of Kenya, Vision 2030, (n 82)
87 ch 3, 69,75
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It is settled, from discussions in chapter 6, that there was no choice on investment
vehicles (fund structures) other than the company limited in Kenya. Tax law and policy, as it
currently stands, offer no additional advantages to private equity as to fund structure choice.
Fundraising is a function of a myriad of factors. It was seen earlier that a majority of
Kenyan based private equity funds are domiciled outside Kenya, and source their investment
capital through the international markets. Domestic sources of fundraising for private equity,
it was observed earlier in this chapter and in earlier chapters, remain suppressed. From the tax
review above, a couple of observations appear pertinent.
The absence of tax incentives to invest in private equity could be wielding a negative
effect on private equity fundraising locally. It was shown that there is no special tax rate for
investing in small and medium enterprises. It was also illustrated that there is no private-
equity specific tax or other fiscal incentive for investing in high-risk innovations. This could
find some explanation in the country’s generally depressed market for research and
development – although causation could run the other way as well. Viewed in a wider context,
this reality is significant, as the next paragraph points out.
The PSDS 2006/2010 identified an important gap in the business relationships
between Kenya’s blue chip companies and the country’s SME sector, and observed that in a
more mature economy, the blue chip corporates would create opportunity for the smaller
corporate sector to provide auxiliary services – which include research and development,
innovation and similar services that feed into the larger operational frameworks of the blue
chip companies – as the Israeli venture capital model reviewed in chapter three illustrates.
Without these linkages, it can be argued that investing in innovative businesses without a
clear route to market would be assuming unreasonable investment risk. Capital holders,
motivated by profit, would hold back, suppressing fundraising for private equity. The
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implication of the foregoing, from a tax law and policy perspective, is that promoting
investments in the SME sector through creating tax breaks or other incentives for businesses
that invest in fund managers whose main portfolio is the provision of enterprise finance to the
SME sector, would do private equity a lot of good.
Secondly, government’s policy of closely regulating the investment portfolio selection
by pension funds – and all other public funds – has achieved in Kenya an ERISA-type effect
prior to the 1978 clarifications.88 These include, for instance, regulatory requirements limiting
pension schemes managing under one hundred million shillings to 100% investments in
government securities. Without a formal change in official policy, pension, insurance and
public trust funds exposure to private equity will be thin, further suppressing the local market
for private equity fundraising.
The absence of a capital gains tax is, on the face of it, a good thing, as it has the effect
of projecting high returns vis-à-vis investment costs. The continued existence of a
compensating tax, however, in spite of industry wisdom it serves no positive economic role
even from purely tax policy perspective, stands in need of policy review. Some tax experts
opine that the compensating tax is an unnecessary and unjust tax, and ought to be repealed
from the Income Tax Act.89 It is not explicit in the law at what point the principle of
‘dividend’ becomes recognisable for tax purposes: is it at the time of distribution of the
capital gains from investment exits, therefore at the GP level – or is it at the LP level? A tax
transparent fund structure might make this objective clearer. It has been discussed above how
proposed legislative changes to the Companies Act of 1962 is set to introduce wider choice of
business organisational forms that would improve tax planning choices for investors.
88 ch 5, 159-169
89 Interview with TX77, Legal Manager, Nairobi, Kenya (August 2009)
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7.6 Conclusion
The possibility of tax planning for private equity investments is not entirely efficient
in Kenya. It is a good thing for the private equity industry in Kenya that a capital gains tax on
investment income is not levied. This country advantage is eroded by the presence of the
compensating tax structure. To give businesses the full benefit of the absence of a capital
gains tax, there is a defensible case for a review of the tax policy on the compensating tax
structure.
Kenya’s tax policy on the taxation of stock options is inefficient to the extent that it
deems a gain to be realised when in fact the option has not been exercised. There is a need for
law reform on this point to ensure that stock options become amenable to tax when the value
in the option is redeemed, that is, upon exercise.
The findings in this chapter also establish a case for an expansion of incentives for
R&D, as well as the need for encouragement of private investments in Kenya. On the basis of
the findings in this chapter, a model for tax law reform aimed at benefiting the private equity
industry is recommended.
Most of the fund manager respondents, however, indicated that taxation is not a
significant entry barrier and that operationally, the prevalence of investment opportunities in
Kenya, tended to off-set regulatory inefficiencies from a tax law framework. Respondents
from among the auxiliary industries, however, opined differently: that policy and regulatory
inefficiencies ought to be addressed, regardless of whether direct harm is suffered.
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THE ROLE OF COURTS IN FINANCIAL CONTRACTING
8.1 Introduction
Private equity contracts are long-term agreements, and fall among that class of
contracts called ‘relational contracts’.1 Relational contracts theory attempts to explain the
dynamics that hold parties together in a contractual relationship, especially one like private
equity’s that subsists for a prolonged period of time. Originated by Macneil as a radical
restatement of contract law, it has attracted competing explanations, mostly grounded on
what a relational theory of contract implies for the courts. Hence for instance, Goetz and
Scott2 perceive the role of the courts to be that of resolving contractual disputes by supplying
terms that promote the contractual relationship. This view presupposes the competence of
courts who engage in interpreting the contract ex-post. Schwartz, 3 on the other hand,
perceives the role of the courts to be strictly interpretative, on the face of the record. This
viewpoint presupposes, on its part, the perfect competence of courts in interpreting and
understanding contract terms, whatever they may be. Macneil viewed the role of courts to be
the determination of the ‘norms’ underpinning the contract, and enforcing those norms, a
view that tacitly suggests omniscience on the part of courts.
Posner4 adopts a fourth view, holding that courts are radically incompetent: both in
understanding the intention of the parties and in the interpretation and application of declared
contractual terms. In consequence, he holds up the reputational nature of contracting attitudes,
1 Ian R Macneil, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry Into Modern Contractual Relations (Yale University
Press, 1992)
2 Charles Goetz and Robert E. Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracts’ (1981) 67 Virginia Law Review 1089-
1129
3 Alan Schwartz, ‘Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial
Strategies’ (1992) 21 Journal of Legal Studies 271
4 Eric A Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error (1999) University of
Chicago, Chicago Working Paper in Law 2
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proposing that while parties honour contracts out of a desire to enjoy repeated custom and
general positive commercial standing, they also apply considerable effort developing legally
enforceable agreements, because courts and contract law remain central to agreements.
Schwartz shifts the burden to the courts entirely, while Macneil reposes the duty on
the parties while asking the courts to somehow divine contested norms. Posner argues that
even under conditions of “radical judicial error”, courts have a deterrent effect on
opportunistic behaviour, introducing a ‘commitment effect’, which has the strongest impact
where high-value contracts are involved. 5 Scott argues that Mcneil’s relational theory over-
emphasises the social aspects of contract relationships, ignoring the central role of consent,6
and Posner places greater emphasis on opportunity cost (therefore, parties to a contract avoid
breaching it if the cost of remedying the breach is higher than the benefit of observing the
contract).7
Admittedly, the rich and textured discourse on relational contracts is beyond the scope
of this work. However, adopting Posner’s notion of ‘high-value undertakings’, it is ventured
that perhaps at the heart of the private equity investment decision in emerging markets sits
the fundamental question: to what extent property rights are secure. Secure financial contracts
ensure investment ventures are profitable.8 In practice, ‘profitability’ is achieved through
each contracting party faithfully undertaking their end of the bargain. The fact that so many
commercial contracts are entered into, repeatedly, suggests that the benefits of contracting
outweigh the costs of contracting. This chapter is devoted to a discovery of contracting
practices within the Kenyan private equity industry, primarily from a contract enforcement
perspective, whether through courts or otherwise. The ‘voices’ of interviewed fund managers
5 Ibid, 8, 14
6 Robert E Scott, ‘A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts: in The Law and Economics
of Risk’ (1990) 19(2) The Journal of Legal Studies 597-616
7 Posner, Radical Judicial Error (1999) 14
8 Joseph J Norton, ‘Taking Stock of the First Generation of Financial Sector Reform’ (2007) SMU Dedman
School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper 9, 32 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=981226> accessed 5 July 2010
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and legal professionals come strongly through, and the analysis of Kenyan law as it relates to
contract enforcement, and is evaluated through these empirical findings.
In exploring the foregoing themes, it seems inevitable to colour that discourse with
the notion of property rights. Research appears to show that in countries with weak property
rights, there is a concomitantly low level of external investments both at the company and
country levels.9 This is readily borne out by UNCTAD statistics on foreign direct investment
flows.10 Property rights have been shown to encourage investment (Besley 1995;11 Knack and
Keefer 1995;12 Johnson et.al 200213), entrepreneurship (Murphy et. al 1991)14 and innovation
(Stern, Porter, and Furman 2000).15 Recently economists have recognized that property rights
can catalyze “collateral benefits” which can raise growth through indirect channels, for
example, through progressing financial sector development (Kumar et. al,16 2001; La Porta et.
al, 2002;17 Claessens and Laeven, 2003;18 Beck et. al, 200519). Alternatively, it can improve
contracting efficiency by allowing borrowers to pledge collateral (De Soto, 2001;20 Djankov
9 Stephen Knack, Philip Keefer, ‘Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using
Alternative Institutional Measures’ (1995) 7:3 Economics and Politics 207-28; Cf: Mauro, Paolo, ‘Corruption
and Growth’ (1995) 110:3 Quarterly Journal of Economics 681-712; and Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and
James Robinson, ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’ (2001) 91:5
American Economic Review 1369-401
10 UNCTAD, ‘FDI Statistics/World Investment Reports’ <http://www.unctad.org/> accessed 5 July 2010
11 Timothy Besley, ‘Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana’ (1995) 105:3
Journal of Political Economy 903-37
12 Knack et al, Institutions and Economic Performance, 1995 (n 9)
13 Simon Johnson, John McMillan, Christopher Woodruff, ‘Courts and Relational Contracts’ (2002) 18(1)
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 221-77
14 Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishnu, ‘The Allocation of Talents: Implications for Growth’
(1991) 106:2 Quarterly Journal of Economics 503 – 30
15 S Stern, M.E. Porter and J.L. Furman, The Determinants of National Innovative Capacity. NBER Working
Paper 7876 /2000
16 Krishna B. Kumar, Raghuran G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales. What Determines Firm Size? NBER Working
Paper 7208/1999
17 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, ‘Investor Protection and
Corporate Valuation’ (2002) 57 Journal of Finance 1147-1170
18 Stijn Claessens, and Luc Laeven, Financial Development, ‘Property Rights and Economic Growth’ (2003) 58
Journal of Finance 2401-2436
19 Thorsten Beck, , Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic ‘Financial and Legal Constraints to Firm
Growth: Does Firm Size Matter?’ (2005) 60 Journal of Finance137-177
20 Hernando De Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere
(New York, NY: Random House 2001)
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et.al 2007;21 Besley and Ghatak, 2009).22 In other words, a strong system of property rights
appears indispensable to the emergence and development of financial markets.
It is striking that the causality vein in the foregoing works is uni-directional: from
property rights to financial development. Bose, Panini and Chitralekha have modelled a bi-
directional pathway between property rights and financial markets, suggesting a mutually
reinforcing growth nexus.23
This work has attempted to build evidence around the notion that in a developing
country, contracting efficiency is driven by laws and legal institutions. 24 Property in a
financial investment, of course, is the financial worth of the investment, represented
physically in the security instruments issued to the investor, and the contract evidencing the
same. The extent to which the security of property rights is linked to the law, contracts and
legal institutions in Kenyan private equity practice in many ways guides the discussion in this
chapter.25 In exploring this issue, this chapter contributes to the objectives of this study by
attempting to discover the extent to which, in Kenyan practice, law is relevant to private
equity market development.
To achieve the foregoing objective, this chapter is organised as follows. In section 8.2,
consideration is given to the classification of contract terms (conditions and warranties), and
an exploration of two contract law doctrines (reliance and expectancy), two notions that are
21 Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Private Credit in 129 Countries’ (2007) 84
Financial Economics 299-329
22 Timothy Besley, and Maitreesh Ghatak , Property Rights and Economic Development, CEPR Discussion
Paper 7243/2009
23 Niloy Bose, Antu Panini Murshid and Chitralekha Ratha, Finance and Property Rights: Exploring Other
Directions,
24 Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else,
(Britain, Bantam Press, 2000)
25 Douglas Cumming and Grant Flemming, ‘A Law and Finance Analysis of Venture Capital Exits in Emerging
Markets’ (2002-03) Australian National University Working Paper Series in Finance, ,
<http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/people/armour.htm> accessed 5 July 2010. Cf: Douglas Cumming and Jeffrey
McIntosh, ‘A Cross-Country Analysis of Full and Partial Venture Capital Exits’ (2003) 27 Journal of Banking
and Finance 511-548
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potentially value-maximizing in a relational contract. Section 8.3 introduces the general
principles for contract-based conflict management in Kenyan private equity, drawing from
the experiences of interviewed research participants. Section 8.4 is devoted to a discussion of
commercial arbitration in Kenya, and the law is evaluated through the empirical findings of
the attitudes of Kenya-based fund managers to resolving commercial disputes in Kenya,
under Kenyan laws. Section 8.5 considers the framework for commercial litigation in Kenya,
and similarly empirically assesses the contracting choices of fund managers in relation to
dispute resolution under Kenyan law and Kenyan courts.
The chapter finds a general disinclination by the fund management community in
Kenya to write in Kenyan dispute resolution options in their agreements. Consequently,
section 8.6 provides a short review of the constraints facing the Kenyan judiciary, while
section 8.7 offers some deductive reflections on what this chapter’s findings mean for private
equity development in Kenya. Section 8.8 concludes.
The general discussion and conclusions in this chapter arise from the interviews
completed with the various stakeholders that participated in this study in Kenya. In particular,
the general law relating to contract enforcement is explored in light of those interviews.
8.2 Classification of Contract Terms:
8.2.1 Conditions and Warranties
A well-established principle of common law is that the intention to create legal
relations in commercial agreements is presumed.26 This is also the position in Kenya as stated
by the Learned Justice MK Koome in Estate Finance Company of Kenya Ltd v Narok Transit
26 Jill Poole, Casebook on Contract Law (OUP, 8th edn, 2006) 185
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Hotel Ltd & 2 Others [2011]eKLR, where, citing Edwards v Skyways Ltd (1964 1 W.LR. 349),
she holds in part –
“…in ordinary commercial transactions it is not necessary to prove that
parties in fact intended to create legal relations. The onus of proving that
there was no such intention is on the party who has asked that no legal effect
is intended, and the onus is a heavy one.”27
This presumption rides on a promise, however, as established in Carlill v Carbolic
Smoke Ball Company [1893] 1 QB 256 (CA), where it was held that an advertisement
carrying an intention to be bound through its acceptance is not a mere puff. In Bowerman v
Association of British Travel Agents Ltd [1996] CLC 451 (CA), the plaintiffs booked a
holiday through ABTA, a tour operator, which became insolvent prior to the date of the
holiday. ABTA reimbursed the cost of the holiday but deducted £10 per head to cover
insurance premiums paid on the holiday. ABTA argued this sum was excluded from the
ABTA protection scheme. Plaintiffs claimed reimbursement of deducted sums, asserting a
contractual relationship between ABTA and themselves obliging ABTA to fully reimburse,
based on ABTA’s holiday advertisement. In the first instance, it was held that the notice was
too vague and inconsistent to constitute a legally enforceable promise. On appeal, this was
overturned, with the Court of Appeal holding that the notice must be construed in the manner
in which the consuming public would understand it – and that was ABTA made a promise to
reimburse holiday booking costs should ABTA be unable to consummate the contract.
Private equity, made available under a commercial agreement, is presumed to carry
the intention to create legal relations between the contracting parties. This presumption does
27 High Court of Kenya Civil Case No.710/1999 (National Council for Law Reporting), paragraph 12
<http://www.kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/view_preview1.php?link=13550320180909331435563> accessed 25
December 2011
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not apply, however, where the allegation relates to unwritten agreements. In Baird Textiles
Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc, [2001] EWCA Civ 274, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 737
(CA), Mance LJ held that –
“(…) for a contract to come into existence, there must be both (a) an
agreement on essentials with sufficient certainty to be enforceable and (b) an
intention to create legal relations.” Paragraph 59
He went on to say:
“Both requirements are normally judged objectively. Absence of the former
may involve or be explained by the latter, but it is not always so. A
sufficiently certain agreement may be reached, but there may be […] no
intention to create legal relations.” Paragraph 60
The Kenyan position on collateral contracts is well-stated in George M Musundi & 2 Others v
Small Enterprises Finance Company Ltd [2007] eKLR, (the SEFCO case) where Justice JG
Nyamu observed –
“a collateral contract can only be proved where it neither alters nor adds to
the whole agreement as agreed by the parties or where the written agreement
is silent.”28
In the English case of City and Westminster Properties (1934) Ltd v Mudd [1959] Ch 129, it
was held that the terms of a collateral contract can supersede conflicting terms in the written
agreement.29English jurisprudence has also established that in certain circumstances, as was
28 High Court of Kenya Civil Case No.1861/1995,
<http://www.kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/view_preview1.php?link=13409345844122979681569>, accessed 25
December 2011.
29 In that case, the defendant leased a shop property from the plaintiff, and used the back rooms as a lodging.
When the lease period came to an end and a renewal was due, the plaintiff inserted a clause in the draft lease to
the effect that use of the premises as a sleeping quarter would not be permissible. While presenting the draft
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the case in J. Evans & Son (Portsmouth) Ltd v Andrea Merzario Ltd, [1976] 1 WLR 1078
(CA), decided by Lord Denning MR, courts can determine that there exist two contracts, one
a written agreement governed by the parole evidence rule, and one an oral agreement, to
which the said rule does not apply. However, where a written contract carries an ‘entire
agreement clause’ or any of its variants, collateral contracts are deprived of their legal
effect30 – as the Learned Justice JG Nyamu decided in the SEFCO case.31
In private equity contracts concluded in Kenya, the device of the ‘entire agreement’
clause is employed, excluding collateral understandings when disputes arise.32 This accords
with the position under section 3 of the Law of Contract Act, Cap 23 of 1961, which
generally requires contracts likely to give rise to pecuniary loss to be in writing.
The covenants clause in a private equity agreement stems from a body of
representations and warranties that form the basis of contract rights and obligations. These
representations ride on a promise, and are usually made with the intention of inducing a
financing contract.33
Contract law distinguishes generally between two types of contractual terms:
conditions and innominate or intermediate terms. 34 Conditions are important contractual
terms, and they go ‘to the heart or the root of the contract’. 35 Intermediate terms, in
comparison, do not go to the root of the contract, and are capable of remedy by monetary
compensation. Conditions, going to the root of the contract, are sufficient to form a basis for
lease to the defendant, the plaintiff represented that if the defendant signed on the lease, the plaintiff would not
object to the defendant’s continued use of the back rooms as a sleeping quarter. In effect, the court found that
this was a promise aimed at inducing a future contract.
30 Jill Poole, Contract, (n 26), pp210, 211
31 The SEFCO Case (n 28)
32 Confidential access to Contracts of FM101, FM104 and FM112, Nairobi, Kenya, January 2010
33 Confidential access to FM104’s standard ‘Termsheet’ – viewed in confidence
34 Jill Poole, Contract (n 26) 244 (Classification of Terms)
35 Mustill LJ in Lombard North Central plc v Butterworth [1987] QB 527 (CA) – at paragraphs 1 – 6.
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contract rescission.36 Conditions can be promissory, giving rise to remedies for breach in the
event of their non-performance, or non-promissory, that is, dependent on the occurrence of
some specified secondary event for their effectiveness.37 Non-promisory conditions are not
frequently written into formal agreements.
In determining whether a term is a condition or a warranty, the provisions in the laws
of a country having relevance to the contractual transaction in question play an important
role – in addition to the intention of contracting parties and the general practice within that
contracting industry. As far as statute-based conditions are concerned, the question to ask is
whether a specific statute classifies a term expressly. Where the law is silent, the next
question to determine is whether the parties have themselves classified the term. The words
employed in such classification include terms such as “it is of the essence of this contract”38
or “it shall be a condition of contract”.39
From a contracts framework, Scott opined that the role of contract law is to set default
rules by which rational commercial partners can bargain and adjust their claims.40 Barnett
argues that “contracts are transfers of entitlements”,41 and that consent sits at the heart of
contractual relationships.42 Contractual terms, whether giving rise to reliance or expectancy,
and whether conditions or warranties, enable, in Barnett’s view, “the existence of a relational
36 See for instance, the decision of Lord Reid in L. Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales [1974] AC 235
(HL) – where he observes that a term can be classified as a condition by law or by the choice of contracting
parties who elect to confer on a term the effect of a condition, that is, the sufficiency of a term to support an
action for contract termination as a result of breached performance. He finds, however, that where contract
terms properly construed lead to unconscionable or otherwise unreasonable outcomes, the true meaning of the
terms must be made sufficiently clear.
37 Jill Poole, Contract (n 26) 244
38 Lombard North Central plc v Butterworth (1987) QB 527 (CA).
39 L. Schuler v Wickman Machine Tool Sales (1974) AC 235 (HL).
40 Scott, ‘Rational Commercial Actors’ (1990) (n 6) 605
41 Randy EBarnett, ‘Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil’s Relational Theory of Contract’ (1992)
78(5) Virginia Law Review 1175-1206, 1181
42 ibid 1180
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order of actions that enable parties to arrive at mutually beneficial adjustments” in futuristic
exchanges.43
8.2.2 Doctrine of Reliance
Commercial agreements give rise to the principle of reliance. Hedley Byrne v Heller44
involved a question under the tort law principle of misrepresentation giving rise to a breach
of a duty of care. The plaintiff sought a credit-worthiness reference from the defendant,
which supplied a positive reference with the disclaimer neither the defendant nor its
employees assumed responsibility for the reference. Relying on the good reference, the
plaintiff advanced sums to its customer (about which the reference was requested), but the
customer soon after went into liquidation, occasioning the plaintiff direct financial loss. It
was held by Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest that -
“…(I)rrespective of any contractual or fiduciary relationship and irrespective
of any direct dealing, a duty may be owed by one person to another…if a
person takes it upon himself to give information (….) or allows his
information (…) to be passed on to another person who, as he knows or
should know, will place reliance upon it, then a duty of care will arise.”
In situations where a special relationship exists between parties – such as in a private
equity financing relationship, the representations made by one to the other give rise to a duty
of care that would be owed if and when the other party suffers loss as a result of acting on the
strength of the representations made. In Mumias Sugar Company Ltd v Freight Forwarders
43 id
44 Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd, (1964) AC 465 (HL).
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(K) Ltd Nairobi CA 297/03, Kenyan courts have held, like English courts have, 45 that
‘contractual reliance’ arises where the following can be demonstrated:
(i) The person making a representation aimed at facilitating or inducing a
contractual relationship possesses some special knowledge or information
about the subject matter - in the private equity financing context, the venture
company possesses insider knowledge about the true state of its business,
placing it a special position in the contractual relationship;
(ii) The person to whom the representations are made is expected to place reliance
on the declared statements or claims – in private equity financing, investors
place reliance on the representations of the venture companies, which are
translated into covenants that carry various sanctions if they are violated;
(iii) The person making the representations must know the other party will rely on
the statement or it must be reasonably foreseeable that he will so rely on the
representations, - in private equity financing, venture companies know that
unless the private equity investor can reasonably rely on their representations,
they will not invest in the venture company – so the representations of the
venture company are designed to induce the decision to invest;
(iv) The person making the representations must have some knowledge of the type
of transaction for which the information is required46 - and in private equity
financing, the venture company knows that the ‘type of transaction’ intended
is a financing transaction. Equivalent principles were reiterated in Kenya
Institute of Management v Kenya Reinsurance Corporation [2008] eKLR, a
Kenya High Court decision.
45 In - Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145.
46 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605.
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Where a future contract is frustrated because the representor fails to perform or
because some of the pre-contract representations turn out to be falsehoods, the injured party
can sue for ‘reliance loss’ to recover wasted expenditure.47
8.2.3 Doctrine of ‘Expectancy’
Separate from the doctrine of reliance is the contract law doctrine of ‘expectancy’.
Having relied on some representation or conduct of a party to a contract, and having been
induced into taking steps to expose oneself to the vagaries of a contractual relationship,
contract law secures that the relationship of parties now anchors on the principle of
expectancy: the expectation that both parties to a contract relationship will undertake in good
faith the observance of their ends of the bargain. Should one party suffer loss of expectation,
that is, loss of a benefit directly linked to the other party’s failure to perform a specified
contractual obligation, the injured party can take recourse to the courts for the award of
damages as compensation. This was the common law rule in Robinson v Harman (1848) 1
Exch 850, 855. There are several ways for determining the measure of damages for this
purpose. Where the monetary value between what was expected and what is actually received
is readily ascertainable, then the damages are the difference in value. The quantum of
damages could also be determined by the cost of curing the defective performance.48
In private equity contracting, pre-contract conditions, representations and warranties
giving rise to either contractual reliance or expectancy, play a central role in determining
whether investments occur. The security of contract-based entitlements therefore depend on
both built-in enforcement mechanisms and the availability of a range of external institutions
that act as motivators to contract-based recompense or normalisation of conduct. In private
47 McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1951) 84 CLR 377 (High Court of Australia).
48 Ruxley Electronics & Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1960] 1 AC 344 HL.
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equity practice, actual recourse to such external agencies need not be taken; but their
availability would appear to be crucial to the financing relationship, as the following sections
illustrate.
The following sections of the chapter focus on how private equity contracts are
managed in Kenya.
8.3 Conflict Management in Private Equity: The General Principles
Every private equity financing agreement carries a dispute resolution clause. The
typical resolution regime availed under such a clause paints a picture of progressive
escalation of measures and choice of dispute management tools as opinion differences
become intransigent. This could be depicted as follows.
Fig 8.1: Typical Private Equity Conflict Management Continuum
Source: Interviews with Fund Managers, 2010
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From financing agreements accessed confidentially in the course of this study’s field
work, 49 summarised in the following paragraphs are the strategies employed by fund
managers in preventing disputes from full scale disputes.
Fund managers write in monetary penalties for violations of representations and
warranties that form part of the closing conditions. In the case of FM109, the penalty is
pegged at 5% of the invested capital. Where a penalty is actually levied, the venture company
may be additionally required to reflect the penalty liability in its company accounts. This
latter stipulation is a strong deterrent to corporate misconduct, as it would be plain to future
investors in the company that the venture company could potentially be untrustworthy as to
its representations – in a sense, indicative of Posner’s reputational basis for contract
observance.
The venture company is more frequently required to remedy default or breach within a
period usually prescribed in financing agreements (shareholders agreement) – the most
frequently observed period for the remedying of contractual breach in Kenyan private equity
was 30 days. Where the venture company fails to remedy the breach within the stipulated
time, and in cases where the venture company is not substantially performing to budget or in
accordance with the corporate business or development plan, the investor can employ several
strategies to enforce contract performance:
a. It can require the venture company to supply to the investor any information in
relation to any aspect of the venture company’s business and affairs, whether
on a day to day basis or at greater intervals;
49 Documents seen at FM101 (January 2010 – a government-linked fund), FM104 (January 2010 – one of the
Kenyan-owned older funds), FM112 (August 2009 – another Kenya-owned fund set-up post-2000) FM107
(September 2009 – an African Fund with significant development fund investor base) - all at Nairobi, Kenya
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b. It can nominate, and the venture company is contractually required to appoint,
such number of additional directors of the venture company as will give the
investor board majority in the venture company; or
c. It can require that the venture company retains as consultants such accountants,
professional advisors, management consultants or other consultants including
employees of the investor (at rates to be determined by the investor) to prepare
a detailed report in relation to the company’s financial and trading
performance and prospects. This will usually be aimed at informing an exit
strategy, or to justify forced management changes in the venture company.
(ii) Activating termination clauses – which can be triggered by a range of corporate
actions of noncompliance.
(iii) In addition, the investor’s put and call options, as well as the contractual
preservation of the investor’s rights even under contract termination, operate to
powerfully motivate contract compliance, or to dislodge intractable points of
difference.
Fund managers FM102, FM103 and FM113 concurred in opining that most venture
companies found it important to avoid permitting differences to escalate to formal disputes
because of future financing rounds.
In addition to the foregoing, private equity investors employ other soft tools in
conflict management. 50 This strategy includes the use of ‘financing rounds’ mentioned
above– a process whereby investor’s capital commitments to the venture company is made
available in tranches, with each tranche being subjected to a predetermined set of
50 Jack S Levin, Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity and Entrepreneurial Transactions Martin D
Ginsburg, Donald E Rocap and Russell S Light (eds.) (Aspen, 2011) ch 2, 2-10 to 2-27.
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performance targets. 51 These performance targets are tied into the venture company’s
business plan that guides the investor’s profit objectives. It will be recalled here that the
private equity investments are provided with an exit event in mind.52 Each financing tranche
that unlocks the next round of capital for the venture company is designed to move the
venture company closer to the state the investor desires for it to support a pre-planned exit
strategy. To sustain this staggered financing commitment, it is in the venture company’s
interest to avoid permitting differences to degenerate into full disputes that introduce
disruptions to contract performance. Non-attainment of performance targets to the
satisfaction of the investor can mean a withholding of capital injections, and that could
trigger business closure for the venture company. In practice, most venture companies do
everything in their power to meet their performance targets.53
Other tools available to fund managers include their board and share class rights that
convey strong control to the financier. The use of anti-dilution provisions in the financing
conditions ensure that pre-emptive rights are passed onto the fund manager at the start of the
financing relationship. In addition, all seen contracts carry a ‘restricted transactions’ clause,
which typically features no less than 26 different types of corporate activity subject to close
oversight, and frequently, investee companies are required to execute an indemnity
agreement that shields the new investment from undisclosed liabilities.
With these intense monitoring tools at their disposal, fund managers that participated
in the study stated that in their experience, very few circumstances lead to formal disputes:
frequently, differences are resolved early. FM107 noted,
51 FM101 employs the following language: “5.22. The Disbursement of (investor’s) equity funds is subject to the
(investee company) meeting ALL THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS contained herein.”
52 FM106, in its standard shareholders agreement, uses the terms: “9.1. The Company and each of the parties
hereby covenant with and undertake to (investor) to use its best endeavours to promote, enhance and improve
the business of the Company with the view to obtaining a market flotation at the earliest opportunity.”
53 Erik A Berglof, ‘Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance’ (Oct.1992) 10:2 Journal of Law, Economics and
Organisation 247-267: [Oxford University Press].
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“We do not wait for the roof to come crashing in – at the first sign of trouble,
we act, and act decisively. It is what we are known for, what makes private
equity a unique investment solution.”54
Being a commercial activity, however, private equity disputes can become intractable
for soft tools, in which recourse to extra-contractual mechanisms becomes necessary. There
are two external mechanisms available for that purpose: (i) referral of disputes to arbitration
or (ii) recourse to courts. To achieve this end, Kenyan private equity agreements seen contain
two additional clauses: the ‘jurisdiction clause’ and the ‘choice of law clause’.55
The jurisdiction clause serves the purpose of guiding contracting parties on the
country or place where disputes under that contract are predetermined to be processed.
Kenyan jurisprudence does not allow parties to oust the jurisdiction of Kenyan courts by
contract. However, Kenyan law permits parties to a private contract to freely choose what law
to apply to their agreement and which legal jurisdiction to locate their choice of forum.56
The choice of forum clause provides for the physical location where dispute
resolution proceedings are to be held, and it usually follows the jurisdiction selected under
the choice of law clause. For instance, it would usually follow that parties selecting to apply
English law to their contract would elect upon English courts for the determination of
contract-based disputes. There is nothing under private international law, however, to prevent
parties to a private commercial contract from selecting a separate forum different from the
forum of the selected law.57 Hence parties to a private equity financing agreement could
54 Interview with FM107, September 2009, Nairobi. Kenya.
55 CMV Clarkson and Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (OUP, 3rd edn, 2006) 250 - 254
56 Arbitration Act No.4 of 1995, ss 21 and 29
57 Clarkson and Hill, Conflict of Laws (n 55) 255, 256
299
perfectly apply Dutch law to their Kenyan investment agreements, and select a forum in
Belgium.58
8.4 Commercial Arbitration in Kenya
This section reviews the design of Kenyan arbitration law from an analysis of the
Arbitration Act No.4 of 1995, which is the operative legislation governing the arbitration of
contract-based disputes in Kenya. The review is then followed by an assessment of routine
contracting choices by Kenyan fund managers, drawing from interviews concluded with
research respondents in the course of this work.
Section 2 of the Arbitration Act applies this legislation to domestic and international
arbitration proceedings. The provisions of the law are quite liberal: under section 11(1) of the
Act, parties to an agreement are free to determine the number of arbitrators to any dispute
that might arise in the course of their contractual relationships. An arbitration agreement, the
law provides, may be in the form of a clause embedded in a contract or contained in a
separate agreement or addendum to a contract.59 In terms of form, such an agreement must be
in writing, and the law construes an arbitration agreement to be in writing if it is contained in
a document signed by the parties, or contained in a facsimile, telegram, telex, exchange of
letters, electronic mail or other means of communication providing a record of
communication between parties to a contract. The existence of an arbitration agreement could
also be construed from an exchange of letters of claim between the parties in which one party
alleges the existence of an arbitration agreement and the other party does not deny.60 Failure
58 Interviews with Lawyers LX71, LX77 and LX79, Nairobi, Kenya (August 2009; January 2010; telephone
interview of February 2010)
59 Arbitration Act Number 4 of 1995, Section 4(1), Laws of Kenya.
60 ibid s 4 (3) (a, b, c)
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to state the number of arbitrators is remedied by the legislative provision that imputes an
implied agreement on one arbitrator.61
In terms of qualifications, nationality (including race and ethnicity) are not effective
barriers to appointment as an arbitrator.62 Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Arbitration Act of
1995 make provision for challenging the appointment of an arbitrator, and for the removal of
an appointed arbitrator.
Kenyan law is flexible as to forum selection. Parties to an agreement are free to
determine the juridical seat for their arbitral proceedings. 63 Without prejudice to seat
selection, the law permits the arbitral tribunal to sit anywhere and hold its meetings wherever
the circumstances of the case deems proper.64
Similar to the enabling about choice of forum, Kenyan arbitration law permits
contracting parties to select a law to govern the arbitration proceedings.65 Choice of law
within an arbitration agreement, however, is limited to the substantive law of the selected
forum, and not to its conflict of laws rules.66
International arbitration awards are granted recognition under section 36(2) of the
Arbitration Act of 1995. The basis for recognition is the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, 67 to which Kenya is a signatory.
Subsections (3) and (4) of section 36 lays down specific requirements for a foreign arbitral
award to be granted recognition under Kenyan law:
61 ibid s 11(2)
62 ibid s 12(1)
63 ibid s 21(1)
64 ibid s 21(2)
65 ibid s 29(1)
66 ibid s 29(2)
67 United Nations, ‘Final Act of the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration and
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards’ (1958) <
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20330/v330.pdf> accessed 24 October 2011
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(i) An original award or a duly certified copy thereof must be availed to the High
Court in Kenya;
(ii) The original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy must be availed as well;
(iii) If the original award is not in the English language, a certified copy translated into
the English language must be availed.
If these requirements are not met, the arbitration award granted in foreign jurisdictions
will not be granted the force of law in Kenya, and will go unsatisfied. In Kundan Singh
Construction Ltd v Kenya Ports Authority, HCC 794/2003, the court struck out an application
for the confirmation of an arbitral award on the ground that the neither the authenticated
original award nor a certified copy thereof had been proven.
Courts around the world have similarly set aside arbitral awards on varying grounds. For
instance, in the Russian case of “Yukos Capital,” 68 Yukos entered into four lending
agreements with “Rosneft”, the borrower in the relationship, by which Rosneft became part
of the Yukos group. Subsequently, disputes arose relating to the loans, and Yukos filed for
international arbitration with the Court of Commercial Arbitration at the Chamber of Trade
and Industry of the Russian Federation. Arbitrators found in favour of Yukos on 19
September 2006 (a total of four awards), and Rosneft was required to pay Yukos some 13
billion roebel. The judgement-debtor approached the Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow,
which by judgements dated 18 and 23 May 2007 annulled all four awards on the grounds that:
(i) They violated the right to equal treatment
(ii) There was a violation of agreed rules and procedures and
(iii) There appeared to be a lack of impartiality and independence on the part of the
arbitrators.
68 Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Annulled in Russia’ – Case Comment on Court of
Appeal, Amsterdam (2009) 27(2) Journal of International Arbitration 179-198
302
The Federal Arbitrazh Court of the District of Moscow, and the Supreme Arbitrazh Court,
both affirmed the annulment.69 It is clear, thus, that national courts can, and do, often exercise
jurisdictional powers to police the integrity of commercial arbitration.
Section 36(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1995, introduces an important qualification to the
sweeping liberality of the law under section 36. Only awards granted by foreign jurisdictions
that have acceded to the New York Convention can be recognised in Kenya.70 This is how
Kenyan law words this requirement:
“36(5) In this section, the expression “New York Convention” means the Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly in New York on the 10th June, 1958, and acceded
to by Kenya on the 10th February, 1989, with a reciprocity reservation.”
In practice, countries that recognise arbitral awards made in Kenya will have arbitral awards
awarded in those countries recognised in Kenya. Under section 37 of the Arbitration Act
1995, however, strict conditions are laid out for the testing of the validity of foreign arbitral
awards. Regardless of the provisions in section 36 of the Act, if any of the grounds laid out in
section 37 are violated, foreign arbitration awards will not receive recognition under Kenyan
law. These grounds include:
69 Yukos approached Dutch courts for enforcement of the award, and in the court of first instance at Amsterdam,
got judgement, with the court arguing the Russian judges did not demonstrate impartiality and independence.
Rosneft appealed to the Dutch Court of Appeal. But in International Standard Elec. Corp (ISEC) v Bridas
Sociedad Anonima Petrolera Industrial Y Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) in VII Y.B.
COM.ARB.312(1982) International Council for Commercial Arbitration – Bridas won an award made in
Mexico City, and ISEC brought suit in a USA court to set it aside. The arbitration applied substantive USA law,
and ISEC argued that this bestowed jurisdiction on USA courts to vacate the award. The USA court agreed with
Bridas that only Mexican courts had jurisdiction, observing that Article VI(e) of the 1958 UN Convention on the
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards placed emphasis on procedural, as opposed to substantive, law as a basis for
such action.
70 For a review of American practice on point, a good article is Bishop R Doak and Elaine Martin, ‘Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards’ <www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/bishop6.pdf>
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(i) incapacity of one of the parties to the arbitration – at the time of arbitral
proceedings;
(ii) some invalidity of the arbitration agreement under the governing law of the
agreement, or the law of the state where an award is made;
(iii) violation of due process, especially with regard to the judgement debtor;
(iv) arbitral award settling questions not reserved for arbitration under the agreement
of the parties;
(v) some incompleteness as to bindingness – either because the award has not become
binding or it has been subjected to legal challenge in the courts of the awarding
state;
(vi) the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under
Kenyan law or
(vii) the recognition or enforcement of the award is contrary to the public policy of
Kenya.
These elements constitute what in practice is termed ‘judicial risk’ – and as the Arbitrazh
case illustrates, countries can misapply them to serve nationalistic objectives. The lessons for
Kenya include the need to render the policy framework for the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards generous, without necessarily giving a blanket enablement.
The High Court of Kenya is granted an important role in the arbitration process under the
Arbitration Act of 1995. It can assist parties appoint an arbitrator or settle disputes over the
appointment of an arbitrator.71 It can assist parties in the taking down of evidence.72 It can
grant interim orders of relief either prior to or during the course of arbitral proceedings.73 It
71 ibid s 12
72 ibid s 28
73 ibid s 7(1)
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can set aside arbitral awards.74 It can recognise foreign awards, and it can grant relief against
the recognition of unjustly obtained foreign awards.75 It can also determine questions of law
arising from domestic arbitrations.76
The court in Kenya can intervene to secure procedural justice in arbitration proceedings.
Thus in Epco Builders Limited v Adam S. Marjan-Arbitrator & Another [2005] HCC 248, the
applicant (EPCO) moved the High Court on grounds that the arbitrator’s procedures were
unfair and likely to prejudice its interests in the arbitration. The majority decision held that
the application raised substantive issues to be determined at full hearing, but also expressed
caution that the courts should be hesitant to entertain any complaint of potential procedural
unfairness in the interest of preserving efficiency in alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms. The dissenting opinion, expressed by Justice Githinji JA (and, it is submitted,
the truer view), held the appellant sought remedies under section 84(1) of the Constitution,
which are remedies in public law, when arbitration law and procedure provided adequate
options for redress.
The court can also intervene prior to start of arbitration proceedings. In Rawal v
Mombassa Hardware Ltd [1968] EA 398, it was held the existence of an arbitration clause in
an agreement cannot prevent a party from electing recourse to court. In Peter Muema Kahoro
& another v Benson Maina Githethuki [2006] eKLR, the court upheld Mombasa Hardware,
holding that section 6 of the Arbitration Act did not grant that power to the courts.
Only parties to a valid agreement to arbitrate have locus under Kenyan law. It was thus
held, in Chevron Kenya Limited v Tamoil Kenya Limited [2007] HCCC 155, and in Pamela
Akora Imenje v Akora ITC Intenational Ltd & Another [2007] eKLR, that privity of contract
74 ibid s 35
75 ibid ss 36, 37
76 ibid s 39
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is an important notion under Kenyan arbitration law, and strangers to an agreement to
arbitrate cannot benefit from court protection and assistance.
Kenyan courts have also intervened in the granting of interim reliefs. In Don-Wood Co.
Ltd v Kenya Pipeline Ltd Civil [2004] HCCC 104, it was held that the court’s powers under
section 7 of the Arbitration Act were designed to support the arbitral due process, and the
relative balance of the parties.
Procedural propriety in moving Kenyan courts is just as important as the substantive
bases of the motion. In Nakumatt Holdings Limited v Kenya Wildlife Services [2001] HCCC
1131, it was held that an application to the court that did not disclose under which arbitration
law it was being brought, and under what heading of the court’s procedural rules was
incurably defective.
In designing arbitral clauses, therefore, private equity fund managers and venture
companies in Kenya need to ensure the validity of their agreement from a statutory
perspective, first and foremost. Secondly, they will need to be careful in determining whether
the selected forum enjoys ‘reciprocity’ under section 36 of the Arbitration Act of 1995 – to
obviate an automatic voiding of both the contractual agreement to arbitrate and the
enforcement of awards stemming therefrom. Thirdly, any matter subjected to arbitration
needs to be a qualifying subject matter for settlement by arbitration under Kenyan law –
otherwise a section 37 bar automatically arises. Due process is a key requirement under
Kenyan law – hence parties need to ensure that any contractual agreement to arbitrate must
be grounded on the intention to observe due process – proper notifications and avoidance of
under-hand tactics like corruption.
Any arbitral agreement or award that is likely to violate Kenya’s public policy is equally
barred under section 37. In Christ For All Nationals v Apollo Insurance Co. Ltd [2002] 2 EA
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366, Ringera J (as he then was) conceded the lack of precision in Kenyan statutory and
judicial law on what ‘public policy’ meant, and ventured to define matters opposed to public
policy to be likely to include anything inconsistent with the Constitution and any other law of
Kenya; anything that contravenes Kenya’s national interest (another ‘grey’ and ‘broad’
concept, it must be observed); matters repugnant to both justice and morality; as well as
arbitral awards tainted by corruption, bribery, fraud, or undue influence (these are the
principles implied under section 35(2)(ii), (v) of the Arbitration Act of 1995).
Overall, Kenya’s legal framework for commercial arbitration, on the basis of the written
law, is ‘competitive’. Kenyan courts, similarly, adopt a generally strict narrow view of the
court’s jurisdiction in arbitral matters, signalling a general institutional inclination to a
market-led system for the resolution of commercial disputes.
Recalling the principles addressed at the start of this chapter, if the role of law is to set
down default rules by which parties organise their affairs in the market place, then the letter
of the Arbitration Act of 1995 and the court’s narrow construction of its jurisdiction, tend to
achieve, prima facie, that objective. It is instructive, hence, to observe the actual enforcement
choices of local fund managers engaged in the course of this study.
So Where do Kenyan Private Equity Investors Arbitrate?
Of all interviewed fund managers, only 23% will arbitrate their investment disputes under
Kenyan arbitration laws – as depicted in chart 8.2, below.
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Chart 8.1: Contract Enforcement Trends
Source: Fund Manager Survey 2010
In rejecting local arbitration, over 50% of the surveyed fund managers cite a shallow
arbitral doctrine and the absence of properly qualified arbitrators in Kenya as the main push
factors. Close behind these is a group of about 40% of the fund managers who view the local
law as under-developed on arbitration for the complex needs of managing a financial contract
such as private equity. Unfamiliarity with local arbitration rules is not a substantial
impediment, and neither are fund policies that mandate external dispute resolution
mechanisms.
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Chart 8.2: Why Fund Managers Reject Local Arbitration
Source: Fund Manager Survey 2010
In light of the provisions in the Arbitration Act of 1995, the first justification for avoiding
arbitrations in Kenya, that is to say, Kenyan law is under-developed on arbitration, would
appear at first to lack substantive merit. The law on arbitration is broad and flexible. When
one takes into account the lack of enabling regulations under the Act, however, the reticence
of fund managers as far as applying Kenyan law and selecting Kenya as a forum for private
equity arbitrations become more understandable. A competitive statutory framework for
arbitration requires an elaborate system for the clarification of the underlying procedural
questions in an arbitral process. These include:
(a) clear principles for the determination of governing law – including a process for the
determination of what law would apply in the determination of whether an agreement
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to arbitrate exists, and whether the dispute between the parties falls within the scope
of that agreement;77
(b) clear principles for determining the law governing the proceedings of an arbitration
(quite separate from the law that governs the arbitration – or indeed the law governing
the merits of the dispute between the parties). This point is important to consider
because every agreement to arbitrate imports two elements: firstly, a procedural one
(which procedure to follow) and an empowerment one (what powers the arbitral
tribunal will have in determining the dispute); secondly, powers of the court of the
selected forum in supporting the arbitral process. The first is an internal procedure,
while the latter is the external procedure. The court’s powers, as the review of the
Arbitration Act of 1995 above demonstrated, include powers to appoint an arbitrator,
to grant interim injunctions (such as asset freezing, or the requirement of security
deposit in court), as well as the setting aside of awards where a tribunal exceeds its
powers or the judgement creditor is found to have employed corruption in securing
the award – or other procedural misconduct;78
(c) clear principles for the determination of the rules that must apply to the determination
of the merits of the dispute – the arbitration option permits parties to an arbitration
agreement to choose a legal standard to apply to their commercial understanding.
These standards can vary – from national legal standards of one or the other of the
parties, or common standards between the laws of the contracting parties, to the
selection of the law of some neutral foreign government, or the application of such
non-national corpus of rules as the UNCITRAL or UNIDROIT principles of
international arbitration or ‘internationally accepted standards of law governing
77 CMV Clarkson and Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (3rd edn, OUP, 2006) 251
78 ibid 252
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contractual contracts’ (also known as lex mercatoria), or even equity or the principles
of fairness (arbitration ex aequo et bono);79
(d) principles governing the application of a governing law where parties fail to make a
choice, and a formula to be applied by arbitrators when selecting a governing law for
the parties;80
(e) principles securing that jurisdictional mandatory rules are not evaded where
arbitrators choose conflicts rules in determining the applicable law – to avoid arbitral
awards being rendered legally ineffective.81
These issues are not exhaustively addressed under the Arbitration Act of 1995, and there
is yet an absence of a tried and tested body of arbitral case law to shed unequivocal standards
bearing on each of the highlighted practice areas. This would also partially vindicate the
empirically established opinion that there would be few competent local arbitrators. In
essence, therefore, there is an opportunity here for a reform process that improves the quality
of the law and procedural aspects to render the Kenyan forum and law as attractive as the
more competitive foreign jurisdictions.
22.5% of the interviewed fund managers (chart 8.3) indicated that their fund policies
excluded local law and local arbitration. A further investigation revealed an illuminating
pattern: for all funds falling in this category, their main investors were foreign governments
and international development finance institutions, or other governmental investment
agencies. Fund management leadership at such funds, chapter 5 shows, are consistently
drawn from overseas. The converse is true for local-led funds: these funds apply Kenyan law
to their investments, and to their arbitral agreements and select Kenya as the forum for the
79 ibid 254-56
80 ibid 256
81 ibid 257
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tribunal. On the merits of the dispute, local funds apply Kenyan law, and there is ordinarily
no conflict of laws arising from their transactions that demand the selection of conflict rules.
It is instructive that a judicial Committee appointed to investigate moral rectitude
within the judiciary in 1998, chaired by Justice Richard Kwach, recommended in its report,
the Kwach Report of 1998, a reorganisation of case handling and management systems and
the introduction of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms in the judicial process.82
The Arbitration Act of 1995, was not the first piece of legislation supporting a formal ADR
framework in Kenya – it repealed Cap 49 of 1968, the earlier legislation on the subject.83 In
effect, a statutory basis for ADR had been in existence in Kenya for nearly a decade prior to
the Kwach recommendations in 1998.
For the Kwach Committee to revisit this recommendation in 1998 suggests that as of
that year, the impact of the Arbitration Act of 1995 remained limited. In other words, ADR
was not yet practiced at a widespread level in Kenya by 1998. More poignantly, as recently as
2007, Justice JG Nyamu, in George M Musundi & 2 Others v Small Enterprises Finance
Company Ltd [2007] eKLR, took considerable time in his judgement to emphasise the
benefits of ADR in commercial disputes in Kenya, highlighting the fact it is still substantially
underdeveloped.84
This deduction vindicates the views of the majority of Kenya-based private equity
fund managers who opined that they would not prefer local arbitrations because the arbitral
doctrine in Kenya remained shallow – at least as of 2010.
82 The Report of the Committee on the Administration of Justice 1998 (The Kwach Report)
83 Arbitration Act 1995, s 42.
84 In the High Court of Kenya, No.1861 of 1995, 10
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8.5 Commercial Litigation
8.5.1 Constitutional Basis for the Kenyan Judiciary
If arbitration is not an ideal or preferred option, to what extent do local fund managers
embrace Kenyan courts for the resolution of investment disputes? To assess this option, this
section reviews the structure of the Kenyan judiciary, and the attitudes of fund managers with
respect to referring disputes to Kenyan courts.
Litigation is the business of the judiciary. The Kenyan judiciary is provided for under
Chapter 10 of the Constitution of Kenya.85 It was adopted on 27 August 2010, and it replaced
the constitutional order that had governed the country since independence in 1963. Under the
new Constitution, the judiciary is named as one of the three arms of the Kenyan
government.86 The other two are the executive and the legislature.87
According to Article 2(1) of the Constitution, the Constitution is the supreme law in
Kenya. Other sources of law include laws enacted by Parliament, the Senate, and County
Assemblies, treaties and conventions ratified by Kenya and general rules of international
law.88 In addition, certain applications of English law, and the doctrines of English common
law and the principles of equity constitute sources of law in Kenya.89
85 Constitution of Kenya Act 2010, Cap 0 Laws of Kenya <
http://www.kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klr_app/view_content.php?ContentHistoryID=24359&CapID=661&preamb
le=1> accessed 15 October 2010.
86 ibid Art. 159
87 ibid Art. 130, 93, respectively.
88 ibid Art. 2(5), 2(6), 94, 96, 185. The Constitution, however, is silent on the procedures for ratification. It is not
clear whether that process will be centralised in the Executive, or left pretty much as it was under the previous
regime, which permitted disjointed and uncoordinated ratification processes and ethics. Reading the spirit of the
Constitution, however, it is valid to deduce that convergence on centralised and rational ratification protocols is
likely to be the way of the future. This is an improvement from the previous constitutional dispensation, which
had the extra bureaucratic layer of domestication requirements to apply international law to Kenya.
89 Judicature Act 1967 s 3 and First Schedule, Cap 8, Laws of Kenya
The judiciary is made up of a two
courts.90 There are three superior courts
final court of the land,91 the Court of Appeal
Source: Constitution of Kenya, 2010
90 Constitution of Kenya (n 85) Article 163
91 ibid Art 163
92 ibid Art 164
93 ibid Art 165
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If private equity disputes were to be litigated in Kenyan courts, the court of first and
original jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter would be the High Court. The reason
rests on the value of the contract: lower courts would not have the monetary jurisdiction to
handle such disputes.
8.5.2 Fund Manager Attitudes to Local Litigation
80% of the interviewed fund managers are happy with the commercial division of the
High Court of Kenya. Development studies, for instance the World Bank’s Doing Business
Index 2012, documented that judicial cases still take a long time to resolve in Kenya – on
average, 465 days. The process involves 40 procedures, 9 more than the OECD average, and
costs 47.2% of claim (more than double the OECD average). This renders the enforcement of
property and contractual rights particularly bothersome.94
Table 8:1 Kenya - Contract Enforcement
Indicator Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa OECD Average
Procedures (number) 40 39 31
Time (days) 465 655 518
Cost (% of claim) 47.2 50 19.7
Source: World Bank Doing Business Index 2010
The Commercial Division has generally enjoyed widespread support for
professionalism and competence since its establishment, but like all other branches of the
94 World Bank Doing Business Index 2010,
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/kenya#enforcing-contracts> accessed 29 December
2010
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judiciary, suffers the problem of acute case backlogs. It was not surprising, therefore, that the
same number of private equity fund manager respondents (80%) decried the lengthy case
back logs.
Given these antecedents, only 31% of the interviewed fund managers indicated they
would most likely be willing to litigate their investment disputes in Kenyan courts – quite
proximate to the 23% that indicated willingness to arbitrate their investment disputes under
Kenyan arbitration laws – as depicted in the figure below.
Chart 8.3: Contract Enforcement Trends
Source: Fund Manager Survey 2010
These findings are worrying when placed in the wider frame of legal and institutional
frameworks for the development of financial markets. It would appear logical that an efficient
framework engenders trust across the investment community. The contract enforcement
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“(…) financial law reform in developing countries is (…) about (…) the
creation of a viable and coherent financial legal infrastructure suitable for the
development of well-functioning financial markets and sound business
environment(s) (…) These include laws in the areas of contracts, property,
property security rights, commercial and financial law (…).”95
To assess these issues at closer range, all respondents were asked to assess the extent to
which they would relate to seven possible explanations on why they would not take their
disputes to Kenyan courts. The seven options were whether it was because they thought:
1. Kenyan courts were so corrupt.
2. Litigation outcomes could not be reasonably predicted for a variety of reasons.
3. Court process was too slow.
4. Kenya had too few competent legal practitioners able to effectively litigate complex
financial contracts.
5. Courts were incompetent and ill-equipped to handle complex financial contracts.
6. Court procedures were too complex and cumbersome and difficult to understand,
especially when you are a foreign investor.
7. Litigation laws are too complicated and difficult to understand.
Their responses are captured in chart 9.5 below.
Over 70% of fund managers, it can be seen, view local courts as too slow, and over
60% believe court procedures are cumbersome. Close to 30% think local laws relating to
litigation are complex and convoluted, while around 11% are concerned with judicial
corruption as it impacts the stability of commercial doctrine in the country - in spite of the
common law doctrine of stare decisis that is applied in Kenya.
95 Joseph J Norton, ‘Taking Stock of First Generation of Financial Sector Legal Reform’ (2007) SMU Dedman
School of Law Studies Research Paper 9, 32 < http://ssrn.com/abstract=981226 > accessed 25 October 2011
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Chart 8.4: Push Factors to Litigation in Kenya
Source: Fund Manager Survey 2010
Interestingly, the competence of legal practitioners in Kenya is not in question;
neither is the technical competence of the High Court in question as far as determining
complex financial disputes.
The last two opinions in the preceding paragraph are indicative that the Kenyan legal
profession has the basic tools necessary to create a competitive market for trade in legal
services. That competitive edge is undercut, however, by institutional weaknesses within the
judiciary: procedures, bureaucracy, opacity of rules, and sporadic application of judicial
precedent. To the extent these ailments strike at procedural as opposed to substantive
qualifications of the judiciary, it is a shame and an indictment of the Kenyan judicial system,
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something policy makers ought to pay immediate attention to as the market increasingly
attracts more private equity intermediaries – as documented earlier in this study.96
The following discussion illustrates that these problems have had a long history – as
long as the age of independent Kenya, quite literally.
8.6 Constraints in the Judiciary
Confidence in the Kenyan judiciary’s ability to be an impartial and independent arbiter in
the determination of disputes, whatever the character of those disputes might be, has
historically been impaired by well-documented cases of corruption in the corridors of justice.
Corruption is a complex problem, driven by a mix of factors ranging from the terms and
conditions of service in the judiciary, the issue of the quality and quantity of the human
resource, infrastructural constraints, and executive interference. In 2003, the Report of the
Integrity and Anti-Corruption Committee of the Judiciary (The Ringera Report),97 a judicial
committee appointed by the Chief Justice Evan Gicheru to investigate the causes, forms,
extent and solutions to judicial corruption, found that out of a judicial sector comprising
3,234 officials (judges, magistrates, Kadhis, and paralegals), a total of 152 judicial officers
were directly linked to overt acts of corruption, that is -
 5 out of 9 Court of Appeal judges (56%)
 18 out of 36 High Court judges (50%)
 82 out of 254 Magistrates (32%)
96 ch 5, 158; 189
97 Government Press, September 2003
<http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/Reports/Government/Ringera_Report.pdf> accessed 11 September 2011.
The implication was either a direct act of corruption, or conduct closely linked to corrupt practice, or otherwise
unethical conduct.
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 43 paralegal staff.
These findings were restatements of long-standing reform agenda previously visited
by other committees appointed to look into the question of improvements to the judicial
system in the Kenya.98 On 7th January 1998, for instance, a committee chaired by the Hon.
Justice Richard Kwach, appointed by the then Chief Justice Hon. Z. Chesoni (deceased) to
review the administration of justice in Kenya, documented widespread patterns of corruption,
incompetence, neglect of duty, theft, drunkenness, lateness, sexual harassment and
racketeering in the judiciary. To resolve these issues, the Kwach Committee recommended
several measures including: the improvement of the terms and conditions of employment of
judicial officers, reorganisation of case handling and management methods, introduction of
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in Kenya (ADR), and an increase in the number of
judicial personnel to ease the pressure of case backlogs.
In 2009, it was estimated that there were in total 910,013 cases pending in the Kenyan
judiciary (2,372 before the Court of Appeal; 115,344 before the High Court; and 792,297
before various magistrate’s courts). The key drivers for this situation were identified to
98 International Commission of Jurists - Kenya Report, 2005: Judicial Independence, Corruption and
Reform, April 2005< http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/Kenyareport> 17-18, accessed 5 April 2011: Fleming
Commission Report, 1960; Pratt Commission Report, 1963; Miller-Craig Commission Report, 1967; Ndegwa
Commission Report, 1971; Waruhiu Committee Report, 1979/80; Ramtu Committee Report, 1985; The
Waruhiu Committee Report 1979/1980; Mbithi Committee Report, 1990/1991; Report of the Committee to
Inquire into the Terms and Conditions of Service of the Judiciary, 1991-1992 (The Kotut Report); The Report of
the Committee on the Administration of Justice, 1998 (The Kwach Report); The Report of the the Integrity and
Anti-Corruption Committee of the Judiciary, 2003 (The Ringera Report); The Governance, Justice, Law and
Order-sector wide Reform Programme, 2003; Report of the Sub-Committee on Ethics and Governance of the
Judiciary, January 2006 (The Onyango Otieno Report); Report of the Committee on Ethics and Governance of
the Judiciary, 2008 (The Kihara Kariuki Report); Vision 2030 Medium Term Plan 2008 – 2012; Kenya National
Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project – Agenda Item 4 Longstanding Issues and Solutions, Draft
Report – Status of Implementation January 2009; Multi-Disciplinary Task Force (chaired by Hon. Justice
William Ouko), January 2009 - Case backlogs were singled out by many of the committees as creating a
supportive environment for corrupt practices including the phenomenon manifested as the disappearance of
files – where court files cannot be traced on matters listed in the daily cause lists of the judiciary, effectively
frustrating the progressing of court hearings, as well as the disappearance of crucial court records.
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include shortage of judicial staff and officers, inadequate number of courts and under-
developed physical infrastructure, inappropriate rules of procedure, jurisdictional limits on
magistracy courts and mechanical management of court records and proceedings.99
To the extent that these institutional weaknesses underwritten by corrupt practices persist
within the Kenyan judiciary, it could be concluded that the integrity of financial contracts in
Kenya, as far as enforcement goes, is uncertain. Chief Justices of the East African
Community Countries recently admitted that the Region’s justice system remained ‘weak’.100
Another structural weakness undermining the reputation of the judiciary relates to law
reporting. Kenya’s law reporting history has been intermittent, and incomplete. 101 This
creates a situation whereby legal practice cannot strictly speaking be said to be applying
standardised judicial precedent around the country. This is also compounded by the
infrastructural weaknesses of the Judiciary, with many places in Kenya not having a
permanent High Court. Lawyer LX73, a leading commercial lawyer in one of Kenya’s top 5
law firms, jokingly mused at interview:
“The further you move away from Nairobi, the further you move away from
the law.”
This jocular statement startlingly captures the basic reality of the statement’s meaning.
Indeed, in National Bank of Kenya Ltd V. Wilson Ndolo Ayah [2009] eKLR, the Court of
99 Republic of Kenya, ‘Final Report of the Task Force on Judicial Reforms’ (2010) 73
<http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Final%20Report%20of%20the%20Task%20Force%20on%20Judicial%
20Reforms.pdf> accessed 24 October 2011.
100 Benjamin Muindi, ‘Region’s Justice System Weak’, Daily Nation,( 8 Tuesday December 2009) <
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/818974/-/item/1/-/d20p8n/-/index.html >
101 Kenya Law Reporting Council, http://www.kenyalaw.org/history/ - follow link for a Kenyan exposition on
the doctrine of stare decisis as applied in Kenya.
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Appeal noted obiter that there does exist a tendency by some judges in Kenya to not follow
judicial precedent, a practice that it frowned upon. Quoting the reported case:
“…The Court of Appeal pointed out that there were many High Court
decisions on the issue, some which followed Obura v. Koome, and some
which did not. It was noted that those decisions which did not follow Obura v
Koome were departing from the doctrine of precedent, as the High Court is
bound by decisions of the Court of Appeal without discretion.”102
Drawing, therefore, from the generality of the foregoing, the following themes
underpinning a reform agenda for the judiciary stand out: the challenge of adequate funding
of the judiciary; the problem of infrastructure; the question of qualifications of judicial
officers; the question of judicial independence; and the question of consistent law reporting.
These are not new themes: they have been rehashed since the 1960s. It is valid to deduce that
there appears to an entrenched problem of institutional inertia.
It was shown earlier that between 1960 and 2009, there have been established no less
than 17 committees, commissions or task forces to look into the question of integrity,
competence, efficiency and transparency in the Kenyan judiciary. A striking feature that has
become recurrent is the rehashing of themes, the rehashing of recommendations, and
pointless bureaucracy. This latter element is seen in the establishment of committees to
evaluate how another committee’s recommendations should be implemented. Most of the 17
reports are in fact self-contained: identifying the problems, identifying solutions, and
recommending strategy. Yet in spite of this massive evidence base on how the judicial
institutions should be reformed, there has been little evidence of implementation.
102 Kenya Law Reports, Issue 085, (11 December 2009) < http://www.kenyalaw.org/newsletter/ > accessed 15
December 2009.
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These views support a deduction that there has historically existed a problem of
institutional weakness to follow reforms through. Institutional weakness is the result of the
absence of political will, which in turn could be the result of a mix of factors including the
overall level of legal development in the country. To progress the agenda for a stable judicial
doctrine, law reporting ought to be viewed as a fundamental development agenda, and
perhaps prioritised in the nation’s growth vision as articulated under Vision 2030.
8.7 Some Reflections on What the Findings Mean
From the empirical evidence around the themes underpinning this chapter, it emerges
that Kenyan private equity practice places substantial effort and contracting emphasis on
mechanisms other than courts and formal arbitration in the management of contract
performance. It was noted in chapter 3 that private equity is a monitoring-based financial
contracting strategy – this feature has been observed quite strongly in the findings in this
chapter. It is a fact that fund managers place disproportionate faith in routine relationship
management activities, and design the monitoring framework to pre-empt disputes ever
getting grievously contentious. Selection bias naturally arises in relation to these deductions
as investee companies were not engaged in the study. Nonetheless, the significance of the
findings in this chapter support the proposition for continued law and institutional reform to
strengthen contracting, even as more and more fund managers establish their businesses in
Kenya.
In answer to the research question, therefore, whether the law is relevant to property
rights, or indeed whether it plays any part in the occurrence of financial contracts, the
answer – to the extent of the matters addressed in this chapter – must be ‘yes’. But is the
security of property rights the same as or commensurate with the efficiency of dispute
resolution mechanisms in a country – both institutional and procedural? This is an important
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question to consider. In other words, what is it that makes property rights secure: is it the
declarative principles in law that clarify what property is treated as secure in law or which
proscribe and sanction certain human action for derogating declared precepts as to property
rights, or does it proceed from the institutional ability of dispute resolving institutions to
efficiently resolve disputes, including commercial disputes? Or, both?
The evidence led in this chapter support the notion that the ability of dispute settling
institutions to efficiently determine commercial disputes turns on more than one factor. It
would appear furthermore that some among those factors are more definitive than others. A
basic principle of law is that compacts are to be observed (expressed in the Latin maxim
pacta sunt servanda). Much of the wisdom in this principle lies in the faith that contract-
based obligations are capable of extra-contractual enforcement, restitution or other forms of
recompense. That faith in an external legal environment seems to be a powerful driver of
contracting choices as they relate to dispute resolution. Law, particularly contract law,
remains relevant to contract design, and so does the role and strength of legal institutions like
the judiciary in supporting relational contracts.
8.8 Conclusion
In light of the foregoing discussion, several things are evident. Firstly, in financial
contracting, the availability of extra-contractual mechanisms for the settlement of contract
disputes, judging from the stated perspectives of private equity fund managers in Kenya, is
essential. Where such availability is seen as elusive, contracts are designed to embed
alternatives to local dispute resolution.
Secondly, in private equity contracting, choice appears to be an important factor. By
“choice” is meant the availability of alternative options to choose from. Between litigation
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and arbitration in Kenya under Kenyan laws and litigation and arbitration extra-territorially,
the overwhelming preference is to take disputes outside Kenya for investments undertaken in
Kenya. Owing to their stated objections to dispute settlement in Kenya, ‘choice’ is
unavailable to local fund managers. As a ‘push’ factor in jurisdictional attractiveness to the
flow of private capital, this factor alone may not be deterministic. In combination with other
country factors, however, it effectively contributes to making the investment environment
less attractive – and sometimes sufficiently uncertain as to prevent entry.
Investors are quick to avoid a country deemed to carry too much ‘risk’, unless a
particularly high rate of return can be guaranteed. In Africa, this closely follows the
extractive industries (mining and manufacturing), meaning certain types of private capital
flows will still be made available regardless of country risk profiles, but that capital will flow
into specific industry types whose overall economic impact within the receiving jurisdiction
may be limited. Taking the last notion a step further, Africa’s experience is instructive. Some
of the African recipients of the largest amounts of private foreign direct investment (such as
Nigeria, Sudan, DRC) are not known for their strength of property rights systems, or as
having efficient judicial systems. The private foreign investment into all three countries have
been to their extractive industries (oil, minerals), and these are countries that have
experienced decades of human conflict, low levels of human development, and weak banking
systems. Would stronger systems for property rights protection motivate investors to
diversify their investment interests into other economic sectors that promote deeper, more
sustainable development for these countries?103 This is an open question.
103 Caution is necessary in interpreting these reflections since factors beyond investment sectors are responsible
for under-development in any economy so classified.
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Africa is not yet strong on technology innovation – the sector that drove private equity
in all the more robust markets right from America in the early 1900s to Asia today.104 It was
shown in chapter 5 that African private equity is strong in the fast-moving commodity and
lifestyle segments of the economy, and is increasingly specialising in agribusiness – arguably
Africa’s largest and most rapidly expanding economic sector. The role for the law is to define
interests in property to facilitate the negotiation of financial contracts. this is especially
important when Kenya’s land-related property rights issues are taken into perspective.
The National Land Policy, adopted in 2010 contemporaneously with the new
Constitution, is very closely aligned with chapter V of the Constitution of Kenya of 2010.105
That policy documents that the land tenure system has made it difficult to establish interests
in land, casting substantial doubt on the goodness of title where land-based financial
investments are concerned. A huge swathe of agri-business, including private-equity financed
agri-business, depends on a rational system for the clarification of land rights in such a way
as to facilitate the creation of financial interests in land. This was the broad thesis in such
works as The Mystery of Capital by Hernando de Soto, who argued for a law-based property
rights system that facilitated the use of land rights as a means of economic exchange.106 The
National Land Policy (set out in Sessional Paper No.3 of 2009) affirms this thesis, arguing
that investments in the land sector have historically been frustrated by the difficulty in
establishing title. Previous inquiries and investigations into the land question documented
patterns of executive abuse of power, the insidious impact of corruption in undermining the
104 Ch 3, 88.
105 Articles 60-68, Land and Environment, Cap 0, 2010
106 de Soto, The Mystery of Capital (2000) (n 24) 36-68, 160-218
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soundness of land titles as a negotiable instrument in commercial transactions, among other
problems besetting landed property as a means to financial contracting.107
New reform programmes are currently underway to redress some of these systemic
illnesses. They include the automation of the lands registry all over Kenya, the reissuance of
land titles, the consolidation of land-sector laws, and the limitation of executive’s ability to
allocate land. The new constitutional paradigm therefore establishes the thesis that law and
the security of property rights is essential to financial development.
Private equity financing is availed, this work has sought to argue, under conditions of
extreme business risk. Within the context of this chapter, judicial risk can drive insecurity in
financial contracts, and like it was deducted at chapter six, capacity constraints are pervasive
across the private equity practice landscape in Kenya. The long-standing need for judicial
reform, and the continuing limited implementation of judicial reforms, only add to that
conviction, that institutional capacity constraints present some of the most pressing
development challenges to an emerging economy like Kenya. Conceptually, this is a cross-
cutting theme that emerges from this work.
It is thus deducible that in Kenya’s case, there perhaps would occur wider investments
in the agribusiness framework were the land tenure system rationalised, simplified and the
integrity of interest in land made transparent and readily verifiable. Applying this to an
enforcement framework yields interesting results. Where interests in land are not readily
verifiable, financial contracts are not secure – since the possibility of third parties
subsequently turning up to claim proprietary rights in the subject of a financial contract
cannot be ruled out. Where the converse is true, investors more readily commit to financing
107 Roger Southall, ‘The Ndungu Report: Land and Graft in Kenya’ (2005) 32(103) Rev. of African Political
Economy 142
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opportunities – on the basis that they can readily clarify what aspect of their contracts are
open to breach, and how local dispute settlement systems are likely to resolve disputes.
In this illustrated sense, efficient dispute resolving institutions are essential for
financial development in a country. That efficiency, the foregoing argument has suggested,
turns on the law – a legal framework that permits contracting parties to clarify the content of
the legal intentions they seek to create, and to clarify their fallback options should they find
themselves standing in contractual breach.
In sum, two distinct patterns have emerged in the preceding review in this chapter as
far as enforcement choices in private equity agreements are concerned. Among the few fund
managers that are led by Kenyans, and which fundraise locally, their financial contracts
demonstrated a preference for local arbitration and litigation before Kenyan courts. The
converse is true for expatriate fund managers, who demonstrated a strong preference for
foreign arbitration and litigation. Kenya, it has been shown, has a legal framework for the
recognition of foreign arbitral awards and judgements, subject to statutory conditions for such
recognition. Adopting a statistical measure of market trends reveals that the substantial
majority of private equity companies operating in Kenya will not embrace local dispute
resolution in the medium term – not until, perhaps, the judiciary’s image as a tainted
institution is altered. In this sense, legal institutions have been demonstrated to impact the
design of private equity financing contracts.
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9
CONCLUSIONS
9.1 Introduction
This work has grappled with the question whether the law is a useful and necessary tool
in the quest to grow private equity markets in developing countries. The empirical chapters (4,
5, 6, 7 and 8) have focused on a study of a single country in Africa, Kenya, and have,
sequentially, collated qualitative and empirical evidence around five key themes –
(a) Constraints to enterprise finance faced by Kenya’s private sector;
(b) The structure and key features of Kenya’s private equity industry;
(c) The regulatory framework for private equity in Kenya;
(d) The tax framework for private equity in Kenya; and
(e) The strength of contracts, property rights and efficiency of local commercial dispute
resolution mechanisms in Kenyan private equity practice.
Within the context of those empirical chapters, a series of factual deductions based on the
identified facts were drawn. This short chapter attempts to bring the empirical findings
together through a concise and thematic analysis and evaluation of what those findings and
deductions mean, reflecting on the main research question and the supporting statements
thereunder (the secondary research questions).
This study’s methodology proposed the employment of a financial contracting framework
in evaluating this work, and the unit of analysis is the private equity contract: it was shown at
chapter 1 (which stated the problem) and chapter 3 (reviewing the history and nature of
private equity) how the private equity contract typically occurs at three levels (the ‘private
equity cycle’): fundraising, investment and divestment. In bringing the study’s findings
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together, this chapter evaluates the relevance (or potential irrelevance) of the law in private
equity fundraising, commercial contracting and investment management (including the
process of divestment). This chapter’s inherent approach in engaging the empirical findings
can thus be stated in three short questions, drawing from the study’s core design:
(a) Is law relevant to fundraising for private equity in Kenya?
(b) Is law relevant to private equity financial contracting in Kenya?
(c) Is law relevant to improving efficiency in private equity divestment (or share sale
transactions)?
The countervailing argument, of course, remains in this chapter as it was in chapter 1, that
the law is irrelevant, that property rights are irrelevant, and that commercial transactions
occur on a ‘willing seller willing buyer’ basis. When reflecting on these contested counter
arguments at chapter 1,1 it was proposed that in market transactions, there exist two sets of
what we called ‘country factors’ necessary for private equity to grow: the ‘external factors’
and the ‘internal factors’. The view was adopted at chapter 1 that law, and legal institutions,
constitute the set of factors fitting within the ‘internal’ dynamics of private equity market
development. It was proposed that the law and legal institutions constitute ‘enablers’ for the
macroeconomic factors – that is, the ‘external factors’ that the ‘willing buyer willing seller’
paradigm promotes. The thesis argument at chapter 12 was that law and legal institutions are
likely to be more influential than the macroeconomic factors, in a developing country context,
in creating fortuitous conditions for private equity markets to grow. A central objective of
this chapter is to explore the extent to which that claim is established in the empirical findings
in this work.
1 S 1.2.1, 5-8
2 ibid 6
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Proceeding on the basis that this is a foundational study of private equity in Kenya, it
seems fitting that the outcomes of this chapter’s evaluations be translated into a series of law
and policy implications. This is, in the end, a fundamental objective of “what it means to
know” 3 what this study establishes on private equity in Kenya. It is thus that this
‘ontological’4 pursuit is contextualised in a set of the ‘emerging legal and institutional issues’
that this study gives rise to.
To achieve the foregoing objectives, this chapter is organised into the following five key
emerging legal and institutional issues –
(i) Issues on the design of a law on private equity;
(ii) Issues on tax policy for private equity;
(iii) Issues on private equity fundraising;
(iv) Issues on capital market development for private equity; and
(v) Issues on the integrity of financial contracts.
Each theme is explored sequentially under the following five subsections. At section 9.7,
a five-point law and institutional Private Equity Growth Model for Kenya is constructed,
based on the evaluations in sections 9.2 through 9.6.
The chapter concludes at section 9.8 with a short statement on what future research
aimed at expanding the frontiers of knowledge around Kenyan private equity might look like.
3 Ch 2, 46,47
4 ibid
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9.2 Issues on the Design of a Law On Private Equity
The empirical findings in chapters 5,5 66 and 77 point to a policy inclination toward a
defined, though still dispersed and incomplete body of law on private equity in Kenya. This
deduction is grounded on the existence of detailed regulations under the Capital Markets
Authority Act of 1989, the Registered Venture Capital Companies Regulations of 2007,8 and
income-tax specific regulations under the Income Tax Act of 1974. Organisational form for
private equity is at the time of completing this study regulated under a separate piece of
legislation (the Companies Act of 1962). In effect, the legal framework on private equity
practice in Kenya remains a patchy framework.9 Perhaps more significantly, the evidence
finds a remoteness of relationship between market intermediaries and the regulator to exist,
underwriting divergence between the law and market behaviour.10
Drawing from the experience of jurisdictions that have cultured private equity markets
employing various legal tools (including the reviewed cases of the USA,11 the UK,12 Israel13
Taiwan,14 Spain15 and Chile16), a law on private equity can be employed to do one or more of
the following (whether that law is consolidated or dispersed) –
(a) Regulate dedicated organisational forms for fund management and venture capital
investment services;
(b) Create structures around organisational vehicles that deliver tax efficiency (without
negatively impacting the overall tax policy for the wider economy);
5 Pp153
6 Pp198
7 Pp251
8 Ch 4 (119), 6 (203), 7 (258)
9 Ch 5&6, 159, 200, 247
10 Ch 6, 235
11 Ch 3, 69, 72, 77
12 Ibid, 72
13 Ibid, 75
14 Ibid, 79
15 Ibid, 78
16 Ibid, 77
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(c) Create frameworks for the making of institutional investments into private equity
funds – as well as the regulation of certain institutional investments depending on the
requirements of public policy (e.g. pension and insurance funds);
(d) Facilitate the provision of government programmes – e.g. government venture funds,
or the channelling of capital into economically sensitive, but otherwise unattractive
investment sectors;
(e) Lay down principles for the industry’s regulation;
(f) Promote home-grown funds – e.g. creating competitive frameworks for onshore funds;
and
(g) Provide a legal framework for efficient financial contracting – stipulating the forms of
permissible investments, investment structures (capital structuring), as well as
flexibilities around financial product innovation.
These objectives can be achieved through a single comprehensive law, or through
targeted but dispersed legislative adjustments across a number of laws. Whether or not either
option is advisable for Kenya is a subject over which there should be, in this study’s
perspective, focused regulatory debate in Kenya. Given the condition of the private sector,
and the persisting attitude of indifference within the regulator toward private equity, it is
deducible that legal development for private equity and alternative investments generally
remains an ongoing need in Kenya.
The study’s findings on the question of legal development do not support a categorical
choice over either consolidation or dispersed regulatory framework for private in Kenya. The
findings in chapters 5, 6 and 7, however, support the definite assessment that the legal
framework for Kenyan private equity is under-developed and would benefit from a review
that –
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1. Expands choice over organisational forms available for private equity investment and
advisory services;
2. Clarifies, expands and consolidates the law on private equity-specific tax policies;
3. Removes conflicts within the law on private equity investment options, e.g. over
investment restrictions and the identified variances between capital market and bank
sector legislations;
4. Clarifies the question of definitions under the Capital Markets Act of 1989;
5. Resolves the apparent division of the private equity market into regulated and
unregulated intermediaries within the framework of Capital Markets (Registered
Venture Capital Companies) Regulations, 2007;
6. Broadens the range of security instruments recognised in law for financial engineering
(through amendments to the Companies Act of 1962 e.g. to include such options as
convertible shares and enabling the full range of private equity contracting tools,
including leveraged buyouts);
7. Progresses the evolution of the law on financial assistance through a careful and
futuristic revision of section 56 of the Companies Act of 1962; and
8. Enables tax efficiency – a theme discussed in greater detail below.
The weight of the empirical findings supports the analytical deduction that the law is an
essential instrument in the resolution of all or a number of the preceding issues – especially in
crafting the basic country conditions necessary to support efficiency in private equity
business formation, practice and regulation.
Issues (1) to (8) above, when placed within the analytical prism of this chapter, tend to
have an impact on the financial contracting and divestment stages of private equity.
Employing the law in achieving them is a practical choice: it would be difficult to attain those
ideals through any other means.
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9.3 Issues on Tax Policy for Private Equity
Tax incentives are a well-documented tool employed across many jurisdictions – as the
cases of Taiwan, Spain, the United Kingdom, the USA, and Israel, cited above, evidence. Tax
incentives, however, vary across jurisdictions, and within each jurisdiction, they are
employed to achieve a predetermined policy-linked outcome.17 This study established that tax
policy tools can take any of the following illustrative forms –
(a) Exemptions – e.g. of dividends (earned from investments into private equity) from
taxation;
(b) Deductibility of eligible expenses and losses – including limits to permissible
thresholds;
(c) Reduced rate for capital gains taxation or complete exemption of capital gains from
tax (usually subject to specified qualification requirements, e.g., stated minimum
investment holding periods, or restrictions against redistribution of dividend incomes
and capital gains income);
(d) Tax reliefs – for investments into private equity, or into SME-focused private equity
funds (linked to a policy objective of bridging the ‘funding gap’);
(e) Incentives for research and development (which can take many different forms);
(f) Special treatment of employee compensation schemes such as stock options.
The objective of the foregoing tax policy tools is the same across jurisdictions: to increase
fundraising for private equity.18 Investors, faced with the promise of a reduced tax burden as
a result of investing into private equity, are motivated to increase their exposure to private
equity. A supportive tax policy for private equity in a developing country could therefore be
17 Ch 1, 9
18 Ch 7, 253
335
crucial to the mobilisation of capital, expanding sources and types of enterprise capital
available to the private sector.
The evidence in this work demonstrates that in Kenya, there are very few tax-based
incentives for private equity investing. Secondly, it has been shown that certain incongruities
exist within the tax policy practiced in Kenya (e.g., the compensating tax). There exists a
basis, therefore, to reflect that –
1. To promote local fundraising and investments into private equity, tax incentives might
be valuable tools;
2. A small and medium enterprise tax rate targeted at key sectors that will drive and
anchor the country’s economic take-off might be valuable – this might unlock
entrepreneur interest in research and development work, and there is every indication
that Kenya’s techno-innovations industry is priming for significant growth;
3. Promoting research and development as an economic activity is necessary – and tax
policy could play a substantial role in driving this process. Taiwanese, Israeli, UK and
USA experiences offer functional models from which to draw learning on targeting
and structuring of incentives.
4. Tax incentives in compensation schemes are also warranted, especially now that the
private equity industry is growing at a rapid pace. Evidence was led at chapter 7 on
such compensation tools as ESOPs and Stock Options – rendering these compensation
options tax-efficient will not only contribute to making them useful in talent attraction
and retention, but will also drive deeper sophistication in overall economic
management across shareholder-based companies in the country.
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While tax policy clearly belongs among those factors this study calls ‘external factors’
(that is, a macroeconomic tool),19 it is inevitably anchored in the law. It has been said that
legal development reflects the dominant political reality within a country, a reality that shifts
with time. 20 The expressed public policy in Kenya strongly supports enterprise and
technology innovation – providing anecdotal evidence of congruence between this study’s
ideal for a private equity-efficient tax framework and the prevailing political will toward
expanding sources of enterprise capital in Kenya.21
Placing these findings into an implementation framework supports the deduction that the
law, and its supporting institutions, can be useful tools in the hands of policy makers when
implementing improvements to the current tax framework for private equity practice in
Kenya.
9.4 Issues on Private Equity Fundraising
The evidence (at chapter 5) shows that in Kenya, there exists a pool of substantial
institutional funds (e.g. pensions, insurance, banks and high net-worth individuals) that could
form substantial fundraising sources for Kenyan private equity investments.22 All of these
strategic fund pools are currently under-exposed to private equity. Lessons from other
jurisdictions (the USA and the Netherlands, for instance) demonstrate that employing the law
to trigger and consolidate institutional investments into private equity can support the growth
and sustainability of local fundraising.23 The law can be employed to –
19 Ch 1, 5-9
20 Mark J Roe, ‘Strong Managers Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance’, (1994)
Princeton: Princeton University Press; Luigi Zingales, ‘The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Millan
Stock Exchange’, (2003) 7 The Review of Financial Studies 125 - 148
21 Ch 1, 23-25
22 Ch 5, 165-168
23 Ch 3, 69, 74
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(a) Set limits on the extent to which a closely regulated institutional fund pool can be
exposed to private equity and similar alternative investments;
(b) Relax stringent regulation of certain types of institutional investors in order to allow
larger exposure to private equity
(c) Create government fund pools to be employed in a targeted way to trigger desired
market responses in capital mobilisation and dispersal.
Current law in Kenya permits, prima facie, limited pension, insurance and commercial
bank exposure to private equity.24 The evidence at chapter 5, illustrating reality within the
pension funds industry, demonstrates that in fact, there remains limited take-up of alternative
investments in the portfolio diversification strategies of most scheme fund managers – mostly
stemming from Government Financial Regulations that require fund managers to invest only
in government security papers.25 The current policy on scheme fund corporate governance is
directly responsible for the very shallow commitment of pension fund resources into unlisted
equity.26 Given stated government policy on restricting exposure of pension funds to such
unlisted equity as private equity, it is proper to deduce that the question of corporate
governance is a strong private-equity linked theme that merits separate focused exploration.
It does appear, on the strength of the foregoing analytical reflections, that beyond crafting
an enabling legal framework for local institutional investments into private equity, political
concerns over regulated fund pools will need to be addressed, alongside the corporate
governance question. These are merely part-solutions, as additional work will need to be
undertaken to build awareness and capacity among institutional fund managers on how to
24 Ch 5, 165
25 Ibid, 166
26 Ibid, 167
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undertake private equity investments. As reported in the empirical chapters, this process has
began.27
More nuanced, and arguably the more delicate task (from a regulatory perspective) will
be the creation of a framework for the various financial sector regulators to forge a joint
approach towards private equity - including on information sharing protocols. The Dutch
model (harmonisation of regulations around capital adequacy, solvency, disclosure standards
and portfolio valuations) offers a useful starting point.28 The last strand in the Dutch model is
particularly relevant for Kenya, in light of the number of financial sector regulators operating
technically independently. This relate to questions of valuation principles, financial
accounting, authorisation and approvals as well as numerical ceilings.29
These are important issues for regulatory dialogue, and it does appear that to varying
extents, a role for the law arises in aiding the creation of or improvements to a harmonious
regulatory framework for institutional investments into private equity. In this sense, the law
can become a fundamental tool in triggering and sustaining fundraising for private equity
investments within Kenya.
9.5 Issues on Capital Markets Development for Private Equity
The findings at chapter 5 demonstrated that preferred exit strategies in Kenya include
mainly trade sales and buybacks, but stock market exits would be more desirable.30 A well-
established theme in that chapter was the expression of difficulties around qualifying for a
27 Ch 5, 167
28 Ch 3, 74
29 id
30 Ch 5, 187
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stock market listing in the main investment segment of the Nairobi Stock Exchange. 31
Chapter 4 reviewed the listing requirements.32 It seems that to improve the investment exit
frameworks for private equity in Kenya, developing alternative options is a desirable pursuit.
Over-the-Counter (OTC) markets and small and medium-enterprise (SME) capital
markets trading platforms have been employed in a number of countries to promote avenues
for enterprise growth and investing.33 Taiwan, Israel and the USA, three of the reviewed
models within this study, offer the more successful examples, while Chile, Spain and Brazil
illustrate the less successful attempts in this regard.34 These experiences offer mixed findings
from a models transplant perspective.35 The key lesson, it would seem, is that a country’s
strong experience with public equity markets can support the successful launching of such
innovative fundraising techniques.36
It would appear that the law is a central tool in aiding the crafting of a formal OTC
market and an SME trading platform in Kenya. Viewed differently, organised markets
ultimately are a set of rules by which intermediaries play, and through which expectations are
set, and against which conduct is judged. These are ‘qualitative’ elements. Key issues from a
law and institutional standpoint relate to the general framework for disclosures and financial
accountability, enterprise stability (from a business soundness or solvency perspective) and
overall corporate governance standards and principles. While a code exists for corporate
governance among listed firms,37 the evidence adduced indicate three key elements –
(a) The level of compliance with financial reporting standards even among the listed
firms remains low (and it was shown that the IFRS do not mandatorily apply to
31 Ch 5, 187-188
32 Ch 4, 119, 121
33 Ch 4, 120, 122
34 Ch 3, 69 - 80
35 Ibid, 80
36 Ibid, 81
37 Capital Markets Authority, Corporate Governance Code, <http://www.cma.or.ke/Regulations/>
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unlisted companies, suggesting the reality of a broad swathe of the Kenyan business
sector implementing widely varied levels of corporate transparency);
(b) Regulatory capacity to discover and redress corporate governance crises and
violations among regulated market intermediaries remains challenged; and
(c) Investor protection remains a challenge – judging from the series of distressed
licensed market intermediaries, some of which have gone into liquidation, exposing
investors to substantial losses because of an investment compensation fund that is yet
under-capitalised.
The experience of failing licensees appears to have jolted the regulator into taking
formative remedial action, in the form of proposing a number of new regulations to
strengthen the regulatory oversight mandate – including the Capital Markets (Conduct of
Business)(Market Intermediaries) Regulations 2011, the Capital Markets (Securities) (Public
Offers, Listings and Disclosures) (Amendment) Regulations 2011, the Nairobi Stock
Exchange (Nominated Advisors) Rules 2011 – to, respectively, clarify more stringently the
qualifications and business conduct of licensees; create a framework for small and medium
size enterprises listing on the Nairobi Stock Exchange under the SME Exchange or SMEx;
and provide for the qualifications for listing, and the role of advisors in preparing SMEs for
listing.38
The foregoing three key objectives relating to deepening of the capital markets require
both legal and institutional instruments. The proposed regulations create a framework for the
occurrence of market practice, while institutional factors promote ethical conduct, and deliver
the public policy objective of investor protection.
38 Capital Markets Authority, Proposed Regulations, <http://www.cma.or.ke/draftregulations/>
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9.6 Issues on the Integrity of Financial Contracts
Proceeding from a financial contracting framework, the private equity process – anchored
onto different but closely-connected contractual agreements – would appear to depend on a
set of institutions for stability –
(a) Strong integrity of financial contracts (security of contracts)
(b) Strong respect for private property (strength of property rights)
(c) Strong tradition of truth-telling (corporate transparency and accountability, linked to
financial reporting standards)
(d) Faith in third-party dispute resolving institutions (judicial integrity).
North (1991) views institutions as sets of recurring values, practices, standards and
expectations, that acquire notoriety, constancy and predictability from repeated usage. 39 In
other words, and within the context of this study, institutions are systems that acquire a
reputational effect from regular usage, grounded in a sense of impartiality.
Fund managers in Kenya, it was documented at chapter 4, opined that financial
disclosures for instance are not entirely reliable in Kenya,40 and that private sector practices
that reduce corporate transparency and accountability effectively lower firm value as
investors practice what private equity terms ‘price protection’ – that is, the attitude of
conservatively pricing their investments because of the uncertainty of latent liabilities not
discoverable at the due diligence pre-investment stage.41
39 Douglas C. North, ‘Institutions,’ (Winter, 1991), 15(1) The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 97-112
40 Ch 4, 138
41 id
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The theory behind financial disclosure is much agitated in disclosure literature.42
Firstly, it is assumed firms hold private information. Secondly, it is supposed that where
firms elect to disclose, they disclose truthfully. Thirdly, it is thought that firms attach
importance to financial market valuation. However, any unverifiable statement in a financial
statement could be indicative of untruthful disclosure, although if disclosure is an important
entry deterrent (that is to say, suppresses the willingness of external parties to enter the firm
context), there exists a structural motivation in favour of truthful disclosure.43
The disclosure literature adopts the basic assumption that disclosed corporate
information is true, although it can be argued that the strength of the truth is higher in
environments where anti-fraud laws are strictly enforced.44 What this suggests is that ‘truth
telling’ may not necessarily be a motivator to disclosure by firms: that is, firms disclose only
so much information as is necessary to meet regulatory compliance thresholds, and no
more.45
It has been argued that disclosure is good for firms – variously that it reduces the cost
of equity capital, and fosters liquid and efficient capital markets.46 It is also argued that
disclosure reduces the cost of debt, enabling transparent companies to enjoy lower interest
42 Masako N Darrough, ‘Disclosure Policy and Competition: Cournot vs. Bertrand’ (1993) 68 (3) The
Accounting Review 534, 537
43 ibid
44 Anat R Admati and Paul Pfleiderer, ‘Forcing Firms to Talk’ (2000) 13(3) in The Review of Financial Studies
479, 481
45 The problem of ‘truth’: is financial reporting essentially about ’telling the truth’, and do firms ordinarily tell
the ‘truth’ about the financial standing of their business? Asked differently, is ‘truth’ integral to and essential in
financial reporting? Even more complicated is the question of ‘truth’ from whose perspective, and whether
‘truth’ as a process or ‘truth’ based on morality. An interesting line of inquiry.
46 Arthur Levitt, ‘Importance of High Disclosure Standards’ (Inter-American Development Bank, Washington
D.C., 29 September 1997) < http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1997/spch176.txt> accessed 25
October 2007.
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rates on loans.47 But if it is so good for companies, why don’t firms disclose fully and
truthfully, without coercion? In practice, “firms are forced to talk.”48
Mandated disclosure compels firms to disclose the types of information they would
rather keep hidden. This directly upsets the natural inclination of a reporting entity to engage
in ‘happy reporting’ – suppressing negative corporate results, disclosing only those aspects
perceived to communicate positive financial performance.49
It would appear thus that North’s construction of ‘institutions’ takes on an experiential
quality for Kenya: owing to a prolonged period when the private sector’s interactions with the
formal economy was limited because of the structural barriers identified in chapter 4, it can
be ventured that the doctrine of corporate transparency remains shallow out of its non-
repetitive application. It is then defensible to presuppose that as the Kenyan private sector
engages more in the formal economy, and as businesses transform, the doctrine will become
more and more entrenched.
Yet as the disclosure literature indicates, firms are forced to talk. That compulsion
proceeds from a legal instrument, and resides in that legal instrument. It is, in effect, the law.
The practice of corporate transparency and accountability, however, becomes
institutionalised in the practice of ‘financial reporting’, a term that in practice relates to the
disclosure of the totality of a corporation’s state of affairs.50
It would also appear that institutions are critical in the quest to improve the quality of the
private sector – among others, to address negative business practices such as corruption,
bureaucracy, inefficient regulatory practices, and widespread tax avoidance.
47 Partha Sengupta, ‘Corporate Disclosure Quality and The Cost of Debt’ (1998) 73(4) The Accounting Review
459, 549
48 Admati and Pfleiderer (n 44) 479-483.
49 Darrough (n 42) 534
50 Interview with PM6, Regulatory Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Nairobi, Kenya, January 2010
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In the context of financial contracting, the evidence supports a deduction that weak
institutions tend to motivate contracting choices that introduce disservice to the local
economy, e.g., taking disputes outside of the national jurisdiction reduces the opportunity for
nurturing a local pool of talented dispute negotiators in complex financial transactions. It also
removes from the local courts the opportunity to deepen judicial expertise around complex
financial contracts.51
From the framework of the main line of inquiry, this thesis argues that the law, together
with associated legal institutions, would be particularly useful to an emerging market like
Kenya in resolving the issues discovered in this study. An efficient regulatory framework, it
is easy to venture, would support the ‘external factors’ that drive macroeconomic activities
within a legal jurisdiction. In fact, if countries were a construct, they would be a ‘legal’
construct, for states are juridical beings, defined by sets of laws and institutions that set them
apart from other states. The implication of this latter proposition are substantial, and perhaps
merit dedicated academic inquiry within the narrow context of financial contracting.
9.7 Synthesising Findings
The preceding reflections bring us back to the question, ultimately, whether laws and
legal institutions are indeed relevant to the growth and expansion of private equity markets in
Kenya? The foregoing analyses support an affirmative answer. But the inquiry line required a
more nuanced evaluation: the secondary questions asked, in effect, which aspects, if the law
is necessary, would be the most important? The foregoing analyses have attempted a drawing
out of the main ingredients of the law and institutional paradigm for private equity growth in
a country. These elements commend themselves closely to a country’s individual
51 Ch 8, 315-318
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characteristics, especially the structure of its overall economy. The identified elements are
used to inform the model proposed below
First, however, it is noteworthy that the evidence in this thesis support the further and
bolder proposition that to more robustly expand Kenya’s private equity industry - specifically,
law and institutional instruments will be main tools in the hands of public policy makers.
Taking, therefore, the totality of the foregoing reflections and deductions, the
following model for growing Kenya’s private equity industry in the medium to long-term
emerges. The model is styled “a Growth Model for Private Equity in Kenya.” Its core
elements include the following:
(a) Efficiency and choice of investment vehicles (fund structures)
(b) Tax efficiency in private equity investments
(c) Promotion of local fundraising
(d) Improvements to investment exit frameworks through capital markets
development
(e) Strengthening the security of private property rights, including the strengthening
of judicial and arbitral institutions
(f) Strengthening corporate transparency (more efficient and widespread adoption of
international financial reporting standards
(g) Development and adoption of a national valuation strategy/standard for private
equity portfolio assessments
(h) Strengthening the quality of Kenya’s private sector.
These elements can be summarised in the following interdependent model:
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Fig.9.1: Note:
As the model illustrates, a multi-pronged approach to growing national markets for private
equity would be essential. Each core element in the model is underpinned by a vortex of
secondary strategies, and it is the submission in this work that pursuing one or two of the
recommended options (like current disjointed practice shows) would not yield efficient
outcomes, because of the inherent inter-dependence across all elements depicted therein.
Law Reform
Institutional
Strengthening
Private Sector
Development
Fund
Structures Capital
Market
Reform
Investment
Regulations
Financial Sector
Deepening
Corruption
Bureaucracy
Business Informality
Research & Devpt
Judicial
Reforms
Valuation
Standards
Financial
Reporting
Compliance -
Enforcement
PRIVATE
EQUITY
GROWTH
MODEL
FOR KENYA
Business
Regulation
347
9.8 FUTURE RESEARCH
As the pioneering study in this field in Kenya, this work has touched partially on the
law and economics agenda, the financial regulation agenda, and the theoretical underpinnings
to financial innovations and the law. These themes need more robust exposition and
exploration, both empirically and theoretically. What this work has achieved is to create a
baseline framework for future explorations of the multi-disciplinary nature of private equity.
Given Kenya’s economic development stage, it is particularly crucial that future work
look into the legal and institutional mechanics for the growth of a dedicated early stage
venture capital programme for Kenya, especially one rooted in research and development.
Financial innovation frequently mirrors enterprise innovation, which in turn mirrors a
country’s development ethic. Inquiry into these dynamics would expand the stock of local
knowledge on how private equity and national development mesh together.
The vexed question on law and finance as a theoretical explanation to the provision of
enterprise capital merits investigation within a developing country context such as Kenya.
While the legal origins doctrine of the law and finance theory has largely been discredited
around the world, the merits of the theoretical exposition of the link between finance,
corporate governance and property rights warrant closer investigation in emerging markets.
The value in theory is its ability to offer a prism for critical evaluation of knowledge, and an
empirical testing of the claims of the law and finance theory in developing country contexts
would be a valuable addition to knowledge.
Virtually everything known about private equity in the developed markets of North
America and Western Europe remain largely unknown for African private equity – and there
is justified merit in further work that tests and exposes assumptions about emerging markets
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private equity. Stemming from the intrinsic design of this work, an empirical approach to
both theoretical and non-theoretical inquiries is favoured for future work in this area.
This work has only considered one face of private equity – two other ‘faces’ remain
unexplored to complete the knowledge ‘baseline’ for Kenya’s private equity commercial
contracting. The experiences and the legal and institutional issues relating to private equity by
venture companies on the one hand, and institutional investors on the other, needs to be
undertaken.
There is a need to build a national baseline of empirical data on all aspects of the
private equity industry. Collaborative work between researchers and the private equity
industry in Kenya would yield valuable information that would form a critical first-line
database for more robust empirical studies on Kenyan private equity, but also for policy
makers seeking to evaluate public policy choices.
Finally, a persistent need has been identified throughout this work: the need for
capacity development in Kenya, and, by extension, any developing economy. A key question
that arises out of every empirical chapter in this thesis is what the role of government should
be, and to what extent does the government discharge such role? Since private equity is a
market process, it is reasonable to deduce that the role of codes of conduct would be central –
giving rise to the question what codes are relevant to private equity? How should they be
developed? Separately, do government agencies possess requisite supervisory skills and
resources? How well-geared are they to discharge that supervisory mandate? What is the
ideal balance for this purpose? On another level, what should the foundations of private
equity be (a trade-off between fundraising, supervision and legislation)? Furthermore, in
transplanting models, what should the ideal be: should developing countries model external
realities, or adapt home-grown solutions? These are pertinent, unexplored issues.
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Appendix A
PRIVATE EQUITY IN KENYA – AN ANALYSIS OF EMERGING LEGAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES – A Doctoral Thesis Questionnaire
Dear …..,
I am a doctoral research student at Warwick University, England, studying the
question how laws and institutions impact investments, financial contracting, and
earnings. My special study economies are Kenya and South Africa. An important
strand to my research is the state of the private equity industry in Kenya, especially
the efficiency of financial contracts, security of property rights, and returns the local
market supports. Your answers will not only illuminate the thesis, but will contribute
directly to the formulation of policy options to be commended to relevant policy
agencies of the government at the study’s conclusion. This research is being
conducted on the premise that efficient financial contracting is important to economic
development, especially in deepening market confidence in the eyes of foreign
investors, as well as engendering confidence in the financial markets by motivating
and expanding the sophistication of business financing options to entrepreneurs.
This is therefore to request and invite you to kindly take a few minutes to answer
the following questionnaire on the state of the private equity industry in Kenya.
The information you provide will be applied to a purely academic use, and will
not be used for any other purpose. Your confidentiality as and individual and as
an institution will be guaranteed, and all information will be desensitized before
use in my thesis. This is my word of honour, and in keeping with my University’s
research ethics.
As I will be in Kenya from 30th December 2009 until 12th January 2010, I shall
endeavour to collect the questionnaire in person from your offices.
Thank you for your kind cooperation.
Nathan R TUIMISING
PhD Research Student
Warwick University, United Kingdom.
E-Mail: ntuimising@yahoo.com
Mobile: +254.710.535.680
QUESTIONNAIRE COMPLETION INSTRUCTIONS
All questions are grouped around sub-headings. Kindly answer each question under each sub-heading
by cycling or striking through a given letter-choice. You are very welcome to pen down your thoughts
where you feel the choices offered do not speak to the reality as you know it. This questionnaire is
designed to take no more than 30 minutes of your time. Please accept my sincere gratitude to you for
accepting to participate in this important survey. The Survey Findings will be circulated to all
participants promptly upon collation and analysis. Thank you.
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QUESTIONNAIRE: PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING IN KENYA
GENERAL ECONOMIC CLIMATE
During the next 12 months, I expect the overall economic climate to –
(a) improve
(b) decline
(c) remain the same
FUNDING
Over the next 12 months, we plan to raise a new fund
(a) Yes
(b) No
Over the next 12 months, we expect raising new funds for investment to –
(a) remain the same
(b) be less difficult
(c) be more difficult
If we intended to raise funds within the next 12 months, we would raise capital from
the following source of third party funding –
(a) Governments and Development Finance Institutions
(b) Pensions and endowments
(c) Insurance
(d) Banks
(e) Private individuals
(f) Fund of funds
(g) Corporates
(h) Other
If we intended to raise funds within the next 12 months, we would raise capital from
the following geographical source:
(a) Kenya
(b) Europe
(c) Africa
(d) USA
(e) Other
I expect the time it will take to invest my current fund to be:
(a) Less than 2 years
(b) 2-4 years
(c) more than 4 years
Currently, I feel that the understanding and attitude of institutional investors [locally]
towards the PE/VC industry is –
(a) Improving
(b) Worsening
(c) The same
Tuimising NR, Warwick University
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INVESTMENTS
Over the next 12 months, I expect to focus on opportunities in the following sectors –
(a) Financial services
(b) Info tech
(c) Health care
(d) Telecoms
(e) Retail
(f) Media
(g) Manufacturing
(h) Entertainment
(i) Services
(j) Other
I am currently looking at the following types of deals –
(a) Start-up and Early stage
(b) Seed capital
(c) Expansion and development
(d) Replacement and buy-out
At the present time, competition for new investment opportunities is –
(a) Increasing
(b) Decreasing
(c) Not changing
Over the next 12 months, I expect entry multiples on transactions to –
(a) Increase
(b) Decrease
(c) Remain the same
Over the next 12 months, I expect the volume of transactions to –
(a) Increase
(b) Decrease
(c) Remain the same
Over the next 12 months, I expect the average deal size to –
(a) Increase
(b) Decrease
(c) Remain the same
In the next 12 months, I expect to be a net buyer or net seller of businesses –
(a) Net buyer
(b) Net seller
(c) Purchases = Sales
I expect the availability of debt financing for transactions to –
(a) Increase
(b) Decrease
(c) Remain the same
Tuimising NR, Warwick University
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EXITS
During the next 12 months, I expect exit valuations to –
(a) Increase
(b) Decrease
(c) Remain the same
During the next 12 months, I expect the volume of exits to –
(a) Increase
(b) Decrease
(c) Remain the same
During the next 12 months, we expect to exit investments by –
(a) Trade sale
(b) Sale to another PE firm
(c) Resale to management
(d) IPO
(e) Dividend payout
(f) Write down
I expect the average life-cycle (or hold-period) from initial investment to exit for
investments made in 2007-2008 to be –
(a) Less than 2 years
(b) 2-5 years
(c) more than 5 years
PERFORMANCE
Over the next 12 months, I expect the relative financial performance of our investee
companies to –
(a) Outperform expectations
(b) Perform in line with expectations
(c) Under perform expectations
12 months from today, I anticipate the combined valuation of all portfolio companies
in which we are invested today, relative to current value, to be –
(a) Higher
(b) Lower
(c) Remain the same
OTHER
During the next 12 months, we expect to spend the majority of our time focused on –
(a) Raising new funds
(b) New investments
(c) Portfolio management
(d) Disinvestments
(e) Refinancing
(f) Other
Tuimising NR, Warwick University
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INVESTORS
My current medium-term view is that PE/VC funds will provide returns that will –
(a) Outperform the appropriate NSE index
(b) Under-perform the appropriate NSE index
(c) Perform in line with the appropriate NSE index
My current medium-term view is that PE/VC funds will provide –
(a) Superior risk-adjusted returns
(b) Adequate risk-adjusted returns
(c) Inferior risk-adjusted returns
During the next 12 months, we expect our allocation (% of total funds) to PE/VC
funds to –
(a) Increase
(b) Decrease
(c) Remain the same
Our current allocation to PE/VC funds are –
(a) 0 - 2.5%
(b) 2.5% - 5.0%
(c) Above 5%
I expect the following to be constraining factors during the next 12 months for
investing in PE/VC funds –
(a) Lack of appropriate risk-adjusted returns
(b) Lack of liquidity
(c) Asset class not well understood
(d) PE/VC perceived as “exotic” products
(e) Other
I expect the sources of third party funds to be raised in 2010 to be –
(a) PE fund of funds
(b) Insurance companies
(c) Pension funds and endowment funds
(d) Banks
(e) Government, aid agencies and DFIs
(f) Private individuals
(g) Corporates
AGENCY ISSUES
Which agency problems do you face most in your investments in this market?
(a) Moral hazard
(b) Bilateral moral hazard
(c) Adverse selection
(d) Free riding
(e) Hold up
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(f) Trilateral bargaining
(g) Window dressing
(h) Underinvestment
(i) Asset stripping
(j) Risk shifting
How are these ordinarily addressed/mitigated in the financing contract?
SECURITIES
Which of the following securities options do you most frequently employ in securing
your cash-flow rights? (tick all that apply)
(a) Common equity only
(b) Preferred equity only
(c) Convertible preferred equity
(d) Preferred equity and warrants
(e) Convertible debt only
(f) Straight debt and warrants
(g) Straight debt only
(h) Warrants only
(i) Common equity and straight debt
(j) Common equity and preferred equity and debt (convertible or straight)
(k) Preferred equity and debt
(l) Preferred equity and common equity
(m)Common equity and warrants
(n) Other combinations
_____________________________________________(please specify)
Would you say your security design is mostly informed by –
(a) The nature of the regulatory environment
(b) A flexible contract environment
(c) An inflexible contract environment
(d) A desire to control for exit
(e) Tax advantage
(f) A poor exit environment
Would you say that your present contracting flexibility
(a) Allows for returns maximisation
(b) Negatively impacts returns
(c) Neither improves nor diminishes returns
EXIT ISSUES
Out of your _____ (total) investments up to July 2009, how many have you exited?
(a) None
(b) All
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(c) Other ______________(please indicate number exited)
From the total investments exited, how many were exited via –
(a) Initial Public Offering _____________
(b) Acquisitions __________
(c) Secondary sales _________
(d) trade sales ___________
(e) Buybacks ___________
(f) Write-offs ____________
Do you control for exits in your investments by contract?
(a) Yes
(b) No
If yes, which of the following contractual provisions do you deploy for that purpose?
(a) Registration rights
(b) Super-majority clauses
(c) Demand rights
(d) Drag-along rights
(e) Warrants
(f) All of the above
(g) Other ________________________________________(please specify)
Would you say the prospect of exiting your investments is usually
(a) Difficult
(b) Uncertain
(c) Reasonably assured
(d) Always available
How would you rate the efficiency of your exit strategy?
(1) Highly profitable and very efficient
(2) Profitable/Efficient
(3) Average
(4) Unprofitable/Inefficient
(5) Mostly Disastrous
INVESTMENT HOLD PERIOD
On average, for the investments you made between 2002 and 2007, what is your
investment hold period?
(a) 0-3 years
(b) 3-5 years
(c) 5-7 years
(d) Over 7 years
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What would you say are the key explanatory variables/factors that determine/control
the investment hold periods? (tick all that apply)
(a) A difficult/poor exit environment
(b) Slow firm-value certification process
(c) Slow turn-around time in value-addition
(d) Steep agency problems stemming from poor corporate governance
(e) Corruption
(f) High price protection
(g) Investment syndication
(h) Few buyers and sellers
Would you say a longer holding period (over 5 years) would:
(a) Lower returns at exit (as a function of increased transaction costs)?
(b) Facilitate complete exit (as opposed to partial exit)?
(c) Motivate lower price protection (as a function of firm-value certification)?
Which legal and institutional reforms in your view would increase efficiency in
investment hold periods and promote more efficient exit strategies?
(a) Enhanced disclosure standards
(b) Improved corporate governance frameworks
(c) Reduced corruption
Would higher disclosure standards result in higher private equity valuations?
(a) Yes
(b) No
How? (tick all that apply)
(a) By lowering the risk-adjusted return on capital
(b) By lowering transaction costs (excluding corruption-related costs)
(c) By lowering agency costs
(d) By lowering price protection (as a result of higher transparency)
COUNTRY RISK, SYNDICATION AND CO-INVESTMENTS
In structuring your investments in this market, what is the typical country risk
premium that applies?
(a) 0-5%
(b) 5-8%
(c) 8-11%
(d) 11-15%
(e) Over 15%
How do you estimate the risk-adjusted hurdle rates for local investments (accounting
for political risk, difficulties in converting cost of capital across currencies,
difficulties of adjusting foreign proxy firm risk measures for financing packages in
Tuimising NR, Warwick University
Research Questionnaire, December 2009 9
local currency, and difficulties in adjusting for financial and operational hedging
policies)?
What are the preeminent determinants of your country risk profiling in this market?
(tick all that apply)
(a) Contracting risk
(b) Agency costs
(c) Corruption
(d) Regulatory costs
(e) Exit risk
(f) Poor returns
(g) Macroeconomic and political instability
Do you syndicate your investments?
(a) Some
(b) All
(c) None
If you do, what are some of the key factors informing your syndication decisions in
this market?
(a) Risk spreading/limiting fund exposure
(b) Deal size
(c) Country risk
(d) Cross-border investments/multi-jurisdictional reach
(e) Fund focus
Is corruption an important factor in your investment decisions for this market?
(a) Yes
(b) No
In your view, an auditor’s report in Kenya
(a) Offers authoritative and exhaustive firm-level disclosure (i) Yes (ii) No
(b) Conforms with the true standing of firm operations (i) Yes (ii) No
(c) Is ordinarily not manipulated (i) Yes (ii) No
(d) Has a strong influence on the relationship between a corporation and its
shareholders (i) Yes (ii) No
(e) Is open to manipulation and ordinarily does not provide complete disclosure in
accordance with the demands of international financial reporting standards
(IFRS) (i) Yes (ii) No
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RETURNS
In the case of a targeted absolute return, which absolute return is your institution
seeking to generate from private equity investments in Kenya?
Average ________
Median ________
Minimum ________
Maximum ________
In the case of a targeted relative rate of return, what level of over-return (in basis
points) is your institution expecting from private equity in comparison to public
equity investments in Kenya?
Average _________
Median _________
Minimum _________
Maximum _________
What discount rates do you (investors and non-resident funds) use to evaluate
investment opportunities in Kenya?
What have been your overall portfolio returns on retired funds?
(a) 0-8%
(b) 8-12%
(c) 12-16%
(d) 16-20%
(e) 20-24%
(f) 24-30%
(g) 30-50%
(h) Over 50%
What has been your Average IRR on both realized and unrealized investments?
(a) 0-8%
(b) 8-12%
(c) 12-16%
(d) 16-20%
(e) 20-24%
(f) 24-30%
(g) 30-50%
(h) Over 50%
What has been your Median IRR on unrealized investments?
(a) 0-8%
(b) 8-12%
(c) 12-16%
(d) 16-20%
(e) 20-24%
(f) 24-30%
(g) 30-50%
(h) Over 50%
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In this market, what combinations of factors best explain your returns performance?
(a) Number of deals
(b) Deal size
(c) Contracting in/efficiency (cross as it applies)
(d) Investment hold periods
(e) Market conditions (please specify)
(f) Exit in/efficiency (cross as relevant)
(g) Legal standards: poor/good (cross as relevant)
(h) Other _______________________________________________(please
specify)
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
In the enforcement of your property rights and financial contracts, would you make
judicial enforcement (via local courts) your number one option?
(a) Yes
(b) No
If you answered ‘no’ to the preceding question, it was because you feel –
(select all that apply to you)
(a) That the courts are corrupt and no fair or just outcome is ever guaranteed;
(b) The courts are too slow and there would be harmful delay in settling rights and
claims;
(c) There are very few competent lawyers locally capable in complex financial
contracts;
(d) The courts are not competent to handle complex financial contracts and
disputes;
(e) The laws and procedures are cumbersome, opaque, unfamiliar and
complicated.
(f) Other __________________________________________________(please
specify)
Where you cannot accept court-based dispute adjudication, would you accede to
locally-based alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as local arbitration,
under local arbitration rules and procedures?
(a) Yes
(b) No
If you answered ‘no’ to the arbitration question, it was because you feel –
(a) The local law on arbitration is not adequately sophisticated to meet the
complex needs of a private equity financing contract;
(b) The local law on arbitration has not yet been tested sufficiently for consistency
in the application of legal principles and international standards of procedural
conduct;
(c) There is not yet an established rich tradition of qualified and competent local
arbitrators that inspire investor confidence in local mechanisms;
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(d) Fund limitations exclude recourse to local dispute resolution mechanisms;
(e) Local arbitral rules and procedures are not as familiar as those of more
familiar ‘developed’ overseas jurisdictions.
Tuimising NR, Warwick University
July 2009
APPENDIX B
PRIVATE EQUITY IN KENYA – AN ANALYSIS OF EMERGING LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES – A Doctoral Thesis
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
The Earnings Question
1. There is thinking that transaction structures in many emerging markets evince investment
syndication as a common practice, and that this partly explains why returns in such markets lag
those of developed markets where syndication is more uncommon. Is it true that syndicating
eats away at earnings? If so, in what specific ways for such investments in Kenya?
2. The investment hold period affords venture capitalists time to add value to an invested firm, yet
there is a school of thought that longer hold periods negatively impact earnings – either because
of increased transaction costs arising from managing the investment for longer, or because the
market perceives assets held for long to be inferior of value, hence the longer certification
process. Is any of these true? And does it matter to the bottom-line how long an investment is
kept?
3. In what specific ways do higher disclosure standards translate to higher equity valuations?
4. In what ways is corruption an important issue in local private equity investments?
5. How do you estimate the risk-adjusted hurdle rate for local investments? [There is a school of
thought that owing to the regulatory costs of operating as a venture capital firm in Kenya, the
target return that would compensate for the regulatory costs has to be 25% minimum. Is this the
case? Is it sustainable in this market?]
6. [Management in Kenya is paid management fees, but must pay VAT thereon. To secure full
value on the management fee entitlement, then, fund managers are paid the management fee
plus VAT, drawn from portfolio earnings. The implication is that the VAT indemnification
from portfolio earnings eats away at the bottom-line. Industry logic is that the private equity
business is not a vat-able service. The question then becomes why VAT is payable on
management fees? Some secondary questions become whether scrapping VAT would be a
significant factor for locating businesses within Kenya, and whether opening up or reducing the
excluded sectors would make the local market more attractive to investments.]
7. There is research evidence that the choice of vehicle for exiting investments frequently
determines how much the investors earn out of an investment – quite apart from the influence of
the hold period, or syndication issues where the investment was syndicated. Is this true in your
experience?
8. How do you adjust for inflation in private equity investments – which are not fixed-income
contracts? [This is based on the premise that high inflation erodes the outstanding nominal
value of contracts to the investor.]
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APPENDIX C
PRIVATE EQUITY IN KENYA – AN ANALYSIS OF EMERGING LEGAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES – A Doctoral Thesis Interview Schedule
FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS IN KENYA
Dear …..,
I am a doctoral research student at Warwick University, England, studying the
question how laws and institutions impact investments, financial contracting, and
earnings. My special study economies are Kenya and South Africa. An important
strand to my research is the state of financial reporting and disclosure standards in
Kenya. The research is contextualised in the wider framework of the efficiency of
financial contracting in African Emerging Markets. Your answers will not only
illuminate the thesis, but will contribute directly to the formulation of policy options
to be commended to relevant policy agencies of the government at the study’s
conclusion. This research is being conducted on the premise that efficient financial
contracting is important to economic development, especially in deepening market
confidence in the eyes of foreign investors, as well as engendering confidence in the
financial markets by motivating and expanding the sophistication of business
financing options to entrepreneurs.
This is therefore to request a very brief interview to consider 10 specific
questions surrounding these issues, as set out below. I shall endeavour to wrap
up the interview within 35 minutes.
I will be in Kenya from 30th December 2009 until 12th January 2010. I humbly request
that you grant me an interview at any time during this period. A confirmation e-mail
can be sent to my address below. I can also be reached on the mobile number detailed
below.
Thank you for your kind cooperation.
Nathan R TUIMISING
PhD Research Student
Warwick University, United Kingdom.
E-Mail: ntuimising@yahoo.com
Mobile: +254.710.535.680
TUIMISING NR, WARWICK UNIVERSITY
December 2009
The Questions:
1. While taking cognizance of the fact that Kenya adopted international
accounting standards nearly 2 decades ago, to what extent are international
financial reporting standards (IFRS) effectively applied in Kenya (both in the
public and private sectors)?
2. Both the Companies Act and the Accountants Act place a duty on companies
to prepare accounts, but neither legislation specifically requires the application
of IFRS to accounts preparations. Who under Kenyan law cracks the whip on
IFRS, and on what regulatory basis?
3. Recently, publicly listed firms were compelled by the CMA to comply with
the IFRS on financial disclosures, and most firms that attempted compliance
were said to have fallen short of the detailed requirements under IFRS
disclosure parameters. What are the regulatory sanctions for non-compliance
with disclosure standards?
4. To the extent that the Companies Act, the Capital Markets Act and the
Accountants Act do not directly legislate on the IFRS standard for accounts
preparation, is it possible that Kenyan businesses are engaging in regulatory
arbitrage to beat compliance?
5. A recurrent theme is that Kenya has far less qualified accountants to fully
comply with the requirements of IFRS, with the result that most companies
engage the services of accounting technicians with limited book keeping
skills. Is it fair to observe, therefore, that compliance with financial reporting
standards is below par in Kenya because preparers of financial statements lack
the skills requisite for the job?
6. How many qualified accountants are in Kenya as of December 2009? What is
the ideal number of qualified accountants needed for today’s Kenyan
economy?
7. How many qualified accounting technicians are there in Kenya as of
December 2009? Does the corporate sector in Kenya have access to
adequately trained accountants?
8. Is it correct to deduce that continued banking sector crises, including the
recent spate of stockbroker and investment bank failures are the result of
weaknesses in financial reporting and poor compliance with disclosure
standards?
9. Does this mean that annual reports are open to manipulation by corporations?
10. What is the integrity of an auditor’s report – as an auxiliary disclosure
institution?
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Annex D
PRIVATE EQUITY IN KENYA – AN ANALYSIS OF EMERGING LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
– A Doctoral Thesis
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
The Judicial Question
1. If you were an investor in Kenya, why would you not use Kenyan courts to resolve your
commercial disputes?
2. Since the early 1960s, we have seen a string of judicial commissions appointed to address the
broad question of judicial capacity – and corruption, under-resourcing and related constraints
have been repeatedly identified and recommendations for their resolution made: why in your
view is there a persistently low threshold of institutional reform within the Judiciary?
3. Is the legal profession generally speaking partly responsible for the condition of standards
within the judiciary? In the alternative, what role ought the legal fraternity play in changing the
state of play?
4. In what ways is judicial corruption an important issue in local financial contracting?
5. For Judiciary: would you concur with the widespread belief that the Kenyan Judiciary is riddled
with corruption? A former judge is quoted saying “The corridors of the high court have become
a market place where justice is on sale to the highest bidder” – what are your views?
6. Commercial arbitration is not yet a widespread form of legal practice in Kenya – why do not
more lawyers adopt it?
